

NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES
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Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia

Islam, Gender and Civil Society

Edited by
Greg Barton · Matteo Vergani · Yenny Wahid

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Greg Barton · Matteo Vergani · Yenny Wahid
Editors

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Editors
Greg Barton
Alfred Deakin Institute
Deakin University
Burwood, VIC, Australia

Yenny Wahid
The Wahid Foundation
Jakarta, Indonesia

Matteo Vergani
Deakin University
Burwood, VIC, Australia

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Dedicated to Siew Mee, Francesca, and Faris

Preface

This book arises out the work of the Southeast Asian Network of Civil Society Organisations working together against violent extremism (SEAN-CSO) since its establishment in 2016, with a particular focus on Indonesia. It is intended to be of interest to civil society activists, security practitioners, communities, policy makers and researchers, and to facilitate understanding preventing and countering violent extremism in a larger frame. It aims to both provide an overview whilst at the same time shining a light on some key P/CVE programs and initiatives in Indonesia to assist readers in developing a more complete understanding of the issues.

The book represents a collaboration, born out of partnership in the field, that brings together academic researchers and civil society activists from Indonesia and Australia. In doing this, whilst striving for clarity and plain language, the distinctive voices of the contributors have not been homogenised but have rather been allowed to reflect their unique characteristics and distinctive backgrounds. In the English-speaking world, far too little is known about Indonesian society in general, and Indonesian Islam and civil society in particular. This is, in large measure, because of the barrier of language. This book represents a small, but hopefully significant, contribution to opening a window to Indonesia. The focus of this book is on the challenging issues entailed with violent and hateful extremism. But the initiatives it portrays and the people it describes, and whose voices it channels, are filled with the hope of transforming the

world to make it better, starting with the people and communities that are most in need of help.

We would like to acknowledge the contribution of the Indonesian writers, and of the CSOs that they represent, and thank them for their perseverance and patience in what has been a long and challenging project. Books like this are uncommon largely because they are so challenging to put together but the insights that result are valuable just as the issues discussed are important.

We would like to particularly thank Sam Kruber and Siew Mee Barton for their assistance in getting this manuscript into shape.

We would also like to acknowledge the support and assistance of colleagues and friends in the Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. For their sake, we won't name them one by one but they know who they are and we thank them. We would also like to acknowledge the practical support of those two departments, and of the Australian government, in supporting the work of SEAN-CSO. And we thank also those many Indonesian officials and practitioners who have supported this work.

Burwood, Australia — Greg Barton
Burwood, Australia — Matteo Vergani
Jakarta, Indonesia — Yenny Wahid

About This Book/Conference

This book of fifteen chapters is structured in four parts. Care has been taken to incorporate a comprehensive and up-to-date set of references and online resources in key chapters.

Part I consists of three chapters and is concerned with understanding the issues involved with preventing and countering violent extremism in general, and in Indonesia in particular. Chapter 1 introduces the central concepts of violent extremism, radicalisation and P/CVE. Chapter 2 examines what we know about radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremism in Indonesia over the past 70 years. The second half of this chapter examines the sociology and psychology of radicalisation in Indonesia by unpacking survey research carried out by LSI (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) for the Wahid Foundation. Chapter 3 looks at the issues involved with deradicalisation and at the experience of rehabilitation and disengagement P/CVE programs in Indonesia.

Part II and Part III contain nine chapters drawing on case study material from P/CVE programs in Indonesia. Chapter 4 looks at the 'Mothers for Change Program'; Chapter 5 focuses on the Wahid Foundation's Peace Village Program; Chapter 6 examines P/CVE programs focussing on youth. And Chapter 7 takes a close look at the effectiveness of programs working with the wives of convicted terrorists. The five chapters in Part III also draw on some Indonesian case study material but are structured around examining key issues. Chapter 8 unpacks some of the key issues involved with gender, examining the changing

roles of women and issues connected with toxic masculinity. Chapter 9 looks at the experiences of using former extremists in tertiary intervention programs. Chapter 10 examines the contribution of the mass-based organisations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Chapter 11 reviews P/CVE programs in the online domain, and Chapter 12 introduces the concept of social enterprise and its application to civil society P/CVE programs.

Part IV focussing on the practical challenges to developing capacity in critical areas. Chapter 13 reflects on the findings of three years of capacity gap surveys with the SEAN-CSO network. Chapter 14 draws upon these insights, and reviews current developments, to set out the way forward. Finally, Chapter 15 stands alone as an Evaluation Toolkit, designed to augment existing P/CVE evaluation guides, to introduce the principles and critical literature of evaluation and then to bring this to bear on a series of practical workbook exercises.

Contents

Part I Understanding Violent and Hateful Extremism

1 Introduction 3
Greg Barton, Matteo Vergani, and Yenny Wahid

2 Understanding Violent Extremism in Indonesia 29
Matteo Vergani, Greg Barton, and Yenny Wahid

3 Disengagement, Deradicalisation, and Rehabilitation 63
Greg Barton and Matteo Vergani

Part II Case Studies in Countering Extremism

4 An Initiative of Women in Preventing and Countering Violence Extremism: The Mothers for Change Program 85
Dewirini Anggraeni

5 Peace Villages 101
Visna Vulovik

6 International and Local Actor Collaborations to Prevent Violent Extremism Among Youth in Indonesia: Initiatives and Effectiveness 125
Suhadi and Utami Sandyarani

7 An Empowerment Program for Spouses of Convicted Terrorists in Indonesia 145
M. Faisal Magrie, Idhamsyah Eka Putra, Any Rufaedah, and Vici Sofianna Putera

Part III Key Issues

8 Gendering CVE in Indonesia 177
Hana Hanifah

9 Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: The Role of Former Terrorists and Civil Society Organisations 195
Muhammad Wildan

10 The Dynamics of Islamic Mass Organisations in Preventing Violent Extremism 215
Wachid Ridwan

11 Online P/CVE Social Media Efforts 233
Ruici Tio and Samantha Kruber

12 An Introduction to Social Enterprise for Practitioners in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism 255
Natalie Ralph

Part IV Developing Capacity

13 Capacity Gap Analysis of Civil Society Organisations Working Against Violent Extremism in Indonesia and South East Asia 279
Dan Goodhardt, Matteo Vergani, Greg Barton, and Samantha Kruber

14 Conclusion: The Way Forward 295
Samantha Kruber, Yenny Wahid, Matteo Vergani, and Greg Barton

15 Appendix: How to Design Impact Evaluations of CVE Programs—A Practical Guide for Indonesian Civil Society Organisations 309
Matteo Vergani, Greg Barton, and Muhammad Iqbal

Notes on Contributors

Dewirini Anggraeni is the founder of the Society Against Radicalism and Violence Extremism (SeRVE Indonesia) and Program Director of Center for Pesantren and Democracy Studies (CePDeS). She recently completed a Master of International Relations at Deakin University, via an *Australia Awards* scholarship. Her research focuses on *Women's Pathways* into radicalisation in Indonesia. Her dedication to preventing and countering violent extremism in Indonesia over the past 10 years brought her to work with *Women without Borders*, in Vienna, Austria, coordinating a mother school project in Indonesia.

Greg Barton is Research Professor in Global Islamic Politics in the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, where, since August 2015, he has led research on Islam and civil society, democratisation and countering violent extremism. Over the past 33 years, he has undertaken extensive research on Indonesia politics and society, especially of the role of Islam as both a constructive and a disruptive force. He has been active in inter-faith dialogue initiatives and has a deep commitment to building understanding of Islam and Muslim society. The central axis of his research interests is the way in which religious thought, individual believers and religious communities respond to modernity and to the modern nation state. He also has a strong general interest in international relations and comparative international politics.

Idhamsyah Eka Putra is a Lecturer in Psychology in the Graduate Program at University of Persada, Indonesia, Director of Division for Applied Social Psychology Research, and Associate Editor in Journal of Social and Political Psychology. He received his doctoral degree in social psychology from Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria. His study focuses on prejudice, (Islamic) terrorism, stigmatisation, social exclusions, conflict and reconciliation.

Dan Goodhardt is a Senior Analyst with Victoria Police. Prior to this appointment, he worked for three years Researcher & Project Officer at Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), Deakin University, assisting with SEAN-CSO. He project managed international workshops, in Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Yogyakarta, Sydney and Melbourne. He also worked on a range of research projects, focusing on hate incidents in Australia, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) trends in South East Asia and policing in related fields. He is a Ph.D. candidate at Deakin University.

Hana Hanifah is a Researcher in the ASEAN Studies Program at the Habibie Centre. She graduated with M.Sc. in International Political Economy from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She was a Project Officer at Ruangguru before joining the Habibie Centre as a Researcher in 2016.

Muhammad Iqbal is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Sustainable Industries and Liveable Cities (ISILC), Victoria University, Melbourne. He is also a Chief Investigator in the Applied Security Science Partnership (ASSP), which brings together policing and security practitioners with academics to collaboratively build robust evidence on behavioural indicators of violent extremism.

Samantha Kruber After completing her Ph.D. on foreign terrorist fighters at Monash University in 2018, Sam joined the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, assisting with SEAN-CSO before taking up a position as Policy & Research Officer at Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency.

M. Faisal Magrie is Associate Senior Consultant and a Program Coordinator in the Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR). He started his research on psychology and terrorism under the supervision of pioneering researcher Professor Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono.

Vici Sofianna Putera is a Lecturer in the Department of Psychology at Bandung Islamic University. He is also an Associate Researcher at Division for Applied Social Psychology Researcher (DASPR). He received a masters in Applied Psychology from the University of Indonesia. His research focuses on intergroups relations, conflict and reconciliation, Islamic terrorism and political psychology.

Natalie Ralph joined Alfred Deakin Institute (ADI) in 2016, as part of her role as Associate Research Fellow for the ARC Centre of Excellence in Electromaterials Science (ACES) where she is part of the ethics and energy team. In 2012 she was awarded a PhD from Deakin University for her thesis on mining and oil companies in conflict-prone areas and corporate peacebuilding. Her research explored the new area of identifying business roles in preventing conflict and supporting peacebuilding, with particular focus on energy and mining corporations. She has a Masters of International Diplomacy focused on Asia and a B.A. (Hons) Degree in European Studies, majoring in International Relations.

Wachid Ridwan is a Lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University in Jakarta. He is Secretary of the Institute for International Collaboration at the Central Leadership of Muhammadiyah. Prior to that he was a lecturer at Padjadjaran University in Bandung where he obtained his Ph.D. for his dissertation on 'Counter-terrorism in Indonesia (2002–2014): Rational Choice and System Dynamics Perspective'. In 2019, he continued his post-doctoral research at Deakin University.

Any Rufaedah is a Senior Researcher in the Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR) and a Lecturer at Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama. She received her master's degree in Social Psychology from the University of Indonesia. Her research concerns are religious radicalism, violent extremism, conflict, women and cross culture.

Utami Sandyarani received her bachelor degree in International Relations from Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, and completed a short master course on Peace Research at University of Oslo, Norway, organised by PRIO. She has more than five years of experience working with several local and international organisations in designing, monitoring and evaluating various countering violent extremism and peacebuilding initiatives. Utami has co-written and contributed to numerous research, baseline and evaluation reports on the issues of intolerance, radicalism and violent extremism in Indonesia. She currently

works as Monitoring and Reporting Officer for Countering Violent Extremism project at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Suhadi is a Lecturer at Graduate School, State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta, Indonesiam and at the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), Graduate School, Gadjah Mada University. His Ph.D. thesis at Radboud University Nijmegen in The Netherlands was published in Germany by Lit-Verlag (2014) under the title *I Come from a Pancasila Family*: *A Discursive Study on Muslim-Christian Identity Transformation in Indonesian Post-reformasi Era*. Suhadi previously worked as a research consultant at Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Indonesia in 2014/2015 and as co-leader of CONVEY research project on behalf of Center for Islam, Democracy and Peace Studies (PusPIDeP) Yogyakarta. He is currently a Research Associate at the Department of Social Sciences, University of Western Australia (UWA), Perth.

Ruici Tio is a Policy Programs Manager at Facebook. He has extensive experience working on online P/CVE program whilst. Working for four years at Love Frankie, based in Bangkok. His work as a Senior Strategic Communications Advisor and Head of Innovation involved extensive engagement with civil society organisations working across Southeast Asia.

Matteo Vergani is a Researcher and Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University, Australia. He has two PhDs in the social and political sciences, one in political psychology from Monash University (2016) and the other in political sociology from the Catholic University of Milan (2011). His primary research interests are political violence, its causes, its impact on society and the study of what could prevent it. Matteo has teaching experience in the areas of research methodology (quantitative and qualitative), political sociology, political psychology, Australian politics and international relations.

Visna Vulovik has over 10 years' experience in program development management of Preventing Violent Extremism and Conflict Transformation issues. She is a program Performance Specialist in Wahid Foundation. Since 2013, she has been active in the development of several key programs, including the Peace Village program, and has also contributed to developing the Preventing Violent Extremism Program five-year plan

at the request of the Government of Indonesia, through the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenkopolhukam).

Yenny Wahid is the second daughter of former president of Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid and established the Wahid Foundation to carry on his work in building tolerance and understanding. She worked as a journalist for the Australian newspapers, *The Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Age*. A graduate from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government where she obtained a master's degree in Public Administration, Yenny was appointed as a member of the special staff for political communication working in the office of President Yudhoyono in 2006, before leaving to concentrate on her work with grass-roots communities and direct the Wahid Foundation.

Muhammad Wildan is a Lecturer at the State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. After his undergraduate studies at UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta in 1995, he obtained his masters degree from Leiden University in the Netherlands in 1999 and then completed his Ph.D. at the National University of Malaysia (UKM) in 2009. Amidst completing his Ph.D., he was a Research Fellow at International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), The Netherland (2007), and at the Asian Research Institute (ARI) at the National University of Singapore (2007).

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Differences between Indonesians who are more and less practicing of Islam (all differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$) 42
Fig. 2.2 Differences between Indonesians who belong and do not belong to Islamic mass organisations (all differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$) 43
Fig. 2.3 Differences between Indonesians who are more and less pessimistic (all differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$) 45
Fig. 2.4 The most disliked groups in Indonesia 47
Fig. 2.5 Inter-group contact and support for violent extremism (all differences are statistically significant at $p< 0.05$) 50
Fig. 2.6 Toxic masculinity and support for violent extremism (the difference is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$) 52
Fig. 2.7 Digital literacy, support for violent extremism (the difference is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$) 53
Fig. 4.1 Mothers for change program at Palu, Central Sulawesi 90
Fig. 4.2 Participants learning about a good listener in role play session 91
Fig. 4.3 Mothers learning about who am i? in leadership session 93
Fig. 4.4 The world connecting us. An interactive session aimed to learn about inclusiveness 94
Fig. 4.5 Women circle in Mothers for Change in Palu, Central Sulawesi 96
Fig. 5.1 Nine indicators of the Peace Village/District 109

Fig. 5.2 President Republic Indonesia, Mr. Joko Widodo visited women business booth on International Day of Peace 2017, Sumenep Madura–East Java 112
Fig. 5.3 Peace Village Infografis 2017–2018 115
Fig. 7.1 Result of the level of integrative complexity in meeting 1, Monitoring 1 and Monitoring 2 160
Fig. 7.2 Psychological sessions: group counselling 166
Fig. 7.3 Family recreation 167
Fig. 7.4 Hijab dancing 168
Fig. 7.5 Citizenship workshop 169
Fig. 7.6 Entrepreneurship workshop 169
Fig. 10.1 Model pan-Islamism, is a combination of Islamist ideology and jihadism 224
Fig. 11.1 Analysis of P/CVE communications approaches (*Credit* M&C Saatchi World Services, Love Frankie) 241
Fig. 13.1 Number of CSOs connections with other stakeholders by country 281
Fig. 13.2 Types of P/CVE initiatives developed by the CSOs surveyed ($N = 60$) 283
Fig. 13.3 Number and percentages of CSOs conducting evaluations of their P/CVE programs by country 285
Fig. 13.4 Preferred terms related to violent extremism prevention across the four countries ($N = 74$) 286
Fig. 13.5 CSOs receiving funds from their governments ($N = 74$) 286
Fig. 13.6 CSOs collaborating with their governments ($N = 74$) 288

List of Tables

Table 2.1	Measures of orthodox Islamic religious practice, negative views of non-Muslims and support for violent extremism	40
Table 2.2	Measure of societal pessimism	44
Table 2.3	Measure of out-group dislike	47
Table 2.4	Measure of intergroup contact	49
Table 2.5	Measure of gender stereotypes	52
Table 2.6	Measure of digital literacy and critical thinking	54
Table 7.1	The level of integrative complexity	158
Table 7.2	Statement extracts for integrative complexity	161

PART I

Understanding Violent and Hateful Extremism

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Greg Barton, Matteo Vergani, and Yenny Wahid

Introduction

Countering terrorism has traditionally been the domain of security agencies and governments. Over the last decade the field has opened to incorporate civil society organisations working to prevent and counter radicalisation into violent extremism. Government stakeholders around the world increasingly recognise the importance of community engagement in dealing with the resilient threat of terrorism, and of empowering communities in order to partner in addressing the social dynamics that facilitate the development of violent extremist movements (Gavrieliedes,

G. Barton (✉) · M. Vergani
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia
e-mail: greg.barton@deakin.edu.au

M. Vergani
e-mail: matteo.vergani@deakin.edu.au

Y. Wahid
The Wahid Foundation, DKI Jakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: zannuba@wahidinstitute.org

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2020; Glazzard et al., 2017; Green et al., 2016; Hlatky, 2020; Inman, 2018; Lamb et al., 2015, Mirahamadi, 2012; Ryan & U.S. Naval War College, 2018; Schmid, 2011).

Community empowerment can take different forms in different contexts (Aslam & Gunaratna, 2019; Thomas et al., 2017; Williams et al. 2016a, 2016b). In post-conflict zones, it can be achieved in the form of economic development: research in conflict zones such as Iraq, for example, has demonstrated that improving service provision reduced insurgent violence, particularly when the provision was delivered to precisely where it was most needed through smaller community-based projects (Berman et al., 2011; Moyar, 2015). Counter-intuitively, however, outside of extraordinary circumstances, such as those found in post-conflict societies, there is little evidence of a clear and direct association between economic indicators and violence (Campana & Lapointe, 2012).

There is no singular solution to addressing violent extremism at the community level, nevertheless a raft of approaches has been shown to limit the capacity of extremist movements to influence, recruit and build support (Aslam & Gunaratna, 2019; Cherney et al., 2018; Jayakumar, 2019). This includes programs to reduce levels of alienation experienced by vulnerable populations through dialogue and exchange, including bringing together former perpetrators and victims of terrorism, and fostering critical thinking and digital literacy amongst young people being targeted by extremist messaging and recruitment (Callimarchi, 2015; Gerspacher et al., 2019; Shane et al., 2016; Silk & Spalek, 2013; Schmid, 2012).

In principle, community engagement to prevent the spread of violent extremist movements and hateful ideologies might appear to represent an incontestable good, meriting universal support. The reality, however, is not so straightforward, and sorting out what works, why, and what the evidence is for this is exceptionally difficult. This field of work is a minefield of terminology, misperceptions, baggage from past mistakes and turf wars.

Terms such as CVE (Countering Violent Extremism), PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism) and social cohesion are delegitimised by some researchers and community groups, in part because they are intrinsically ambiguous (they tend to be seen as identifying a normative position on a continuum of opinions and behaviours, and the delineation between extremist/radical opinions or behaviour from a

moderate/legitimate opinion or behaviour is seldom clear-cut or incontestable). As a consequence, some fear that addressing violent extremism necessitates 'Orwellian thought police' approaches punishing political ideas not approved by the governing party. There is certainly some substance to this that needs to be given serious consideration, especially within the context of more authoritarian states (Schmid, 2013; Williams & Lindsey, 2013).

Moreover, these terms are loaded with meaning because they refer not only to a distinct form of political violence (typically—in accordance the most generally agreed elements of what constitutes terrorism—non-state actors using violence against non-combatants outside of conflict zones) but are also sometimes pressed into service as rhetorical instruments to condemn political opponents in public discourses, to stigmatise them and to justify acts of repression against them. And fear of terrorism in itself is easily exploited as a rhetorical device, especially for right-wing and populist leaders who promise simple and aggressive solutions such as immigration bans or military campaigns to counter the threat.

With this in mind, it is important to be sensitive to the significant problems associated with CVE terminology (Aly & Zeiger, 2015; IPAC, 2014; Jayakumar, 2019). At the same time, however, it needs to be recognised that the definitions of virtually all phenomena of political significance are loaded with ideological meaning and are problematic and contested, including such fundamental concepts as nationalism, revolution, empire and colonialism. Just as it is possible, and indeed, necessary, to research these issues despite their problematic nature, so too we need to engage with the complexities of this area of research, starting with the definitional issues.

In this volume we follow the usage of Michael Williams in his definitive textbook in using the term Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) to indicate the full range of efforts in prevention, mitigation and rehabilitation (Williams, 2021).

Defining Extremism, Terrorism and Radicalisation

The etymology of extremism suggests an excess beyond mainstream society's values and norms (Neumann, 2013). Yet scholars have noted that this simple definition is ambiguous and problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, the centre and the extreme are inherently relative to social contexts, and ideas that are considered as extreme in one

context may be viewed as moderate in other contexts (Bartlett, 2017; Lentini, 2013; Van Hiel, 2011; Vergani et al., 2017). Secondly, extremism encompasses at least two dimensions: the behavioural dimension, and the cognitive dimension, also described as action-based and values-based extremism (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2010) and style and substance (Kaplan & Weinberg, 1998).

The cognitive side of extremism is generally defined by a form of monism or Manicheanism, i.e., the belief that there is only one legitimate worldview, and that everyone else is wrong and evil, meaning that any sign of compromise or mediation is seen as a moral weakness (Lentini, 2013; Sternberg, 2003). The vast majority of extremist Islamist ideologies, for example, are based on the premise that 'we' are right and 'they'—non-Muslims, and the majority of Muslims that follow other traditions—are wrong (Berger, 2018). Far right extremism in the west follows the same pattern, only it is Muslims and Jews, other minorities and migrants, together with feminists and 'left liberals', who comprise the hated other (Ebner, 2020; Kaplan & Weinberg, 1998; Koehler, 2017b; Picciolini, 2017, 2020).

The behavioural side of extremism is defined by methods of political action that show varying levels of disregard for the life, liberty and human rights of others (Neumann, 2013; Schmid, 2013). Extremist methods of political pursuit can be used to seek to realise any political objective (Barton, 2018; Hegghammer, 2020; Horgan, 2013; Kilcullen, 2009, 2010; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Mironova, 2019; Rapoport, 2004; Silke, 2016). They include not just acts of terrorism as generally understood but also other violent, politically motivated, acts against people (such as kidnapping) and attacks on property (such as vandalism and arson), as well as hate speech and hate crime (Barton, 2020; Barton et al., 2019; Commission for Countering Extremism in England & Wales, 2019; McAleer, 2019).

Extremism is a cross-ideological and cross-cultural phenomenon that presents significant recurring patterns in both the cognitive and behavioural aspects. There exists a broad body of literature concerned with the comparative analysis of the messaging of violent extremist groups in terms of narratives, ideologies and propaganda (Barton, 2019; Carthy et al., 2020; Ingram, 2016, 2017; Lentini, 2013; Macdonald, 2017; Maher, 2020; Manne, 2016; McCants, 2015; Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2020; Reed et al., 2017; Vergani & Bliuc, 2018). Saucier et al. (2009), for

example, identified sixteen common extremist themes from a comparison of thirteen militant-extremist groups from different ideologies (from secular leftist to religious groups associated with Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic religions).

Violent extremism is generally understood as being closely associated with terrorism and involving the use of violence, or at least the threatened use of violence, by non-state actors against non-combatants. Frequently with terrorism and violent extremism, the intention is to multiply the power of a particular group or network and leverage a response from the nation-state by provoking it (Barton, 2018). In this understanding, violent extremism is linked to non-state social movements that hold to extremist political positions and believe that their political ends justify the means of using violence (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Vergani et al., 2018).

Although not always linked to extremist religious ideas, the ideology of violent extremists tends to share the characteristics of religious fundamentalism, whether overtly religious or not, and manifest as fundamentalist world views (Horgan, 2014, 2018). Adherents believe they are going back to an earlier age of purity and are restoring things to an imagined pristine state before they had suffered degradation and corruption (Dawson, 2018; Dawson & Amarasingam, 2017; Horgan, 2008, 2014, 2018; Richardson, 2007; Roy, 2013). They tend to hold to a narrow reading of texts, sacred or otherwise, to look to charismatic leaders for guidance, and to reject traditional scholarship (Juergensmeyer, 2003, 2020 Schmid, 2013; Schuurman & Taylor, 2018). Above all else, they cling to a black-and-white worldview sharply divided between their community, who they see as 'fighting the good fight', and all the others, who are generally the majority, and who are seen to be deserving of judgement.

This thinking can apply to extremist nationalist movements or to movements concerned with protecting the physical environment, or some other great cause, as well as to movements that articulate their vision in terms of religious language and ideas. In all cases, however, the common element is that they believe that in using violence they are bringing about political change, generally by forcing the nation-state to respond (Wilson, 2020). By this definition, simple bigotry and hatred, along with misogyny and narcissistic self-serving behaviour, although frequently violent or involving the threat of violence, does not constitute violent extremism. Confusing the picture, however, is the fact that all of these

elements frequently manifest in violent extremist actors, including very often in lone actors seeking redemption, spurred on by the promise of going from 'zero to hero' (Jivani, 2019; Kruglanski et al., 2014, 2018; Speckhard & Shaikh, 2014).

By this definition, extremist or radical ideas are not necessarily inherently problematic in themselves. Radicalism and radicalisation represent, like terrorism, contested terms frequently determined by political context (Coolsaet, 2016; Hoskins & O'Loughlin, 2009; Kundnani, 2012). In practical terms, this means that some forms of political action are seen as being legitimate whilst others are dismissed as being 'too radical' (Sprinzak, 1991). For this reason, some researchers either dismiss the utility of the term radicalisation (Sedgwick, 2010) or even deny that it exists as a recognisable phenomenon (Hoskins & O'Loughlin, 2009).

Nevertheless, there is a more basic usage that is broadly agreed upon. 'Radical' here is understood in terms of the meaning of *radix*, or root, of those desiring a comprehensive root-to-branch upending of the current order of things. Where this radical upending involves violence and the order of things is inherently political, this is violent extremism (Lentini, 2009). But if the radical behaviour is concerned with simply, for example, advocating changes in diet, perhaps out of moral or environmental concerns, then even though that might constitute a radical view it need not involve justification for the use of violence or even a deeply held desire to change the political system. A radical minority might well be entirely quiescent, comfortable with remaining forever a minority, and with no immediate expectation of driving political change, much less by using coercion.

Defining extremism, by itself, is far more difficult than might first be thought. By definition, extremism is thought of as being 'out of line with the values and norms of mainstream society' (Neumann, 2013). The problem with this approach is that it can only be defined with respect to social context, and what appears to be moderate in one context can be judged extreme in another (Lentini, 2013; Van Hiel, 2011). A second problem is that extremism is concerned not just with behaviour but also with thought. In other words, it has both a behavioural and a cognitive dimension. This has led, as was noted above, to the description of extremism as being 'action based' and 'values based' (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2010), or to put it another terms, a matter of 'style' and 'substance' (Kaplan & Weinberg, 1998).

Cognitive extremism, as noted above, generally manifests in Manichean black-and-white worldviews in which society is divided into right and wrong, good and evil, 'us' and 'them', with any attempt to try and bridge these differences or engage in dialogue and cooperation judged as a sign of weakness and error (Lentini, 2013). Behavioural extremism, on the other hand, often manifests as political activism that shows scant regard for the rights of others (Neumann, 2013). This leads to the classic extremist position of arguing that 'the ends justify the means', or put another way, that the ends are so very important that, at least in the absence of any efficacious alternative, the means simply have to be accepted. So violent attacks, such as suicide bombings, it is argued, might be the 'weapon of the weak' but if they are all that the weak have then what else is to be done, especially when theirs is a 'just cause' demanding of noble struggle?

Just as it has been observed that the different forms of fundamentalism display family likenesses, so too different manifestations of extremism can be seen across the spectrum of ideology and culture, and regularly manifest common patterns of both thought and behaviour.

Narrative and belief are certainly important when it comes to violent extremism, but it is increasingly clear from researching violent extremist groups, and the people who are radicalised into them, that social networks and relationships tend, in most cases, to precede full cognitive radicalisation. In other words, people are drawn into groups, often following the offer of friendship that starts with a conversation that occurs in an online chat room or on the sidelines of a public event. It is only once they identify with their new friends and community and feel that they belong and are accepted that they begin to internalise the ideas of the group. This follows a pattern familiar to most forms of religious conversion and is by no means necessarily connected with radicalisation into violence. What it does mean, however, is that even when people do not fully share violent extremist ideologies and values, they may still participate in their actions because of the strength of the social bonds of kinship or friendship (Borum,).

In principle it is good to have a clear conceptual definition of violent extremism in each particular context, along with specific understanding of how it manifests in each region when it comes to research and policy planning. In general discourse, however, it is helpful to broaden the discussion beyond violent extremism specifically, to include both violent and hateful extremism.

Violent and Hateful Extremism

Whilst strong and even radical belief systems and convictions may not in themselves constitute a problem, the promotion of hatred, intolerance and sectarian sentiment is certainly a problem wherever it manifests. Understood in this way, it is not only violent extremism, narrowly defined, that is a problem and matter of vital concern, but also the issue of hateful extremism more broadly defined (Commission for Countering Extremism in England & Wales, 2019). At the same time, any form of violence, and any dynamic that contributes to the use of violence, together with a failure to prevent and resolve conflict, must all be matters of concern.

For the purposes of broader discussion, it might be more productive to talk about violence and hateful extremism when reflecting upon the broader social context of extremism and how best to respond to it. This is consistent with working towards sustainable, multilevel and inclusive approaches to supporting communities to become more socially cohesive, peaceful and resilient. Community engagement is likely to be both more effective and more widely supported if it is framed around a broad understanding of violent and hateful extremism (VHE), rather than framed more narrowly, as is typically done, in terms of violent extremism (VE) (Barton, 2020; Barton et al., 2019).

Violent and hateful extremism is a general concept that could include both violent extremism, as conventionally understood and outlined above, and expressions of hatred and intolerance that do not necessarily involve violence, or even the immediate threat of violence, and also do not necessarily involve links to an extremist social network. In other words, violent and hateful extremism covers a broad spectrum, ranging from individuals espousing bigoted and hateful views at one end through to terrorism at the other. Using this more encompassing term of VHE is not meant to imply that hateful extremism automatically or inevitably leads to violent extremism. Nevertheless, it recognises the resonances and synergies that exist between the two kinds of extremism, whilst also recognising that very often there are similar drivers and common elements in the kind of responses that are required to both (Hadiz, 2016; IPAC, 2018; Kalyvas, 2006; Machmudi, 2008; Noorhaidi, 2006; Osman, 2010; Pepinsky et al., 2018; Petru, 2015; Picciolini, 2017, 2020; Vergani & Link, 2020; Vergani et al., 2020; Wilson, 2011, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2019; Woodward, 2019; Woodward, Rohmaniyah et al., 2012; Woodward, Yahya et al., 2012).

Whilst relatively few of the individuals who engage in hateful extremism are likely to progress to violent extremism, there does appear to be good evidence that the growth of hateful extremism makes it easier for those recruiting for violent extremist networks and promoting their narratives to find space to operate in society with less constraint. Thus, whilst it is not the business of governments or civil society actors to try and police what somebody thinks or believes, it is, nevertheless, appropriate to intervene when hatred, bigotry and sectarianism are being openly promoted. This is now relatively well understood when it comes to misogynistic and sexist narratives. And indeed, very often hateful extremism does involve both misogynistic and sexist narratives, alongside racism and other forms of hateful discrimination that treats the other as less than fully human.

It is generally recognised that when children and young people grow up in an environment poisoned by hateful and bigoted attitudes and behaviour, they are both damaged and more likely to damage others (Mattei & Gyte, 2019). Where there is ongoing violence in communities, or where the long shadow of violence hangs over communities recovering after conflict, addressing attitudes, speech and behaviours that falls short of violent extremism but nevertheless runs parallel to the narratives of violent extremists becomes imperative.

In terms of the socialisation of these interventions and general discussion about them and the issues they involve, including within communities, it may often be more appropriate and fruitful to talk at the level of violence and hateful extremism rather than violent extremism per se. This allows broader discussion of issues, such as communal and familial warfare shifting the focus of discussion to a more relevant line of analysis (Kilcullen, 2010). It also sits well with the situation in Indonesia where there is broad concern about both hateful extremism and violent extremism. Framing the discussion more broadly in this fashion also allows for reflection on the role of state actors, either in directly contributing to hateful extremism and/or violence or in contributing indirectly to the political economic and social grievances that fuel resentment and facilitate non-state actors in violent extremism.

Approached with sensitivity and care, consistently respecting the principles of neutrality and do-no-harm, and guided by workers on the ground, there will be opportunities for advocacy in addressing the issues that contribute to hateful extremism, violence and violent extremism, including those issues which involve the behaviour and actions of state actors. This advocacy needs to sit consistently alongside programming

which is framed in positive terms around building social cohesion, resilience and capacity at both communal and individual levels. This will involve the development of alternative narratives which are shaped by focus on affirming positive principles and values with an optimistic orientation towards effecting change.

It is not possible to do this consistently or effectively in any context without engaging with the question of gender and gender roles (Bloom, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2016; Eggert, 2018; Pearson & Winterbotham, 2020; Qazi, 2018; Winterbotham, 2020a). At a basic level, this means the promotion of the rights of women and girls. But it must not be narrowly focused on women, mothers and girls in the private or family sphere alone. Rather, it needs to involve capacity building, advocacy and empowerment towards the greater involvement of women across all spheres and activities in addressing peace and security. At the same time, it needs to recognise that the consideration goes well beyond the role, rights and position of women. Any consideration of violence and hateful extremism also needs to address the problem of toxic masculinity, meaning that programming in addressing these issues needs to be consistently framed with an understanding of gender dynamics.

By framing the issue in terms of violence and hateful extremism more broadly, alongside a careful discussion of violent extremism more specifically, the simplistic view of violent extremism as simply being an Islamic issue imported from the Middle East can be gently challenged. Clearly, this discussion needs to follow different lines in different regional contexts. A universal concern, however, is the normalisation of violence and the perpetuation of structural violence. This sometimes manifests as, and contributes to, violent extremism but it also takes the form of hateful extremism and multiple expressions of violence including those involving state agents.

Even when this hateful extremism does not manifest as violent extremism it often shares similar narrative elements with violent extremism. These malign narrative elements of intolerance, dehumanisation and othering need to be addressed wherever they are found, regardless of whether they ultimately manifest in what might be technically described as violent extremism because they are nevertheless destructive and harmful.

This requires consistent engagement with counter narrative elements, best understood and applied in terms of a positive alternative narrative.

This positive alternative narrative emphasises peace and conflict resolution, the building of social cohesion and resilience in the development of human potential. It is particularly relevant to young people and working with them, and it must inevitably be concerned with questions of gender and the empowerment of women and girls.

Defining Terrorism

The ultimate manifestation of extremism is terrorism. That terrorism exists and represents a concrete and enduring problem is clear but delineating when and where it occurs is not nearly so simple as most imagine it to be.

Defining terrorism involves opening a Pandora's Box: political and ethical issues are raised by any attempt to define what Herbst called 'the mantra of our times' (Herbst, 2003, p. 163). Academic studies on the definitions of terrorism show that all definitions tend to reflect the political interests (and the moral judgement) of those who are doing the defining: this is the reason why there is no common definition within the United Nations, and even within a single nation-state (for example, the US) there is no common definition amongst different state agencies (Schmid, 2011). In this book we adopt the revised academic consensus definition of terrorism proposed by Schmid (2011), in which terrorism is both a tactic and a doctrine:

> Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral constraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. (Schmid, 2011, p. 86)

Defining Radicalisation

Finally, we want to define here how the concept of radicalisation will be used throughout this book. Radicalisation (as well as terrorism and extremism) is a contested and ambiguous term, in large part, because of its political relevance in the public agenda (Hoskins & O'Loughlin, 2009;

Kundnani, 2012; MacDonald, 2017; Neumann, 2013, 2017). The definition of radicalisation raises the issue of legitimacy, which is the line that social consensus draws around the normative status conferred by citizens to a political system, and which defines the types of political action that are legitimate or not (Sprinzak, 1991). As already noted, some scholars go so far as suggesting that the term radicalisation is a source of confusion (Sedgwick, 2010) and deny that the phenomenon exists (Hoskins & O'Loughlin, 2009).

Although we acknowledge the criticisms of the concept, we also believe that it nevertheless remains useful in seeking to capture a process in which individuals adopt an ideology aimed at replacing the status quo, by transgressing legitimate or accepted modes of political pursuit, separating from the mainstream society and beliefs (Lentini, 2009). When referring to 'radicalisation to terrorism' or 'radicalisation to violent extremism', the term radicalisation refers to the process that leads to engagement in violent behaviour, be it terrorism or violent extremism. Recapping themes discussed above, this allows us to distinguish between behavioural radicalisation, also called engagement, and cognitive radicalisation, also referred to as radicalisation, which involveds the adoption of an ideology.

As earlier discussed, radicalisation in itself does not imply radicalisation into violence. Consequently, radicalisation does not define criminal conduct or behaviour that needs to be repressed: the same political actor can be defined as radical in a certain context, and as a non-radical in another context. The Civil Rights Movement was considered by many to radical in the Southern states of the United States in the 1950s, but today it is seen as aligned with mainstream views and values.

Following this definition, the adoption of violence is not a necessary stage for all radicals: there are many individuals who share radical beliefs but reject violence. There are also some individuals who endorse violence (i.e., who see violence as legitimate), but do not themselves engage in violent activities. And then there are individuals who both hold violent beliefs and directly engage in violence. But there are also people, as pointed out by seasoned observers such as Borum and Horgan, who engage in extremist violent groups without even sharing ideologies and values but participate for other core reasons (such as a sense of solidarity and obligation borne out of kinship and friendship) (Borum, 2011a, 2011b; Horgan, 2008).

CVE and Civil Society

CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) is intended as a non-coercive adjunct to counter-terrorism (CT) (Afrianty, 2012; Aly & Zeiger, 2015; Bjørgo, 2013; Braddock, 2020; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; El-Said, 2015; Green et al., 2016; Hlatky, 2020; IPAC, 2014; Jayakumar, 2019; Madriaza & Ponsot, 2016; Mirahamadi, 2012; Romaniuk, 2015; Rosand et al., 2018; Wallner, 2020; Williams, 2016; Winterbotham, 2020b). CVE involves working 'upstream' of the problem to focus more on prevention and addressing the risk factors that produce violent extremism more than police-led CT is generally able to do. CVE also involves working 'downstream' on disengagement and rehabilitation in ways that go beyond the remit of CT (Abbas, 2020; Barrelle, 2015; Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al., 2008; El-Said & Harrigan, 2012; Hansen & Lid, 2020; Horgan, 2009a, 2009b; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Hwang, 2018; Koehler, 2016, 2017a; Kruglanski et al., 2014; Marsden, 2017; Yunus, 2018).

Generally, CVE interventions are typically thought of in terms of primary, secondary and tertiary stages of intervention. This distinction is borrowed from public health policy, where primary interventions are implemented with general populations before there is evidence of a disease (e.g., encouraging exercise and healthy eating to prevent obesity and the diseases of obesity), secondary interventions are more targeted and are implemented after a disease has begun but before it is symptomatic (e.g., using indicators such as body mass index to identify overweight individuals and putting them in specific programs to reduce weight) with specific at-risk groups and individuals. Tertiary interventions, on the other hand, are implemented after a disease or injury is established (e.g., helping obese individuals suffering from cardiac problems or diabetes manage their condition through building fitness and achieving a more healthy weight).

Primary CVE interventions concern initiatives addressed to the general population that aim to build social cohesion and resilience so as to diminish factors conducive to the emergence of violent extremism. Secondary CVE interventions are usually targeted at individuals and groups who are thought to be at immediate risk of being caught up in political violence through being recruited or drawn into extremist groups or networks. Tertiary CVE interventions are directed at the disengagement and rehabilitation of individuals who are already involved in violent

extremism or whom have been caught up in a plot that required police intervention. In the Indonesian context this has generally, if inaccurately, been referred to as 'deradicalisation', or 'derad'. Many tertiary interventions are started when individuals are serving time in detention or following their release from prison.

Civil Society and CSOs

Civil society is generally defined as the 'uncoerced associational life distinct from the family and institutions of the state' (Chambers & Kopstein, 2006, p. 363). Civil society organisations (CSOs) often have the social capital and the credibility to access the community and have a positive impact in the prevention of violent extremism. Even though scholars have noticed a general decline of trust and accountability in civil society organisations (see for example Kaldor, 2003), the potential positive role of civil society in state-building, democratisation and economic development has been discussed at length, highlighting strengths and weaknesses of non-governmental organisations and other civil society actors, which ultimately concern their relationship with state actors (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000; Salamon, 2010).

CSOs frequently incur significant risks in collaborating with governments and security agencies in the so-called 'war on terror' (Howell 2005). As Howell (2005) suggests, the main issues for CSOs relate to the preservation of a trust relationship with the communities and independence from the aims of the security apparatus, and the ability to continue addressing issues of social justice, redistribution and ethnic oppression, without being oppressed by the government. Moreover, CSOs and individual members can be targeted by extremists and hate campaigns, both physically and via social media.

From many points of view, CSOs are in a position of advantage to address violent extremism at a local level. First, they can take on roles that state institutions could not take on without infringing upon civil liberties. For example, CSOs can start a public discussion about the legitimacy of certain extremist ideologies and they have the right to campaign to reject extremist values and narratives. If, however, a government agency were to enter the space of determining which ideological or moral position is legitimate and which one is not, it would likely not only risk exacerbating tensions it would also risk being perceived as an infringement on freedom of expression and freedom of belief. Moreover, government agencies are often unable to establish sufficient levels of trust and open dialogue within

civil society about extremism, especially in countries where there are low levels of trust between citizens and institutions, generally because of low levels of good governance.

CSOs usually have more credibility than government agencies amongst those who are more vulnerable to extremism. Those who are more at risk of radicalisation usually have low levels of trust in government agencies, and therefore any source of communication, and any counter-narratives seen to originate from the government, tends to be rejected a priori. In contexts where civil society is less free to democratically oppose the government, however, the credibility of CSOs can be undermined by working in the field of CVE, especially in the eyes of those who have less trust in state institutions.

The relationships between civil society and the state typically vary substantially across different contexts. Civil society can be more or less separate from state institutions, more or less antagonistic towards the state, and more or less supported by the state. Also, civil society groups can extend beyond state boundaries and plug into transnational networks. These varied possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and they affect the ability and configurations of CSOs to address violent extremism.

Viewed using the frame of Walter Rapoport's influential Four Wave model of modern terrorism, we are currently experiencing a wave of terrorism in which religious ideas play a dominate role. This 'Fourth Wave' emerged in the late 1970s and was, previously, thought to have begun to peak with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Twenty years on from 9/11, after the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the continue growth of al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates, the wave appears to be continuing unabated.

In Muslim-majority nations such as Indonesia, the main threat of terrorism and violent extremism today originates from jihadist groups and ideologies. In this context, faith-based organisations deserve particular attention in relation to CVE efforts. Many faith-based organisations focus on countering jihadist ideologies and promoting inter-religious dialogue (Kayaoglu, 2015, p. 236). These organisations have a very important role, especially in Muslim-majority countries, in driving the public discussion about violent extremism, and in shaping what is considered a mainstream interpretation of religious belief versus what is considered an extreme interpretation of religion.

In recognising the importance of engaging with civil society and the roles that CSOs are uniquely placed to play it is important to not be a-critical and naïve in our view of civil society. It should be acknowledged that civil society groups are not necessarily, and always, agents for positive change. Civil society contains, for example, negative elements such as malign groups and associations that promote bigoted and exclusivist worldviews. Even if these groups do not engage directly in criminal activities but rather follow the laws of the country, they can nevertheless have a detrimental impact on the social fabric and create fertile grounds for the spread of extremist ideologies.

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CHAPTER 2

Understanding Violent Extremism in Indonesia

Matteo Vergani, Greg Barton, and Yenny Wahid

Introduction

The reasons why people are moved to engage in violent extremism and terrorism remain a matter of contention for scholars around the globe. The scholarly literature shows us that radicalisation into violent extremism is generally understood to entail three broad fundamental categories of factors: perceived political grievances, promised rewards and personal vulnerabilities (including individual predisposition) and this appears to

M. Vergani (✉) · G. Barton
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia
e-mail: matteo.vergani@deakin.edu.au

G. Barton
e-mail: greg.barton@deakin.edu.au

Y. Wahid
The Wahid Foundation, DKI Jakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: zannuba@wahidinstitute.org

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hold true for the Indonesian context (Barton, 2020a, 2020b; Borum, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Callimarchi, 2015; Coolsaet, 2016; Horgan, 2008; IPAC, 2017a; Jayakumar, 2019; Karnavian, 2014; Lentini, 2009; Ramakrisna, 2009; Ranstorp, 2009; Sedwick, 2010; Schmid, 2013; Schuurman & Taylor, 2018; Vergani, Iqbal et al., 2018, Vergani, O'Brien et al., 2018).

Across differing social contexts, there are significant differences in the frequency and types of factors within these larger categories. For example, poverty is more frequently cited as a factor of radicalisation in studies that focus on impoverished African countries compared to the rest of the world (Kilcullen, 2009; Vergani, Iqbal et al., 2018). Material incentives in general (such as employment opportunities and economic compensation paid to families) appear to be more relevant in developing countries than in developed western economies such as in Europe, North America or Australia (Kundnani, 2012). Conversely, individual factors such as having a military background and a history of psychological disorders, including toxic narcissism, together with misogyny and domestic violence, are more frequently found to figure among lone actors in developed Western nations, including both right-wing militants and jihadis, compared to developing nations (Corner & Gill, 2017; Hoskins & O'Loughlin, 2009; Kenney, 2018; Koehler, 2017; Vergani et al., 2017; Kruglanski et al., 2014, 2018).

In this chapter we discuss the specific factors that explain why Indonesian Muslims are drawn into engaging in violent extremism and terrorism. We review the historical roots of radical Islamism in Indonesia, and we set the contemporary studies on radicalisation in Indonesia in the cultural and social context of the country. We then review original data from survey research that has been conducted by the Wahid Foundation using large samples of Indonesian Muslims. Examining this data provides valuable insights into the political, psychological and social factors that are associated with support for violent extremism.

The Roots of Radical Islam in Indonesia

Indonesia, home to more than 275 million people, of who around 87% identify as Muslims, is the world's fourth-largest nation, third-largest democracy and largest Muslim country (Hefner, 2011; Kersten, 2015; Pepinsky et al., 2018). Even before declaring independence on 17 August 1945 and emerging as a modern nation state, the Indonesian archipelago

had an energetic, extremist, religious fringe. Proto-Islamist groups made important contributions to the nationalist movement and to the struggle for independence (Barton, 2004, 2009, 2010a). Contemporary Indonesian radical Islamism networks draw inspiration from the Darul Islam, or Islamic State, (Negara Islam Indonesia, or NII), rebellion in West Java, Southern Sulawesi and Aceh from 1949 to 1962.

The Darul Islam movement was born out of the fusion of anti-colonial militias that entered into conflict with the new Indonesian Republic as the revolutionary struggle against the Dutch colonial military came to an end in late 1949. One of the most significant militias was based in West Java and led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, who was a principal organisers of Hizbullah, a militia group set up during the Japanese occupation and later reorganised to fight the Dutch. Kartosuwirjo, unhappy with the agreement between nationalist Indonesian forces and the Dutch, in January 1948 established the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII—Islamic Army of Indonesia) in West Java, and one year later proclaimed the creation of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII—Islamic State of Indonesia) and declared the densely forested, rugged districts controlled by his troops in West Java to be 'Darul Islam'—the abode of Islam.

Kartosuwirjo was then joined in February 1952 by Kahar Muzakkar from South Sulawesi, who was another influential rebel fighter who was angry with not being given a senior leadership position in the post-revolution Indonesian military and joined with the remaining rebel militia groups that he was tasked with demobilising. Kahar had wanted to be appointed commander of South Sulawesi but due to a lack of qualifications, military training, battle experience and powerful mentors in the republican military, was offered a more junior position.

The Darul Islam movement gained an Acehnese element in 1953 when founder and leader of the All Aceh Association of Ulama (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh—PUSA, founded in 1939) and Governor of Aceh (1947–1951) Teungku Daud Beureueh became involved with the movement. When Aceh was merged with the province of North Sumatera and western-educated leaders, including Batak Christians, were given leadership roles at Beureueh's expense, he was joined by former PUSA members in leading a rebellion against Jakarta. In September 1953 he announced that he was aligning with the Darul Islam insurgency. His rebellion was quickly driven out of the urban areas of Aceh but remained active until 1959 when a peace agreement recognised Aceh as a Special Region

(Daerah Khusus) with the right to apply Sharia law. Beureueh remained in his jungle base until 1962 when he was granted an amnesty.

The republican government began an offensive against Darul Islam in 1956, targeting its leadership structure and driving remaining forces deeper into the forested hills and jungles of West Java and Southern Sulawesi. Kartosuwirjo was finally arrested in 1962, and Muzakkar was killed in 1965, but the spirit of the insurgency continued and their radical Islamist ideology was transmitted along family lines throughout the three plus decades of the Suharto New Order (Orde Baru) regime (Barton, 2004, 2009; Jones, 2007, 2010; Solahudin & McCrae, 2013).

In mid-1977 the Suharto regime arrested 185 people, many with Darul Islam connections, whom it accused of belonging to an organisation it referred to as Komando Jihad. It was established later that the arrests were the result of a sting operation conducted by the Indonesian army intelligence led by General Ali Murtopo, Suharto's Special Operations manager. During this operation, Murtopo's men allegedly persuaded key former Darul Islam members to reactivate the movement.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar were identified as being the key leaders of the movement, and sentenced to nine years in prison, later reduced to three years and ten months. When released, they worked hard to re-build a network of Darul Islam supporters, further radicalised by the experience of the military repression. This ultimately led to the establishment of Jemaah Islamiyah (which simply means 'the community of Islam'), which renewed and forged bonds among radical Muslims in South Sulawesi, Sumatra and Java. Members of this group, despite the arrests, continued to make *hijra* (migrate), first to Malaysia and then to Afghanistan/Pakistan through the 1980s and 1990s. Ba'asyir and Sungkar declared the formation of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), independent from Darul Islam, in Afghanistan in 1993.

Ba'asyir and Sungkar were very effective in establishing a new organisation throughout Indonesia: they encouraged their followers to return to their villages and establish cells of around a dozen members, to live communally according to a radical Salafist understanding of Islam and to avoid all non-Islamic institutions. They translated and published writings of Islamist intellectuals from the Middle East, and found justification for their cause in the repression they experienced at the hands of the of the Suharto regime. This included cases of mass murder of Islamists by elements in the army, such as the Tanjung Priok incident in 1984 when many dozens of members of local mosque communities were shot dead

by troops, or the Talangsari village incident in 1989. This tragic incident saw at least 100 people, including women and children, killed by the army because the entire community was deemed to be protecting and hiding hard-line Islamists who had murdered a local military commander.

In 1985 Ba'asyir and Sungkar fled to Malaysia to avoid being rearrested. From Malaysia they nurtured the network in Indonesia and also built international links with radical organisations such as Egypt's Gama Islami (or al-Gama'et al.-Islamiyah, to give it its full name, using the hard 'g' typical of modern Egyptian Arabic, but in Classical Arabic, such as is taught in Indonesian religious schools it is: al-Jama'et al.-Islamiyah), the militant wing of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, closely linked to al-Qaeda and involved in terrorist acts like the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This moved the position of the group to a more global pan-Islamic ideology and the establishment of an international Islamic caliphate. Several hundred senior leaders and operatives of Jemaah Islamiyah went to fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 1985 and 1995, where they received training and established international connections with figures close to Osama Bin Laden, and with fighters from other South East Asian countries like the Philippines' Moro Islamic Liberation Front. In 1996 these connections were then used to establish in JI training camp in Mindanao called Camp Abu Bakar (Barton, 2004, 2009; Solahudin & McCrae, 2013).

Violent Extremism in the Post-democratisation Era

Following President Suharto's resignation in May 1998, Ba'asyir and Sungkar returned to Java. Sungkar died suddenly soon after of natural causes but Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was able to re-establish himself in Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin ('Pondok Ngruki'), in the hamlet of Ngruki in the Central Java royal city of Solo/Surakarta.

From his base in Ngruki, Ba'asyir spearheaded a push to unite all groups wishing to implement the Shariah in Indonesia. Pondok Ngruki was a religious boarding school (*pesantren*) founded in 1971 by Ba'asyir and Sungkar, where they educated many key figures of the jihadist movement in Indonesia. Pondok Ngruki graduated Indonesians who, through their common experience training and fighting in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and earlier 1990s developed personal links with the recently formed al-Qaeda. Their ranks include Fathir Rahman al-Ghozi, Hambali, Abu Jibril and Agus Dwikarna, who were arrested for involvement in a series

of bombings in Jakarta and Manila in December 2000 and other activities related to al-Qaeda financing and recruitment.

The process of democratisation in Indonesia saw an opening-up of the political market-place with a proliferation of parties and social movements. This coincided with a decades-long growth of interest in Islam that resulted in rich and diverse civil society activity even during the Suharto regime 'New Order' period. The sudden resignation of Suharto in May 1998 also opened the way for more energetic and overt activism by Islamist groups. This included a surge in jihadist extremism as JI members returned to Indonesia. Galvanised by the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime, radical groups exploited the emergence of religious and ethnic identities, which had long been buried and repressed in Indonesian politics.

The inevitable reality of the democratisation process was that it was not able to deliver in the short term the promises of social justice and economic inclusion of the population, which left many disappointed and created a fertile ground for the recruitment of extremist groups and their promises of justice based on radical Islam (Barton, 1997, 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Hadiz, 2016; IPAC, 2018b; Machmudi, 2008; Noorhaidi, 2006; Osman, 2010; Petru, 2015; Wilson, 2015). The late 1990s and early 2000s were a key period for Indonesian jihadism. Laskar Jihad was a militia group formed in early 2000 by Jafar Umar Thalib, a radical preacher who had trained in Pakistan and fought in Afghanistan, with the purpose of sending thousands of vigilantes to Maluku to inflame communal riots between Muslims and Christians.

There is considerable evidence that the vigilante militia were supported by elements within the military elite, against the orders of President Abdurrahman Wahid to stop Laskar Jihad activists from sailing from Java to Ambon (Barton, 2002; Noorhaidi, 2006; Sholeh, 2006). Laskar Jihad had no direct links with JI and, in fact, a degree of rivalry developed between them. JI sponsored a smaller, but much better trained and more lethal, militia, Laskar Jundullah, that also joined in exacerbating the communal violence in Ambon (Barton, 2004).

In August 2000, Ba'asyir organised a three-day congress in Yogyakarta where he invited delegates of Islamist groups from all over Indonesia. The congress was used to establish Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI—Indonesian Mujahidin Council), notionally dedicated to 'preparing the way for the establishment of a new international caliphate'. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was declared Amir ul-Mujahidin, or commander, of MMI's

governing council. Also, in 2000, when Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao was overrun by the Philippines military, JI set a new training camp in Poso, Central Sulawesi.

Splinter factions within JI were responsible for the terrorist attacks that made the group globally known. These attacks include the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, the 2001 Atrium Mall bombing, the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing. One faction later formed its own independent cell, called al-Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago, which carried out the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing, the 2005 Bali bombings and the 2009 Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotel bombings. The first Bali bombings of 12 October 2002 in particular triggered a strong response from Indonesian security agencies that conducted over three hundred arrests over the ensuing three years. Yet, despite the arrests, the organisation continued to be surprisingly resilient (Barton, 2004, 2010a; ICG, 2002; IPAC, 2017b, 2020; Karnavian, 2014; Sholeh, 2006; Solahudin & McCrae, 2013).

In 2008, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir left the organisation and established Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), which operated partially above ground and partially clandestinely. In 2014, JAT split following Ba'asyir's decision to support ISIS, leading those who opposed ISIS to form Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS). In 2013 and 2014 ISIS grew rapidly, culminating with its blitzkrieg surge across northern Iraq in June 2014, and the declaration of the so-called Islamic State caliphate on 29 June 2014. This ultimately led to the aggregation of a network extremist groups, loosely organised under the umbrella of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) led by cleric Aman Abdurahhman. A much smaller network was led by former JI member Abu Husna. Abdurahhman was the leader of a small group formed in 2004 called Tawhid was Jihad, and was arrested in 2010 for establishing a training camp in Aceh. JAD became the largest group in Indonesia's pro-ISIS network, and it was linked to many Indonesian foreign fighters who have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, which are estimated to be in excess of 800 (Schulze, 2018).

After several years marked by an absence of large-scale terrorist incidents, 2016 saw the beginning of a new level of threat in Indonesia. Militants inspired by ISIS and often affiliated with JAD conducted a series of attacks against police forces and civilians (especially Christians) in Jakarta (January 2016), Samarinda (November 2016), Jakarta (May 2017), Medan and Jakarta (June 2017), Depok detention facility, Surabaya and Riau (May 2018). These more recent attacks were different

from past incidents because jihadist groups had broadened participation in militant operations to include women, children and individuals who radicalised relatively recently (Barton 2020a, 2020b; IPAC, 2017a, 2017c, 2018a, 2020, Schulze, 2018).

Why Do Indonesians Radicalise into Violent Extremism?

Given the long history of radical Islam in Indonesia, discussed above, it is not surprising to find the prevalence of multi-generational jihadi families in JI communities, where the parents were members of Darul Islam who continued their belonging to jihadist groups across generations. Some sent their children to pesantren linked to JI, like Solo's Pesantren al-Mukmin, also known as Pondok Ngruki, and when they married and had children, they followed the same path (Jones, 2007). This intergenerational form of radicalisation is not dissimilar from what can be seen in other jihadist conflicts where for example the sons of those who joined the jihad in Afghanistan have joined the Syrian jihad (Jones, 2010).

The transmission of radical ideas through families is not, however, the sole, or even primary, pathway of radicalisation, especially in the current context characterised by a broadening in participation. Hwang and Schulze (2018) compiled and examined a dataset of 106 Indonesians who joined militant Islamist organisations between mid-1980s and 2014, looking at individual pathways and radicalisation processes. The results of this analysis suggest that social relationships and bonds were the common thread in explaining radicalisation in the sample. The variation observed was related to where the key bonds were formed: during Islamic study sessions (*pengajian*), during local conflicts, in schools and within kinship circles. The social bonds consolidated a strong group identity through the regular participation in group activities, the gradual separation from mainstream society and the engagement in risky behaviour. These patterns are, for the most part, not substantially different from what has been observed in other extremist groups around the world (see for example Atran et al., 2017, 2018; Vergani, Iqbal et al., 2018).

Chalmers (2017) interviewed 20 former jihadists and collected their personal stories, including their radicalisation process. His analysis points to the diversity of social class of the interviewee, as some were workers, some others small traders, and other professionals. One common aspect in all stories that he collected in his study is the influence of radical

preachers such as Aman Abdurrahman, who continued to have strong influence on the jihadist community from jail. He suggests that there is an identifiable community in Indonesia who supports jihadist ideas, shares and normalises violent extremist narratives among like-minded people. Religious identification is associated with support for political action, including violent political action, as demonstrated by a recent psychological study conducted with a sample of 1,367 young Indonesians from Ambon and Yogyakarta (Kanas & Martinovic, 2016).

Afrianty (2012) interviewed leaders and activists of different student organisations at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta about what they believe are the factors that explain youth extremism. According to the interviewees, students from secular schools are more likely to be recruited by extremist organisations than students coming from religious schools because they have less knowledge about Islam and are more vulnerable to being persuaded by extremist religious narratives. Although this interpretation seems eminently sensible, the data to support it is not as robust or reliable as it could be, as it relies upon the collection of third-party opinions of radicalisation, without collecting primary data about the phenomenon.

Survey Data and Analysis

The remainder of this chapter focuses on discussing empirical evidence about the factors associated with support for, and engagement in, violent extremism. We provide a quantitative overview of support for violent extremism in Indonesia, which is particularly important in order to understand the context in which the new wave of attacks perpetrated in the name of ISIS has emerged. Given the paucity of empirical studies on the topic, it will provide a broad understanding of support for violent extremism in Indonesia, its prevalence in the population and the factors that are associated with it.

The analysis of data presented here comes from data collected among three different samples of Indonesian Muslims. The first is a representative sample ($N = 1{,}342$) collected by LSI (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) on behalf of the Wahid Foundation. The sample is composed of people above 16 years of age, 50.4% female ($N = 677$). The data was collected in April 2016 and it is useful to understand general trends among the Indonesian Muslim population.

The second survey involved a large purposive sample of young Muslims who attend Rohani Islam (literally Islamic Spirituality, abbreviated Rohis) religious programs ($N = 1{,}619$) between 14 and 19 years old, almost evenly split between women and men (51.7% to 48.2%). The data was collected in May 2017, and provides a useful snapshot of the attitudes of young Muslims.

The third is a national survey ($N = 4{,}258$) collected by LSI (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) for on behalf of the Wahid Foundation. The sample had slightly more women than men (54.7% to 45.3%) above 17 years of age, and the data was collected in October 2017.

In the following discussion we present univariate and bivariate analyses to explore the main factors associated with support for, and engagement in, violent extremism among different samples. We structure the presentation of the findings under five thematic categories. First, we look at the relationships between Islamic orthodox religious practices, negative sentiment towards non-Muslims and support for violent extremism. Second, we show that having a negative view of the Indonesian economy (and presumedly, by extension, the Indonesian government) is a stable predictor of support for violent extremism. Third, we show that Indonesians tend to display more negative attitudes to out-groups that are distant and not well-known to them. Fourth, and consequently, we present and discuss data about the key role of inter-group contact to prevent violent extremism. Finally, we present original analyses to investigate the differences in gender stereotypes, social media critical thinking and their relations to supporting violent extremism in Indonesia.

Religiosity and Belonging to Islamic Mass Organisations

Scholars continue to debate whether higher levels of commitment to religious practice and belief, sometimes referred to as orthodox religiosity, represent a barrier or an opening to violent extremism (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). Terrorism studies scholars tend to find that religious knowledge is a barrier to terrorist recruitment (Ilardi, 2013; Rinehart, 2006), but social-psychologists have documented a positive association between religiosity and negative views, prejudice and hate towards out-groups (see for example Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Jost et al., 2003). Moreover, prejudice and hate towards out-groups are

often considered as creating a breeding ground for terrorist recruitment (Vergani, Iqbal et al., 2018).

We used data from the 2016 national survey to examine the relationships between religious orthodoxy, negative views of non-Muslims and support for violent extremism among Indonesian Muslims ($N = 1{,}342$). In this context what is meant by higher levels of orthodoxy is higher levels of religious observance in practice.

Among Indonesian Muslims this is approximately measured by consistency in regular prayer. In Indonesia observant Muslims are referred to as *santri* Muslims and non-observant Muslims as non-*santri*, or more controversially as *abangan* Muslims, or in the case of those affiliated with aristocratic court culture as *priyayi* Muslims. This usage was popularised by Clifford Geertz (1960). Not only are *santri* Muslims more observant in their religious practice but they tend to hold more closely to the religious teaching of the *ulama*, or scholars of Islam. Whereas non-santri Muslims are more likely to incorporate synergistic elements of animistic pre-Islamic culture and belief. Over the past four decades an increasing proportion of Indonesian Muslims have tended to identify as *santri*, or observant Muslims. For many, women in particular, this is reflected in dressing in what is perceived to be a more Islamic fashion. For women this often involves covering their hair with a scarf (in Arabic *hijab* and in Indonesian *jilbab*). The term *santri* literally refers to students of a *pesantren*—a religious boarding school complex that houses *madrasah*, or schools, teaching Islam.

We believe that the three statements that we used to capture support for violent extremism are appropriate because they refer to leaders of terrorist groups in positive terms, and in relation to the religious notion of jihad. Table 2.1 presents the measures used in the analyses (the original Indonesian version is provided in footnote). Additionally, we asked whether respondents belong to mass Islamic organisations like Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

We began the analysis by re-categorising the answers to the question about higher levels of religious observance. We created a dummy variable, with 1 indicating higher values on the scale (above the mean value of the scale) and 0 indicating lower values (below the mean value). Second, we looked at whether people who have higher levels of religious observance and people who belong mass Islamic organisations (Muhammadiyah and NU) show significantly different levels of support for violent extremism,

Table 2.1 Measures of orthodox Islamic religious practice, negative views of non-Muslims and support for violent extremism

Construct	*Items (translated in English)*
Orthodox Islamic religious practice (α = 0.73, 5 items)	1. How often do you consider religious orders or values when making important decisions for your own life? (1 = never, 4 = always) 2. Pray five times a day? 3. Fast during Ramadan? 4. Pray the Sunnah? 5. Attend the congregational prayer (Jumat) in addition to Friday prayers?[a]
Support for violent extremism (α = 0.78, 3 items)	1. Amrozi, Imam Samudra, Osama Bin Laden, Abu Bakar Baasyir, Bahrun Naim and Oman Abdurrahman are examples of true Muslims who practice the true jihad (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 2. The bomb attacks in the Sarinah area of Jakarta in January 2016 carried out by Muslims affiliated with ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) were jihad 3. Osama bin Laden, who was shot dead by US forces in May 2011, died of martyrdom because he carried out jihad[b]

Construct	*Items (translated in English)*
Negative attitudes to non-Muslims (α = 0.91, 6 items)	1. Would you object to the following scenarios? Non-Muslim people hold religious events/functions in the area around here (1 = yes I would object; 0 = I would not object/not sure) 2. Non-Muslim people build places of worship around here 3. A non-Muslim person becomes regent / mayor 4. A non-Muslims person becomes governor 5. A non-Muslim person becomes vice-president 6. A non-Muslim person becomes president[c]

[a]The original questions in Indonesian were: *Seberapa sering Ibu/Bapak mempertimbangkan perintah atau nilai-nilai agama ketika membuat keputusan penting bagi hidup Ibu/Bapak sendiri? Shalat wajib lima waktu; Puasa Ramadhan; Shalat Sunnah; Shalat berjama'ah selain shalat Jumat*

[b]The original statements in Indonesian were: *Amrozi, Imam Samudra, Osama Bin Laden, Abu Bakar Baasyir, Bahrun Naim, dan Oman Abdurrahman, adalah contoh Muslim yang mempraktekkan jihad sejati. Serangan bom di wilayah Sarinah, Jakarta, pada Januari 2016 lalu oleh sejumlah Muslim yang dekat dengan gerakan ISIS (Negara Islam Irak dan Siria) adalah jihad. Osama bin Laden, yang ditembak mati pasukan Amerika Serikat pada Mei 2011, mati syahid karena dia menjalankan jihad*

[c]The original questions in Indonesian were: *Orang non-Muslim mengadakan acara keagamaan/kebaktian di daerah sekitar sini; Orang non-Muslim membangun tempat peribadatan di sekitar sini; Orang non-Muslim menjadi bupati/walikota; Orang non-Muslim menjadi gubernur; Orang non-Muslim menjadi wakil presiden; Orang non-Muslim menjadi presiden*

and negative attitudes to non-Muslims. The findings are reported in Figs. 2.1 and 2.2.

The data presented in Figs. 2.1 and 2.2 show that Indonesians who are more observant in practicing Islam have significantly more negative views towards non-Muslims than Indonesians who are less observant. Yet, conversely, more observant Muslims display significantly lower support for violent extremism. This suggests that, as predicted by previous research in the field of social psychology, a higher level of religious observance is associated with closure towards out-groups (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Jost et al., 2003). Yet, at the same time, individuals who are less religiously observant (and possess lower levels of religious knowledge) are more likely to support violent extremism (Ilardi, 2013; Rinehart, 2006). This finding is also confirmed by data in Fig. 2.2, which shows that being member of one of the two large Islamic mass organisations (Muhammadiyah and NU) is associated with lower levels of prejudice, and lower levels of support for violent extremism. This suggests that mainstream religiosity and the associated religious knowledge and social capital acquired as a member of these organisations, is a barrier to prejudice and extremism.

As a methodological note, it is important to point out that the differences in support for violent extremism are much smaller that the



Fig. 2.1 Differences between Indonesians who are more and less practicing of Islam (all differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$)



Fig. 2.2 Differences between Indonesians who belong and do not belong to Islamic mass organisations (all differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$)

differences in attitudes towards non-Muslims. This is explained by the fact that there is more variation in the answers related to non-Muslims, and little variation in the answers to the support for violent extremism, with almost the entirety of the respondents displaying lower levels of support for violent extremism.

Societal Pessimism

Societal pessimism, which is defined as a negative view of the world and the country of belonging, and a disillusioned view of politics, economy, security and all aspects of society, is a key component of the narratives of all violent extremist groups (see for example Furlow & Goodall, 2011; Saucier et al., 2009; Stankov et al., 2018). This component has been referred by some authors as 'narrative of the aggrieved party' (when a group responds to the perceived injustice with self-righteous violence), 'narrative of oppression and victimhood', 'narrative of victimisation' (Furlow & Goodall, 2011; Stout, 2004), 'narrative of grievance' (Archetti, 2012, 2017), or simply 'political narrative' (Kessels, 2010). This narrative exploits the feelings of social exclusion among communities

and individuals who perceive that society is on the edge of a catastrophe, and extreme and unconventional measures need to be used to save it.

Societal pessimism has been studied in a number of recent studies of public opinion and has been found to be associated with support for radical right-wing parties in Europe (Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018). The research to date, however, has not yet investigated whether there is an association between societal pessimism and support for violent extremism outside Western contexts. We used data from the 2016 national survey to examine the relationships between societal pessimism, negative views of non-Muslims and support for violent extremism among Indonesian Muslims ($N = 1{,}342$). Table 2.2 presents the measures used in the analyses (the original Indonesian version is provided in footnote).

We began the analysis by re-categorising the answers to the question about societal pessimism and we created a dummy variable, with 1 indicating higher values on the scale (above the mean value of the scale) and 0 indicating lower values (below the mean value). Second, we looked at whether people who have higher levels of societal pessimism show significantly different levels of support for violent extremism, and negative attitudes to non-Muslims. The findings are reported in Fig. 2.3.

Table 2.2 Measure of societal pessimism

Construct	*Items (translated into English)*
Societal pessimism ($\alpha = 0.74$, 6 items)	1. How do you see national politics? (1 = very good, 5 = very bad) 2. How do you see the state of law enforcement now? 3. How do you see the state of national security now? 4. How do you see the implementation of national government now? 5. How do you see the state of the national economy now? 6. How do you see the national economy compared to last year? (1 = much better, 5 = much worse)[a]

[a]The original questions in Indonesian were: *Bagaimana Ibu/Bapak melihat keadaan politik nasional sekarang? Bagaimana Ibu/Bapak melihat keadaan penegakan hukum secara nasional sekarang? Bagaimana Ibu/Bapak melihat keadaan keamanan nasional sekarang? Bagaimana Ibu/Bapak melihat pelaksanaan pemerintahan secara nasional sekarang? Bagaimana Ibu/Bapak melihat keadaan ekonomi nasional sekarang? Bagaimana Ibu/Bapak melihat keadaan ekonomi nasional dibanding tahun lalu?*



Fig. 2.3 Differences between Indonesians who are more and less pessimistic (all differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$)

The findings show that societal pessimism is significantly associated both with negative views of non-Muslims and support for violent extremism. If we consider societal pessimism as an indication of a perception of threat and vulnerability, this finding is consistent with existing social and psychological theories such as Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Terror Management Theory (Greenberg et al., 1986), which suggest that threat perception and associated anxieties are associated with aggression towards out-groups and scapegoating (Vergani, 2018). Moreover, societal pessimism can be also seen as loss of significance (Kruglanski et al., 2014, 2018), which predisposes individuals to search for meaning in strong black-and-white narratives that can provide certainty and significance, such as the narratives of violent extremist groups.

The Imagined Enemies

The perception of threat from an enemy is presumed to be one of the most earliest experiences of the human species. Certainly, throughout recorded history social groups like tribes, empires and nations have fought

against groups they consider to be enemies. Threats and enemies are often indistinguishable, because the enemy itself constitutes a threat, and, in most cases, threats define what we perceive as constituting an enemy. In the contemporary social science literature, threats can be symbolic, material (or realistic) and personal threats depending on whether they threaten material resources (for example, economic and financial resources), symbolic resources (for example, cultural, religious and ethnic identity), or personal safety (see, e.g., Vergani, 2018; McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Kinder & Sears, 1981).

In this analysis we examine what Indonesians perceive as being the most disliked out-groups, which we can reasonably assume are the groups that are most likely to be object of prejudice and aggression. Research has showed that disgust facilitates out-group prejudice and dehumanisation, which are in turn associated with aggression (Buckels et al., 2013; Terrizzi et al., 2010).[1] In other words, disliked groups are more likely to be perceive as enemies and be the target of hate. What are the enemies of the Indonesian population? We used data from the 2017 national survey of Indonesian Muslims ($N = 4{,}258$) to investigate this empirical question. Table 2.3 presents the measures used in the analyses. The descriptive statistics are reported in Fig. 2.4.

The findings show that 30.8% of the respondents ($N = 1310$) report that they do not have a particular group that they dislike, and 23.9% ($N = 1017$) report disliking the terrorist group ISIS. Interestingly, anti-Chinese sentiment, which is thought to have caused so much harm in modern Indonesian history, is only shared by a tiny minority of the Muslim population (0.4%, $N = 16$). About half of the population indicate a general dislike towards political out-groups such Communists (15.8%, $N = 674$), gender diverse out-groups (12.2%, $N = 519$) and religious out-groups (14.2%, $N = 604$). Of these, the most disliked groups are Jews (8%, $N = 339$), despite that fact that Indonesia has not significant Jewish community, and Christians (3.3%, $N = 140$).

It is easy to understand that ISIS might be seen as a source of threat to the personal safety of people, because of the terrorist attacks conducted in Indonesia by groups who support ISIS, which also targeted the Muslim population.

[1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886910002710; http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1368430212471738

Table 2.3 Measure of out-group dislike

Construct	*Items (translated into English)*
Out-group dislike	In our community, it is normal to find some people who do not like certain groups. What about you, is there any group from the ones listed below that you do not like? 1. Christians 2. Other religious out-groups (Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians) 3. Chinese 4. Jews 5. Communists 6. LGBT 7. ISIS 8. Atheists 9. Other 10. No particular dislike, don't know



Fig. 2.4 The most disliked groups in Indonesia

Other groups such as Communists, the gender diverse and religious out-groups (such as Shia Muslims and members of Indonesia's heterodox Ahmadiyya community), which overall are identified as being disliked by about 42.2% of the population, arguably constitute more a symbolic

threat to the culture and religion of the respondents. We can also safely assume that the large majority of the respondents would not know any Jews, and most are likely not aware of knowing gender diverse people (it needs to be recognised that as LGBTIQ+ people face overt hostility and hated, and in some areas like Aceh are criminalised by anti-sodomy legislation, many are cautious about revealing their identity) or Communists (the Communist Party was banned in 1966).

These three out-groups can be said to represent 'imagined enemies' that are perceived as being inherently threatening by many Indonesians, even though most of the people who report disliking them will never have knowingly met any members of these out-groups. Consequently, these groups can be said to represent a purely perceived symbolic threat to culture and ideology. Hatred towards them is most likely to originate from political and media discourse, framed around identity politics, rather than from personal contact or personal knowledge of the out-group.

Intergroup Contact

Much of the existing work in the fields of prejudice and conflict prevention is underpinned by Intergroup Contact Theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006a, 2006b; Pettigrew et al., 2011). Research has consistently shown that knowing people of other groups (for example religious or ethnic groups) is associated with more out-group knowledge and less prejudice towards the out-group (Allport, 1954). Meta-analysis of the research on prejudice reduction and recent research on knowledge, contact and prejudice (Mansouri & Vergani, 2018) found that the effect of intergroup contact on prejudice is consistently mediated by knowledge of the out-group.

We investigated whether intergroup contact in the form of having friends and family members from different religious groups is associated with lower support for violent extremism, and lower prejudice towards out-groups. To explore this question, we used data from the 2017 national survey of Indonesian Muslims ($N = 4{,}258$), and from the purposive sample of Rohis students ($N = 1{,}619$). Table 2.4 shows the measures of intergroup contact used in the two surveys. The dependent variables measuring support for violent extremism were the same as described in Table 2.1.

Table 2.4 Measure of intergroup contact

Survey	*Measures of intergroup contact*
National survey (N = 4,258)	How many non-Muslim friends do you have? (1 = none or very few, 2 = few, 3 = about half, 4 = many, 5 = almost all)
	How many of your friends, who share the same religion with you, but belong to different sects (Islam: NU, Muhammadiyah, Shia, Ahmadiyya)?
Rohis survey (N = 1,619)	Does anyone in your nuclear family follow a different religion or faith? (1 = yes, 0 = no)
	Over the past year have you interacted or socialised with somebody of a different faith or religion? (1 = yes, 0 = no)

We begin the analysis by firstly creating a dummy variable with the measures contained in the national survey. As the largest group of respondents indicated not having any non-Muslim friends (52.3%, N = 2227) and not having any friends who belong to different Islamic Sects. (36.5%, N = 1553), we recoded as 0 the answers 'none or very few', and 1 all other answers. Subsequently, we examined whether there were differences in the support for violent extremism among those who have and have no contact with religious out-groups. Results are provided in Fig. 2.5.

Analysis of the data clearly shows that individuals who are more in contact with religious out-groups, whether they be non-Muslims or member of other Muslim groups, are more likely to have lower support for violent extremism than others. The effect of inter-group contact is particularly large when the out-group members are family members, but it is significant also when they are friends. It is important to acknowledge that this analysis does not allow for us to determine the causal relationship between variables: in other words, we don't know whether people with lower support for violent extremism are more likely to look for friends or family members (e.g., husbands and wives) from religious out-groups, or if having contact with people from religious out-groups reduces the support for violent extremism. In reading the findings presented in Fig. 2.5 we need to acknowledge that we don't yet have clear data on causality. Nevertheless, what data we do have tends to suggest that intergroup contact has a significant impact on people's attitudes (see for example, Mansouri & Vergani, 2018; Pettigrew et al., 2011).



Fig. 2.5 Inter-group contact and support for violent extremism (all differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$)

Toxic Masculinity and Violent Extremism

The increased participation of women in terrorist attacks represents one of the observable trends in the new wave of ISIS linked terrorism that Indonesia has been experiencing since 2016. On 13 May 2018, suicide bombers targeted three churches in Surabaya. A family of six including a mother and her young children were among the attackers. Two other families in the same small extremist local social network, we involved in subsequent terrorist bomb explosions, both explosions involving mothers and children. Hours after the bombings of the three churches that Sunday morning, fellow cell-members accidently detonated explosives that they were working in their apartment, killing three adults and severely injuring three children. The next morning another family travelling on two motor bikes attempted to enter the Surabaya Police Headquarters compound. When stopped by guards they detonated both devices, killing the husband-and-wife bombers, two of their children and six police officers. In the wake of the explosion an eight-year old girl, thought to be a daughter of the attackers, was found dazed and badly injured. Although this was not the first-time women were involved in terrorist activities, it was one of the first times that they have been given a key role in militant operations in Indonesia.

ISIS networks and sophisticated narratives have attracted an unprecedented number of women to join the group, allowing some of them to become female fighters: it is estimated that about 45% of the Indonesians who went to Syria were women and children. At the same time, female Indonesian ISIS supporters have been very active on social media, organising groups and recruiting men for the organisations. Some even helped their husbands in assembling improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and others volunteered to be suicide bombers as early as 2016 but were arrested by security forces before carrying out the attack (Hwang & Schulze, 2018; IPAC, 2020; Schulze, 2018).

Recent research has focused on the key roles of women in preventing and countering violent extremism in Indonesia (see for example, Lierde, 2013; Wulan, 2015, True & Eddyono, 2018). At the same time, the more widespread implementation of women's rights, the empowerment of women in society and better gender education has significant potential to contribute in itself to challenge toxic masculinity and extremist narratives. This is explored in detail in Chapters 4,5,6,7 and 8 of this book.

In order to better understand the relations between gender, toxic masculinity and violent extremism, we examined whether stereotypes about gender (specifically, toxic masculinity) are associated with support for violent extremism among Indonesian Muslims. We used data from the 2017 national survey of Indonesian Muslims ($N = 4{,}258$) to investigate this empirical question. Table 2.5 presents the measures used in the analyses. We then created a dummy variable, with 1 indicating higher values on the scale (above the mean value of the scale) and 0 indicating lower values (below the mean value). Finally, we looked at whether respondents with more toxic masculinity were more supportive of violent extremism than others. The findings are reported in Fig. 2.6.

We also examined whether there were any significant gender differences between male and female respondents, but we found the relationship to be equally large and significant among both genders. The results show that higher levels of toxic masculinity are associated with higher support for violent extremism, both among male and female Indonesian Muslims. This suggests that gender education and women empowerment can challenge extremist beliefs and contribute to counter and prevent violent extremism in Indonesia.

Table 2.5 Measure of gender stereotypes

Construct	*Items (translated into English)*
Toxic masculinity ($\alpha = 0.68$, 8 items)	1. Only men have the right to file a divorce (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 2. A husband has the right to hit his wife if he feels he needs to do so 3. A wife should obey her husband because a man is the head of his household 4. Women who become housewives are better than those who work for a living 5. In general, men are more capable of serving as political leaders than women 6. In general, men are more capable of serving as heads of the companies than women 7. If a wife earns a higher income than her husband, it is almost certain that their marriage will be in trouble 8. It is more important to give higher education to boys than girls



Fig. 2.6 Toxic masculinity and support for violent extremism (the difference is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$)



Fig. 2.7 Digital literacy, support for violent extremism (the difference is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$)

Digital Literacy and Violent Extremism

Research has found that higher levels of belief in conspiracy theories tend to be associated with greater levels of lack of social trust and hate towards out-groups (Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014). In Indonesia, social developments such as the 212 (2 December 2016) protest movements directed against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, widely known as 'Ahok', the Chinese Christian governor of Jakarta, showed that exclusivist political movements can make effective use of social media to spread misinformation and hate. The lack of digital literacy skills and more in general critical thinking constitutes a vulnerability to the spread of extremist ideologies based on unsubstantiated claims and conspiratorial beliefs (Briggs & Feve, 2014).

In this section, we use data from the 2017 national survey of Indonesian Muslims ($N = 4{,}258$) to investigate whether individuals who display less digital literacy skills are more likely to support violent extremism. Table 2.6 shows the items used to capture digital literacy. We then created a dummy variable, with 1 indicating higher values on the scale (above the mean value of the scale) and 0 indicating lower values (below the mean value). Finally, we looked at whether respondents with more digital

Table 2.6 Measure of digital literacy and critical thinking

Construct	*Items (translated in English)*
Digital literacy (α = 0.63, 3 items)	1. You always get insights or benefits from information about religion on social media, although its accuracy cannot always be confirmed (1 = not at all accurate, 5 = very accurate) 2. You rarely trace the original source of the information about religion that you receive 3. Upon receiving religious information from social media, you share them to your friends at once

literacy were more supportive of violent extremism. The findings are reported in Fig. 2.7.

Analysis of this data supports the idea that developing digital literacy skills has the potential to constitute an important contribution towards preventing and countering the inroads made by violent extremist networks. This is in line with existing research showing that bias and closed mindedness are high among people who employ partial searches for information and are engaged in motivated reasoning (Dawson et al., 2002). It is possible that other confounding variables might also explain the relationships between digital literacy skills and support for violent extremism: for example, digital literacy skills overlap with more general critical thinking, which is usually (but not necessarily) acquired during formal education. More research is needed to understand the relationships between digital literacy and the vulnerability to extremist recruitment, and to assess the effectiveness of interventions aimed at building digital literacy in preventing the spread of violent extremism.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed current knowledge about violent extremism in Indonesia, examining the historical roots of the phenomenon, reviewing the recent empirical research on the issue and presenting original analyses of survey data collected in 2016 and 2017. This analysis suggests that the reasons why Indonesian Muslims engage in violent extremism are multi-faceted. We have shown that hateful ideologies tend to spread through

generations and social networks of families and friends. This multi-generational jihadi transmission has been documented in multiple studies and remains an important phenomenon. Local conflicts and grievances also play an important role in the recruitment of terrorist and extremist organisations, and jihadist recruitment is more likely to take place in conflict zones.

It needs to be acknowledged, however, that a number of other psycho-social factors contribute to providing fertile ground to terrorist recruitment in the current Indonesian context. We have shown that threat perception and societal pessimism are associated with increased support for violent extremism. It is interesting to notice that the perceived threat is more likely to originate from exotic 'imagined enemies' that are imagined to be threatening cultural and religious identities, rather than from real out-groups with which people have regular social contact. Significantly, when people establish meaningful relationships with out-groups (such as friendship or family bonds) they tend to have decreased prejudice towards them. Toxic masculinity is certainly another important factor associated with the spread of hateful ideologies and violence in Indonesia.

What are the factors of resilience to violent extremism that should be reinforced by CVE initiatives? There is convincing empirical evidence indicating that higher levels of religious observance and religious knowledge, together with belonging to mainstream religious organisations, are associated with lower support for violent extremism. Contact with religious out-groups is also an important factor associated with reduction of violent extremism. The quality of the relationship established with out-group members is crucial: the more substantial it is, the more likely it is to shape attitudes and perceptions. Gender education and women's empowerment can challenge toxic masculinity and associated extremist beliefs and contribute to counter and prevent violent extremism in Indonesia. Another key factor of significance to preventing and countering the spread of violent ideologies is digital literacy. This suggests that being open to new sources of information and at the same time having the capacity to think critically about them, can constitute a significant factor in building resilience to the influence of conspiratorial thinking and extremist ideologies.

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CHAPTER 3

Disengagement, Deradicalisation, and Rehabilitation

Greg Barton and Matteo Vergani

Introduction

The vast majority of work in preventing and countering and violent extremism (P/CVE) involves working 'upstream' of the problem to focus more on prevention and addressing risk factors that produce violent extremism in ways that police-led counterterrorism (CT) is generally not able to do (Romaniuk, 2015; Rosand et al., 2018). There are good reasons for this focus, not the least being that it is always better, where possible, to prevent rather than to cure. But whilst we must constantly strive to achieve as much success in prevention as we can, we also need to face the reality that some, overwhelming the young, will be ensnared by the false charms of recruiters offering belonging, purpose and the hollow

G. Barton (✉) · M. Vergani
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia
e-mail: greg.barton@deakin.edu.au

M. Vergani
e-mail: matteo.vergani@deakin.edu.au

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promise of fighting injustice. And whilst some lives will be forever lost to family and society, many can potentially be reached and retrieved to the benefit of them, their families and society in general. Just as prevention is better than cure, rehabilitation is better than paying the high cost of lives lost to a cycle of recidivism, criminality and inter-generational radicalisation. For this reason, it is important to be reminded that P/CVE has great potential, currently only very partially realised, to work 'downstream' on disengagement and rehabilitation in ways that go well beyond the remit of CT.

Generally, P/CVE interventions, as was noted in Chapter 1, are typically thought of in terms of primary, secondary and tertiary stages of intervention (Williams, 2021). As was discussed, this distinction is borrowed from public health policy, where primary interventions are implemented with general populations before there is the evidence of illness, and secondary interventions are implemented with specific at-risk groups and individuals that benefit from targeted interventions. Tertiary interventions, on the other hand, are therapeutic and concerned with rehabilitation and are designed to heal and reverse the course of illness, being implemented after a disease or injury is established.

Tertiary P/CVE interventions are directed at the disengagement and rehabilitation of individuals who are already involved in violent extremism or whom have been caught up in a plot interrupted by police. Many tertiary interventions occur when individuals are serving time in detention or following their release from prison, although some might also occur outside the context of custodial sentencing and this might even form an element of an alternative to detention (Barrelle, 2015).

This chapter presents a brief overview of the context of tertiary P/CVE initiatives in Indonesia and examines both the potential for their expansion and the structural, cultural and political impediments that need to be overcome. As the case studies in this book illustrate, Indonesian civil society has taken the lead in developing some of the best P/CVE intervention programs in Asia but (as revealed in Capacity Gap Analysis presented in Chapter 13) almost all of these P/CVE interventions have been primary interventions, with very few secondary or tertiary intervention programs being developed.

As Muhammad Wildan sets out in Chapter 9 of this volume, Indonesia faces a pressing need for rehabilitation programs but so far only a handful of pilot programs, such as Noor Huda Ismail's pioneering work with the Yayasan Prasati Perdamaian (YPP) team, have been attempted. The

remarkable work of Densus 88 (Detasemen Khusus 88 Antiteror) the special counterterrorism squad of the Indonesian National Police, established in 2003 in the wake of the October 2002 bomb attacks in Bali, has seen more than 1800 extremists arrested over the past 18 years, with most successfully prosecuted for terrorism offences (Barton, 2018). The challenges of the Indonesian legal environment, together with the difficulties of prosecuting on the basis of alleged intention, have seen most of these sentenced to serve relatively short periods of time—typically two to six years—in the prison system. As a consequence, there has been a considerable volume of churn through the prison system (IPAC, 2013, 2018a, b, 2020). Nevertheless, as Wildan explains, in early 2020, there remained around 300 inmates charged with terrorism offences and a further 150, or so, detainees awaiting charges.

At the same time, around 570 Indonesian IS supporters have been deported from Turkey, having allegedly been attempting to join IS fighters in Syria. When the first wave of deportees arrived back in Indonesia in early 2017 BNPT began working with C-SAVE (Civil Society Against Violent Extremism), a new consortium of CSOs (including YPP) on rehabilitation programs for hundreds of women and children (IPAC, 2018b, 2019). On 11 February 2020, following considerable internal debate, the Indonesian government announced that it would not be allowing the repatriation of any of the 700, or so, Indonesians then detained in camps run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in north-eastern Syria, with the possible exception of children. Driving this decision were fears about the capacity of BNPT and CSO partners to safely and effectively deal with the imminent return of 700 IS supporters from the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, despite this decision the existing population of hundreds of deportees, returnees and current and recent detainees, together with the hundreds of IS supporters likely to eventually find their own way home, many slipping undetected through Indonesia's porous borders, means that Indonesia's counter Terrorism Agency, BNPT (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorism) and partners will need to develop new programs to more comprehensively deal with disengagement, deradicalisation and rehabilitation (Anindya, 2019; Chalmers, 2017; IPAC, 2016; Widya, 2020).

Indonesia is hardly alone in facing significant challenges with rehabilitation and with extending P/CVE programs beyond the usual focus on primary interventions. Tertiary programs aimed at rehabilitation aside,

even in the field of secondary interventions, there are very few comprehensive programs in operation. The vast majority of P/CVE programs engage communities broadly with little being done to identify and focus on those on the cusp of entering into problems or facing particular vulnerabilities. And somewhat counter-intuitively, there appears to be relatively more work being done in the tertiary intervention space than there is in the secondary intervention space.

This reflects universal challenges seen around the globe and particularly in the region. In other countries in Southeast Asia where there is a significant body of work carried out by civil society organisations in countering violent extremism, such as in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, almost all of the programs are directed at the level of primary interventions. An optimistic reading of this is that it simply reflects a natural stage in the current cycle of development in the field. It makes sense that for CSOs starting out in the field of P/CVE most work is done at the primary intervention level because this is where the barriers to entry are lowest and the interventions are the least controversial. To engage in secondary interventions requires careful analysis based on critical intelligence about vulnerabilities. Whilst this is potentially well within the scope of many CSOs it remains much more challenging. Tertiary intervention programs face an extra barrier if they are to occur within the penal system because they require facilitation by, and cooperation with, government agencies. So far this has proved to be very difficult in the Philippines and Thailand, and there has been only very limited engagement with the authorities in Malaysia (Agastia et al., 2020; Aslam & Gunaratna, 2019; Yunus, 2018). In this respect, the situation in Indonesia is markedly better.

Tertiary programs in Indonesia have so far consisted primarily of a series of pilot projects rather than large-scale systematically structured and supported programs. The good news, as is discussed in the chapters that follow, is that these pilot projects have succeeded sufficiently and have been running long enough, to have delivered proof of concept. The challenge now is for government agencies, guided and supported by BNPT, to think more holistically, and boldly, about large-scale projects. Specifically, what is required are projects that run across the prison system and engage comprehensively with both detainees and those released from detention. For several years now, there have been promising signs of potential programs being developed and implemented but so far there has not been the breakthrough program that is required to bring about a paradigm shift.

Indonesia's success in counterterrorism, and specifically the success of Densus 88 in tactical responses—in making arrests ahead of attacks and disrupting terrorist plots—has been remarkable. But it has in turn produced its own problems. Over the past 17 years, Densus 88 has arrested more than 1800 suspected terrorists. This means that dozens of plots and developing cells have been successfully interrupted. And the vast majority of these 1800 plus arrests have led to successful convictions in court. The corollary of this, however, is that of the sentences have been relatively short, with most being between two and six years in length. In part, this is a product of counterterrorism legislation and challenges to proving intent, something which represents a perennial challenge in counterterrorism prosecutions all around the world. In Indonesia's case, the inadequacy of appropriate legislation has made the challenges all the harder. It was only after the shocking Surabaya family suicide bomb attacks of May 2018 that the Indonesian parliament was finally pressured into passing long-discussed counterterrorism legislation (Schulze, 2018). This legislation is widely seen to be imperfect but to nevertheless represent a considerable improvement, in most respects, over what was previously available. The new legislation means that recent and future arrests have the potential to result in more appropriate sentences. But even if this is the case it still leaves serious challenges when it comes to interrupting the cycle of recruitment, radicalisation, and recidivism.

The experience of conflict zones such as Iraq is that terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) detained for long periods of time, use that time in prison to educate themselves and others, consolidate social bonds and prepare for a return to terrorism post-release (Daymon & Malet, 2020). The Iraq case represents an extreme case, but it does point to the nature of the challenges. ISIS regarded the terrorist prisons in and around Baghdad as their 'university campuses'. In 2012, as the organisation was beginning to rebuild strength and plan for rapid future expansion it prepared a campaign which it ran through until late 2013 called the 'Breaking the Walls campaign' (Cockburn, 2016; Fishman, 2016; Hamming & Osteyen, 2018; Kilcullen, 2016; MCants, 2015; Stern & Berger, 2015). This involved audacious jail breaks using suicide attackers to penetrate prison perimeters and then storm the compounds with such force that the guards were overrun and hundreds of prisoners at a time were broken-out. Many of those who were released were seasoned al-Qaeda and ISIS militants, but some were new recruits. It was primarily from the Breaking the Walls campaign that ISIS replenished its ranks,

and strengthened its leadership, reaping a more tight-knit and disciplined core of leaders and senior militants. Today in both Iraq and Syria, there are signs that the cycle is repeating itself with the Islamic State insurgency (Barrett, 2017; Cordesman, 2020; Daymon et al., 2020; IPAC, 2019). In Afghanistan, a similar dynamic has been occurring for many years but has been more recently accelerated by peace negotiations with the Taliban which despite claims to the contrary continues to work closely with al-Qaeda (and in some cases with IS) even while securing the uncontested release of thousands of imprisoned Taliban militants.

Indonesia is a very different case. Most of the 1800, or so, militants who have been arrested and charged with terrorism offences have served their time and have been released. And so far, the signs are that most of these will not return to terrorist activity. Nevertheless, if even a small proportion does return to the same social networks, and in time, to actively supporting terrorism, then the cycle of recruitment, radicalisation and recidivism will continue (Chalmers, 2017). There is an important lesson of history in Indonesia with respect to the Darul Islam movement which has seen successful intergenerational transfer through three generations of committed extremists, with a fourth generation now emerging (Barton, 2020a, 2020b; Jones, 2007, 2010). And whilst Indonesian prisons might not have not been 'university campuses for terrorism' to the same extent as is the case in the Middle East there have nevertheless been elements of that dynamic played out in a less comprehensive fashion.

Indonesian prisons have long been notoriously porous and under-resourced (Kfir, 2018; Llewellyn, 2018). There are not nearly enough prison staff, or appropriate physical resources, to cope with the burgeoning prison population. The general prison population in Indonesia exceeds 250,000 people detained in over 500 prisons. These numbers reflect a demand on the system which is more than double the design capacity. The ratio of prisoners to prison guards is around 55 to 1, making the surveillance and control of prisoners particularly challenging, especially when it comes to maintaining control of charismatic radicals and terrorist leaders. There have been a number of well-known cases in which senior terrorists, such as leader of the IS-aligned JAD network Aman Abdurrahman, have worked productively in prison translating Arabic texts into Indonesian, actively inspiring terrorist networks, receiving visitors and engaging in regular communications (Ismail & Sim, 2016a, 2016b).

Recognising these problems, the Indonesian authorities have for some time been planning a dedicated counterterrorism detention centre. The

need for this was made very clear in the same week as the Surabaya suicide bombings when an uprising at the police detention facility holding a number of terrorism detainees saw terrorist prisoners gain control of the prison and execute five prison staff members (Llewellyn, 2018). This accelerated awareness of the need for dedicated prison facilities for terrorists such as the recently completed BNPT De-radicalisation Centre (Pusderad) in Sentul on the outskirts of Jakarta. In August 2019, the government inaugurated a new super-maximum-security prison for high-risk convicted terrorists on the prison island of Nusa Kambangan (U.S. Department of State, 2019). Initiatives like this are likely to lead to better control but they don't take away the basic dynamic of prisons being used by terrorist networks to recruit and to consolidate.

What now needs to be done is for Indonesia to begin to translate some of the proven success, or at least promising early signs of success, in pilot programs, into large-scale systematic rehabilitation programs both in prison and with prisoners being released (Suarda, 2016; Sumpter et al., 2019). The agency that has to lead in this is BNPT as no other body has the authority or the resources to initiate what is required. There are numerous reasons why BNPT has so far not risen to this and other challenges and has been slow to realise its potential (Anindya, 2019). The shortcomings within BNPT represent an entire field of study within itself. They are not unique to that particular organisation but rather reflect challenges within the Indonesian public service bureaucracy, and within the military, in terms of achieving transformational leadership and large-scale problem-solving.

Leaving aside these internal challenges, there are a series of universal problems to be faced when it comes to successfully implementing large-scale tertiary P/CVE programs. The first problem is understanding how radicalisation occurs and how it can be reversed. Despite very good work being done on radicalisation by a diverse range of scholars, the mechanisms and processes of radicalisation into violent extremist networks and of disengaging from them continue to be incompletely understood and very much contested (Dean et al., 2018). What is clear is that many people disengage largely by themselves without external intervention. But just as radicalisation tends to be closely connected with recruitment, grooming and other social processes, so too facilitating disengagement and rehabilitation requires attending to extremist social networks and to broader social contexts. The fact that the language of rehabilitation within

Indonesian programs tends to fall back simplistically to the term deradicalisation, of 'derad', speaks to a relative lack of awareness of the processes involved on the part of government agencies.

Whilst cognitive deradicalisation is important and is experienced by many, it is difficult to precipitate and direct on a large-scale. It is probably better to think in terms of producing conducive circumstances in which cognitive deradicalisation can be facilitated rather than thinking in terms of driving and directing that process. In any case, it is generally better to focus on disengaging people from violence and from the social networks that support and encourage that violence. But this is only part of the story, as disengagement can only really be sustained if people are re-engaged back into mainstream society and into healthy relationships (Barrelle, 2015; Børgo & Horgan, 2009).

Consequently, it makes sense to focus on the social environment and providing pathways both to disengage from malign social networks and to engage or reengage with healthy networks (Hwang, 2018; Sumpter et al., 2019; Syafiq, 2019). This is why the pilot programs discussed in this volume have focused on equipping people for productive lives outside of prison. In part, this is about ensuring that they have the personal capacity to earn a living and are not forced to return to their old networks that will see them drawn back into extremist circles. But it is not simply a matter of education and training, it is also a matter of awakening and consolidating self-belief through the experience of being received into normal society and finding a place within mainstream communities. This is why learning to work in a coffee shop, or to cook in a café kitchen, or to serve its customers, for example, is as much about learning new social skills and developing self-esteem in mainstream contexts as it is about learning skills. The good news is that this can work very effectively within the context of social enterprise as the pilot projects discussed in this volume illustrate. What that means for government agencies is that relatively modest investments and support, whether from government or better still in partnership with business and civil society, can achieve sustainable programs on a large scale. What is required, however, is for peak bodies like BNPT to lead the way, to facilitate and implement large-scale rollouts and to secure the consistent support of critical agencies.

One of the many weaknesses of the penal system in Indonesia is the lack of a sufficient number of well-trained parole officers and of a sufficiently resourced parole system. This is another area that needs to be considered in terms of implementing rehabilitation programs for those coming out

of prison. Technically, of course, parole only works for those who are required to participate because they are released on parole. A prisoner who serves a full term and then is released is under no obligation to engage with the parole system. This presents challenges for sentencing and for the management of the penal system in addition to the need to adequately resource and build up a parole system that can cater for the needs of terrorism detainees.

Beyond this, there is also a need for dedicated programs within prisons (IPAC, 2018b). Here the concept of deradicalisation is particularly unhelpful. What is required is better understood as a system of counselling and accountability. This may involve religious teachers and leaders, but it is largely about working through personal and family issues in a productive fashion.

The fact that a number of relatively successful prison rehabilitation programs have been developed around the world means that templates exist that can be adapted to the Indonesian context (Børgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al., 2008; Eggert, 2018; El-Said, 2015; El-Said & Harrigan, 2012; Hansen & Lid, 2020; Horgan, 2009a, 2009b; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Hwang, 2018; Koehler, 2016, 2017; Kruglanski et al., 2014; LaFree et al., 2020; Marsden, 2017; Silke, 2013; Yunus, 2018). The Singapore religious rehabilitation group (RRG) program appears to have achieved significant success (Jayakumar, 2019). And there are almost certainly elements of this that can be fruitfully borrowed and replicated in Indonesia, notwithstanding the reality that the rich city state is a vastly better resourced than its giant neighbour. The number of terrorism detainees in Singapore is relatively small, and there are ample human and other resources allocated to support them. Nevertheless, the elements of using dedicated religious leaders working in partnership with community groups and in particular with mothers and 'aunties' who can bring to bear maternal leadership and guidance represent elements that could be readily copied in Indonesia.

Similarly, in Australia, the programs like the Community Integration Support Program (CISP) in Victoria and the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) in New South Wales contain elements that could be borrowed and applied in the Indonesian context relatively easily (Cherney et al., 2018; Cherney 2020a, 2020b). There have, over the years, been some limited exchanges between correctional system staff from Australia and correctional system staff in Indonesia but there is great scope to do more of this work. The backbone of the success of CISP in

Victoria has been the leadership shown by *imams,* that is to say by Islamic clerics working in a pastoral-care capacity. Their legitimacy and authority as religious figures opens doors to engagement and, occasionally, has direct bearing on what they discuss with their clients, but the most part what they do is in the realm of pastoral care. In the Australian context, such religious figures seldom have time to do the one-on-one pastoral care that they do in the community integration support program. Consequently, the mere fact that an *imam* is spending time with a prisoner, or with an ex-prisoner now released into society, and sometimes helping with their family as well, is generally greatly appreciated and well-received. This sort of engagement can easily be borrowed from and applied within the Indonesian context. And indeed, some of the key personnel from the community integration support program have travelled to Indonesia and shared with several study groups of the work that they do. With small investments by appropriate government agencies in both Indonesia and Australia, this work could be greatly extended in a very fruitful fashion. And indeed considerable work in partnership is being done in this space (AIPJ2, 2020).

As was noted above, the vast majority of P/CVE programs in Indonesia, as is common across Southeast Asia, represent interventions at the primary level working broadly with communities (Sumpter, 2017). When discussing tertiary interventions intended to affect rehabilitation of those who of already been radicalised or recruited, it is helpful to think beyond this boundary and to give consideration to the need for secondary intervention with at-risk communities. There is an organic and seamless connection that needs to be recognised. Not only should rehabilitation programs be conducted within prisons and carried on with those who have recently left prison but there needs also to be work done with their family and with their communities. This is not just to ensure the prospects for rehabilitation for prisoners but it's also to work to try and break the cycle of recruitment between the generations across extended family networks. Experience around the world has shown that for every individual in prison on terrorism charges there is likely to be an element of extended family and associated community that is at risk of being drawn into the same network that recruited the detainee.

This is been seen quite dramatically in the Australian context where the families involved in the Operation Pendennis arrests of 2005 saw nine individuals in Victoria and nine in New South Wales detained on terrorism charges for their association with two Al Qaeda inspired cells have later

seen extended family members such as nephews and in-laws go on to become engaged in IS and travel to Syria and Iraq. Australia continues to have a relatively small number of terrors and detainees and yet the scale of problems associated with them is already very significant and came to a head in the context of 2014 through 2017 foreign terrorist fighter travel to Syria (Zammitt, 2019; Zammitt et al., 2019). It is not well understood to what extent the same dynamics of have occurred in Indonesia but it is clear this is an area requiring further study. And as work is done on building the capacity for rehabilitation with terrorism detainees and former prisoners so too work needs to be done with extended family networks in the hope of not just effecting rehabilitation but of preventing the radicalisation and recruitment of young people at risk.

As noted above, whilst there has been a considerable body of important work done on understanding recruitment and radicalisation along with the process of leaving and disengaging there is much that is still not well understood, or at least is difficult to monitor and to measure. One of the perennial challenges in this field is trying to assess the risk of recidivism and to gauge progress in disengagement and rehabilitation. So far, no reliable tools exist to reliably measure radicalisation, and the risk of individuals moving more deeply into engagement with violent extremism, and similarly no reliable tools exist to gauge the process of disengagement and rehabilitation. In Australia, the two tools that are most used to understand risk of radicalisation are the Australian tool referred to as RADAR and the Canadian tool known as Vera-2R. Both of these tools have a certain degree of utility, but much work is required to develop from them robust tools more appropriate to the Indonesian context. Researchers are currently working on how to assess the utility of these tools with a view to developing better ones. The same researchers recognise the need to do similar work in developing tools to assess in the process of rehabilitation and disengagement. To the extent that such tools become available they would be invaluable in constructing effective well supervised tertiary intervention programs in the Indonesian context.

The large scale of terrorism arrests and detentions in Indonesia, is more a reflection more of the size of Indonesia, a nation of 275 million people and of the effectiveness of counterterrorism programs, than it is of an exceptional degree of radicalisation. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index (IEP 2020) ranks Indonesia as 38 out of 135 in terms of the impact of terrorism (down two places from 2019) placing it in the ‘medium’ band

of nations, together with the U.S., the U.K. and France, whereas, the Philippines, for example, with a rank of 10 is in the 'high' impact band.

The large number of convicted terrorists in Indonesia means that there are very large datasets potentially available to researchers trying to understand deradicalisation and disengagement. Consequently, a good opportunity exists for the risk assessment tools needed to better understand and manage disengagement and rehabilitation to be developed in Indonesia. The fact that there is an emerging body of academic research in Indonesia interested in these issues, and with steadily growing capacity and expertise, suggests that Indonesia may well lead the way in future in this field. For the time being, however, Indonesia is struggling. Both challenges and opportunities are being addressed in a piecemeal fashion rather than at the level of scale required. The success of counterterrorism under Densus 88, working with mass organisations and civil society, means that the immediate threat of terrorism has been contained. But it remains a resilient threat and the history of terrorism in Indonesia suggests that it is likely to continue to be an enduring threat constantly at risk of flaring up as circumstances change, whether within Indonesia, or elsewhere in Asia, or in the Middle East.

One of the challenges to developing and evaluating prison and post-prison rehabilitation programs for convicted terrorists and other detainees at risk of radicalisation is the lack of clear and complete data (IPAC, 2018a). This is not just a problem for Indonesia and other developing nations it is very much a universal problem, and one that has not been adequately addressed even in the mature, wealthy, democracies of Western Europe. The unprecedented volume of extremists that authorities are currently dealing with, resulting in enormous surveillance caseloads for police and other security agencies, has contributed to high levels of concern about the thousands of convicted terrorists in detention and the many hundreds due for release over the coming few years. With thousands travelling from Western Europe to Syria to join ISIS and thousands more arrested in connection with numerous terrorist attacks, and interrupted plots, since 2014, there is understandably considerable anxiety about the threat of terrorist recidivism. There are currently around 4,000 inmates in Western Europe with links to terrorism. In France alone there are 1,700 terrorist convicts, and 90% of these will be released by 2025 (Renard, 2020).

The experienced Belgium researcher Thomas Renard sought to make sense of the data on recidivism in a provocative recent article (2020),

drawing upon analysis of a specially constructed dataset of 557 Belgium Islamist terrorist convicts ('Jihadi Terrorist Offenders in Belgium'—JTOB) covering the three decades from January 1990 to December 2019. Based on analysis of this data, and related studies of terrorist recidivism and re-engagement, Renard strikes a counter-intuitively optimistic note. From his 30-year data set of 557 Belgium terrorist convicts, Renard identified only 13 cases, or 2.3%, of recidivism, narrowly defined, and a further 14 cases of re-engagement or suspected re-engagement, giving a combined figure of just 4.8%. Renard reviews a number of other European, British and American studies looking at terrorism convict recidivism and reveals that most of them report similarly low rates (Altier et al., 2019). Even allowing for the gaps in data, and the narrowness of the definitions used, these figures suggest that, contrary to widely-held expectations and concerns, very few terrorist convicts will continue on the path of terrorism once released from jail. Some might interpret this to mean that rehabilitation programs are unwarranted. Arguably, however, in the light of everything else that is known about the broader problems that need to be dealt with, these figures can be read to suggest that there are grounds for being optimistic about what can be achieved with terrorism convicts in rehabilitation programs. Certainly, the situation is not hopeless, and the vast majority of individuals are not irredeemable.

In September 2020 the consistently insightful team of researchers led by Sidney Jones at the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) in Jakarta released a report entitled 'Terrorism, Recidivism and Planned Releases in Indonesia' (IPAC, 2020). This IPAC report looks at 825 men and women who were convicted of terrorism offences and detained and released between 2002 and May 2020. It positively identified 94 repeat offenders from among the 825, which gives a terrorism convict reoffending rate of over 11%. Most of these 94 were re-arrested for a second terrorist offence, some had travelled to Syria to join ISIS, and a smaller group had clearly re-engaged with violent extremism but had not been re-arrested. A total of 12 tried to join in with pro-ISIS fighters. Three attempted to travel to the Philippines and one to Afghanistan. Eight attempted to travel to Syria and five succeeded in joining with ISIS fighters, with at least four being killed. The IPAC team points out that these figures are conservative as the figure of 94 repeat offenders does not include the 44 former prisoners re-arrested for terrorism offences after leaving jail whose original detentions were the result of regular criminal

convictions. The case of these 44 points to the broader problem of prison radicalisation and recruitment.

IPAC's analysis suggests that Indonesia has a terrorism convict reoffending rate that is at least two or three times higher than the reoffending rates in Western democracies referred to by Renard (2020). It is difficult to be certain about why the Indonesian case should be so different, but it is clear that Indonesia has a much greater problem than many would like to acknowledge. As the IPAC report observes: '*The one agency that consistently downplays the problem is the one with the most responsibility for addressing it: the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT). In 2018, the then head of BNPT claimed that Indonesia had only had three terrorism recidivists since 2002 and that this was due to the 100 per cent success rate of its deradicalisation program*'.

The writers of the IPAC report are not nearly so sanguine as the former head of BNPT. They make the case that: '*BNPT programs are largely ineffective, partly because they mostly draw in prisoners who have already decided on their own to disengage (if indeed they ever used violence in the first place). In one study of released prisoners, mostly from JI, personal factors such as the birth of a first child, disillusionment with leaders or tactics, and individual cost–benefit analyses were found to be more important than any government interventions.…*

The BNPT programs are voluntary, and many prisoners are not interested. They also focus more on instilling loyalty to the Indonesian state than on giving prisoners, while still in detention or after release, new goals, marketable skills or access to new networks. In 2018, of 630 released prisoners eligible for post-release programs, only 325 elected to take part'.

By the end of 2020, over 120 convicted terrorists will have been released and in 2021, a further 150 plus will leave detention (IPAC, 2020). Based on the pattern of the past 18 years, this would suggest that around 25 to 35 of these individuals will go on to re-engage in violent extremism. The IPAC report concludes that there is scope reducing this rate of terrorist recidivism and re-engagement: '*This paper suggests that some of the factors involved for those who do is the radicalism of their immediate family members; their ideological commitment and status in prison; and the availability of a movement once they are out to join that combines a powerful idea with the opportunity for action. Of these factors, there is little that authorities can do about the last, but the first and second have more possibilities'.*

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PART II

Case Studies in Countering Extremism

CHAPTER 4

An Initiative of Women in Preventing and Countering Violence Extremism: The Mothers for Change Program

Dewirini Anggraeni

Introduction

Over the past two decades, as the world has witnessed successive waves of terrorism, there has been a growing awareness and recognition of the importance of understanding of the root causes of terrorism and what leads groups and individuals to engage in violent extremism. The processes of recruitment, radicalisation and pre-and post-attack have altered policy makers, practitioners, researchers and society in general of the need to focus disengagement and de-radicalisation strategies to counter violent extremism. Of equal importance, however, is the issue of how to prevent violent extremism in the first place; that is, how to identify the early warning signs of radicalisation, the motivations behind violent extremism and the push and pull factors that influence escalation to violence.

D. Anggraeni (✉)
Center for Pesantren and Democracy Studies (CePDeS), Jakarta, Indonesia

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This chapter focuses on the role of parents, and in particular the role of mothers, in recognising the signs of radicalisation and playing an integral part in preventing violent extremism. The findings of recent research indicate that one of the key drivers of radicalisation into extremism is alienation and the need for belonging and acceptance. Young people have been a heavily targeted group by terrorist organisations, in part because they are at a particularly vulnerable stage in their psychological development, making them more susceptible to recruitment and radicalisation. In recognising this, parenting education has emerged as a crucial tool for protecting children from external influences that prey upon these feelings of alienation. The threat posed by external influences is particularly potent in the current era of wide scale social media accessibility. With the rapid development of technology as a means of communication (Zeiger, 2016), the internet has become one of the predominant means of spreading propaganda and has been used as a facilitative tool to support terrorist groups in recruiting and communicating with their followers (Mahmood, 2017).

In their efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism, some NGOs have taken the approach of using mothers to assist in countering the narratives which have led to radicalisation to violent extremism among young people. Mothers are often the first to become aware of radicalisation entering their home through the social networks of their children or their husbands. Consequently, mothers have an important role to play in countering and preventing violent extremism given their role as carers and protectors (Eggert, 2018; Lierde, 2013; True & Eddyono, 2018; UN Women, 2015; Winterbotham, 2020). Mothers are uniquely positioned to recognise behavioural changes in their children. Their critically important role is recognised in religion, with one verse in the Quran describing mothers as 'the first school for their children; therefore if the mothers are good the nation would be good'.

One of the longest running programs in Indonesia that seeks to engage mothers in countering and preventing violent extremism is called 'Mothers for Change'. Established by the Center for Pesantren of Democracy Studies (CePDeS), and working in collaboration with government bodies such as the Ministry of Women Empowerment and Children Protection of Indonesia, the program educates mothers and leaders of women's organisations under the network of the Ministry of Women Empowerment and Children Protection across Indonesia from Jakarta and Bogor to Semarang and Palu. This initiative has had a significant

impact on supporting mothers to play a role in decreasing the spread of violent extremism. The initiative focuses on building strong lines of communication between children and their mothers and providing opportunities for mothers to listen to, and learn from, their children's experiences. Although the actual stories told by the children may not appear to be particularly significant, the establishment of strong channels of communication is important for creating bonding between mothers and their children in order to develop a relationship of trust between them. This chapter will provide an overview of the aims, scope, participants and key activities involved in the program before moving on to an evaluation of its effectiveness and some suggestions for the future of the Mothers for Change initiative.

Program Aim and Scope

The Mothers for Change program is designed and run as a 'parenting for peace' method with an educational approach. Broadly, this program seeks to introduce mothers to the early warning signs of radicalisation. The key aims of the program are:

- To identify how communities in general, and mothers in particular, understand the threat of radicalisation and the relationship between radicalisation and extremism.
- To explore community perceptions of the core drivers of radicalisation. This aims to contribute to recognising and responding to early warning signs of radicalisation in children, and specifically young adolescences.
- To engage in interactive discussions and critical thinking on the concept of parenting education, the dynamics of communication with children, and the leadership development of mothers.
- To better understand the building community resilience as something that starts with familial and personal change.
- To actively solicit community engagement through mothers and women leaders, giving them a voice to engage the community in effective approaches to reducing the threat of radicalisation and violent extremism.
- To explore individual community understandings of radicalisation in order to inform and elevate policy makers' ability to create effective

strategies to prevent violent extremism and counter radicalisation in specific community contexts.
- To educate mothers and women leaders on the early warning signs of radicalisation and how best to counter and prevent violent extremism at home.

Target Participants

The target participants for this program are mothers with teenage children. Participants also include female leaders of women's organisations, as they are deemed to be well-positioned to disseminate the program content to other women in order to expand the reach of this community resilience focused initiative. This chapter draws upon data from when the program was held in four different provinces in Indonesia between 2016 and 2018; these provinces were Jakarta, Bogor (West Java), Semarang (Central Java) and Palu (Central Sulawesi). In each training group, approximately 30 participants from various backgrounds joined the program, including female leaders of women's organisations, multi-faith organisations, the Indonesian Police Wife Association, the Indonesian Army Wife Association and media organisations. No specific age restrictions were imposed for the participants of the program; as long as they had teenage children and were able to deliver the education to other organisation members they were able to participate.

Context of the Initiative

Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, with a population of 275 million people of whom approximately 240 million (87%) identify as Muslims. This large population is home to a number of extremist groups seeking to recruit new members. Over the last three decades, a variety of violent extremist groups in Indonesia have committed acts of terrorism both locally and internationally, claiming their actions to be in the name of Islam. In many cases the spread of propaganda started in extremist *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) belonging to a dangerous radicalised fringe element of Indonesia's otherwise moderate Islamic educational institutions. In these *pesantren*, the ideological beliefs of young adolescent students is often influenced by extremist teaching delivered by some of their teachers who had previously

been involved in wars in Afghanistan and/or Syria. This has led to radicalisation and recruitment of these young people, and it is suspected that this has been funded by organisations who have also provided support to of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Terrorist groups work to entice potential members into the recruitment process through a variety of approaches. For example, individuals from lower economic backgrounds are often drawn in by appeals targeting their economic needs or desires. In other cases, alienation can be employed as a powerful push factor for *hijrah* (migration) (Rahmah, 2016; Zeiger, 2016). For some, religious fanaticism and the desire to find reward from Allah represent the strongest motivating factor. In these instances, new recruits believe that by becoming involved in terrorism, they are effectively granted a ticket to heaven (*Jannah*) for their family; this is a common element employed in luring candidates into the recruitment process (Rahmah, 2016).

On factor that can contribute to the success of terrorist group recruitment efforts is their understanding of the particular characteristics of geographical, cultural and religious of their target communities (Bloom, 2011; Grossman et al., 2013). By developing a sound understanding of these factors, a group can more efficiently and effectively appeal to its target audience for recruitment. Terrorist groups often target adolescents from small villages. This is, at least in part, because people in small villages tend to be more culturally closed off to external influences, including radical ideologies. These communities tend to be more inward looking, more socially conservative and religious, and live more traditional lives when compared with communities in more urbanised areas. These characteristics are exploited by terrorist groups seeking to infiltrate these areas to target children and young people through religious classes and/or Quran reading classes.

It is here that the role of mothers becomes a crucial tool in the effort to counter and prevent violent extremism, particularly within more vulnerable communities. Although radicalisation can occur rapidly, initiatives involving women being engaged in countering terrorism have the potential to counter this threat early on where it first reveals itself within the home environment. This means that it is important to increase women's education on parenting for peace in order to support efforts to minimise the risk of radicalisation within the community. In addition, it is also important to support mothers in developing the self-confidence and strategy needed to build good communication with their children so that

Fig. 4.1 Mothers for change program at Palu, Central Sulawesi

safe spaces for discussion between mothers and children can be developed. In time, this can contribute to the overall development of resilience at the community level (Fig. 4.1).

Project Activities

In light of the specific challenges in Indonesia, the Mothers for Change program was developed to address mothers' concerns about the potential spread of radicalisation. Recent research findings indicate that mothers have the potential to play a significant role in countering violent extremism, but they need support to build their capacity. With this in mind, the Mothers for Change program sought out mothers who were eager to counter extremist influences and strengthen community resilience, viewing these women as the basis for developing a significant foundation for security starting from within the home. The program can be adapted to better accommodate local cultural factors and customs, enabling optimisation of the pre-existing sources and grassroots implementation through critical dialogue, facilitation of leadership classes, and critical reflections to improve the current knowledge that participants have about early warning signs of radicalisation. In addition, this program provided a space to learn about the effects of extremism, the significant barriers to addressing radicalisation at home, and how to foster open

discussions with their children and confront the radical ideas that they have been exposed to (Fig. 4.2).

The Mothers for Change program adopted a capacity building approach to leadership and helped women learn how to become agents of peace. The leadership skills developed throughout this program serve as an essential foundation for building mothers' confidence to be agents of peace at home. Through this program, mothers learn about the value of forgiveness, factors that create and destroys peace, how to be a good listener, and some of the key characteristics of effective communication as a mother and woman leader. These values and qualities are presented through a diverse range of session topics. For example, in one session, the Mothers for Change facilitators look at relationships between mothers and children, and how these relationships can be supported by fathers. Cooperation between mother and father can serve as a means of strengthening familial relationships, which is an essential element of parental education for addressing radicalisation issues.

Fig. 4.2 Participants learning about a good listener in role play session

The curriculum provided in the Mothers for Change program focuses on the central concept of 'inner peace' and listening to the inner peace of mothers to support their role as agent of change within the family. Hence, building self-esteem is very important to enhance the mother's capacity as an agent of peace. Before mothers can create peace within their family and environment, they first need to create peace within themselves. These leadership values are passed on to the mothers so that they can speak up and 'be friends' with their children. The parent–child dynamic of communication sometimes becomes a barrier in building good communication; the Mothers for Change program seeks to counter this provide women with the skills and confidence to overcome these communication barriers.

The Mothers for Change program workshops were held across two days. The first day focused on creating an open space and comfortable platform for participants to collectively explore questions such as 'who am I?' through deconstructed discussions and productive conversations. These discussions and conversations seek to build the leadership capacity of the mothers. Self-reflection is also used to give mothers time to listen to their own inner peace and identify their own strengths and weaknesses, which then allowed them to analyse the common problems happening around them. Since mothers have multiple roles as part of their family, organisation and workplace, it is sometimes difficult for them find time to stop and listen to their own self-reflections. With this in mind, the sessions are designed give participants the time and space to learn about themselves and elevate their capacity as mothers in order to create peace and become agents of change at home (Fig. 4.3).

Once mothers have learned about building their own confidence and capacity on Day One, Day Two then introduces them to the early warning signs of radicalisation. The natural inclination of mothers to nurture their children and family represents a powerful resource that women can use to address radicalisation. The emotional connection that mothers have with their children is an important element that can be used in the pre-radicalisation stage and the post-radicalisation stage. In the last session of the program, mothers come together in a group exercise designed to reinforce what they have learnt. They gather in a circle and hold a rope which connects them to one another as a symbol that mothers are not alone in combating extremism. This session also stressed that mothers whose children have left to join terrorist groups should not be blamed, because, by working with these mothers, they too can contribute to creating change.

Fig. 4.3 Mothers learning about who am i? in leadership session

Enabling women to be the first line of protection against radicalisation and enhancing their capacity are the main objectives of this this bottom-up approach to preventing and countering terrorism. For it to achieve its full potential, however, this effort requires ongoing support from government bodies and civil society organisations. While it is important to help mothers prevent and recognise the signs of radicalisation, it is also important to know when and how to escalate their concerns. The community crisis centre program provided by the Society Against Radicalism and Violent Extremism, SeRVE Indonesia, has a crucial role to play by helping society as a whole understand the communication and complaint process for identified instances in which an individual receives an offer from a radicalised group, or indeed becomes involved in a radicalised group. Nevertheless, we still have no clear reporting method for the reporting and monitoring of recruitment efforts by terrorist groups.

Initially, some of the mothers feel shy and afraid to speak up about their personal stories of losing family members to radicalisation into violent extremism, and they were also reluctant to tell the stories of friends' families who also experienced such loss. Reluctance to discuss these issues has served as a barrier in the past to these mothers and families receiving proper support. Since a reporting mechanism has not yet been established by the government, the approach taken by the Mothers for Change initiative may help serve as a means of listening to the needs of the society.

This is particularly the case in grassroots areas such as Palu and Semarang, which are considered to be particularly vulnerable to infiltration by violent extremists. The small city of Palu, Central Sulawesi, for example, is particularly sensitive to the emergence of hateful views, given the genocide and multi-faith conflict it has previously endured. In contrast, the mid-sized coastal city of Semarang, Central Java, is a central area from which radical group teachings can spread relatively unchallenged into Solo and Semarang. Furthermore, the social impacts of the hatred projected by older generations is exacerbated by the ability of terrorist organisations to reach and potentially radicalise a broader audience more quickly with the support of online communication like the internet and social media (UNODC, 2016; Zeiger, 2016). These factors—both wide reaching and more localised—significantly increase the threat of radicalisation and the need for grassroots level strategies to prevent and counter this threat through empowering women and encouraging dialogue (Fig. 4.4).

Traditionally as pillars of the homes and local communities, mothers are well positioned to recognise changes within their family. In addition, a mother's connection to her children can be deep and enduring. Therefore, mothers can play a very important role in preventing and countering violent extremism from within the home. Indeed, the role of mothers can be as important as the armed force for state security when it comes to

Fig. 4.4 The world connecting us. An interactive session aimed to learn about inclusiveness

recognising, preventing and countering violent extremism. The Mothers for Change program has recognised mothers as key assets in P/CVE and has sought to strengthen their capacity to be peace agents within their homes and communities.

Evaluation

The effectiveness of the program was measured through the pre- and post- program survey responses provided by the participants. These surveys sought to quantify the understanding of mothers about parenting for peace both before and after taking part in the program. This evaluation focused on gauging the participants' understanding of radicalisation through assessing their knowledge of radicalisation and its early warning signs before joining the program, and again after completion of the program.

In the pre-program survey, the mothers' views regarding their own potential role in countering and preventing radicalisation was quite narrow in scope. By contrast, the responses gathered in the post-program survey were generally broader in scope, as mothers openly shared their perspectives on how to be agents of change at home. In the post survey, almost all of the participants agreed to be agents of change and believed they were likely to become actively involved in combatting violent extremism to support national security.

The feedback collected through the evaluation forms may assist in further developing aspects of the Mothers for Change Program in order to increase the adaptability of the program to suit to different cultural and geographical contexts. As Indonesia is rich in cultural and ethnic diversity, it is important to recognise the different local contexts and develop the program with these differences taken into account. This also enables the organisers to learn how different issues might arise and to listen thoroughly to what has happened in the community. This information can then be translated into recommendations to local authorities and the national state body (Fig. 4.5).

Future Directions of the Program

As we continue to develop new and more effective approaches to preventing and countering the threat of radicalisation and violent extremism, mothers will continue to be a vital instrument in the pre-radicalisation stage for their children. Their contribution is particularly

Fig. 4.5 Women circle in Mothers for Change in Palu, Central Sulawesi

valuable in encouraging and supporting children and adolescents to resist radicalisation or, if already radicalised, disengage from violent extremist groups and de-radicalise. This novel approach to supporting state security uses the uniqueness of mothers' strengths and leadership capacity, enabling them to support the broader P/CVE effort.

In future it is hoped that the empowerment of women and recognition of the important role of mothers will enable them a platform through which to contribute to the national security policy making process and the state security agenda. Women have much to offer in state-level discussions about peace-making processes (McCarthy, 2015; Shepherd, 2007; SIPRI, 2016; Tickner & True, 2018; UN Women, 2011, 2015; Wibben, 2016) The security strategy of engaging women in the peacemaking process has proven to be salient method (Bloom, 2011; Chowdhury Fink et al., 2016; Eggert, 2018; Grossman & Tahiri, 2015; Grossman et al., 2013; McEvoy & White, 2012; UNDOC, 2016). Women peace makers are now widely involved in different stages of preventing and countering radicalisation processes and the involvement of women in these spaces has produced new and compelling approaches to addressing radicalisation. This has been illustrated in this chapter by the Women for Change program, which uses mothers' emotional connections to their children, parenting education and women's empowerment, to build women's capacity to recognise and address the early warning signs of radicalisation. Carrying this program forward on a larger scale as part of a broader security

policy has the potential to offer significant measurable benefits for national security.

This initiative produced much positive feedback and generated further knowledge about preventing and countering violent extremism through the inclusion of mothers' voices in security dialogues. For instance, one of the participants in the Mothers for Change program, when sharing her views on the positive outcomes that they gained from joining the program said: 'This meeting is very important, because the knowledge is not taught generally in the society'. Another mother said,

> I am very happy to be able to take part in this activity because I can study the process of radicalism into the family, especially, preventing our children from violent extremism. Additionally, I am very interested in the exposure to human psychoanalysis in the age category so that it becomes a measurement indicator for my learning process as the agent of peace from home.

These comments from participants are indicative of the need for greater security education for mothers. Although women are generally viewed as agents of peace at home, their role in P/CVE up until now has been limited. Many women expressed their fear about the threat of terrorism, and although they are willing to help in preventing terrorism, they often lack the knowledge and a safe space to prevent and counter radicalisation, and later, to support the disengagement process as part of the reintegration stage. In building community resilience, the first step is to equip mothers with knowledge of the early warning signs of radicalisation. Identifying and filling this gap in the existing approach to P/CVE is the first step. The next step is to broaden the involvement of mothers to strengthen the network of individuals and groups fighting against the influence of radical groups, who quickly adapt their strategies in response to changing contexts. The inclusion of women as agents of change in the community is an important approach to stemming the appeal of propaganda disseminated by terrorist groups to radicalise and recruit young people.

A further step should involve creating community crisis centres which offer safe spaces for mothers, young people and parents who want to learn about early warning signs of radicalisation and access peace education programs offered by groups such as SeRVE Indonesia. This should be followed by the establishment of a reporting mechanism whereby the

community can easily share their concerns through a hotline number and see these complaints escalated to the appropriate government body and/or civil society organisation to assist in the case being managed.

Conclusion: Mothers as Key 'Peace Agents'

Mothers have considerable potential to be key peace agents in the P/CVE space through their unique position within their families and communities. Their role as central in the family places them in a unique position to address radicalisation where its signs may first present: within the home. In order to build the capacity of mothers to be positive peace agents or agents of change in their family, however, relevant education and support is necessary. The Mothers for Change program seeks to provide that support, first by equipping mothers with leadership skills and peace education, and next by teaching them about the early warning signs of radicalisation. This program has been integral to furthering efforts to enhance women's capacity in preventing violent extremism as it has expanded their support network and their access to education on violent extremism beyond traditional sources of this information, which would usually come from within the home itself via their husband, children or extended family. The benefits of this novel approach to collective security through empowered mothers can be optimised if appropriate support is provided by relevant government bodies and other civil society organisations. Overall, mothers are not left to work alone in preventing and countering violent extremism, but more education, training and support is needed to better support them in this role.

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CHAPTER 5

Peace Villages

Visna Vulovik

Introduction

The direct involvement of women in acts of violent extremism and terrorism is not a new phenomenon. But in Indonesia, the issue has risen to greater prominence over the past five years. It began to gain significant public attention following the 2016 arrest of Dian Yulia Novi in Bekasi, on the eastern fringe of Greater Jakarta, on allegations of preparing to carry out a suicide bombing (Aziz & Agung, 2016). Then the suicide bomb attacks on three churches and a police station in Surabaya in May 2018, involving two mothers and their young children, shocked the nation and caught the horrified attention of the global community. The emergence of these female terrorists has made it clear that terrorism in Indonesia is not exclusively the domain of men and that women are increasingly becoming directly involved in attack planning and execution.

Women in Indonesian terrorist networks are no longer merely engaged in support roles but are now actively becoming actively engaged as

V. Vulovik (✉)
Jakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: visna1@wahidinstitute.org

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perpetrators of terrorist attacks. In fact, research conducted by the Institute of Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC, 2017a, 2017b, 2020) states that the involvement of Indonesian women in radical organizations has exceeded those in other countries. This research also shows that since 2013, more than 100 women from Indonesia crossed the Turkish-Syrian border to join ISIS, as did over 100 Indonesian children (Barrett, 2017; IPAC, 2017a). Hundreds more were arrested by authorities in Turkey before they could cross into Syria. Most of these—as many as 570—were repatriated to Indonesia by Turkish authorities. Women are increasingly presented as playing important roles by groups such as IS, and not as homemakers who give birth to, and educate, the next generation of mujahideen. According to recent IS propaganda messaging at least, women are now also able to take up combat roles, including carrying out suicide operations. In Indonesia, this new promise of direct participation in terrorist by women has generated enthusiastic responses. And there is good reason for believing that it is going to prove to be a growing trend. If that is the case, then the transformation of Jihadi women in Indonesia from being passive supporters of terrorism to active perpetrators of terrorism will follow the path of what has occurred in places like Palestine, Iraq and Chechnya.

This challenges a prominent narrative theme used to understand women's role in terrorism that assumes that most women have no agency and are simply the naïve victims of radicalism and terrorism. In this framing, women are seen as victims of a patriarchal construction that occurs in radical and terrorist organisations where women are seen as second-class citizens who must obey their husbands, including following their partner's ideological beliefs.

And finally, whilst there is now a large body of literature examining the narratives of women as either the perpetrators or the victims of terrorism, there has been much less inquiry into the role and potential of women as 'agents of peace' or P/CVE actors.

Women and Terrorism

Examining the Peace Village Initiative offers an opportunity to examine the role of women as female peacemakers (Bloom, 2011; Chowdhury Fink et al., 2016; Eggert, 2018; GIWPS, 2016), rather than positioning them as, on the one hand, active terrorists or supporters, or on the other hand, as victims of radical and terrorist acts. Developed and run

by the Wahid Foundation, the Peace Village program seeks to leverage the potential of women and empower and equip them to become more attractive agents of peace. The potential of women as peacemakers is clear in surveys such as the 2017 National Survey on Tolerance among Muslim Women in Indonesia, conducted by the Wahid Foundation and Lembaga Survey Indonesia. The survey results, released in January 2018, show markedly higher levels of tolerance among women than men in Indonesia. In comparison to men, women are shown to report being consistently more tolerant of differences and to be disinclined to support the use of violence against groups that are considered different.[1] The survey shows that as many as four out of five women (80.7%) support the right to freedom of religion and/or belief. In the context of radicalisation into extremism, a similar proportion of four out of five women (80.8%) reported being unwilling to adopt an extremist position compared with three out of four men (76.7%) and there amongst respondents reporting intolerant views there were fewer women (55%) than men (59.2%).

In seeking to better realise the potential of women, and by building their capacity, the Peace Village Initiative aims to increase community resilience to intolerance and violence that can help reduce conflicts by empowering women to more effectively play key roles in building peace within families, within communities and within governance systems. Women are introduced to the knowledge and skills needed to develop their abilities to be economically independent and to actively participate in decision-making at the community level, including in the development of peace narratives. Women are empowered to become more active in local governance at the village level so that peacemaking values are incorporated into local policy and decision-making to prevent conflict, reduce intolerance and address hateful and violent extremism. Through the Peace Village Initiative, women's participation combined with government support helps create prevention efforts that are able to run systematically and sustainably, involving target groups who are empowered as agents

[1] The survey took place 6–7 October 2017 in 34 provinces in Indonesia. Those surveyed were adult Indonesian citizens in 34 provinces with voting rights in elections (being 17 years of age or older, or already married when the survey was conducted). The total number of respondents was 1500 (50% women and 50% man) selected by *multi-stage random sampling* technique with 450 women respondents as additional samples, and margin of error ±2.6% with level of trust 95%. The survey method involved face-to-face interviews; with one interviewer for one village interviewing 10 respondents. Quality control checks were done randomly with 20% of the total sample.

and are able to be part of radicalism and terrorism prevention activities for a wider group.

Research conducted by the Wahid Foundation on the wives of terrorist detainees in 2017 revealed that three key internal driving factors, or motivators, stand out as leading women to become involved in radical and terrorist groups: boredom/emptiness (*bosan*), social relations and economic need. A significant factor appears to be a sense of boredom, linked to a lack of purpose and meaning, experienced by the women who become drawn to extremism. Boredom and emptiness can refer to both their personal life within their households or to boredom and lack of meaning at work. The women surveyed reported that after beginning to experience boredom in everyday life that they began exploring religious narratives in the hope that religion could provide them with a purpose in life and a meaningful sense of identity. It was at this stage that many women turned to the study of radical material or to radical groups themselves, which were perceived as being able to provide answers to the problems these women were facing.

Another factor contributing to women's involvement in extremist groups is the motivation to maintain their social relations, whether it be a marital bond or the social bonds of friendship and community. In this context, women become involved with extremist groups because they do not want to get left behind by their husbands or by their circle of friends who have become members of extremist groups. Alternatively, some joined extremist groups seeking purpose and meaning and then found themselves swept up in the group dynamics and sense of belonging.

Another key factor is economic hardship. Although generally not as strong as other factors, economic hardship remains an important element of vulnerability for some women to engage with extremist groups or respond to their enticements. The desire to improve their families economic circumstances represents another reason why some women are open to being persuaded support their husband's decision to move to Syria. Coming from positions of hardship and struggle, the Caliphate's promise of a utopian welfare society that fulfils Islamic ideals of justice and mercy can seem very persuasive.

These findings offer insights into ways to counter the spread and appeal of intolerant and radical ideologies to women, such as through a personal approach to addressing the feelings of boredom and loneliness experienced by women before they engage in radical and terrorist groups. A personal approach in building women's interactions aims to redevelop a

sense of togetherness, personal closeness and meaning in life for women so that they are provided with the means to develop a healthy sense of identity and purpose. Other opportunities include support for initiatives and economic incentives to increase the resilience of vulnerable groups to recruitment efforts conducted by intolerant and radical groups. Such economic incentives offer a concrete and immediate alternative to the promise that conditions in the Caliphate will improve women's economic conditions and lives.

The Peace Village Initiative

The Peace Kampong initiative (a kampong is a traditional urban neighbourhood or rural village) was created to address the problem of women joining radical and terrorist groups. The Peace Kampong initiative by the Wahid Foundation aims to prevent radical ideological and terrorist expansion in grassroots communities, especially through the women's movement.[2] As Yenny Wahid, Director of the Wahid Foundation, explained in a 2018 interview (Wahid, 2018):

> It is impossible to come to the community and just give a lecture. When people feel alienated and desperate for their future, they become easily provoked to carry out radical actions. So improving economic circumstances is critically important and we start through economic empowerment. We attempt to slowly glue the diverse elements of the community together and then make them communicate with each other. What we do is to blend these groups so that they greet each other in daily life. It will create an understanding that we are actually the same. The humanity side is highlighted. So, without many theories, more tolerance can be built among them.

This program aims to address the underlying issues contribute to the involvement of women in radicalism by strengthening group ties and improving their economic conditions. The economic empowerment approach is carried out as an essential part of efforts aiming to address the factors leading to involvement in radical and terrorist organisations.

[2] Indonesia has a National Action Plan for the Protection and Empowerment of Women and Children in Social Conflict (RAN P3AKS) which is inspired by 1325 UN resolution on women, peace and security, CEDAW dan Law No. 7 Year 2012 on Social Conflict Intervention.

This approach is based on previous experience of women in the promotion of peace and resolving large-scale conflicts in Indonesia, such as in Poso, Ambon and Maluku. The Indonesia experience shows how women can, and indeed have, play a strong role in peacemaking efforts when conflicts occur in their communities. In conflict situations, women are often left in vulnerable positions, as their economic and security conditions deteriorate. In conflict and post-conflict zones, women face greatly increased challenges in being responsible for continuing to care and provide for their family. These issues are considered the main driving factors motivating the fight for peace (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2010).

Much of the day-to-day activities that women are engaged in tend to be driven by a deep sense of responsibility to answer the needs of sustaining and preserving life. This means that women's peace initiatives tend to be directly related to the fulfilment of economic needs. When women have a stable income, they are more able to take care of their family and participate in key decision-making processes. Economic empowerment for women is a very important factor in bringing about a significant contribution for peacebuilding and has become the main component to create equality for women (Chowdhury Fink et al., 2016; Eggert, 2018; GIWPS, 2016; UN Women, 2015; Wibben, 2016; Winterbotham, 2020).

The Peace Kampong initiative was initially a part of the Women Participation for Inclusive Society (WISE) program, which aimed to involve women in a collective effort to create a peaceful and independent society by applying an economic empowerment approach and strengthening women's capacity in peace-building. The program itself is supported by UN Women. In its implementation, the Wahid Foundation not only collaborated with local communities but also with national and local governments such as the Ministry of Villages, Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration, the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection, the National Commission on Violence Against Women and district/city level government and village government.

The program's key outcomes include:

1. Evidence-based research on the roles of women and the gender dynamics that underpin violent extremism as the basis for an effective intervention program for prevention of violent extremism (PVE). In achieving this outcome, some key activities were executed:

1.1 A National Survey on the dynamics of women's participation in radicalism and violent extremism in Indonesia. The purpose of this survey was to measure the extent of intolerance and radicalism amongst women in Indonesia. This survey data has then been quantified by the construction of an index from a number of factors and indicators that reflect levels of women's participation, acceptance and approval of socio-religious intolerance and radicalisation. The components in the vulnerability index cover two main factors: (1) women's action, behaviour, and acceptance towards socio-religious intolerance and radicalisation; (2) factors which are directly related to socio-religious radicalisation, such as jihadist ideology, extremist Islamist agendas, affiliation with religious radical extremist organisations and acts of intolerance.

1.2 In-depth research to identify the key factors that lead to women's involvement in violent extremism (IPAC, 2017a, 2017b, 2020), as well the potential for its prevention. This in-depth research explores the prevention initiatives that have been undertaken in the community and measure their sociological impact. It will include a brief legislative and policy review at the national and provincial level to determine whether the existing laws and policies have supported women's role in preventing violent extremism. This research will also look at the impact of social assistance and social protection intervention over socio-religious vulnerability in the targeted districts; as well as measure the level of women's ability and their power in decision-making processes in the family. The result of the research will be used to provide recommendations on a practical level for women's movement in the community.

2. A Women's Groups Coalition has been established to promote peace and diversity, and to encourage partner governments to adopt more effective policies and approaches to prevent the spread of hateful and violent extremism (Policy and Campaign). In achieving this outcome, some key activities were executed:

2.1 Strengthening the Women's Group Coalition and its advocacy on PVE to enhance common understanding and coordination on PVE among government institutions, women's faith-based organisations and women's groups. This key activity is also used

to facilitate women religious leaders in fostering peace in the society. Religious leaders, both men and women, tend to be informal leaders who have a degree of influence within the community. Some have a number of followers and will certainly be capable of impacting the promotion of peace. Unfortunately, not many women religious figures have been facilitated to become agents of peace. These roles are mostly performed by male religious figures.

2.2 One objective of the Peace Village Initiative is to create a village-based early warning system to detect hateful and violent extremism. The aim of the Peace Village/District initiative is to institutionalise women's participation for peace and diversity in the community through the mechanism of village regulations (*peraturan desa*). Through the Peace Village, a Guide for Peace Village Indicators has been provided, which can be used to strengthen government and society's commitment in peacebuilding locally and nationally. This book explains the values that form the basis of the Peace Village/District Indicators, including: *Human Rights*, *9 Main Gus Dur Values* and *Gender Equality* (Fig. 5.1). These three value bases were chosen because they are acknowledged to capture important elements of building successful, peaceful societies. This guide also contains a detailed description of the Peace Village indicators along with the elements that need to be in place and the assessment tools.

3. Increased social cohesion in communities through women's economic empowerment and women's leadership (Capacity Building). In achieving this outcome, some key activities were executed:

3.1 Strengthening women's capacity in vulnerable communities to access the economic empowerment scheme through *Koperasi Cinta Damai (KCD) Wahid* (Peace-loving Multibusiness Cooperative) and entrepreneurship training to increase the skills of community-based entrepreneurs according to the local business potential called **One Village One Product**. This program focused on how to effectively manage their small businesses, add value to the products and generate more income as well as creating job opportunities.

Indicators for Peace Village:
1. The existence of regulations which are set and respected by residents to live securely and comfortably in their village.
2. The existence of education and the improvement of universal values, peace, gender equality, tolerance, and the justice in a multicultural society established from a household level.
3. The existence of residents' attitudes of understanding and practicing values of solidarity and tolerance.
4. The existence of art and cultural-based community activities that reflect and promote mutual cooperation (gotong-royong), awareness, and sensitivity practiced by various communal components.
5. The existence of an early warning system in preventing violence, radicalism, terrorism, and social conflicts.
6. The existence of a system/mechanism of rapid conflict intervention, recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration of victims of violence, both by community and outsiders.
7. The existence of active participation of women in all sectors starting from village administration, village security, economy, up to education.
8. The availability of structures & institutions of village which are mandated to design, execute, and to provide reports/documentation of the existing communal systems.
9. The availability of proper means and infrastructures of services for a village to conduct its activities collectively, for example: a hall or public space for communal meetings, inter-resident communication facilities/channels, a hall of aspiration or complaint facility.

Fig. 5.1 Nine indicators of the Peace Village/District

The curriculum materials included:

1. Financial Literacy (FE).
2. Basic entrepreneurship training using the framework of Gender and Entrepreneurship Together—(GET Ahead) and the Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB) tools.
3. Entrepreneurship training with special attention in access to market; government agents, private sector, social enterprise practitioners as well as academic actors will be invited to take part in the initiative, by providing technical assistance to improve women's microenterprise capacity.
4. Gender Equality, Women's Empowerment and Peacebuilding. The strengthening of women's capacity specifically covers 6 (six) topics, namely 9 'Gus Dur values', the role of women in Islam, knowing themselves, understanding peace and conflicts, analysing conflicts and the role of women as agents of peace. Through participation in a number of training programs with different topics, women's groups are expected to broaden their knowledge so that they can sustainably apply the values of peace in their families and their neighbourhoods.

Establishing a Peace Village: Three Phases

To achieve the main deliverable, which is a Peace Village—a community that promotes and realises the values of peace, equality and a gendered approach in its policies—the strategy is divided into the following phases:

1. Developing evidence-based research. Targeted research will allow us to understand the extent of radicalism amongst women in Indonesia and identify the many factors that lead to women's involvement in both violent extremism and its prevention. At the same time, this research is oriented to generate recommendations, both for building a context-specific peace narrative curriculum and recommendations on how to campaign and design intervention programs for women in PVE, as well as building a common action plan for Women and PVE.
2. Building Women's Economic Entrepreneurship for Peace. To strengthen social cohesion in the community, we develop saving-loan schemes, capacity building and community entrepreneurship

for women's groups. Using this approach ensures that women will have the opportunity to succeed and advance themselves economically and to participate in community decision-making and peacebuilding. These women's groups are expected to be able to generate income and reduce inequality between communities. Ultimately, this initiative has the potential to create collaborative exchanges between women's groups for peace.

3. Achieving synergy among multi-stakeholders to establish a Peace Village. This third phase is conducted once the women's group is established. During this phase, the focus is on facilitating community initiatives for peace through women. In building the Peace Village, we aim to create synergy between different stakeholders because it is important not only to prevent the spread of radical ideologies but also to disseminate alternative peace narratives throughout the community. In this respect, the Peace Village program aims to maximise the role of inter-faith women scholars and leaders in promoting peace and justice, as well as facilitate women becoming peacemakers within their community. Through capacity building and village forums, the institutionalisation of narratives for peace through a collaboratively developed peace declaration that is presented at the Peace Village's launch.

Areas of Implementation

Since 2017, the program has been implemented at national and subnational levels. The four areas of program implementation are Bogor and Depok Regency (West Java); Solo Raya (Central Java); and Malang and Sumenep (East Java). Broadly speaking, these regions were chosen because of indications of increased intolerance, radicalism and terrorism. Depok, for example, regular experiences outbursts of intolerance, in the form of hostile discrimination against minority groups, while in Bogor, Malang, and Sumenep (Fig. 5.2), there has been clear evidence of ideological radicalisation of the kind that has contributed to radical and terrorist movements in Indonesia more broadly. Meanwhile, in Solo Raya, a process of increasing radicalisation of behaviour has been observed, with this region long being home to a number of violent extremist groups.

Fig. 5.2 President Republic Indonesia, Mr. Joko Widodo visited women business booth on International Day of Peace 2017, Sumenep Madura–East Java

West Java

During the early stages of the spread of Islam in Indonesia, West Java was one of the provinces that had particularly close ties to the public expression of 'Islamic values'. In the 1940s, a movement of violent rebellion was established in West Java. Led by Kartosuwiryo, the movement opposed the government of the new Republic of Indonesia and sought to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia (*Negra Islam Indonesia,* NII) in the mountains of West Java. Although the movement has long since been quelled it continues to exist and its extremist values and goals are still being kept alive by generations of followers of NII.

This is also reflected in the socio-political life in West Java, including the outer-urban districts of Depok and Bogor. Although these are semi-urban areas, they have played a significant role in colouring and shaping community behaviours and their political dynamics. Following the outbreak of mass sectarian and intercommunal conflict in some parts of Indonesia, a transformation occurred in the nature of radical movements and their focus shifted from central to local areas. Some urban areas in Indonesia, such as Depok and Bogor, were strongly influenced

by NII and continue to be sites of significant Islamist support today. Consequently, Depok and Bogor in West Java have often served as incubation areas for violent extremist groups to prepare acts of terrorism. Furthermore, extremist groups find it advantageous to use these areas because they are strategically located in close proximity to the capital city. It is significant that the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), an Islamist political party, dominates West Java, with the governor of West Java being a member of the party.

Central Java

Central Java, and in particular the cities of Solo (also known as Surakarta) and Klaten, have become important centres of growth for terrorist networks. Solo in particular has been a prominent location for ISIS-inspired extremism and ISIS sympathisers. For example, in March 2016, 34-year-old Siyono, a leading figure of Neo Jemaah Islamiyah, was apprehended in his house in Pogung Cawas Village, Klaten. The National Police counterterrorism squad, Densus 88, also apprehended three suspects of terror attacks in Solo a month before in relation to the Alfamart terror attack in November 2016 and Candi Resto terror attack in December 2016.

Solo and adjacent densely populated urban districts, such as Klaten, are subject to a number of factors that can lead to the growth of extremist movements. Solo was the birthplace of the jihadist movement Jemaah Islamiyah and a key centre of its expanding network, and over the past sixty years, a number of influential actors, activists and jihadists have lived in Solo. The activities of these actors are supported by the social environment, as there are a number of schools, *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), *pengajian* (Islamic studies) and publishers that are spreading the seeds of radicalism. These factors increase the risk of radical Islamic groups in this area.

East Java

The third location selected is East Java, which has also encountered challenges from radical and terrorist sympathisers. For example, two alleged terrorists were apprehended in Dusun Kramat in March 2016. At the same time, The elite counterterrorism unit of the Indonesian police, Densus 88, arrested eight alleged terrorist suspects in the large East Java

city of Malang for their involvement in a terror attack in Thamrin, Jakarta. In addition, a number of individuals, and in particular *santri* (students), from Sumenep and other cities in Madura were mobilised for the 212 demonstration in Jakarta in 2016, protesting against the Christian, then-governor of Jakarta Basuki 'Ahok' Tjahaja Purnama. These protests brought together large numbers of people with varying motivations but a dominate element was hateful extremism focusing on Ahok's Christian and Chinese identities. The religious perspective in Maduranese society can be categorised as being orientated towards a traditionally conservative and patriarchal ideology. This ideological orientation is reflected in the unequal treatment of women and men, particularly in decision-making processes. This conservativism can be seen to further contribute to the development of radical ideology.

Initiating the Peace Village

In the regency of Sumenep, on the eastern tip of the island of Madura, the Wahid Foundation has worked in collaboration with PP. Annuqayah. One of the leading *pesantren* in Sumenep, PP. Annuqayah was founded in 1887 and focuses on the development of education for *santri* and civil society in Madura and East Java. Initiated by Nyai Eva, a key women Muslim leader in PP.Annuqayah, a particularly significant achievement of the *pesantren* has been their movement to decrease early marriage numbers of *santriwati* (female students) and girls.

From the initiation period onwards, women are directly involved in the operations of their Peace Village. The program aims to increase their capacity and skills in peace and to work towards their own economic empowerment. As a manifestation of this capacity strengthening, the nine out of thirty strengthened villages have been declared Peace Villages. They include Pengasinan Village, Depok, West Java; Tajur Halang Village, Bogor, West Java; Gemblegan Village, Klaten, Central Java; Nglinggi Village, Klaten, Central Java; Sidomulyo Village, Batu City in East Java; Desa Candirenggo, Singosari, Malang, East Java; Payudandundan Village, Sumenep, East Java; Guluk-guluk Village, Sumenep, East Java; and Desa Prancak, Sumenep, West Java. In addition, 10 businesses involved in the One Village One Product aspect of the initiative have been started in villages that have been declared Peace Villages, and 87,997 residents in Peace Villages (Fig. 5.3) have felt the positive impacts of the formation of the OVOP.



Fig. 5.3 Peace Village Infografis 2017–2018

Effectiveness of the Peace Village Initiative

To examine the effectiveness of the peace initiative, external evaluations were carried out by independent evaluators in Depok and Bogor (West Java), Solo (Central Java) Malang and Sumenep (East Java). The evaluation process examined levels of 'participation' of all parties involved in this program, including beneficiary groups at the village level and also official groups such as village government officials, district/city government officials and a number of ministries, such as the Ministry of Villages, Transmigration and Development Region, the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection and the National Commission on Violence Against Women.

The methods of data collection used include field visits to Peace Villages, in-depth interviews with key respondents, focus group discussions (FGD) and questionnaires. The spread of questionnaires used random sampling with village-based targets. The sample collection technique used in this final evaluation is a 'purposive' sampling technique, which was produced by considering which data sources have certain qualifications or criteria to obtain accurate and precise information. Based on

the fact that the total number of WISE program beneficiaries is 1606, the total number of respondents for the questionnaires was set 100, so has to capture a significant proportion of beneficiaries. Therefore, this evaluation has used quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques. The quantitative approach was implemented through face-to-face interviews using structured questionnaires, while qualitative techniques were conducted through focus group discussions using an FGD manual, and in-depth interviews with an in-depth interview manual.

These findings were analysed using the 4S Framework (Strategy, Skills, Systems and Shared Values) to validate the effectiveness of the Peace Village initiative. The framework is then used to derive detailed questions, such as:

- Strategy: What are successful and unsuccessful WISE project strategies; How are strategies adjusted to achieve WISE Project objectives?;
- Skills: Are the skills/knowledge emphasised in the training/capacity building spreading within the village? How so?; Has financial literacy and business proven empowered to support PVE?;
- Systems: What are the systems in the implementation of savings and loans, gender and peacebuilding, financial literacy and development of peace in the village?;
- Shared values: Did the project result in a change in culture or shared values?.

Strategy

One of the WISE program strategies is to conduct research to design PVE intervention programs for women. Drawing upon this research, policy recommendations and a capacity building module for women in 30 villages were developed. Another strategy used was conducting a Rapid Community Assessment (RCA) in 17 women's communities and/or business groups in Malang Raya, Solo Raya and in West Java (Bogor and Depok). Based on RCA, the Wahid Foundation then conducted focus group discussion involving village stakeholders and women representatives to design our program intervention area. We used the ORID (Orientation, Reflective, Interpretive and Decisional) framework in order to reach some point of agreement and clarify differences in pitching areas

of intervention. Based on ORID, we found 30 villages that became our areas of operation for the Peace Village program.

Another key finding of the Wahid Foundation based on the 2017 National Survey on Tolerance among Muslim Women in Indonesia became the foundation for developing policy recommendations to the government for deepening the National Action Plan of Women, Peace and Security based on a socio-religious tolerance perspective. These findings also went on to form the foundation for the Female Ulema *Halaqah* (FGD) in developing four fatwas: the fatwa requiring a veil, the fatwa for women's involvement in jihad, the fatwa of Hijrah and the fatwa for women's work outside the home. These fatwas were disseminated in various ways, including via articles, memes and videos (peace campaign products). At the community level, peace campaign efforts have been made by the media to raise awareness for women building peace in Wahid Foundation respective areas. It is hoped that by building on this new level of awareness, village women would become better placed to respond to fake news campaigns impacting on their communities.

Based on the results of the evaluation, the research strategy for making recommendations and materials for strengthening women's capacity and peace has been found to have succeeded in increasing understanding of the concept of gender development and peace. This is in line with one of the main strategies of this program, which is to prepare beneficiaries (women) as agents in disseminating narratives about gender and peacebuilding in the community. Evaluation data also shows that women have successfully played their role in disseminating and sharing their knowledge about the concept of peacebuilding and gender, at least to the people who are very close with them or with whom they meet every day, such as family members, other females within their community and neighbours.

The results of the RCA have been used to conduct a women's empowerment for peace intervention program, which focuses on savings, loans and community businesses. Based on the evaluation report, this program has been successful in strengthening women's economic access through a savings and loans strategy in peace-loving cooperative (KCD), improvement of financial literacy and women's businesses. A detailed evaluation report shows that women's groups take loans of around Rp. 2–15 million (AUD 200 to 1500) for their venture capital and that these loans will be paid over 1–2 years through small monthly instalment. A simple loan process with few requirements or restrictions has provided economically active women with better access to savings and loans.

The strategy used to investigate program implementation was via participatory inquiries, where we engage government (local and national), private sector and civil society. Based on the evaluation report, this program has been able to encourage commitment between multiple elements within society in implementing the Peace Village. First, the commitment to women as lead actors in decision-making processes and their active involvement in village forum; second, the commitment to a male and female ulama as buffer/bridge in building social cohesion within society and local government; third, the commitment from local and national government in supporting the resilience of the Peace Village so that people can live in harmony and feel safe; and fourth, the private sector's commitment as a medium to strengthen and sustain the economic health of small business and enlarge the women's 'peace-preneur' market.

Skills

The basic principle of the WISE Program is to cultivate social cohesion and community resilience in society through the empowerment of women's economic independence and building women's leadership capacity to become agents of peace. Women's empowerment is fostered by strengthening their capacity for peace and entrepreneurial skills.

The program evaluation shows that the peace-related capacity building has not only encouraged women to become agents of peace but has also helped other community members gain a better understanding and better attitudes around how to counter radicalism and terrorism. Increasing women's capacity has proven to be effective in forming a community paradigm so that they can contribute to peace development in their village.

At the same time, a series of women's entrepreneurial capacity development and the development of OVOP (One Village One Product) have boosted motivation and increased women's skills in business. Empowering capacity for women's microbusinesses does not only involve providing them with vocational training, but also supervising them in developing their brand, quality of product and compliance with relevant standards to ensure their products have license and certification from the appropriate authorities. Furthermore, introducing women's products to the wider market is also part of our movement to enlarge village women's businesses.

Business skills training has opened up the way for women to find themselves not only able to contribute to the improvement of their family's economic situation, but also improves their confidence in expressing their opinions. There are at least 107 products produced through this capacity development. Of these 107 women's products, there are 72 food products, 24 handicraft products and 11 fashion products. Additionally, 10 OVOPs have been initiated in villages that have declared themselves as Peace Villages.

System

With regard to the system aspect, there are at least three systems built into the WISE program. The knowledge-production media campaign system and an advocacy system have been used for the promotion of gender mainstreaming in PVE. Gender mainstreaming in PVE is then implemented in the Peace Village initiative. The Peace Village Initiative is also used as medium to establish an early warning system to detect violent extremism at the village level. This system engages women in four key areas in their village (local government, community policing, male and female *ulema* and private sector) to actively prepare for and prevent violence within their village. Another established system was a scheme to encourage women's economic empowerment through KCD and community businesses.

The evaluation report shows that the campaign system and the production of knowledge that were built proved to be effective in influencing the mindset of the community in preventing radicalism and extremism. The use of targeted media content is acknowledged to have raised awareness about peaceful environment and has proven to be very useful for women to share information about peace with other community members.

In this context, the Peace Village has succeeded in deepening a combined system of peacebuilding, community business and family financial literacy. A module of Women and Peace-Building, Business and Financial Development, was developed by the Wahid Foundation consisting of 12 topics that raise relevant case studies of women and peacebuilding and women in business. This module also explains 'the 9 values of Gus Dur' as a simple model for peacebuilding. This model has been developed as a simple practice with role-play and an interactive game mechanism so that village women and local facilitators can practice it within their larger groups or community.

At the same time, the WISE program has succeeded in strengthening women's coalitions in PVE advocacy, as demonstrated by the introduction of recommendations on the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (NAP WPS) and recommendations for the expansion of the Peace Village initiative. Based on recommendations developed from this program, a Memorandum of Understanding was made between the Wahid Foundation and the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection in an effort to improve the capacity of women in peacebuilding. In addition, through the Peace Village initiative, 9 of the 30 participating villages chose to declare themselves as Peace Villages. In a Peace Village, a working group consisting of women, local community representatives and local government officials are formed to ensure that the indicators of the government system and practices of communal life are used to establish Peace Village.[3]

In a speech delivered on the International Day of Peace Indonesia's president, Joko Widodo, affirmed that building Villages for Peace now represents a concrete element of the Indonesian Government's PVE strategy. Soft approaches are equally important as hard approached in ensuring that communities are empowered to counter violent extremism through building resiliency and enhancing social cohesiveness.

In the context of economic empowerment, the Wahid Foundation has succeeded in establishing a Value Chain Assessment Implementation to identify the characteristics of women's businesses and development mechanisms. The Value Chain Assessment Implementation approach became the main system for an intervention strategy to encourage and improve the quality of women's businesses, including group conflict management and community peacebuilding. From this system, the Wahid Foundation has been able to establish a Ministry of Understanding alongside the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration, which focuses on strengthening the economic capacity of women's groups and the Village Enterprise Agency (BUMDES) of Peace Village.

At the same time, the savings and loans system developed in a peace-loving cooperative has succeeded in providing benefits for women. These

[3] There are 9 Indicators of Peace Villages: Commitment to live peacefully, Promotion and Education on Peace Values,Caring Ethics, Local Wisdoms and Traditions, Early Detection on Radicalism, Response System on Prevention of Violent Extremism, Women's Participation, Accountable Government, Availability of Peacebuilding Support Facilities.

benefits include access to funds to be used as capital to finance their small businesses and help to finance the costs of their children's education. The establishment of minimal administrative requirements has made it easier for women who cannot take loans from banks to access financial support for their economic endeavours. In addition, financial literacy and business development are integrated into pro-peace cooperatives, providing important benefits for women in family financial management and small business financial management, and in developing market networks.

Shared Values

Regarding the distribution of values, evaluation data also reveals that the Peace Village initiative has strengthened local values and gender mainstreaming in preventing violent extremism in their villages. This is a result of the Peace Village initiative's design to institutionalise women's participation in peacebuilding through village regulations. Furthermore, a series of capacity development initiatives have made a significant impact in encouraging the active participation of women in Peace Village working groups. This capacity building equips women to become agents of change, to be involved in the promotion of peace in the family and the neighbourhood, as well as to contribute directly to creating a peaceful environment in the village governance.

The Peace Village Initiative has also been able to encourage local governments to adopt more effective policies and approaches to prevent the spread of radicalism and extremism. City/District Governments, such as the governments of Solo and of Sumenep, have made the women's group a special team to prevent conflict and violence at the District/City level. At the same time, the Peace Village Initiative is recognised as a pilot project for a community warning system to prevent radicalism and terrorism. In other words, the Peace Village represents a prototype for how to build an early warning system to detect violent extremist movements that are able to run systematically and sustainably.

Conclusion: Sustaining and Strengthening the Peace Village Initiative

In order to ensure the continued sustainability of the Peace Village initiative, the Wahid Foundation has initiated two programs primarily focusing on (1) strengthening women's groups capacity, organisation and

entrepreneurship at the local level, and (2) incorporating support from the private sector.

These objectives have been pursued through strategic collaborations, the first of which has been with UN Women to promote both the implementation of the Peace Village program in government policies and the formation of an early warning system in general. To strengthen women's capacity in peacemaking, the Wahid Foundation has collaborated with the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection. Finally, for the economic empowerment of women's groups to be integrated in Village Enterprise Agency (BUMDES), the Wahid Foundation has collaborated with the Ministry of Villages, Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration. Through continuous cooperation, the Peace Village initiative is expected to be a prototype for the prevention of radicalism and terrorism in a participatory and gender-sensitive manner.

Born out of the desire to develop a prototype for building community resilience and social cohesion to prevent radicalisation and terrorism in a participatory manner, the Peace Village initiative has shown us that there are some key areas that require particular attention when similar initiatives are to be implemented in other regions in Indonesia or Asia. First, empowering the community, especially women, is a crucial intervention. Women are the central actors in cultivating peace from an early age and from the smallest social unit; within the family. In addition, attention needs to be drawn to the specific context of women's empowerment, that is, their locality. For this reason, the intervention must carefully consider women's domestic role as well as their role in their social environment, as agents of peace. This means that the division of roles with the involvement of husbands and other men also becomes an aspect that cannot be ignored so that empowerment of the role of women does not generate a culture shock. Studious observance of the principle of 'do no harm' is very important in each intervention. Furthermore, the economic development approach has been shown to be an effective way to encourage the role of women in peacebuilding. In addition to women's closeness to the issue of basic needs in the family, economic empowerment contributes significantly to women's self-esteem to play a further role in prevention of violent extremism. The economic approach can also provide answers to the sustainability dimension of a grassroots people's movement.

Second, in addition to empowering civil society, it is necessary to conduct interventions in the policy sector through the involvement of the government and the private sector. The involvement of the government

promises to make a positive contribution with relation to support for community initiatives in the prevention of violent extremism. The government will provide directions to women's organisations carried out at the grassroots level. In other words, government involvement and policy advocacy are important factors in accelerating the grassroots empowerment process; this is mainly related to the problem-posing empowerment method. In parallel with grassroots involvement and government engagement, the involvement of the private sector is no less important. The private sector lays an important role not only in the context of policy advocacy, but also contributes significantly to women's economic empowerment, particularly in expanding market access.

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CHAPTER 6

International and Local Actor Collaborations to Prevent Violent Extremism Among Youth in Indonesia: Initiatives and Effectiveness

Suhadi and Utami Sandyarani

Introduction

In 2010, the Indonesian Government formed the National Agency for Combatting Terrorism (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme—BNPT), established to be the lead government body responsible for counterterrorism. Through the course of the past decade, as the agency has worked intensively to combat terrorism within Indonesia, it has come to emphasis the need for global cooperation and for international institutions working towards preventing violent extremism to play a stronger role in Indonesia. President Joko Widodo has taken the lead in stressing

Suhadi (✉)
State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: suhadi.cholil@uin-suka.ac.id

U. Sandyarani (✉)
Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

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the need to develop stronger cooperation between international counterterrorism institutions and the Indonesian Government and civil society (Sumpter, 2017: 133). It is for this very reason that within BNPT, there is a unit focused specifically on international cooperation. Because terrorism and terrorist networks, by nature, represent both a domestic and an international challenge, Indonesia, like other nations facing this problem has sought to build collaboration with international institutions, both at the government and civil society levels. This also requires global collaboration between funding bodies and experts in order to broaden the impact of research on violent extremism prevention and to ensure its effectiveness.

Although there exists an extensive body of research on Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) in Indonesia, literature on international institutions working in cooperation with local actors in Indonesia for PVE initiatives remains under-examined. It is vital to recognize the role of collaborative efforts by these local and international actors. Moreover, it is imperative to assess their project initiatives and effectiveness. Such studies are important as they can help to examine the opportunities and challenges faced by international institutions working in Indonesia.

Youth: Necessary Concern

At the time of the 2002 suicide bombing in Bali, which saw 202 people killed, it was seemingly unthinkable that Indonesian youth would be involved in planning and executing terrorist attacks of this kind. Within a few years, however, the previously unthinkable had become all too familiar. By the time of the 2011 suicide bombing at a church in Solo by 17-year-old Ahmad Yosefa Hayat, the issue of youth involvement in terrorism, and as perpetrators no less, was no longer remarkable. A new pattern had emerged. In 2016, five years after the Solo church bombing, Nur Rohman carried out a suicide bombing on a police station in the same city. Although he was 32 years old at the time of the suicide bombing, Nur Rohman had first become involved in a vigilante group and then terrorist network in Solo when he was just 22 years old (IPAC, 2016).

A study conducted by BNPT in 2012 looking at 110 perpetrators of terrorism found that all were under 40 years old and most under 30 years old, with almost one in eight under 21 (11.8% were under 21, 47.3% of aged between 21–30 and the remaining 29.1% were aged between 31–40 years). Considering this evidence, it is reasonable to assume that those

perpetrators who form the most dominant age group (21–30 years) had likely already taken an interest in extremist media content or had joined an extremist group some time prior to committing acts of terrorism. This suggests that there is considerable scope for preventing violent extremism and the spread of terrorism by preventing young people from being exposed to terrorist content or networks in the first place.

The pathway to terrorism is often a very complex journey for young Muslims and generally involves an ideological shift towards more conservative, intolerant, militant and/or extremist views. In conjunction with this potential ideological shift, rising anger fed by perceptions of social injustices within their country or in their specific environment can also serve as a significant push factor towards violent extremism. Not infrequently these conditions are fostered by feelings of moral panic and a mentality of feeling under-siege which can ultimately lead to the belief that Islam (or more accurately a particular interpretation of Islam) is the only solution (Hasan, 2018: 4). A significant contributing risk factor that has been identified here is that of religious education, with many young Muslim students not having access to religious education with a solid peace perspective in school (Suhadi, 2018: 60). For this reason, the two institutions observed in this chapter, SFCG and UNDP, agreed on the need to initiate youth-specific projects with an emphasis on peace-focused religious education. They argue that addressing violent extremism prevention for youth is a strategic initiative. Without such an initiative, the risk of youth disengagement leading to violent extremism will only continue to grow.

Developing PVE projects specifically for youth is a strategic initiative supported by the two institutions' studies. For example, and SFCG study entitled *'Working Together to Address Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Youth-Government Partnerships',* identifies the prevalence of youth in terrorist groups, noting that the majority of Jamaah Islamiyah members are male and young, the average age of an ISIS recruit is around 26 years old, and a large proportion of Boko Haram's fighters in Nigeria are teenagers. Nevertheless, the narrative that portrays youths as either the victims or the perpetrators of violence is often unhelpful in countering violent extremism efforts. Instead, the study makes the case for the involvement of youth in establishing counter-narratives, making young people part of solution in building peace and preventing violent extremism efforts, recognizing that most young people reject violence (Williams, 2016). The SFCG study is one of a number of studies that

recommend placing the emphasis on the importance of ensuring fundamental freedoms, the principles of human rights, religious tolerance and individual safety; ideas which form an important foundation for its Transforming Violent Extremism (TVE) programs in Indonesia. The SFCG report recommends the involvement of a diverse array of youth leaders and youth-led organisations.

Another important effort towards addressing the challenge of youth and violent extremism is CONVEY (Counter Violence Extremism for Youth), a collaborative initiative by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM, *Center* for the Study of *Islam and Society*), State Islamic University of Jakarta (UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta). The CONVEY project has conducted extensive research and broad public engagement that has resulted in a number of books, reports and public policies being produced as part of its knowledge sector of PVE. CONVEY studies show that young Muslims in Indonesia generally support open and moderate thinking and behaviour, and that until recently, the inclination of young people towards conservatism, radicalism and extremism had been in decline. But according to CONVEY's studies, however, there are two key enclaves—educational institutions and cyber media—which have been responsible for driving young people towards hard-line conservatism and radicalism (Convey Indonesia Project, 2018b).

Indeed, schools have become very vulnerable to penetration by ultra-conservative religious groups. Senior high school students who become acquainted with Islamic teaching deeply for the first time in Islamic based intra-curricular school organisations such as *Rohis* (the word Rohis is a contraction of Rohani Islam—'Islamic spirituality'— and refers to extra-curricular religious instruction) have been found to be particularly susceptible to developing militant religious beliefs. Rohis sessions are extra-curricular but are supported and funded by the school's management. Since, the Rohis instruction program often offers exclusive teaching about other religions and sometimes presents a narrow vision of political Islam as being ideal—in many cases as a consequence of the alumnae of the school having influence over its curriculum—the students joining the Rohis session in turn are highly likely to develop conservative or even radical views. In addition to the influence that schooling can have, cyber media also becomes a fertile space for spreading values of radicalism and extremism among young people, including the popular but conservative packaging of Islam (Convey Indonesia Project, 2018a).

In view of these challenges, CONVEY points to the significance of encouraging young Muslims, including those affiliated with *Rohis,* to have encounters with both other Muslims who hold more moderate views, and with students from different faith backgrounds. It is important to widen their views with diverse perspectives within Islamic groups and to experience direct interactions with other religious groups in order to respect differences (Convey Indonesia Project, 2018b). Another suggestion presented by CONVEY recognizes the urgency of producing alternative narratives of peaceful Islamic views (online and offline) that target students, including cyber literacy (Convey Indonesia Project, 2018a).

In line with the studies of SFCG and CONVEY, a study by the Wahid Foundation (WF), entitled 'Youth, Middle-Class Muslims, and the Challenges of Intolerance and Radicalism in Urban Areas', argues that the symptoms of intolerance and radicalism have increased among young people, with young middle-class Muslims being no exception. Middle-class Muslims were found to be concerned with their political-moral identity in responding modernity. At the same time, they are well equipped with technology and are connected to high-quality internet access. Therefore, it is no surprise that they find it easy to build a movement, mobilise and foster communal sentiments both online and offline for the sake of their exclusive religious aspirations. The paper quotes the Wahid Foundation's survey about the activists of *Rohis* and intra-school organisation (OSIS) at senior high school level, which shows that 60% of respondents were willing to go to *jihad* in the conflict area should the opportunity arise, and 86% of respondents supported perpetrators and acts of terrorism. (Huda, 2017: 10–14). These studies indicated that is imperative to engage youth actors in the PVE programs.

UNDP and PPIM UIN: The CONVEY Initiative

While acknowledging that the underlying factors that drive violent extremism can vary, CONVEY specifically focuses on trying to prevent it at the very beginning of its pathway through education. In conducting their PVE work through education, CONVEY utilized a multi-pronged approach made up of: (1) development of evidence-based knowledge on the nexus of education, violent extremism and its prevention, (2) advocating effective evidence-based policy on PVE, (3) engaging the youth and the public through youth-friendly and innovative approaches, and (4)

building regional cooperation and information-sharing for PVE among academics, educators and policy makers (https://conveyindonesia.com).

CONVEY boasts a highly collaborative approach in their work. Led by The Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat Penkajian Islam dan Masyarakat—PPIM) in the State Islamic University (UIN) of Jakarta, one of Indonesia's leading research centres in the field, with quality assurance supported by UNDP, CONVEY partnered with 21 civil society organizations (CSOs) for their second year of project implementation. These 21 CSOs include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), university-based research centres and private companies based in various parts in Indonesia, such as Maarif Institute, Nusa Tenggara Center (NC), Ambon Reconciliation and Mediation Centre (ARMC), Sabang Merauke, Peace Generation, Social Trust Fund (STF) UIN Jakarta, PUSPIDEP Research Centre Yogyakarta and several others. In conducting these activities, many of CONVEY partners also work with local-level organisations or communities. Initially, the project targeted more than 10,300 people including high school and university students, teachers and the general public. By the end of its implementation, it had reached more than 15,300 people through direct activities, and more than 4 million people indirectly. The high number of individuals reached by the CONVEY project is, in part, the result of the collaborative approach that was been developed between its partners. Due to the sensitivity of topics discussed in PVE, such collaboration is rare among CSOs working on PVE projects in Indonesia. Certain information is deemed not appropriate to be freely shared as it may jeopardise the PVE efforts they are working on. Under the CONVEY umbrella, however, CSOs involved in PVE would meet regularly to share updates and information from each of their projects, such as data, networks and insights. As a result, the implementing partners were able to adapt and expand their work in accordance with the information gained at these coordination platforms.

The youth engagement activities of CONVEY consist of two highly interconnected components, which include face-to-face engagement activities and multi-platform communication campaigns. The first component involves activities that allow participants to meet and get involved first-hand in learning about violent extremism, its dangers and ways to prevent it. These activities include innovative training for youth using a specially developed board game called Galaxy Obscurio, awareness-raising roadshows to various schools and universities and youth camps targeted at (1) Indonesian Muslim youth leaders, (2) interfaith youth leaders and

(3) international students from various Islamic countries. The second component of CONVEY's youth engagement program involves activities that utilize social and mass media as a means to increase and amplify counter-narratives and advocate P/CVE to youth and the general public. These activities include a social media competition called '*Milenial Islami Competition'*, which aims to flood various social media platforms such as Instagram and Facebook with peaceful and tolerant photos, memes, short-videos and comics. There was also an essay-writing competition for youth with a thematic focus on transformation of violent extremism, as well as, the production of creative content such as music videos, radio talk-shows, radio lip-ad and inclusion in various television shows and radio.

SFCG: Reducing the Risk of Recruitment and Recidivism

While CONVEY makes explicit use of the term P/CVE, SFCG has taken a different approach. In their '*Reducing the Risk of Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremism in Indonesia'* Project, SFCG aimed to address violent extremism through two ongoing issues in Indonesia: (1) the recruitment of youth to violent extremist groups and (2) the recidivism of former convicted terrorists returning to their former groups. In conducting this project, SFCG sought to contribute to reducing the level of recruitment of high-risk youth in targeted universities and schools to violent extremist groups, and to increase coordination among key stakeholders (e.g. CSOs, the Directorate General of Correction, community members) in supporting the reintegration process of former convicted terrorists into the community.

The target audience of this project was divided into two groups: the primary target group and the secondary target group. The primary target group were the direct beneficiaries of SFCG activities on the field-level, including the high-school and university students and community members in the target areas. The second group included the indirect beneficiaries of this program, such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The targeted location of this project included areas where a high level of radicalism and intolerance have been identified such as West Java, Jakarta, Central Java, Banten and Central Sulawesi.

In designing the project, SFCG built upon their extensive experience in working through creative media to build community awareness around conflict transformation and peacebuilding. While their work is heavily in line with P/CVE work, they instead refer to it as Transforming Violent Extremism (TVE) an approach that alters the dynamic of violent extremism into non-violent agency or engagement—as opposed to 'counter'-violent extremism, which is deemed as 'being reactive' towards violent extremism. While SFCG believes that the use of violence in advancing certain beliefs or ideologies should be condemned, its approach in TVE tries to acknowledge the core motivations behind violent extremism, addressing these core motivations and transforming them into a more constructive outcome (Slachmuijlder, 2017).

As part of their TVE work in Indonesia, SFCG conducted conflict management and media for peace training for youth leaders in five cities, through a movement called #CiptaDamai (literally #PeaceMaking). This capacity-building training aimed to increase young people's skills in transforming conflict from using violent approaches to using constructive ones such as dialogue and collaboration. Furthermore, they also aimed to equip youth leaders with skills in producing media content that promotes conflict transformation and collaboration across people of different beliefs or ideologies. Media experts delivered several types of media training, including short-documentary film production, blog-writing and photography. Through various activities including training, workshops, discussions, film screenings and many others, SFCG were able to reach more than 9000 young people in Indonesia (Hiariej et al., 2017). In contrast to the work conducted by CONVEY, which subtly focuses on specifically Muslim youth as their target population, SFCG did not tailor their CVE program to just observant Muslim youth; instead, they targeted youth in general regardless of religion, with the single exception of their *pesantren* project held in 2012 (Octavia & Wahyuni, 2014).

Program Effectiveness

The section that follows describes the PVE initiatives of these two international institutions, in collaboration with their partners, and will then analyse the effectiveness of these initiatives and their project implementation. Advantageous to this analysis is the availability of data from the two international institutions, most of which has been published in program reports and evaluations. This section focuses largely on the qualitative

data available, although in some instances quantitative data is also used to assist in describing perception changes of the target group.

Evaluating CONVEY

The PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Report (2018) on Islamic radical movements in schools and universities has generated important knowledge on the underlying factors that foster the growth of radicalism and extremism among Muslim high school and university students in Indonesia. This research report highlights troubling information relating to growing radicalism among Muslim high school and university students and provides a range of intervention options to address this problem through religious education. For example, the research shows that the vast majority of students (89.24%) agreed that Islamic religious subjects should also contain discussion about other religions to reduce negative prejudice between religious groups, and that discussion about shared-issues as seen from the perspective of other religions should be included (70.75%) (Convey Indonesia Project, 2018a). This data can strongly support any initiative to redesign the concept of religious education to include more cross-religious understanding.

In addition to quantitative data, CONVEY has also generated in-depth knowledge on the perspective of various youth organisations towards radicalism, violent extremism and terrorism. These survey results were then used to create public conversations about the rising support for violent extremism among high school and university students. Evidence of this public discourse is demonstrated by numerous reports—49 at least—made by local and national newspapers and online news sources about the survey. These include in major national newspapers, which supported the findings of the survey, such as Kompas, the Jakarta Post, Suara Pembaruan and Media Indonesia, as well as in several online news sources that were more critical of the survey results. Following these reports, BNPT released a statement that contained a list of public campuses that have been highly affected by violent extremism (www.merdeka.com). The above situation demonstrates the tensions between those who think that radicalism among youth is prevalent and those who reject this view, and it has sparked policy discussions among several key policy makers such as BNPT and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

In addition to generating evidence-based knowledge that sparked conversations among policy makers and the public, these youth engagement activities also served to increase the capacity of CONVEY's youth beneficiaries and to further develop their knowledge about radicalism, peace, counter-narratives, inter-religious relations and many others topics which have the potential to inform preventative measures to counter youth radicalization.

There are at least four youth engagement activities in CONVEY itself, and each has yielded various results in accordance with the nature and the target audience of its activities. These engagement activities included three youth camps: one for students of Islamic Universities from all over Indonesia, one for youth leaders from various religious communities, and one for Muslim international students in Indonesia. In addition to these camps, CONVEY has developed a training program which has been conducted in five major Indonesian cities and using a board game that focuses on peace.

Among the youth camps, the first was held by the Nusa Tenggara Center for university students from various Islamic universities to increase Muslim youth leaders' understanding of the concept of Islam *rahmatan lil 'alamin* (Islam as mercy to the entire universe). In a five-day youth camp in Lombok, 200 Muslim students from all over Indonesia participated in various classes and discussions about three main themes: (1) the concept of Islam *rahmatan lil' alamin*, (2) nationalism and our Indonesian identity and (3) preventing violent extremism, radicalism and terrorism. An essay written by one of the participants after the camp illustrates how the youth camp had expanded their knowledge about the nation-building process of Indonesia as a highly diverse society:

> Christians in Indonesia have a major role in the Indonesian nation-building process. Therefore, Indonesia was not formed as an Islamic state, despite Muslims as the majority, but rather the state of Pancasila, given the population's religious plurality. All of these were inspired from the Medina Charter adopted by the Prophet Muhammad PBUH. (Hasan, 2018)

The second youth camp, which targeted high school and university students of various religious backgrounds, worked towards increasing inter-religious understanding among the participants to prevent them from being radicalized. Ambon Reconciliation and Mediation Center (ARMC), CONVEY's implementing partner, gathered 120 participants

from various islands in Indonesia, and introduced them to concepts of inter- and intra-faith tolerance in order to improve their understanding of the importance of religious cooperation and tolerance. Through various approaches ranging from lectures, discussions, music, art, culture, outdoor activities and field trips, the camp effectively became a platform that brought the youth together to interact with other youth from different religions and faiths in a safe space. For most of the participants, the camp was the only platform that could connect them with youth from all over Indonesia and it saw them build genuine friendships with each other. Glen Fredly, a popular musician of Moluccan ethnicity, attended and supported the event, which resulted in high outreach on Instagram. One of the youth camp participants from South Sulawesi commented on her appreciation for the camp, saying that she had began to realise that differing religious beliefs should be addressed constructively. As she described:

> I learned to understand the various religious beliefs that most probably are different than ours. What we need to do, is not to debate them, is not to tell them that they are wrong nor right, what we need to do is to simply understand them. (Convey Indonesia Project, 2018c, p. 60)

The third youth camp was targeted at international students of Islamic religious backgrounds in Indonesia. Through a four-day youth camp in Bogor, CONVEY Project gathered together 29 young Muslim leaders from Indonesia and several other countries to discuss various topics with regards to Islam, peace and violent extremism. The camp allowed them to gain new knowledge from various experts and creative methods. Topics covered included, 'Radicalism as a Threat to Peace'. 'Various Perspectives in Islam and How to Identify Radicalism', 'Strengthening the Values of *Islam Rahmatan lil 'Alamin*' and 'The Role of Youth in Promoting Peace'. The camp served as a strategic platform for this international community of youth with a shared common interest in advocating peace together. The international youth camp also promoted an appreciation of the ways Islam is believed and practiced in accordance to pre-existing local wisdom in Indonesia. A Canadian participant made the following comment:

> This camp was one in a lifetime experience! I really enjoyed the programs, the speeches and the games we played. The chances we had for group

> discussions were a great opportunity for developing our ideas and thoughts and then being able to present it in front of everyone helped us to build our presentational skills. Furthermore the working in groups gave us a chance to put into work our leadership skills. The speeches were very eye opening and influential. I personally gained a lot of new information that I believe will benefit me as the topics we discussed are quite relevant to the issues in our Muslim societies. The games that were played were so much fun and it truly tied in with the important messages that were the core of each topic presented. I am so happy for the opportunity I got to join this camp. I am fortunate for being able to meet other university students who like me share common interest in being peace makers of tomorrow. (Social Trust Fund UIN & Convey Indonesia, 2018, p. 94)

Another youth engagement activity conducted as part of the CONVEY project was the production of a specially developed board game called Galaxy Obscurio, which helps participants learn about collaboration, empathy and peacebuilding through an enjoyable activity. The game was produced through a collaboration between Peace Generation—CONVEY's implementation partner for this activity—and Kummara, a game development consultant. The CONVEY project has successfully produced an innovative way of countering violent extremist narratives through this board game. The game is cantered on building a galaxy, in which various planets and alien lifeforms exist. The participants' task is to collect species while also fighting and eliminating viruses and they need to collect 24 points to win. The uniqueness of this game is that a participant cannot win alone. To win, participants must work together. This is where the game's central messages of empathy and collaboration fall into place.

In introducing the game to 358 youth in five cities, CONVEY equipped the youth participants with knowledge about radicalism and violent extremism, which was then reflected upon after the game was played. As a result, the Board Game for Peace Training was able to change the attitude of participants on issues of violent extremism, terrorism and radicalism. For example, after the training, the number of participants who agreed that violent extremism, terrorism and radicalism were made to discredit Muslims decreased by 26.2% (Peace Generation Indonesia & Convey Indonesia, 2018). This change of attitude has been captured in one of the testimonials of the local partner who was involved in the program as a training mentor:

> Ninin Karlina, an Islamic boarding school (pesantren) teacher, saw a change in the attitude of a student who initially considered all illegitimate cards for tasyabuh (resembling a product of infidels). After being invited to play and capture the values of peace, the student rejected the argument sustained in the beginning. He said he did not agree if anyone said all illegal cards according to what has been discussed. (Peace Generation Indonesia & Convey Indonesia, 2018)

After the training, the participants then competed to gain the greatest outreach. As a result of this competition, the board game for peace training has spread to more than 2800 people in Indonesia.

While the immediate results from monitoring tools indicate some positive changes among the beneficiaries of CONVEY activities, it is very challenging to verify that those activities have created a sustainable impact upon CONVEY youth beneficiaries without tracing the change of attitudes among the beneficiaries years after the project ends, possibly through an impact evaluation.

While practitioners of interfaith dialogues have stressed the importance for 'communities to develop a common justice agenda to facilitate commitments across lines of religious division' (Smock, 2003) to create trust and de-stigmatise negative stereotypes, the program of youth camps and board game for peace training was not designed to be ongoing. The agendas were filled with discussions, sharing and team building activities, however, these activities were designed as a one-time event. Cognitive change relating to knowledge of other religions might be reached through such activities, but to create substantial attitude changes towards other religions, mutual trust, commitment, continuous engagement and collaboration are critically needed.

Moreover, evidence for the link between the two youth camp activities, the board game for peace training and prevention of violent extremism itself remains weak. Materials for the two youth camp activities were dominated by topics such as inter-religious dialogue, mutual understanding among different groups and peacebuilding, with inadequate explanation on the nexus between such topics and efforts to prevent violent extremism. The board game for peace training, however, included materials on violent extremism and its counter-narratives. For one full day, participants would learn about the root causes radicalism and violent extremism, the push and pull factors, the types of narratives used by violent extremist groups and other materials about PVE. Nevertheless,

this was not clearly linked to the Galaxy Obscurio game itself, which supposedly became the highlight of the training; in other words, the training materials and the game were not effectively integrated.

Evaluating SFCG

SFCG conducted an external evaluation for their CVE project which was published in a report called 'Final Evaluation: Reducing the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia' (Hiariej et al., 2017). The evaluation was conducted in 2017 in five project locations including Bandung, Jakarta, Palu, Semarang and Banten. The evaluation involved a survey which was distributed to 256 direct beneficiaries and 914 indirect beneficiaries. The sample size was calculated based on their number of beneficiaries using Slovin Formula for the primary targets and Hypergeometric Distribution Formula for the secondary targets. In addition to the survey, the evaluation method also comprised of semi-structured interviews with 31 key participants, including national and local government officials, civil society organizations, ex-offenders and SFCG staff themselves. Furthermore, the external evaluators also held 13 focus group discussions (FGDs) with students, social media users and members of CSOs. Lastly, the evaluation also utilised a social media tracking method to collect data on the narratives and discussions around violent extremism and terrorism among the project's direct and indirect beneficiaries' social media accounts.

The evaluation study assesses the SFCG's project through the five dimensions outlined in the Development Assistance Committee of the Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD) Peacebuilding Evaluation Guidelines, namely relevance, effectiveness, social media, coordination and sustainability. For the purpose of the discussion here, however, we will focus on only three dimensions: relevance, effectiveness and social media. With regard to the relevance dimension, the evaluation results suggested that the project was quite relevant to the context in which it took place. Several factors that may have contributed significantly to this relevance are (1) the topic of CVE that touched upon some of the most pressing issues faced by the general public and youth in particular, (2) the easily-digested materials and contents and (3) the youth-friendly and attractive media that were utilised to convey the message.

The evaluation found that the project was able to develop young peoples' understanding of violent extremism, evidenced by the survey results which show that 70% of surveyed university students view

religious-based persecution as a form of violence (Corlazzoli et al., 2016). Furthermore, the effectiveness of the project at increasing youth understanding of violent extremism is also reflected in their preferences regarding conflict. The evaluation survey showed that more than 82% of the respondents prefer to resolve conflict through discussion. When compared to the baseline assessment, there is a 4% increase in the number of respondents who prefer a non-violent conflict style. However, the evaluation also showed that, while their knowledge about the dangers of violent extremism increased, their knowledge regarding creating non-violent initiatives or peacebuilding did not change significantly. In an interview in Bandung, the evaluator interviewed several alumni of the project and their answers indicated that they had limited understanding when asked to reflect upon real situations around them. As stated in the report:

> Interviews among students in Bandung show that some youth beneficiaries in Bandung city hold unempathetic views on raids against Christian activities. On 6th December 2016, an Islamic vigilante group, Pembela Ahlus Sunnah (PAS), attempted to disband Christmas celebrations in Sabuga, Bandung. The students believe that such vigilantism departs from narrow political interests or shallow understandings on religion and peace. Yet, they were still unable to formulate arguments and concrete practices on this issue based on their knowledge on violent extremism, on the one hand, and youth beneficiaries find difficulties in developing arguments and practices to respond to intolerant activities in their everyday life, on the other hand. (Hiariej et al., 2017)

Furthermore, another criticism towards the project has been that while conflict management was a major component in the project, it did not sufficiently equip youth beneficiaries when facing issues of asymmetrical conflict. This is evident from some of the testimonials during interviews with students in Bandung and Palu, where they admitted that SFCG's technique was less relevant in managing conflicts in which there is an unequal power balance, for instance, conflicts such as urban eviction or land grabbing between large corporations and the common people. In these kinds of conflicts, some of the youth beneficiaries believed that a more confrontational technique, such as demonstrations and blockage, or non-cooperative methods are much more important.

Nevertheless, these youth-friendly approaches and methods appear to be working. When the students participated in the training, they were

required to choose which class they wanted to participate in, with options such as videography, photography, poster-making or essay-writing. The evaluation shows that youth beneficiaries seemed to be highly impressed by the media utilised in the trainings and that the majority of the beneficiaries were able to understand violent extremism through such methods. One student in Solo claimed that it was not until he made a film about the story of a mother of a former terrorist in East Java that he began to understand the conflict from the perspective of others.

In the SFCG Project, the aforementioned training on media for peace was enhanced by an online strategy cantered on elevating the discourse on CVE among young social media users and raising their awareness about the issue. By using the #CiptaDamai hashtag, SFCG worked through various social media channels such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram to produce and disseminate contents that may provide alternative narratives towards violent extremism. As most of SFCG's youth beneficiaries have social media accounts, the online campaign could be their most innovative and beneficiary-friendly method yet. Undeniably, through this approach, SFCG has produced eye-catching visual design, captions and videos that helped to raise awareness about violent extremism. However, the evaluation also pressed that despite the significant outreach the effort had achieved, it was not sufficient to spark any substantial discussions. Most of the postings were 'one-way', and most people only provided short comments such as 'cool' or 'great' rather than offering anything of substance.

Moving Forward: Increasing Scope and Cooperation

The two programs conducted by both CONVEY and SFCG's CVE Project are both highly, timely and relevant international initiatives which see collaboration with local partners in responding to the increase of intolerance, persecution and support for violent extremism among youth. While SFCG took a community based and media utilisation approach in engaging the youth, CONVEY focused heavily on educational institutions. Each project employed their own expertise and advantages very differently, albeit targeting almost the same audience—youth and/or millennials—CONVEY has been successful both in generating much-needed knowledge that has helped understand youth violent extremism in an Indonesian context, especially in educational settings, and in engaging

with communities at a local level by utilising innovative youth-friendly approaches. SFCG on the other hand has focused its energy on efforts to engage with youth communities at a local level by using approaches that will be more likely to appeal to them.

The program effectiveness analysis presented above shows that both the programs of the UNDP Indonesia-PPIM and SFCG played a significant role in increasing youth awareness of terrorism and extremism, as well as in reducing youth interest in violence, extremism and terrorism. CONVEY's board game for peace training projects has been able to modestly reduce perceptions of some kind of conspiracy surrounding acts of terrorism among the participants. Meanwhile, the evaluation survey of SFCG's direct and indirect beneficiaries demonstrated that more than 82% prefer to resolve conflict through discussion following SFCG's program, which represents a 4% increase compared to the baseline assessment. The qualitative evaluation offers similar insights. CONVEY's participants in the youth camp project clearly illustrated how the youth camp expanded their knowledge about the nation-building approach to Indonesia as a highly diverse society. The youth participants of SFCG expresses that their sense of empathy towards minority increases after joining SFCG's project.

Both the UNDP and SFCG programs are short term in scope; they are not intended to remain active in Indonesia in the long term. Nevertheless, the programs offered by the two institutions have demonstrated how creative approaches to establishing youth-friendly methods for campaigning to prevent violent extremism amongst young people can be developed. The issue now is program sustainability. It is important to consider how the sustainability of these youth-friendly programs can be achieved in future when these institutions are no longer involved in PVE projects in Indonesia. At this point, it seems that the UNDP and SFCG approaches to collaborating with local institutions have been very effective, which presents possible ways that the vision, strategies and methods of these projects may be carried on. A number of civil society organisations, especially those working with youth, appear to have adopted these youth-friendly approaches for their own PVE programs. At the moment, however, neither religious institutions nor government bodies use youth-friendly approaches strongly in their PVE projects; instead, they tend to use conventional approaches which are not as accessible for young people. This chapter has shown that the engagement of youth is highly

significant to achieving greater success in PVE. This underscores the critical importance of religious institutions and government bodies adopting youth-friendly approaches in their PVE programs.

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CHAPTER 7

An Empowerment Program for Spouses of Convicted Terrorists in Indonesia

M. Faisal Magrie, Idhamsyah Eka Putra, Any Rufaedah, and Vici Sofianna Putera

Introduction

Violent extremism in Indonesia is not a new phenomenon. Over the past two centuries, there have been a number of cases when some Muslim

M. F. Magrie
Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR) & Search for Common Ground Indonesia, Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama, Jepara, Indonesia

I. Eka Putra (✉)
Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR), Persada Indonesia University, Jakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: idhamsyah.eka@upi-yai.ac.id

A. Rufaedah
Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR), Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia

V. S. Putera
Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR), Bandung Islamic University, Kota Bandung, Indonesia

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communities in the archipelago have been drawn to puritanical and militant expressions of their faith, and a small number of them have been prepared to use violence (Fealy & Borgu, 2005). Nonetheless, before the Bali bombing in 2002, terrorist acts in Indonesia did not catch the attention of the international community due to their limited impact on the outside world. After the Bali bombings, however, both the Indonesian government and the international community could no longer ignore the threat posed by violent extremism in Indonesia and began to develop measures to counter these threats. The Indonesian government created Special Detachment 88—Anti Terror (D88) shortly after the attack. Since then, the detachment has arrested more than 700 suspects of terrorist acts (Lestari, 2012).

In addition to putting perpetrators behind bars, the Indonesian government formed a national body aimed at mitigating the threats of terrorism called Badan Nasional Penaggulangan Terorism (BNPT; National Agency for Counter Terrorism). Over the past decade BNPT, working together with several Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and academic institutions have conducted various intervention programs in an attempt to 'deradicalize' perpetrators of terrorism or former prisoners of terrorism-related offences (Sumpter, 2017).

More recently, these efforts have been expanded to not only target the perpetrators of terrorism or former combatants, but also aim to disrupt the terrorist groups' broader networks. However, these deradicalisation efforts have still failed to include key individuals: the spouses and children of terrorists. In considering this absence, in 2015, we began interviewing jihadists' spouses and in 2016, we developed empowerment programs for spouses of convicted terrorists in order to disengage them from radical groups.

As the various programs related to countering violent extremism in Indonesia have been reported by many scholars (see for example Putra & Sukabdi, 2013; Putra et al., 2017; Rabasa et al., 2011; Sumpter, 2017), we limit the discussion in this chapter to explaining countering violent extremism in relation to women. Specifically, we present the activities that we have developed working together in the Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR) to facilitate the rehabilitation and reintegration into society of the wives of convicted terrorists.

The Evolving Role of Women in Islamic Terrorism

Women have been involved in various ways in supporting acts of terror throughout the history of Islamic terrorist movements. For a long time, however, their roles tended to be complementary or supporting roles, such as raising children and preparing youth for jihad or handling logistics (Knop, 2007; McCauley & Segal, 1987; Sarwono, 2016). A study conducted by Saputro (2010) revealed that women play a significant role in providing moral support in the development of radical narratives and passing these narratives on to their children. This can include, for example, giving their children names of famous jihadis, such as Osama. It is believed that by giving children such names, they are aspiring for their children to grow up to be a jihadi like Osama Bin Laden.

Another study conducted by Rufaedah et al. (2017) found that some wives sought to justify their husband's acts of terror by believing them to be a form of jihad and that consequently their incarceration was a necessary sacrifice that had to be made in their struggle for the glory of Islam. Many wives believe that those who patiently wait for their husbands to be released from prison will receive blessings as they were engaging directly in jihad themselves (Knop, 2007; Rufaedah et al., 2017, 2018).

In regard to the division of roles in the family, Sarwono (2016) found that women from radical groups will very often take on the role of the breadwinner while their husbands remain in prison on terrorism charges. They support their family's finances by, for example, handling the logistics for their husband's business operations, which their husbands are able to continue to conduct from prison. As a result of women performing these types of duties, Sarwono suggests that the husband's absence from the family home does not necessarily result in the family experiencing financial hardship as a consequence of his support of terrorism.

More recently, in addition to providing a supporting role, women in Indonesia, and in a number of other countries, have begun to take a more active role in preparing attacks, conducting suicide bombings and making *hijrah* to Syria. Because of this shift, the role of women in perpetrating terrorist attacks has increasingly begun to attract attention around the world (Rufaedah et al., 2017). For example, the United States of America (USA) began giving greater attention to women and their direct involvement in terrorist attacks after Tashfeen Malik joined her husband Syed Rizwan Farooq in a cold-blooded, mass-shooting of public service colleagues at a work meeting in San Bernardino, California, in December 2015 (Alexander, 2016). Malik had been raised in a mainstream Muslim household in Pakistan but had, apparently become radicalised in Saudi

Arabia, where she married Farooq in 2014. The couple had met online and had apparently, from the outset of their relationships been planning to partner in suicide terrorist attack in the US.

There have been a number of active steps taken at both the global and national levels to address the growing involvement of women in terrorism. The United Nations has passed Security Council Resolution 2242 (2015) on ensuring the participation and leadership of women's organisations in developing CVE and CT programs. In the UK, a counter-radicalisation program targeting women has also been developed (Rabasa et al., 2011). In this program, Muslim women who are mothers, or who work with children, were invited to join a course designed to increase awareness of the dangers of online radicalisation to prevent potential radicalisation.

In Indonesia, awareness of women's active involvement in Islamist terrorism increased sharply when Dian Yulia Novi was arrested and charged with preparing to carry out a suicide bombing at the Presidential Palace in late 2016. When police raided her rented room in Bekasi, on the eastern outskirts of Jakarta, in early December, they discovered a powerful improvised explosive device (IED) based on a pressure cooker packed with three kilograms of high explosives, powerful enough they claimed, to have a produced a devastating explosion with a blast radius of 300 metres. Police allege that Novi was planning to go to the palace the next day and execute the attack. She would have mingled with members of the public assembling outside the palace fence to watch a regular changing of the guards ceremony, an event popular with both foreign and local tourists and onlookers. Dian Yulia Novi had apparently been recruited by an Islamic State network led by Syrian-based Indonesian IS leader Bahrun Naim whilst she was working as a domestic worker in Taiwan. She was sentenced by a Jakarta court to seven-and-a-half years jail in August 2017, a sentence made more lenient by the fact that she had confessed to planning to carry out a suicide bombing, and by the fact that she was pregnant and about to give birth.

Since the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/IS), there have been increasing numbers of women showing interest in joining ISIS. The Indonesia Ministry of Social Affairs (2017) reported that 88 out of 161 deportees from the Middle East who joined ISIS were women, with most bringing their children with them.

In addition to growing levels of radicalism among women in Indonesia, the wives of currently incarcerated terrorists have been taking on a new role as temporarily single parents as their spouses serve-out their sentences. The wives of convicted terrorists have to manage their own

and their children's financial needs as well as their children's safety and comfort. Many are also subject to stigmatisation in their own neighbourhoods (Rufaedah et al., 2017). It has been found that women from radical backgrounds endure prolonged stigmatisation in three stages. In the first, they tend to ignore the stigmatisation, before moving on to the second stage at which they attempt to avoid stigmatisation. In the final stage, they usually move, relocating themselves to a new neighbourhood (Rufaedah et al., 2017). These conditions have forced wives of convicted terrorists to enhance their resilience in the face of hardship and to also develop skills to improve their own and their family's financial conditions.

Based on the expanding role of women in Islamic terrorist movements, in 2016, we developed a model for an intervention and empowerment program for wives of convicted terrorists in Indonesia. In the following section, we present an overview of this study.

Overview of the Empowerment Program for Spouses of Convicted Terrorists

Before initiating the empowerment programs for spouses of convicted terrorists, we interviewed the wives of convicted terrorists in order to understand their lives and their perspectives about terrorism. From the ten wives of convicted terrorists we interviewed, we found that most did not support the use of violence; all ten wives claimed that they never knew the activities of their husbands outside their homes, especially any conduct related to terrorism, prior to their arrest. They believed that if their husband was away or did not come home for some time, it was most likely for *ta'lim*, trading or doing odd jobs to earn a living. Consequently, they claim to be surprised when they found out their husband had been arrested. The following are examples of extracts from the interviews:

> […] I came home at 11, and finally I got a call from home, saying my husband was arrested. I was surprised, why arrested? I didn't know, when he left he told me it was for work. […] I wasn't too suspicious. (B, 33)

> We didn't know, because the reason he went [….], to my knowledge it was just for business. […] We didn't understand what his activities were like. (NJ, 43)

If these accounts are to be believed, then most of the convicted terrorists concealed from their wives the real activities that they were involved with.

From interviewing the wives and evaluating their conditions, we found that they were generally lacking someone in their lives that they felt they could talk to, that they did not have strong friendships and that they were vulnerable to being recruited by radicals. After build rapport with them and gaining their trust, many of the wives interviewed began to open up and share their problems with the interviewer, through direct interaction as well as via phone calls and social media communication like *WhatsApp*. These interactions, and what was learned from them, enabled us to develop a program that focused on rehabilitation through empowering the women so that they were able to help their husbands disengage from violent extremist networks and by giving wives the agency and capacity to first reengage with mainstream society themselves.

It is important to note that using a family member as a way to deradicalise other family members is not new; a number of countries have already used this method (Koehler, 2015). In Saudi Arabia, the family care program was developed as part of a pre-release program. This program facilitates family reunions, participation in public events and participation in religious pilgrimages (the Hajj and Umrah). Saudi Arabia also provides financial support for family members of convicted terrorists after their release (Al-Hadlag, 2015). This program is considered to present too high a risk, however, if it is used in isolation. Rather it must be used in conjunction with an additional program developed to prevent or deradicalise the family members before providing the family care program; without this, the family members might remain vulnerable to radicalisation.

Germany has also developed a rehabilitation program based on empowering family members, particularly parents, who have a radicalised individual in their family (Koehler, 2015). This program aims to help family members gain a deeper understanding of Islam and the arguments or ideological narratives used by radical groups in their recruitment messaging. The family member then plays a key role in disengaging the radicalised individual from the radical group and reducing their level of radicalism through informed and supportive engagement. This program has been found to be effective in leading the radicalised family member to become less radical.

Nonetheless, deradicalisation programs involving family counselling rarely give significant attention to involving the spouses of radicalised individuals. In considering this, our study was specifically tailored for this often-neglected group, with the aim of developing the skills of the wives of currently incarcerated terrorists to increase their resilience against

violent extremism and terrorist ideology. Moreover, the study also sought to develop the abilities of participants to successfully reengage in their local communities after they turned away from supporting extremist activities. A major goal of this study was to create a psychologically safe space among participants who shared common individual, financial and familial problems.

The program was conducted in three regions across Java: in the provinces of West Java, Central Java and East Java. With a population of more than 145 million Java is the most populous island in the world. With an area slightly less than that of England and Wales, and much of it taken up by volcanic mountains, it has some of the most densely populated areas of anywhere in the world. It follows than any violent incidents in Java are likely to have a greater impact and affect more people than in any of the less densely populated islands in Indonesia. The rugged, forested mountains of West Java provided shelter to the radical, proto-Islamist, Darul Islam (DI) movement that emerged out of a disaffected militia movement caught up in Indonesia's revolutionary struggle for independence in the late 1940s. Central Java is the location of the al-Mukmin *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in the hamlet of Ngruki, in the ancient royal city of Solo (also known as Surakarta), which produced DI Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir who when on to found the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network after breaking from DI. One of masterminds of the 2002 Bali bombing was a JI member and graduate of al-Mukmin. This *pesantren* also inspired a significant minority of other *pesantren* adopt a more radical interpretation of Islam. East Java is also home to several Jemaah Islamiyah leaders and members, some of whom created the al-Islam Islamic *pesantren* in Tenggulun, Lamongan, which served as the base of their operations. This boarding school produced three of the main perpetrators of the 2002 Bali bombings and other terrorist attacks.

Workshops

Our team designed a series of workshops with each involving a qualified facilitator as a moderator for each topic. Our moderators were academics and practitioners who have been in the field for over seven years. Speakers were selected based on their expertise, ability to deliver information, commitment to involvement in the project (that is, willingness to attend all required activities including training for the trainers and workshops in three cities) and having an organisational affiliation

that would be accepted by potential participants. The process of selecting speakers was based on recommendations and information about their competence from our team members as well as internet sources. The speakers that were considered appropriate would then be included in further round of competency evaluations.

There were nine topics presented in three workshops: entrepreneurship skills (in two separate workshops), religious outreach, religious tolerance, self-empowerment, community service and public speaking, fostering a stable home environment, citizenship, and critical thinking. Many of the speakers were practitioners and mentors who had previously conducted a range of training and mentoring workshops for communities. The speakers covering the topics of religious outreach and *Revolusi Mental* (mental revolution)[1] were professors in Islamic studies and social psychology, respectively. Other topics such as fostering a stable home environment were given by child and family psychologists. The critical thinking module was presented by an expert in social psychology.

Each topic had specific desired outcomes for the participants to ensure the success of the main program. The workshop on entrepreneurship was designed to encourage participants to start their own business and to manage their domestic finances. The workshop on women's empowerment discussed women's role in modern society and how to reconcile this role with traditional Islamic values towards women. The workshop on religious outreach worked to create a better understanding of the teachings of Islam and the duties of Muslim mothers and wives, as well as attempted to disengage participants from radical teachings. It is hoped that this knowledge goes on to be spread throughout the participants' local communities through the skills they acquired in the community service workshop.

Having to take on the role of a single mother temporarily during their husbands' incarceration is undoubtedly challenging for the participants. To support this, the workshop on parenting provided them with the necessary skills and knowledge needed to better cope as a single mother under unique circumstances. The workshop on religious tolerance was intended to provide participants with better knowledge and understanding of other beliefs and how to coexist with people from

[1] *Revolusi Mental* is the slogan for a national movement of self-improvement initiated by President Joko Widodo intended to encourage Indonesians to transform their outlook and habits to be more disciplined and have a stronger work ethic.

different religious backgrounds. Similarly, the workshop on citizenship provided civic knowledge and guidance on how to behave in society according to the constitution, while the critical thinking workshop aimed at enhancing the participants' perspectives on current humanitarian issues, both nationally and globally.

Before providing information to participants, the speakers were involved in a Training of Trainers (ToT) activity, during which they developed the materials to be presented to participants and planned methods for delivering information based on different approaches based on the character and demographics of the participants, location, schedule and other key characteristics and limitations. Other team members and participants would then evaluate the materials that were presented by the speakers. Material that was considered to not meet the program objectives were then refined by the speakers and sent back to the research team as part of a collaborative review process.

We set up three different dates to conduct the workshops and each workshop was held for three days. Themes of the workshops are as follows:

Workshop 1: The first workshop enabled participants to enhance their entrepreneurial skills. The participants were asked to develop their own small business that matched their skills and experiences. In this first workshop, participants also discussed the role of women in modern Islamic society while guided by a facilitator. In this workshop, participants also learned about citizenship, including the rights and responsibilities of a citizen of a pluralistic country. There was also a group sharing session in the evening.

Workshop 2: In this workshop, participants discussed their current psychological state as a single parent in a 'healthy family' session. The participants also worked to enhance their critical thinking. The last activity of the second workshop focused on communication skills. The participants were encouraged to enhance their speech and communication skills so that they were equipped to articulate a tolerant and peaceable understanding of Islam to members of their community.

Workshop 3: The third workshop was intended to further enhance the entrepreneurial skills and capacity of participants. This second entrepreneur workshop aimed to discuss what they had been doing in terms of securing their financial income since the first entrepreneurial workshop. The participants also discussed the Quran

and the relevance of the concept of jihad (literally, struggling for a righteous cause) in the modern era with a facilitator. The last session of the workshop was about religious tolerance, and the participants discussed the condition of religious diversity in their neighbourhoods and whether it was thriving or declining.

In the workshop meetings, we asked participants to bring their children. We set up activities and recreational programs for the children. Among the activities for the children were visiting theme parks, learning about farming and animal husbandry and taking part in outbound activities.

Participants and Locations

Twenty-three spouses of convicted terrorists participated in the programs[2]: nine women participated in the workshops located around West Java and Jakarta; six women participated in the workshops located in Central Java and eight women participated in workshops located in East Java. Each location was set up for three workshops and two monitoring phases. The participants ranged in age from 23 to 45 years old and their highest level of formal education varied from rudimentary elementary school education through to undergraduate degrees. Participants had a diverse range of occupational backgrounds, such as running a soyabean milk business, managing a shop, selling food or clothes, tutoring in Quranic recitation, school teaching, working in the cafeteria and running their home. The duration of sentences being served by the participants' husbands varied from four years to life without parole. The charges varied from involvement in the Bali bombings, illegal weapons possession, illegal military training, carrying out terror attacks in Poso and Ambon, involvement in a bombing plot on the Myanmar Embassy and joining ISIS in Syria.

[2] In the beginning, twenty-four spouses of convicted terrorists participated in the programs; 9 persons participated in the workshops located around West Java and Jakarta; 6 persons participated in the workshops located in Central Java and 9 persons participated in workshops located in East Java. However, 1 participant from East Java only attended the first workshop so we do not have enough data based on her experience. For this reason, we excluded her case in the analysis.

Procedure

The process of inviting participants to join our program had a series of challenges. First, our team created a list of potential participants with the help of the Special Detachment Anti-Terrorism Force of the Indonesian National Police. The team then contacted the names on the list to ask for their participation in the program. Several people declined this initial invitation, citing a lack of confidence in our team and the nature of the program. The rest of the potential participants agreed to join but they required their husbands' permission first. Our team then had to visit each of the potential participants' husbands in their penitentiaries across Java.

The responses of the husbands varied considerably. Eleven convicted terrorists agreed directly to allow their wives to join the program. Another thirteen convicted terrorists delayed their decision and the rest refused to give their permission for their wives to be involved in the program. The team then had to go back to meet the wives who already had their husband's permission and invite them to attend the workshops in each area.

The program was based on seeking to engage participants in active discussion of each of the topics throughout the workshops. Facilitators presenting the materials encouraged the participants to give comments and ask questions about the content. The research team recorded all of the participants' responses and categorised them according to the topics and areas of workshop.

As set out above, in analysing the experience of participants in the program, we used three different approaches:

1. Thematic content analysis of Integrative Complexity (IC),
2. Visual Analysis (VA) and
3. Qualitative Thematic Analyses (QTA).

Integrative complexity was used to analyse the participants' thoughts on the level of difficulty in integration before and after the programs. Visual analysis was used to understand their psychological state through visual images. Qualitative thematic analysis was used to understand participants' verbal expressions, how they described their experiences, whether the programs were accepted in a positive way, and what their future plans were (we describe how these approaches were integrated in greater detail in the results and discussion section). Below, the results are presented

through integrative complexity followed by visual analysis and thematic analysis.

Results and Discussion

Integrative Complexity

Integrative complexity is a measurement of a person's cognition which focuses on the structures of their statements rather that the content of those statements. Integrative complexity examines the complexity of the structures of statements responding to a particular topic (Suedfeld et al., 1992). It consists of a 7-point scale, where 1 is categorised as undifferentiated strategy/simple thought, and 7 is categorised as multiple-integration strategy/complex thought. Examples of the scores are (Suedfeld, 1996: 180).

Undifferentiated (Score 1)

I know what my values are and do not need to gather more information in order to form an opinion or decide what to do. The appropriate action to take is very clear-cut. I am able to respond quickly and decisively. I am quite certain about how I feel and may rely on rules which I have established for myself or that others follow. It is not the right time to try to get all of the facts or details of a situation or to listen to a lot of other people's opinions. It is unnecessary to completely analyse the entire situation and what my behaviour should be.

Differentiated, Not Integrated (Score 3)

It is important to analyse things a bit before deciding how I feel or what to do. There may be more than one viewpoint which is worth considering or more than one aspect of the situation which is important. It may be important to recognize other people's needs or points of view. Jumping to conclusions will probably not work out too well. Rules that I have established may need to be modified depending on the situation.

Differentiated, Some Integration (Score 5)

It is necessary to analyse the situation so that I clearly understand the different aspects of it. It may also be important to look at other people's views or feelings. Once I understand the situation I will try to take as much information as possible into account in deciding how to behave or what to say or do. I may try to come up with a novel approach or a creative solution that encompasses all of the important factors or viewpoints. I will be flexible and willing to incorporate new information or ideas.

Differentiation, Multi-Level Integration (Score 7)

It is necessary to examine the situation fully so that I can clearly understand all of the relevant information and am able to consider it in making the best possible decision. I will need to compare the possible outcomes of a variety of different courses of action, and thus systematically derive the best outcome. It is not enough to merely combine different points of view; instead, I will analyse the problem on a number of different levels (e.g. examine it historically) and combine the points of view on each level to achieve an overall understanding of the situation and how a solution would fit into the overall picture. I will come to the best solution by making numerous compromises among different points of view.[3]

The tendency to use violence, the intention to be aggressive and acts of terrorism are consistently related to a low score of integrative complexity. Terrorist groups were found to have relatively simpler rhetoric than non-terrorist groups (Conway et al., 2011). The study by Conway et al. also showed that the simpler the rhetoric, the more likely the terrorist group would be to act. On the other hand, the people who tend to avoid confrontation and choose to compromise with opposite groups exhibit higher scores in integrative complexity (Conway et al., 2011). The communication or messaging between two or more conflicting groups also tends to differ during a time of peace and during the brink of an open conflict or war. In relatively peaceful times, the messages tend to exhibit higher scores on integrative complexity than at times when open

[3] Such explanation and citation about integrative complexity is also written as part of integrative chapter in Putra et al. (2017, p.102) as part of a chapter in the book entitled *Examining Global Peacemaking in the Digital Age*.

conflicts are about to take place (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Suedfeld et al., 1977).

In the program of empowerment for spouses of convicted terrorists, we tested the level of the spouses' integrative complexity between the first meeting (workshop 1) and after a series of subsequent workshops, which consisted of Monitoring 1 and Monitoring 2. We used their statements on each activity to analyse the level of integrative complexity. Five statements from the participants were randomly sampled for inclusion in the coded sample (if fewer than five statements were available, all statements in the document were used). Participants who were not involved in all meetings would be excluded from further analysis. In total, we gathered 82 statements that could be analysed in all 3 stages (i.e. workshop 1 + 2 monitoring).

In workshop 1 (see Table 7.1 for descriptive results, meeting 1, monitoring 1 and monitoring 2), the mean number of participants in West Java was 1.88 (SD = 0.76; $M_{\text{minimum}} = 1$; $M_{\text{maximum}} = 3$), Central Java was 1.82 (SD = 0.67; $M_{\text{minimum}} = 1$; $M_{\text{maximum}} = 3$) and East Java was 1.75 (SD = 0.69; $M_{\text{minimum}} = 1$; $M_{\text{maximum}} = 3.5$). The results of monitoring 1 showed that the mean of the level of integrative complexity in Central Java was 1.47 (SD = 0.39; Minimum = 1; maximum = 2.25), West Java was 1.49 (SD = 0.57; Minimum = 1; Maximum = 2.50) and East Java was 1.88 (SD = 0.69; Minimum = 1; Maximum = 3.50); the level of

Table 7.1 The level of integrative complexity

		N	*M*	*SD*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
Workshop 1	Central Java	26	1.8173	0.66917	1.00	3.00
	West Java	19	1.8816	0.76544	1.00	3.00
	East Java	37	1.7568	0.68589	1.00	3.50
	Total	82	1.8049	0.69280	1.00	3.50
Monitoring 1	Central Java	26	1.4712	0.39577	1.00	2.25
	West Java	19	1.4868	0.57418	1.00	2.50
	East Java	37	1.8770	0.69471	1.00	3.50
	Total	82	1.6579	0.61326	1.00	3.50
Monitoring 2	Central Java	26	1.5096	0.57654	1.00	3.00
	West Java	19	1.3947	0.39366	1.00	2.00
	East Java	37	2.0660	0.73793	1.00	4.00
	Total	82	1.7340	0.68743	1.00	4.00

Note *N* = Participant statements

integrative complexity in East Java was found to significantly differ from other locations (F (2, 79) = 4.70, $p < 0.05$; Tukey's post hoc between West Java and East Java: $p = 0.05$; Tukey's post hoc between Central Java and East Java: $p = 0.023$). Again, in monitoring 2, the level of integrative complexity in East Java ($M = 2.07$, SD = 0.74) was higher than in West Java ($M = 1.40$, SD = 0.39) and Central Java ($M = 1.51$, SD = 0.58) (F (2, 79) = 9.74, $p < 0.00$; Tukey's post hoc between West Java and East Java: $p = 0.001$; Tukey's post hoc between Central Java and East Java: $p = 0.002$).

Testing with split-plot ANOVA between factor 'group' (West Java, Central Java, and East Java) and factor 'pre-post time' (meeting 1, monitoring 1 and monitoring 2), there was a significant interaction (F (3.40, 143.01) = 3.25, $p < 0.05$, $\eta^2 = 0.08$). The multiple comparisons of Tukey's Post Hoc Test showed that the mean difference between East Java and Central Java ($M_{\text{difference}} = 0.37$, SE = 0.10, $p < 0.01$) and West Java ($M_{\text{difference}} = 0.38$, SE = 0.11, $p < 0.01$) was significant. What can be argued from these findings is that our program is considered successful in increasing the relative level of integrative complexity on East Java participants, but not on West and Central Java participants. These results are illustrated in Table 7.1 and Fig. 7.1.

Of particular, interest is the findings after the monitoring process, especially with regard to East Java participants. The results from the East Java participants saw a consistent increase until the second monitoring phase. Potential explanations for this shift include:

1. East Java workshops were conducted after workshops at other locations were held. Following these workshops, we would usually evaluate the results (from observation) and assess the weaknesses and strengths of the workshops. Some weaknesses were reassessed and improved. For example, in the critical thinking component of the workshop, the instructor originally did not show videos to boost participants' critical thinking at the time of the first workshop (i.e. in the West Java location). After evaluating this first meeting, however, the instructor made critical improvements to the delivery of the themes and added videos in order to boost the level of empathy experienced by the participants.
2. From the beginning, the East Java participants were the most open to our programs. They were all from the same network, and one of



Fig. 7.1 Result of the level of integrative complexity in meeting 1, Monitoring 1 and Monitoring 2

the participants was already considered a leader and could encourage other participants to be active in the sessions.

3. Many Indonesian Muslim women are culturally orientated to be passive and less communicative. We argue that by getting our female participants to express their opinions and write comments in response to the questions we presented represents considerable progress (Table 7.2).

Qualitative Thematic Analysis

Qualitative Thematic Analysis (QTA) is a method of identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within qualitative data. It minimally

Table 7.2 Statement extracts for integrative complexity

Extract	*Integrative complexity score*
The case of my husband's involvement never made me angry. For me being angry is tiring. It is better to just take it easy (JTAYMO2_30)	1
My second child, even though she is a female, I never chose which school she attended. For me it is better that she chose her own school than I choose it and as a result she cannot stand my choice so I let her choose it herself. (JMUSMO1_61)	1.5
An example that proves entrepreneurship is part of Islamic teaching is Siti Khodijah, the wife of the Prophet Muhammad who was a trader. (JMSRMO1_2)	2
The difference of the recitation ritual here is there is no clash for example whether there should be a *tahlilan* or not. For those who passed away, sometimes there are those who are cynical is it really that a dead person just be buried without *tahlil* but that is all but I do admit that the recitation of the people of NU is better than the people of Muhammadiyah. (JTAYMO2_21)	2.5
I previously had an experience of interacting with non-Muslims and I acted normally without differentiating them from others. When I was in school, I had non-Muslim friends, no problem, we blend in. When I taught in Surabaya my students were non-Muslims and I had no problem. (JTTNMO2_24)	3
In the context of Islam, the right of a woman is almost the same even though not exactly the same as the concept of feminism in the context of feminism. That is, the position of the man and the woman are equal, however in Islam [it] is not like that, in the context of Islam a woman may still be lower in educational rights fair treatment receive an adequate income the woman's obligation is also suited to her condition or there might be an obligation for women to stay at home, related to this issue there is a saying in Arabic that a mother is the first 'school' for her children, the spearhead of kindness in a family lays with the mother. (JMHKMO1_8)	3.5
In my neighbourhood the majority of people are of old age. The majority are part of NU and Muhammadiyah things that are often a problem. There are differences in perspective which are implicated in the mosques however they still live in harmony and are cooperative. (JTMHRT_1)	4

organises and describes the data set in (rich) details (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Different from TCA, QTA can provide a more detailed and nuanced account of one particular theme or group of themes whereas the former explores reflections of the content of the entire data set.

As presented above, our study aims to train the participants in skills that will develop their resilience against violent extremism and terrorist ideology. For this reason, we provided participants with workshops designed to encourage the development of their resilience towards violent influences. We recorded participants' responses in all workshops and found three different narrative themes emerge regarding their views on religious tolerance. First, several participants tended to exhibit conditioned tolerance, which is tolerance as long as the other parties are friendly toward them and not harming them. The second is unconditioned tolerance. This view mainly comes from their understanding of certain verses of the Quran. The third narrative is showing suspicion of people of other religions. These views were assessed from participants' reactions in the workshops.

Conditioned tolerance was displayed several times by the participants. This standpoint believes that tolerance is a good thing only when the other parties are not harming them. When this condition is perceived to have been violated by other parties, they feel justified to disrespect or even cause harm to the other parties. Furthermore, several participants believe that violence is justified for self-defence or as an act of retaliation against people from other religions, but it is only justified as a last resort. As one participant stated:

> We should display kindness toward Muslims and non-Muslims in social situations, in the market, in the neighborhood, etc. But if we already display kindness toward non-Muslims but they act otherwise, we should be hard toward them as well. (RS, 28)

This statement shows that the participant views tolerance to be dependent on certain conditions, in this case, that non-Muslims should also show kindness towards Muslims in order to be tolerated or respected themselves. If these conditions are not met, Muslims would be justified in responding sternly. Similar arguments were expressed by other participants:

> I think that tolerance means respecting each other, but it still has limitations, especially in terms of faith and belief. People used to say that tolerance is in all terms and conditions. But for us, Muslims must have limitations. (MS, 37)

> Tolerance means not disturbing each other. But we must not develop tolerance in terms of faith and belief, because the Quran had said so: 'upon you thy religion, upon me mine'. In terms of social life, we should help each other, be kind to others, and respect. (SR, 31)

These two statements were from different participants in different areas. They did not state clearly the exact conditional situations (e.g. to cause harm), but still viewed tolerance as having strict conditions, which must not interfere with personal faith and belief. The former participant also added that according to her personal understanding, tolerance had to be in all aspects of life.

The second standpoint for viewing tolerance is unconditional tolerance. This standpoint regards social interactions among members of society from different religious or ethnic backgrounds as a gift from God and a duty for Muslims. In this study, this standpoint is the most common view among participants. This gives an illustration of the level of radicalism among participants, especially in terms of tolerating other religions. These are two statements from two different participants:

> My principle, as a mother, is to put efforts to teach my children so they won't develop radical thoughts as their father once embraced. If we want to help other [people], we should not consider his/her skin colour, religion, or race. It is best if the government supports this kind of morality and incorporate[s] it in the national curriculum to educate the society, especially parents, about the danger of radicalism and terrorism. (HK, 35)

> Last Christmas I was invited to attend [a] celebration in nearby church. The priest is a close friend of mine. I don't care about what other people think of me. Whenever the Christians invite me, I never [decline]. Vice versa, whenever the Muslims celebrate, I also [invite] my Christian neighbors. In Eid al Adha, we deliver meat to our fellow Christians. No discriminations. The Chinese also invited us into their house on their New Year. (LB, 37)

The statements above are considered to be representative of some of the most tolerant statements throughout the study. The former emphasises the importance of religious tolerance as a preventive measure to counter radicalism and terrorism, and the latter explains the importance of tolerance among members of society from various religious backgrounds. Other shorter statements that offer us some insights into the participants' views on tolerance are as follows:

> The point is, acceptance on diversity is [a] very important [aspect] of being Indonesian. We have various [ethnicities, races, and religions]. We live together, and we should not fight among each [other]. (ZN, 36)

> Tolerance is very important for our life. Islam teaches to tasamuh (to be tender and to forgive) for every human. It is also very important to prevent conflict. (S, 28)

> Even though there are principle differences regarding ethnic and religious background in my neighborhood, we never regard those differences as important. In daily activities, we still tolerate and help each other. (M, 30)

The passages above were provided by three different participants, but they share much in common with statements from other participants as well. The statements give us an understanding of their attitude toward coexisting with people from other religions. These participants regard tolerance as a task for every member of the community, and, especially for Muslims, to ensure the cohesiveness of the pluralistic community itself. These statements could also be interpreted as indicating that the participants do not regard religious tolerance as a condition but as a duty.

The third narrative on religious tolerance relates to developing suspicion towards people from different religious backgrounds. The participants who developed this narrative tended to have more negative experiences in their past, or simply adhere to more radical views of Islam.

> Poso was a conflict zone, where we know that many Muslims were being slaughtered by Christians. Therefore, I cannot put sympathy and love toward the Christians. (UH, 43)

In the above sentences, a participant shared her view towards non-Muslims, in this case, Christians, who according to her was responsible for the conflict in Poso between 2000–2003 and the deaths of many Muslims

in that conflict. She perceived Christians in general as people who do not deserve her attention because of the past actions of their religious counterparts in Poso. Her direct experience in that conflict made her develop this narrative. A similar sentiment was given by another participant in a more explicit way:

> I have strong objection regarding construction of churches in my neighbourhood. The songs in the church will disturb the Muslim community. (SR, 35)

This participant did not clearly state that she is against Christians, but that she objects to the construction and establishment of churches in her area due to the associated noise disturbances. However, these expressed views may also be perceived as a more general reluctance to have another place of worship near her daily area of activity.

These three different narratives on religious tolerance provide us with descriptions of participants' attitude towards people from other religions. One of the objectives of this study is to develop knowledge and skills for participants to successfully engage in their local communities as non-supporters of extremists' activities. Nonetheless, despite the different views on how the participants see others, most participants (i.e. 16 participants) were impressed with the program. For this reason, and due to their shifting attitudes towards non-Muslims, the achievement of the workshop's objectives depends on the attitude that each participant develops within her own community.

Visual Analysis

This study is also informed by the social psychological perspective. The advancing technologies in photography have created an opportunity for social psychology researchers to explain social phenomena. Milgram (1976) predicted that the popularity of photography in everyday life eventually would produce a significant and fruitful new domain of social psychology. Furthermore, Sontag (1990) declared that photographic events act to mark the experience of being photographed as one of special significance. Visual or photographic research methods are now firmly entrenched in major fields of study, including sociology, health and nursing, educational research, criminology, human and cultural

geography, media and cultural studies, discursive and social psychology, management and organisation, political science and policy analysis.

Throughout the series of workshops conducted as part of the empowerment program, pictures were taken to document events and situations happening at the workshops. Through pictures, we can gain some insight into whether the participants were eager to be involved in our programs or not, or whether the participants have shown changes in terms of openness to others or acceptance of other viewpoints.

Figure 7.2 is from the group counselling session. In this picture, all participants held each other's hands and their facial expressions showed their solemn engagement with the activities. Based on the participants' testimonies, the group counselling session was considered one of the most valuable sessions. Throughout this session, they could reveal their problems and find the solution together. It was a moment where they could express their emotions.

Fig. 7.2 Psychological sessions: group counselling

Next, during the workshops, we organised recreational activities for all family members. Here, we asked them to bring their children to the venue so that our team could take the children to the nearest recreation area. As expected, the recreation session was one of the most anticipated sessions in the workshop series. As shown in Fig. 7.3, the children and adults appeared to be happy and having fun. They appeared to be enjoying the time dedicated to this session.

The recreational sessions can be considered a success as a result of the bonds created between the children. At the initial workshop, the children tended to always be with their mothers and seemed reluctant to interact with each other. As the program reached the final workshop, the children became more open to each other and became more reluctant to be separated when the workshop sessions were completed and the participants had to go back to their residence.

One of the particularly interesting outcomes of this program was that we were able to get participants to dance outdoors. As can be seen in Fig. 7.4, the women, in their full-faced *niqab*, were dancing freely and expressing themselves through an activity considered to be a sport. Most fundamentalist Muslim women are not allowed to express themselves, let alone dance in public. In this workshop, however, we found that the participants were willing to open themselves up to mingle with others as ordinary women with the need to express themselves.

Fig. 7.3 Family recreation

Fig. 7.4 Hijab dancing

Another interesting finding throughout the workshop series was that, contrary to our expectations, the participants did not object to the presence of a male facilitator. The assumption that this might raise objections was based on our previous intervention programs. These programs included male participants, and we found that individual participants with a radical Islamic background tended to refuse facilitators of a different gender. In the spouses program, we sought to test that phenomenon on females with a radical Islamic background, and we found that these female participants had no objections to facilitators of a different gender. Not only did the female participants listen to the male facilitators' materials, they also openly expressed their opinions, thoughts and directed questions to the facilitator, which further created a dialog between the two parties. Moreover, the entrepreneurship and religious outreach workshop was considered one of the best workshops in the series by the participants, despite involving a male facilitator.

The workshops (Figs. 7.5 and 7.6) above show various stages of the study. They provide a clear depiction of different situations, which helps

Fig. 7.5 Citizenship workshop

Fig. 7.6 Entrepreneurship workshop

us to further explain the study visually. The photographs show how the workshop created a safe environment for the group participants, gave them an opportunity to engage in group recreational activities with their children, provided them moments to express their sense of womanhood, and finally, provided them the opportunity to learn skills which would help the participants in their everyday lives.

Conclusion and Key Findings

Our study shows that empowerment programs can have a significant impact on participants' thought processes in terms of the integrative complexity of their responses. As for the declining results of the integrative complexity for participants from Central and West Java at the Monitoring 2 session, we have developed some theories. First, the activities in Workshop 1 were considered successful in leading participants to almost reaching a score of 2 for the level of integrative complexity (that is, in between undifferentiated and differentiated scores. Please see previous section on integrative complexity for clear understanding). The themes of Workshop 1 focused on entrepreneurship, citizenship and women's empowerment. From our observations, Workshop 1 was able to lead participants to express their emotions and talk about their problems. This outcome is considered successful in opening participants up to improved interactions with people in their wider communities; that is, people outside of their existing peer group/s.

We started the first workshop in West Java, then Central Java and ended up in East Java. As West Java was our pilot workshop where the content and delivery were initially trialled, we later delivered the workshop in East Java in a way that improved upon the shortcomings of the first workshop. We expect that this may contribute to the East Java workshops appearing to be more successful than in the other locations. However, this may also be due to participants from East Java being more open to our programs in the first place, compared with the participants from West and Central Java. In the light of these differing results, in future programs, we will seek to survey participants regarding their views before the programs are held. This will provide us with a baseline knowledge of their level of integrative complexity prior to the programs taking place.

In terms of the participants' views regarding people from other religious backgrounds, the qualitative thematic analysis showed that participants developed three different narratives in their views. This shows that, albeit closely connected with radical Islamic ideas, the participants differ significantly in their perspectives regarding religious tolerance. To the best of our knowledge, there are no theories supporting this categorisation so far, but this finding could help future research in these areas. The more interesting finding from this thematic analysis is that there are more participants who view other religions neutrally rather than as a threat.

Furthermore, the visual analysis provided some direct experience insights into the implementation of the study. Various findings in this section help us to understand that participants who come from a radical background do not necessarily behave according to what people from different or opposite backgrounds would expect of them. For example, the participants were willing to attend classes with male facilitators, contrary to our expectations and popular belief. They were also willing to express themselves through dancing, even though it is considered a sport and not something they should engage in, which surprised everyone involved in the study. The participants also managed to appreciate sharing their experience with the other participants, which is a good start towards developing positive bonds among the participants.

This research has some clear limitations. First, it has not been able to examine how the wives' involvement in the workshop may influence their husbands' ideologies and behaviours. This point is essential in considering future research that would examine this related topic. Second, there is no preparation for a follow-up planned at the end of the program. Therefore, we suggest future research to prepare a follow-up designed to facilitate the continuation of the deradicalisation process following this program. Third, the program mainly focused on empowering the wives of radicalised individuals as they are considered to have the closest relationship with radicalised men, whereas mothers are considered a beloved, yet less close connection. We suggest that future programs should consider involving the mothers of radicalised individuals for countering violent extremism as well. We argue that if there is a program developed that embraces both the mothers and wives of radicalised individuals, CVE programs may be more effective in deradicalisation efforts.

This study and the workshops themselves represent just one of many CVE programs in Indonesia. However, this study is the first in Indonesia to focus specifically on the wives of currently incarcerated terrorists using

a scientific approach. Therefore, this report offers some significant initial insights into the lives of the terrorists' wives and should encourage more studies on this particular subject not only in Indonesia but also globally.

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PART III

Key Issues

CHAPTER 8

Gendering CVE in Indonesia

Hana Hanifah

Introduction

In Indonesia, gender has not traditionally occupied a central role in the discussion of violent extremism and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Violent extremism is considered to be a matter of national security, dealing with issues such as violence, war, state power, military and strategic calculation, all of which are issues traditionally dealt with by men and associated with masculinity. Indeed, scholars have long observed that international politics and security issues are dominated by masculine narratives and men, who have assumed roles as leaders, decision makers, protectors and perpetrators of violence throughout history, and that the issue of gender and the role of women was deemed to be irrelevant and marginalised (see: Sjoberg, 2016; Tickner, 1992, 2004). However, through a gender analysis of security issues, scholars have been able to expose this lacuna and bring the discussion about gender and women to the fore.

H. Hanifah (✉)
The Habibie Center, Jakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: h.hanifah@alumni.lse.ac.uk

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This chapter seeks to explain what has been learned so far from the inclusion of gender as one of the key elements in understanding violent extremism and P/CVE in Indonesia. It argues that emerging gender analysis in Indonesia has been particularly valuable in providing awareness and understandings about women's involvement in violent extremism as well as their potential as actors in the P/CVE space. This chapter is structured in five sections. The first provides a brief introduction to gender analysis and its use in understanding violent extremism and P/CVE. The second section then discusses the trend of gender analysis in violent extremism in Indonesia. The third section provides an examination of the inclusion of a gendered lens in the P/CVE efforts in the country to date. Finally, the fourth section presents assessments and recommendations from the lessons learned so far, which will then be followed by some final remarks in the concluding section.

Gender Analysis in Violent Extremism and P/CVE

The inclusion of gender as a key element in understanding violent extremism and P/CVE has been described as a positive step, particularly with regard to understanding different interpretations of women's and men's involvement in violent extremism and P/CVE. Gender analysis examines how the socially constructed behavioural expectations, norms, and stereotypes that dictate what it means to "be a man" or "be a woman," vary across cultural and social contexts, and considers how these constructed behaviours influence the way people act and perceive other people's actions (Sjoberg et al., 2011). In other words, gender analysis is concerned with the implications of gender identity as a social construction of masculinity and femininity, and how these social constructions influence the dynamics of people's, not just women's, participation in violent extremism and P/CVE.

A gendered lens acknowledges the complex power relations between women and men that arise as a result of the gendered socio-cultural structure of the society. Accordingly, applying a gendered lens is not only useful to uncover women's participation in violent extremism and P/CVE, but it is also valuable to examine how the domination of masculine power and privilege in states, political and even social affairs affected women and men differently (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2018). By recognising unequal power relations between men and women, the gender lens has been particularly useful in revealing that women's roles in

violent extremism have been underestimated; consequently their potential to participate in, and contribute to, P/CVE has been overlooked. Men, to whom masculine traits such as strength and aggression are attributed, have been commonly perceived and expected to be protectors or perpetrators of violence as a result of their power and agency. Conversely, women, who are commonly associated with feminine traits, such as gentleness and sensitivity, have generally been presumed to be largely the victims of violence, or else they are seen as passive actors, usually without agency and in need of masculine protectors. The gender lens criticizes and challenges such assumptions and helps reveal women's increasing activism in violent extremism and terrorism globally, including their involvement and motivations to be recruiters, fundraisers, combatants and suicide bombers (see: Bloom, 2010; Cunningham, 2003; Gentry, 2009; Jacques & Taylor, 2008; Nacos, 2016). Ultimately, with the revelations of women's activism in supporting violent extremism, which has increasingly been reported in different regions such as Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia, women's potential for active participation in P/CVE has also been seen as increasingly necessary (see: Couture, 2014; d'Estaing, 2017; Patel, 2017; Van Uffelen & Walden, 2018). The gender lens has been especially valuable in bringing women into the discussion about violent extremism and P/CVE.

As a country that has prioritised the fight against violent extremism, Indonesia has only recently started to integrate a gender lens into its national P/CVE strategy. This has raised a number of questions, including what is the trend of gender and violent extremism in Indonesia, and has the Indonesian government effectively integrated a gender lens into the national P/CVE strategy? The subsequent sections of this chapter address these questions.

Gender Analysis in Understanding Violent Extremism in Indonesia

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly how gender as an element in violent extremism was considered in Indonesia in the past because there is no account of it available. That is, there is no record that identifies how a gender lens was integrated in understanding men's and women's involvement in violent extremism or P/CVE in the past. This seems to indicate that gender analysis was previously neglected. Further investigation is

needed to explain how and why exactly gender analysis had been overlooked in Indonesia previously, however such an investigation is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, this section will discuss how gender has been increasingly recognised as a crucial element to understand violent extremism in the country.

Generally speaking, the inclusion of a gender lens in understanding violent extremism in Indonesia was a post-hoc reaction to key events, and it has been primarily used to study women's involvement in violent extremist groups and their potential roles in P/CVE. As a tool of analysis, the gender lens only began to gain traction in examining violent extremism in Indonesia after Dian Yulia Novi's foiled suicide bomb attack in December 2016 (Campbell, 2017). Later, the importance of a gender lens in violent extremism was further signified following the Surabaya incidents in May 2018, in which a mother and her daughter successfully launched a suicide-bombing mission in a church (Faridz et al., 2018). These events generated considerable interest in investigating women's participation and gender dynamics in violent extremism, most likely because they presented first hard evidence that women in Indonesia, who are traditionally expected to be caring and peaceful, have now demonstrated not just an interest and capability in supporting violent extremism, but also of actively partaking in acts of violent extremism, and as such pose a direct and distinct threat to national security.

The rising interest in investigating women's involvement in violent extremism was further prompted by significant growth in media reports and research publications on the issue after 2016 (Hanifah, 2018). Media reports and research publications have revealed an interesting trend of gender dynamics in violent extremism in Indonesia, particularly related to women's involvement in supporting violent extremist groups and their participation in P/CVE. Looking at the overall media reports, initially, there was a tendency in Indonesia's local news media to portray women's involvement in violent extremist groups as somewhat different and special because the perpetrators of violent extremism in Indonesia were usually men. For example, unlike men who were portrayed as jihadists or martyrs, women were generally referred to as "suicide bomber brides," or just simply as "brides," as one of the main ways women were recruited was through marriage (Tribun News, 2016, Purba, 2016). These women would be described as wives who just followed their husband's will, rather than acting on their own sense of ideological or religious agency (Arnaz & Rikin, 2016). Furthermore, women's participation as perpetrators of

violence was also described as the result of their social isolation and emotional distress (Arnaz & Rikin, 2016). Moreover, some media reports fell back on the explanation that as women are generally expected to be more peaceful, they were therefore considered to be a particularly effective tool for violent extremist groups to gain more media coverage as well as to shame potential male sympathizers or members into engaging in more action (Setiawan, 2018). Despite the variations in the descriptions, these accounts point to the same conclusion: women have little personal agency in directing their involvement and rely on emotional reasons as drivers of their involvement in violent extremism. Furthermore, media reports rarely discuss the role of women, or the potential role of women, in P/CVE.

Unlike media reports, research publications have often presented more nuanced views of women's involvement in supporting violent extremism, as well as provide more convincing explanations for women's agency and inclusion in P/CVE. Findings on women's involvement in supporting violent extremism in Indonesia point to a wide range of factors relating to women's roles in violent extremist groups, their motivations and their radicalisation. Women's roles were found to be mostly gendered and generally influenced by conventional expectations and virtues of femininity, however this does not mean that their roles were less important for the survival of violent extremist groups. As research findings have shown, by fulfilling the roles of wives and mothers, women have been seen to serve a significant role through reproduction and by reinforcing extreme ideologies, not only to the next generation of violent extremists but also to the other wives and women outside their family (see: Arianti & Yasin, 2016; Bloom, 2011; IPAC, 2017a; Marcoes-Natsir & Octavia, 2014). Through their marriages, women have enabled violent extremist groups to expand their alliances and strengthen their sense of kinship as well as solidarity (Affianty, 2017; IPAC, 2017a; USAID Indonesia, 2017). In addition, they have also contributed by raising funds to sustain their community and providing operational support, including hiding their husbands, carrying messages, or providing assistance for migration to Syria (Bloom, 2011; Marcoes-Natsir & Octavia, 2014).

Moreover, research has also suggested a trend of increasing activism amongst Indonesian women in violent extremism as some have shown interest in, and actually taken on, combatant roles as trained fighters and suicide bombers; roles usually assumed by men (Affianty, 2017; IPAC, 2017b; Nuraniyah, 2018). These roles were not simply given

to and accepted by the women. In some cases, role assignment, and particularly assignment of roles related to being the breadwinner or a combatant, involved negotiations and rule changes within the violent extremist groups because women are not normally considered to be suitable for such masculine functions (Nuraniyah, 2018). Accordingly, women's decision to accept and internalise violent extremist group's terms and values, including the gendered expectations and roles, cannot be defined as simply "submission or resistance." Rather, women's participation in violent extremism is actually the result of complicated dynamics of rejecting a structure of authority (for example, parental guardianship or moderate religious teachings) and following a new one (i.e. the extremist teachings) (Nuraniyah, 2018).

Women's roles and increasing activism in Indonesia have also been explained as a consequence of a complex combination of structural and personal factors, which are not confined to only emotional factors. Identity crises and emotional turbulence resulting from multi-layered personal problems (e.g. family problems, divorce and abandonment) as well as social, economic and political injustice (e.g. poverty, exploitation and disappointment with secular ideas or moderate religious teachings) have stimulated anger and isolation that has led some women to actively seek a channel or community through which they can express their grievances as well as to gain a sense of belonging (Affianty, 2017; Marcoes-Natsir & Octavia, 2014; USAID Indonesia, 2017). This has been seen to influence a cognitive opening among the women, who then, facilitated by the development of technology, have actively sought out resolution through online communication platforms and found the answer from extremist groups, which offered practical and emotional benefits, including ideological resonance, new friends and family, welfare, as well as a sense of belonging, purpose and religious fulfilment (Nuraniyah, 2017). As a way of illustration, it was reported that the constructed narrative of the war in Syria as being a campaign of violent oppression by the Bashar al-Assad regime against the Sunni Muslim communities, triggered anger and sympathy amongst Indonesian women (the majority of whom are Sunni Muslim), which then led them to join and support violent extremist groups' mission to build an Islamic state and protect the Muslim community in Syria (IPAC, 2017b). Hence, in joining violent extremist groups, rather than simply being emotionally driven, women were actually inspired by a deeper religious and political interest to seek spiritual fulfilment as well as to express grievances and alter perceived structural injustices.

This could also be a sign of activism and agency, instead of victimisation or exploitation; however, further research is needed to examine this phenomenon.

Overall, studies have suggested that women in Indonesia have been involved in a variety of roles in supporting violent extremism, and their involvement has been the result of a complex combination of different structural factors and motivations, which can no longer be dismissed as gendered or 'women-specific' issues. Therefore, P/CVE policies should not view women in strictly binary conceptions of masculinity and femininity, but rather must try to understand the gendered nuances of women's involvement in supporting violent extremism in order to design a more robust and inclusive strategy. With these considerations in mind, the following section will examine the trends in national P/CVE strategy in Indonesia to determine whether these gendered nuances have been implemented in Indonesia.

Gender as a Key Element in Indonesia's P/CVE

The use of a gender lens is considered to be crucial due to the current perceived gender bias in P/CVE policy in Indonesia which, it is argued, has ignored women's participation. This problem can be divided into three broad issues: (1) the marginalisation of women in national P/CVE efforts (Solna, 2017; Wulan, 2015); (2) the lack of gender perspective in the design and implementation of P/CVE policy (Solna, 2017; USAID Indonesia, 2017); and (3) the enduring perception that women's issues are not included as a priority in Indonesia's security sector (Solna, 2017). These gaps contribute to Indonesia's lack of effective strategy to prevent and counter women's radicalisation and involvement in acts of violent extremism.

Researchers have correctly pointed out this problem. Overall, Indonesia's main state-led strategy for P/CVE has been "de-radicalisation," with particular emphasis on reversing the radical ideology of individuals convicted on charges relating to violent extremism. Initially, after the 2002 Bali bombing, the national police special anti-terror unit Detachment 88 was the only actor responsible for "de-radicalisation." Their programme mainly targeted terrorist prisoners and suspects, and it was used largely to gather intelligence and, in exchange, the cooperative individuals would receive incentives such as better treatment in prison,

assistance for their family, periodic outings and a chance to negotiate a more favourable sentence (ICG, 2007).

In 2010, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) was established as the coordinating agency for countering violent extremism in Indonesia with three main areas of work under its leadership: (1) prevention, protection and "de-radicalisation" led by the National Military (TNI); (2) operations and enforcement led by Detachment 88 and (3) international cooperation led by diplomats within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sumpter, 2017). Moderation of extreme religious ideology has been the focus of the national-led P/CVE interventions as, according to BNPT's De-radicalisation Blueprint, ideology is the main driver for the decision to engage in violent extremism (BNPT, 2013; IPAC, 2014). The idea of nationalism and loyalty to the state's ideology of Pancasila (faith in one God, nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy and social justice) have become an axial component of this national P/CVE approach, in large part as a result of TNI's leadership of the prevention and de-radicalisation unit within BNPT (Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015).

As reflected by the revision of national law on counter terrorism in 2018, Indonesia's state-led approach for P/CVE does not put gender as one of its key elements. According to Article 43A paragraph 3 of Law No. 5/2018, national prevention efforts will be conducted through three main programs: (1) national resilience, (2) counter radicalisation and (3) de-radicalisation. The first two programs deal mainly with prevention. National resilience focuses on empowering society and strengthening national institutions to anticipate violent extremist attack, while counter radicalisation is aimed at preventing the spread of radical ideology by promoting counter narratives or counter ideology. On the other hand, de-radicalisation is designed to be a counter measure, as it aims to reduce or remedy the radical ideology of those who have been exposed to violent extremism (e.g. suspects, convicts and ex-convicts) (see: article 43B, 43C, 43D of Law no. 5/2018 on the revision of Law no. 15/2003). In this document, the importance of ideology and reversing cognitive belief are reiterated as the key elements in Indonesia's national P/CVE strategy. There is no further indication or explanation regarding the way in which gender should be considered as one of the key elements in the national prevention efforts.

The importance of incorporating a gendered lens in P/CVE initiatives in Indonesia has been emphasised in numerous research publications, particularly to highlight women's potential for participation in preventing

violent extremism. Overall, women's participation in Indonesia's P/CVE efforts is considered to be crucial for two main reasons. Firstly, contrary to previously discussed assumptions about women's ideological agency, women do possess a sense of self-agency as reflected in the ways they promote their own perceptions of religious teachings and social values. Studies have revealed that the women in their research sample have expressed opposition to violence, they believe in the principle of peace and equality in Islamic teachings and they also perceive themselves to have the necessary capabilities to contribute to national P/CVE efforts (Lierde, 2013; True & Eddyono, 2017). Secondly, women are argued to have a better understanding of gender sensitivity and they are perceived to be better positioned to deal with women's issues than men. Some studies have revealed, through interviews, that women are more sensitive to identifying gender-specific warning signs in their family and community and are also better at providing insights based on distinct gendered perspectives and experiences that are different from the dominant masculine understanding of violence, security, and peace (Solna, 2017, True & Eddyono, 2017, USAID Indonesia, 2017). Furthermore, because of their unique position in society, women are also argued to have a distinct capacity to contribute to prevention efforts through community campaigns, teaching, providing assistance to victims and taking part in social welfare empowerment programs (Wulan, 2015).

In addition to direct participation in P/CVE efforts, women's general empowerment and improvement in social, economic and political spheres has also been found to be beneficial to the success of P/CVE. For example, one quantitative study has determined that improvement in women's rights resulting in better participation in higher education, the labour force and the political process, could deter violent extremism more effectively than efforts to just establish cultural acceptance of the idea of gender equality (Salman, 2015). That is, violent extremism in society could be more effectively prevented and repressed if women are granted better opportunities and access to participate in education, the economy and politics. These findings point to the need for Indonesia to not only consider women's involvement in P/CVE, but also to include the agenda of gender equality as one of the strategies to prevent and combat violent extremism.

Studies have further revealed that women in Indonesia have shown leadership and activism in preventing violent extremism as well as dealing with the negative impacts of extremist power within their community.

For example, some women had been reported to provide effective assistance to resolve cases of violence against women caused by radical Islamist powers in their community by employing dialogue facilitation and collaboration with the relevant stakeholders (Lierde, 2013). Moreover, female religious leaders have also challenged extreme ideologies in their community by asserting their authority in re-interpreting the teachings and promoting a moderate view (True & Eddyono, 2017). Most of the women's activism in P/CVE is usually channelled through community or grassroots based organisations, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and localised religious organisations (Wulan, 2015). Indeed, community-based and more practical approaches of P/CVE in Indonesia have been mostly promoted through CSOs which have received little support and direction from the government (Sumpter, 2017).

When it comes to including women and a gender lens in P/CVE initiatives in Indonesia, CSOs have done the majority of the work. They have commissioned researchers, not only to uncover women's involvement in violent extremism, but also to argue for their involvement in P/CVE. Some of the organisations also implemented projects related to women's empowerment to increase their awareness about violent extremism as well as to prevent them from becoming radicalised themselves. The Wahid Foundation, for example, initiated the "Kampung Damai" or "Peace Village" program in a number of villages in Indonesia, with the aim of increasing women's participation as well as empowering them with entrepreneurship skills and knowledge about tolerance and peace values in order to build a peaceful and independent community (Wahid Foundation, 2017). Other organisations, such as C-SAVE, have worked on programs and initiatives to improve the process of social rehabilitation and reintegration for violent extremists in the country (C-SAVE, 2018). Numerous CSOs in Indonesia have also come together to establish the Working Group on Women and C/PVE (WGWC), a network of organisations with a specific focus on the issue of women and violent extremism. This network has done considerable work, including consultation to integrate a gendered lens in the development of the National Action Plan on P/CVE. Despite rarely receiving direct support from the government, CSOs in Indonesia have collaborated with various government agencies to promote women's participation and integrate a gender lens in P/CVE.

Although a gender lens has not been fully integrated in the national P/CVE strategy, positive steps have been taken which show that gender has been increasingly considered an important element of an effective plan

to prevent and counter violent extremism. The inclusion of a gender lens in P/CVE, particularly related to women's participation is still relatively new in Indonesia. As such, it is still too soon to tell the exact trend of gender as a key element in P/CVE or to examine whether it has been successful in reducing the threat of violent extremism. However, there are valuable lessons to be learned from existing accounts and efforts. The next section presents the challenges and recommendations for the future implementation of a gendered lens in P/CVE in Indonesia.

Moving Forward: Key Challenges and Recommendations

As discussed above, one of the main barriers to incorporating gender as a key aspect in understanding violent extremism and designing P/CVE strategy is the absence of a clear account of the development of gender and how it has influenced radicalisation and violent extremism in the past. If a consolidated understanding of how gender as social construction has been involved in influencing radicalisation and violent extremism in Indonesia were readily available, it would allow us to better identify how gender has been used as a part of violent extremist groups' strategies to recruit and radicalise both women and men in Indonesia. Such knowledge can also contribute to understanding the pattern of gender in violent extremism and how the country should adjust its P/CVE strategy accordingly. Rather than treating the inclusion of a gender lens in P/CVE strategy as only a post-hoc reaction to recent security threats, it is time to generate a more comprehensive understanding of how gender should be properly implemented in the country's security sector.

One particularly positive development thus far is that the consideration of gender as a key element has meant that women are no longer invisible in the discussion about violent extremism and P/CVE in Indonesia. Research findings have presented important evidence about gender dynamics in violent extremism as well as women's potential and capacity as perpetrators and other key actors. Both gender and the issue of women's involvement have, however, not yet emerged in the centre of the discussion, but rather remains on the periphery. Violent extremism continues to be predominantly framed as an ideological problem, not a gender problem, and, accordingly, national P/CVE strategy relies heavily on changing cognitive belief without necessarily considering the influence of gender identity and dynamics in the process of radicalisation

or de-radicalisation. The development of a P/CVE national action plan that includes careful consideration and inclusion of gender and women's involvement has also been slow, with no clear indication of progress. Nevertheless, there has been increasing awareness of the importance of gender and women's involvement in issues relating to violent extremism, as well as some efforts to integrate a gendered lens in P/CVE measures. These developments have signalled positive progress towards a more inclusive P/CVE strategy in Indonesia.

It is also important to note that in Indonesia, gender perspectives have been commonly understood as a means by which to uncover issues relating to women's roles in violent extremism and argue for their involvement in P/CVE. Whilst this development is a positive step towards bringing women's issues into the spotlight, thus far this only offers a part of the story. As explained in the first section of this chapter, a gender lens can also be used to uncover whether social constructions of masculinity have any influence or impact on men's radicalisation and participation in violent extremism. So far, men's involvement as perpetrators of violent extremism and their role as security actors have been taken for granted, particularly from a gender standpoint, because such roles have been expected as a result of their gendered traits as men. This simplified view of men's roles should be challenged in order to generate a more comprehensive understanding about what makes men particularly vulnerable to radicalisation, as well as to challenge their exclusive authority in the national security sector. In the future, the integration of gender perspectives in violent extremism and P/CVE in Indonesia should also be expanded to include these aims in order to produce a more complete picture of gender dynamics in violent extremism and to evaluate how violent extremism, as well as P/CVE, have impacted men and women, and girls and boys, differently.

By the same token, one of the shortcomings of P/CVE initiatives in Indonesia is the gendered bias in understanding women's potential and capacity in P/CVE. Many of the initiatives and recommendations have indeed reiterated the importance of women's inclusion in P/CVE, however the suggested roles still confine women to their conventional gendered expectations, particularly because most of these roles are related to women's works in the private sphere (i.e. family) or their own communities. This statement does not intend to undermine women's contribution and leadership in these important spheres, which has been

proven to be especially valuable in complementing other P/CVE strategies. On the contrary, the intention of unveiling this limitation is to point out the general gendered bias that could potentially limit the extent of women's participation in P/CVE. Gender perspectives seek to clarify the gendered constraints imposed by social constructions of femininity and masculinity, and how these constructions limit individuals' potential pathways in life. However, they should also be used to open up wider opportunities to address and improve upon these limitations. In future, women's participation in P/CVE should also be assessed and expanded to see women included in the national policymaking space and in the security forces (e.g. as intelligence, military personnel, or in the police special squad Detachment 88).

On a more practical note, monitoring and evaluation in gender and P/CVE are still key challenges in Indonesia. Despite being the country with the second largest number of P/CVE projects funded by foreign aid between 2006 and 2014 (The Asia Foundation, 2017), it is still very challenging to identify the extent of success or failure of every project because there is still no proper monitoring and evaluation method in place. Consequently, it is also difficult to generate lessons learned from previous projects about what kind of interventions work and what kind fail. This is also part of the reason it is still a challenge to see whether including a gender approach works to reduce radicalisation or whether P/CVE projects have impacted women and men differently. The answers to these questions are essential to improve the inclusion of gender perspectives in P/CVE. No doubt, more years of operation must pass before the effectiveness of social projects aimed at reducing violent extremism can be effectively evaluated. A minimum method or checklist of immediate tangible results, however, should be made available in order to make it easier to point out what should be changed in future P/CVE efforts, and to establish feedback for policymaking. Government, CSOs and foreign aid donors should be aware that monitoring and evaluation are not just about media exposure and finishing the projects on time. They must work together to push for a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation tool for all of their respective projects to ensure not only the success of the projects in reducing violent extremism, but also to be responsible for consequences that might arise from the projects and to learn from previous mistakes and challenges.

Lastly, the Indonesian government should display more tangible support for CSOs that have been actively involved in gender issues and

P/CVE. Certainly, the current trend is looking very positive in relation to this, as the government has increasingly established meaningful and substantial engagement with CSOs to work on P/CVE projects. This positive relationship should be sustained by improving transparency and accountability to make sure there is no abuse of power or exclusivity in collaboration. This is especially important for encouraging more trust in the government and CSOs to work with society, and in particular with radicalised violent extremist supporters who are already sceptical about the government and general public. As violent extremism is a delicate subject in Indonesia, building trust for all of the actors involved in P/CVE projects is necessary for the continued and future success of P/CVE.

Conclusion: Bringing the Gender Lens Forward

The incorporation of a gendered lens has been, up until now, generally marginalised in the security environment of violent extremism and P/CVE in Indonesia. Despite this, its emerging use in the country has provided valuable insights on three issues: (1) gender dynamics in violent extremism; (2) women's roles in supporting violent extremism; and (3) women's participation in P/CVE. By incorporating gender in the analysis of violent extremism, researchers have provided evidence about women's complex motivations and decision-making processes when joining violent extremist groups. It has also revealed the potential for women's activism to make a greater contribution in preventing radicalisation, particularly inside their family and community. In future, using a gender lens can be expected to contribute more to the success of P/CVE in Indonesia by uncovering how violent extremism and P/CVE initiatives might influence women and men differently. Further efforts are needed to properly monitor and evaluate whether the inclusion of gender as a key element in P/CVE has resulted in a better result for reducing the threat of violent extremism. The Indonesian government, experts, CSOs and donor organisations must enhance their collaboration to ensure P/CVE initiatives will yield the best outcome for preventing and countering violent extremism through the promotion of greater inclusion and gender equality.

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CHAPTER 9

Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: The Role of Former Terrorists and Civil Society Organisations

Muhammad Wildan

Introduction

Many initiatives have been introduced by both government institutions and civil society organisations (CSOs) to respond to the challenge of radicalism and violent extremism in Indonesia. The National Counter Terrorism Agency (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme*, BNPT) is the lead agency overseeing initiatives both within and outside of prisons. As many observers and scholars have identified, however, BNPT programs tend to be top-down approaches and lack any ongoing commitment (Sumpter, 2017). By contrast, many CSOs engaged in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) activities have concentrated their efforts at either the level of deradicalisation or prevention (Hikam, 2016). But many of these P/CVE programs operated by

M. Wildan (✉)
Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University (UIN-SUKA), Yogyakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: muhammad.wildan@uin-suka.ac.id

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CSOs tend to be fragmented and suffer from a general lack of coordination within and between CSOs. Given the inherent complexities and challenges of dealing with radicalism, terrorism and violent extremism, a comprehensive approach to P/CVE should include a wide range of actors, including government, CSOs, *ulama*, families and young people.

This chapter focuses on the role of rehabilitated former terrorists—'formers'—within a range of P/CVE programs. BNPT, as well as a number of CSOs, have begun to trial the involvement of former terrorists in their P/CVE programs. Up until now, however, it has been very difficult to obtain a clear overview of what has, and is, being done. Based on my research, there are several types of initiatives in which former terrorists have been involved, including prison-based programs, youth programs and economic empowerment programs. By identifying these three categories, this chapter explores the extent to which these CSOs have involved former terrorists within their P/CVE programs, what the programs of each of the CSOs actually involve with respect to the participation of formers, and what initiatives are the most effective among each of these efforts.

When P/CVE initiatives first commenced in Indonesia in the late 2000s, the field was sparsely documented and poorly understood. Since 2015, however, some very significant and innovative research has been conducted on the issue of counter terrorism and P/CVE in Indonesia. Chernov-Hwang (2015), for example, has focused on the pathways of disengagement for Indonesian jihadists, especially those from the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Mujahidin KOMPAK (a Poso-based JI affiliate) networks. Ian Chalmers (2017) has explored the experiences of disengaged and deradicalised jihadists after being treated during or after their time in jail. Based on his research, Chalmers offers a policy regarding which programs are most effective for dealing with jihadists. And Cameron Sumpter (2017), has provided a comprehensive overview of the various P/CVE programs and initiatives conducted by CSOs to fill the gaps left by government bodies. Using the work of Hwang, Chalmers and Sumpter as a starting point, this chapter will focus specifically on the role of former jihadists in P/CVE programs.

In order to establish a comprehensive understanding of these themes, I have combined library research, participatory observation and interviews in order to build up a more complete picture. Analysis of the existing literature in this field provides a foundational background for this article, while my own involvement in and observation of, several of

these P/CVE initiatives provides additional insights. Finally, I have also conducted online and on-site interviews with both former terrorists themselves and the caretakers of the CSOs dealing with former terrorists. It is hoped that this chapter may enrich and enlighten the existing understanding of many government bodies and policymakers on the various approaches to P/CVE in Indonesia.

De-radicalisation as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy

In Indonesia, the growth of ultra-conservative ideologies in a political and social context of democratic contestation has created a hot house for radicalisation into hateful and violent extremism. In the 1950s, the home-grown radical Islamist group Negara Islam Indonesia (Darul Islam, NII) gave rise to several generations of close-knit extremists. This led ultimately to the formation of a new spin-off group Jemaah Islamiyah, in 1993 in part as a result of the experiences of Darul Islam mujahideen in the 1978–1992 Afghanistan war. It was formed by two prominent Darul Islam activists, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baashir, who had gone into exile (*hijrah*) in Malaysia in the mid-1980s and then led a group of several hundred self-proclaimed mujahideen to al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan from Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

A number of other groups have since emerged in Indonesia, including Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), established in 2008, and Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD), formed in 2015, both of which have declared their support for the Islamic State (IS) movement in Syria and Iraq. The emergence of these groups indicates that violent extremism has established a strong presence in Indonesia. There have been many violent incidences or acts of terrorism that have occurred in the country since the turn of the century, conducted by both JI and JAD. While JI has since renounced its previous policy of violent and deadly attacks in Indonesia as a 'mistake', JAD and JAT continue to openly support violence. Support for JAT and JAD has continued to grow in Indonesia, especially among the youth population.

As the radical ideology of these groups continues to gain traction, Indonesians and especially Indonesian authorities, have a lot of work to do to combat this threat. Since the authorities, and in particular the specialist anti-terrorism squad, Densus 88 (Special Detachment 88), have weakened the structure of JI and arrested many of its key members, JAT and JAD have emerged as a new threat, particularly since the establishment

of the Islamic State in Syria. The narrative surrounding the Islamic State caliphate in Iraq and Syria has inspired many Indonesians to not only become a part of the jihad in Syria, but to also wage jihad at home. In addition to the Indonesians who made the journey to join IS in Syria, many others engaged in small-scale attacks at home in the name of JAD. These include the Sarinah bombings in (2016), Kampung Melayu bombings in 2017, Mako Brimob riots in 2018 and Surabaya bombings in 2018. Clearly violent extremism and groups such as JI, JAT and JAD constitute an enduring threat in Indonesia. The threat might be contained but there is no realistic hope of it being eliminated.

Many attempts have been made to counter terrorism by both governmental bodies and CSOs. At the governmental level, the Indonesian government has issued Anti-Terrorism Law (2003), established the anti-terrorism squad, Special Detachment 88 (2003) and in 2010 it established BNPT, the National Body for Combating Terrorism. In 2018, the Anti-Terrorism Law was revised to accommodate for input from multiple elements of society and to address recent developments in the terrorism space. In order to reach multiple regions, BNPT has created a support body, the Coordination Forum for Preventing Terrorism, or Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme (FKPT), at every provincial level. Normatively, FKPT should work hand-in-hand with local CSOs to identify the vulnerabilities in their respective areas and prevent people from becoming involved in violent extremism.

As there is no single factor that accounts for radicalism and terrorism, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to dealing with these threats. Many efforts have been made to counter radicalism and terrorism, including both hard and soft approaches. While law enforcement authorities tend to employ hard approaches to apprehend individuals involved in radicalism and terrorism, many government bodies and CSOs work together to counter and prevent radicalism through soft approaches targeting issue areas such as ideology, economics, culture, etc. These approaches recognise that a comprehensive, diverse approach is required as radicalism is driven by a range of different pull and push factors.

In relation to counter-terrorism programs, the government tends to employ the concept of 'deradicalization' (*deradikalisasi*). Although the types of programs within this concept are relatively broad, the usage of this term is somewhat misleading. Deradicalisation refers to disengaging radicalised individuals from violent extremism; however, government bodies tend to use this term for a broad range of programs, including

those that focus on preventing people from becoming extremists or radicals. This loose usage of the term 'derad' is not widely accepted, however, outside of government bodies, and it has faced criticism from both the public as well as from CSOs that include non-radicals in their deradicalisation programs. For example, Muhammadiyah, Indonesia's second biggest Muslim organisation, refuses to be involved in government projects on deradicalisation as it is felt that it poses a significant risk of causing tension between the organisation and the society with which it works (Haedar, 2016). This resistance from society towards deradicalisation is understood by many CSOs. As such, they tend to use different terms to name their programs, such as mainstreaming moderate Islam, countering violent extremism and religious moderation (*moderasi beragama*). In contrast, in line with the new terrorism laws, the government continues to use and define deradicalisation as "a planned, integrated, systematic and continuous process carried out to eliminate or reduce and reverse the radical understanding of Terrorism that has taken place".

Terrorism and Prisoners in Indonesia

The Soufan Center (2017) has recorded that, of the more than 600 (as of 2017) Indonesian jihadists that travelled to Syria, about 384 of them are still in Syria and only about 50 have returned to Indonesia. The data also records that approximately 435 people have been stopped in Turkey and deported back to Indonesia (Barret, 2017). Meanwhile, BNPT estimates from 2017 indicate that about 1,000 Indonesians travelled to Syria and of those, some 200 of them have returned (*Mengapa Suriah Menjadi Tujuan* 2017). More recent reports indicate that there are 689, or so, former Indonesian supporters and fighters of IS in Syria that may return to Indonesia (Adyatama, 2020). Although the number of Indonesians making the journey to Syria began to decrease in line with the significant losses suffered by IS, the number of foreign fighters returning to Indonesia will likely increase as a result, posing an additional threat to the country. In line with this issue, Sidney Jones warned some years ago, in the wake of the declaration of the ISIS caliphate, that "the overall capacity of Indonesian extremists remains low, but their commitment to ISIS could prove deadly" (Pitaloka, 2014). In terms of both homegrown and foreign terrorists, as of late 2018 there were approximately 302 inmates spread across 111 prisons throughout some 26 provinces across Indonesia. In addition, there were 152 detainees who have not yet

been charged (*inkracht*) (taken from H. Fikri, personal communication, September 5, 2018).

During a visit to terrorist inmates in Palu prison in February 2018, repentant former militant Nasir Abas observed that terrorists from Java and outer Java differ in many important aspects. While terrorists from Java are normally more ideologically driven, those from outer Java, such as from Sulawesi, tend to be less ideologically driven. My conversations and discussions with terrorists in Palu's first-class prison confirms the assertion that most inmates became involved in violent extremism, taking up the methods of terrorism out of desperation, due to their disappointment with the government, and in particular the government's policies that they believed to have mostly marginalised Muslims.

Many former terrorist prisoners have not been successfully disengaged from terrorist networks and the use of violence. The director of BNPT, Suhardi Alius, stated in early 2018 that among the 630 ex-prisoners of terrorism, only 325 of them have followed a deradicalisation program and about 128 of them have willingly helped the BNPT with the program (Dari 360 eksnapiter, 2018). Taufiq Andrie of the Institute for International Peace Building (*Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian*; YPP) has reported that YPP is aware of many ex-terrorists who have returned to violent extremism upon release (Andrie, 2012). Indeed, Alius also admits that many ex-terrorist prisoners have gone on to be involved again in violent activity (*600 Napi Kasus Terorisme* 2018). However, he has urged society as a whole to take part in the reintegration process of the ex-prisoners, especially in an economic sense, in order to help prevent these individuals from returning to violent extremist groups.

This is not to say that deradicalisation programs in prisons have completely failed to achieve their desired outcomes. Among the 302 terrorist inmates in 2018, Husnal Fikri reported that 46 inmates had been successfully disengaged from terrorism and accepted the political legitimacy of the Indonesian Republic, reversing their previous stance of radical opposition (taken from H. Fikri, personal communication, September 5, 2018). To be truly effective, however, P/CVE requires broad, ongoing, support from across the whole of society. This is critically important to both the successful disengagement of the prisoners and ex-prisoners from their groups and to limiting the creeping influence of ultra-conservative/reactionary ideology that incites hate and violence. Within this whole of society approach, there is an integral role for former terrorists to play in the disengagement process.

The table below summarises a range of efforts by CSOs to establish prison-based, youth-based and economic empowerment-based P/CVE programs using former terrorists. The discussion that follows in the remainder of this chapter examines each of these programs in detail, giving particular attention to how they have incorporated former terrorists into their P/CVE programs.

Youth-Based Programs

Institute for International Peace Building/Yayasan Prasasti Perdamain (YPP)	• Films 'Jihad Selfie' (2015), 'Pengantin' (2017) and 'Seeking the Imam (2020) as counter narrative. • Documentaries using formers/youth who have been drawn to VE groups • Screened in towns, senior high schools and universities • Q&A with formers
Aliansi Indonesia Damai/ Alliance of Peaceful Indonesia (AIDA)	• School-based programs • Programs incorporate formers and victims of terrorism • Aims to raise awareness and empathy
Ruangobrol.id	• Website-base programs • Employs disengaged terrorists and returnees as 'credible voices'
Center for the Study of Islam and Social Transformation (CISForm)	• University research centre • Employs cartoons in counter-narrative initiatives • Distributed across social media: Facebook, YouTube, Twitter. • Launched by former returned from Syria
Kalijaga Institute for Justice (KIJ)	• School-based program • Former returned from Syria involved to present counter narrative

Prison-Based Programs

The Research Centre for Police Studies/Pusat Riset Ilmu Kepolisian (PRIK)	• University-based organisation • Incorporates formers and religious scholars • Focuses on range of political, religious and social issues • Security approach

(continued)

(continued)

Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR)	• University-based organisation • Incorporates formers, religious scholars, psychologists, spouses and entrepreneurs • Applied science approach
Institute for International Peace Building/Yayasan Prasasti Perdamain (YPP)	• Program without formers

Economic Empowerment Programs

Institute for International Peace Building/Yayasan Prasasti Perdamain (YPP)	• Employs entrepreneur training • Option to start own small enterprise or become involved in existing YPP business • Provides skills, social environment, employment for formers
Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (YLP)	• Economic empowerment through employment and training opportunities • Provides safe space to discuss religious and ideological issues • Provides practical support to those disassociating from former VE networks • Founded and run by former previously involved in JI

Prison-Based Initiatives

There are several CSOs that run programs with inmates convicted of terrorism. These include the Institute for International Peace Building (*Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian*, YPP), established by Noor Huda Ismail, the Research Centre for Police Studies (*Pusat RisetIlmu Kepolisian*, PRIK), and the Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR) Daya Makara of the University of Indonesia (UI). The first of these CSOs is a private organisation, while the other two are university-based organisations/research centers. Although each of these three CSOs have prison-based programmes for terrorist inmates, they each differ in their approaches. For example, the prison-based programs of YPP do not

incorporate former terrorists. PRIK and DASPR on the other hand both involve former terrorists in their prison-based programs, drawing on the expertise and experiences of these individuals.

Since 2009, PRIK has been working with prisoners and individuals on parole who have been charged with terrorism offences. PRIK is a university-based centre founded by well-known psychologist Sarlito Wirawan, and it aims to change individual mindsets through several programmes, some of which involve religious scholars. PRIK has also incorporated former JI member, Nasir Abas, into their program as an expert on radicalism. Recognising that shifting the ideology of the terrorist inmates requires a multi-faceted approach, PRIK's programs address not only political and religious issues, but also social issues such as family, social welfare, governance and daily life in prison. Up until 2016, PRIK worked with roughly 150 individuals, some of whom may still be serving their prison sentences (Sumpter, 2017). Following the death of Sarlito Wirawan, some PRIK members from the Faculty of Psychology, as well as Nasir Abas, detached themselves from PRIK and in 2017 establish a new centre; DASPR at the University of Indonesia. Some of their work on the spouses of terrorists is covered in Chapter Seven of this volume. Although PRIK and DASPR share a number of commonalities, particularly their 'In Prison Re-education Program' (IPRP) strategy, some members of DASPR view their research centre as having an applied science approach, whereas PRIK focuses more closely on a security approach.

Based on DASPR's 8-month research project across a number of prisons, it found that:

> 1. it was unclear with whom the responsibility for designing and implementing deradicalisation programs in prisons rested, whether it was with BNPT or with the Directorate General of Correction (DGC); and.
> 2. to date, there is little coordination among CSOs when dealing with terrorist inmates (Convey Indonesia 2018). Consequently, many programs dealing with terrorist inmates tend to overlap with one another and miss the opportunity to build synergies.

At one end of the spectrum, the program conducted by BNPT focuses primarily on ideological aspects and does not deal with economic or

psychological issues. DASPR, on the other hand, finds that disengagement programs in prisons should be more comprehensive and should involve the inmates' spouses as well as psychologists.

In light of these findings, in 2018, DASPR commenced its third IPRP which included psychologists, religious scholars and entrepreneurs, as well as the inmates' spouses (taken from F. Erikha, personal communication, September 25, 2018). While terrorist inmates work directly with the religious scholars and entrepreneurs, the terrorists' wives interact with the program's psychologists. In 2018, DASPR worked with roughly 22 inmates in 5 selected prisons: Cianjur, Cirebon, Karawang, Lamongan and Palu. DASPR teams visited the prisons each month with different team members.

Nasir Abas has served as the central figure involved in the P/CVE programs for inmates conducted by PRIK and DASPR. Abas, originally from Malaysia, became a naturalised Indonesian citizen in 2017. In 1986, Abas joined Darul Islam/NII when he was studying at Ma'had Ittiba As-Sunnah in Selangor, Malaysia, which later brought him to study at the Military Academy of Harbiy Pohantun at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border from 1987 to 1993. After the formation of JI and the split with Darul Islam/NII in 1993, Abas went on to serve as the head of Mantiqi III, a JI division covering the Eastern part of Indonesia and the Philippines, and also established *Hudaibiyah* Camp in Mindanao to assist the mujahidin in the southern part of the Philippines. Although he was never involved in any violent activity in Indonesia, Abas was arrested by the authorities in relation to document falsification and possession of a gun. At the time, he says, he was already beginning to have doubts about the extremist violence promoted by some activists in the network. For Abas, the violent extremism of some JI members in early 2000 was not in line with the *manhaj* (platform) of the organisation. Following his arrest, Abas has assisted Indonesian authorities, writing a book in the process (2005) and has been involved in many P/CVE programs. His experience during his time involved with JI has assisted DASPR to run programs specifically in the areas of Palu and Poso, which were previously part of Abas' Mantiqi III area of operation (taken from F. Erikha, personal communication, September 25, 2018).

The DASPR inmates programme has been deliberately designed to serve not only as a treatment per se, but also as a quantitative research project. This research project aims to examine the effectiveness of the program and seeks to determine the most effective type of program for

terrorist inmates. DASPR's research acknowledges that running effective deradicalisation programs in prisons is no easy task. As it deals with high-risk terrorists, the program needs to involve a range of stakeholders, such as BNPT, DGC and Densus 88. When visiting prisons, the IPRP program should involve not only the above representatives, but also psychologists, entrepreneurs and religious experts. The greatest challenge for this program, however, is the inmates themselves, as many of them may be reluctant to cooperate during the intervention (taken from F. Erikha, personal communication, September 25, 2018).

Youth-Based Initiatives

Youth have been found to be among the most susceptible to the influence of extremism ideology. As such, many CSOs have designed programs specifically for a youth audience, and of those, a number have involved participation from former terrorists. Key CSOs engaging in youth-based programs incorporating formers include Aliansi Indonesia Damai (AIDA), Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP), Ruangobrol.id, the Centre for the Study of Islam and Social Transformation (CISForm), and Kalijaga Institute for Justice (KIJ).

Since 2013, AIDA has run a broad program focusing on spreading its peaceful campaign in dozens of schools in many vulnerable areas throughout Jawa, Sumatera, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Maluku, & Sulawesi Tengah (A. Subkhi, personal communication, September 24, 2018). From 2018, AIDA's targeted schools have become narrower in scope, focusing particularly on schools in Serang, Solo and Bima, where some students have already become involved in violent extremism (taken from A. Kustiadi, personal communication, September 18, 2018). To deepen the emotional impact of its program, AIDA involves both victims of terrorism and former terrorists, allowing each to speak about their experiences. In these sessions, victims speak about their journey and how they have come to forgive those responsible for the attacks, while former terrorists discuss their experiences and how they have transitioned away from violent extremism. The aim of the program is not only to raise students' awareness of the dangers of violent extremism, but also to promote empathy towards the victims of terrorism, and to remind students that, at its heart Islam's central message is to be 'show mercy to all creation' (*rahmatanlil'alamin).*

Two of the key former terrorists involved in the AIDA team are Kurnia Widodo and Ali Fauzi Manji. Widodo had previously been involved in NII since 1991, when he was still a student at senior high school. His involvement in radical groups intensified during his time as a student at Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). Following Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Widodo was involved in Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and JAT. In 2010, he was captured by the authorities for his involvement in the Cibiru group plot to bomb several places and for his involvement in military training in Aceh. Released in 2014, Widodo acknowledged that he had learned a great deal about culture, humanity and peaceful Islam from several *ustadzs*in prisons (Widodo, 2017). Having made this transformation, Widodo says that he is now very glad to be involved in many AIDA peaceful campaigns and to be a part of the AIDA peace team. Widodo's contribution to the youth programs run by AIDA offers a very good opportunity for raising awareness and empathy among the youth (Widodo, 2017).

YPP also focuses on the youth and their vulnerability to the influence of radical ideology. Among YPP's efforts targeting the youth population are Noor Huda Ismail's documentary films 'Jihad Selfie' (2015), 'Pengantin' (2017), and 'Seeking the Imam' (2020). These documentaries are based on the experiences of youths who had been drawn in by ultra-conservative ideology. These films were screened in many towns, universities and senior high schools across Indonesia and even gained attention in other countries. Following the screenings, Ismail (2015) would offer a discussion session featuring a former member of an extremist group. Often, Machmudi Hariono, a former JI member, would be present at these screenings and would be asked to share his experiences during his involvement in JI.

Although never directly involved in violent activity in Indonesia, Machmudi Hariono (aka. Yusuf) held fast to violent extremist views. Yusuf studied Islam with Bali bombers Muchlas and Amrozi at the Pesantren of Al-Islam in Lamongan in 1995, where he was recruited as a JI member. In 2000, Yusuf was sent to join a Muslim militia in Mindanao and, during this time, gained significant experience in war strategies and weaponry techniques. Upon his return to Indonesia in 2002, Yusuf continued his involvement with JI under the leadership of Abu Tholut. In 2004, Yusuf, along with Abu Tholut, was arrested by the Indonesian authorities for hiding explosives and thousands of ammunitions. During his five-year prison term, Yusuf reflected at length upon his life and previously unquestioned convictions and came to regret his extremist activities and

involvement with radical movements (taken from M. Hariono, personal communication, September 29, 2018). His interactions with Noor Huda of YPP led Yusuf to become an entrepreneur. Yusuf now works as a private taxi driver and is actively involved with many CSO-run P/CVE programs as a speaker. His testimonies during the screening of YPP movies have contributed significantly to the aims of the movies as counter narratives for youth. Ruangobrol.id greatly contributes to counter the spread of extremism ideology among the youths. As understood that extremists make use of technology especially internet and social media to spread their ideologies; many youths are also attracted and involved in some violent extremism due to the propaganda of extremists through social media. To reduce the backlash from the target audience, Noor Huda Ismail and the late of his brother Rosyid Nurul Hakim established Ruangobrol.id. To strengthen its voices, Ruangobrol.id employs some disengaged terrorists and returnees to participate in the web-based platform. The experiences of the reformed terrorists and returnees made them as the 'credible voices' to counter the propaganda of the extremists. Mahmudi Hariono (aka. Yusuf), the former JI member, and Joko Trihermanto (aka. Jack Harun), the former right-hand man of the late Noordin M Top, a Malaysian JI member, are among the first 'credible voices' of Ruangobrol. Currently, many other disengaged terrorists or returnees have joined the forum, whereas Arif Budi Setyawan (aka. Arif Tuban) as the most prolific writer in Ruangobrol.id. Since 2018, Arif has wrote about 394 short essays in Ruangobrol as his reflections on his previous experiences or some current phenomena on the issue of (violent) extremism either in Indonesia or abroad (taken from Arif B. Setiawan, personal communication, August 28, 2021). Based on an analysis by the end of 2020, about 30% of the readers of Ruangobrol are youths (18-34 old range). To broaden its scope of readers, Ruangobrol is promoted in many platforms of social media such as facebook, twitter, and instragram.

I am personally involved with another university-based program involving former terrorists is CISForm, a research centre at the State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga, in Yogyakarta, with a focus on research and publishing. In the last several years however, CISForm has shifted its program to focus on youth as the most vulnerable population at risk of becoming influenced by radical ideology. In promoting counter narratives to the hateful narratives associated with the ultra-conservative ideology of groups like ISIS, CISForm developed a series of 40 cartoons on several contemporary subjects within Islam, including *jihâd, hijrah,*

khilâfah and tolerant Islam. The cartoons have been disseminated widely via key social media platforms, such as Youtube, Facebook and Twitter. To strengthen its influence among the youth, CISForm invited Nurshadrina Khaira Dhania, a returnee from Syria, to launch the cartoon in Jakarta. Dhania has played a significant role in the CIS Form program by offering the audience her experiences as contextualisation for the subject matter of the cartoons.

Another CSO engaged in P/CVE, KIJ, also works on youth, with a particular focus on school students in the Klaten region (a sprawling low-rise city 30 kms east of Yogyakarta). As KIJ is a relatively new research centre at UIN Sunan Kalijaga, this is the first P/CVE initiative it has conducted. This initiative is not just a youth outreach program, it is also a research initiative which aims to produce P/CVE policy papers in order to contribute to the broader policy discussion surrounding P/CVE initiatives. Similar to CISForm, KIJ's P/CVE initiative is conducted in four schools in Klaten, two of them private schools and two public schools, and it also involves Nurshadrina Khaira Dhania as a significant voice contributing to their program.

The experience of Dhania living in Syria offers a very significant counter narrative to the ultra-conservative and utopian ideology of IS, which threatens to spread unchallenged among the local youth. Dhania recounts being deceived by IS propaganda and the caliphate of Islam. When she was in her second year of senior high school in Jakarta, she went to Syria along with 17 members of her family, lured by the utopian promise of the Caliphate, including the provision of welfare promised under the banner of IS. After having lived in several locations in IS-occupied northern Syria, Dhania's family found the promises of the Islamic State's online propaganda campaign of an Islamic utopia to be completely at odds with the lived reality of the Caliphate. During her first year, living in a female dormitory, Dhania saw that women were treated as sexual slaves for the male jihadists. Disappointed with the reality of life under IS, Dhania and her family tried to escape from the captivity of IS and, after almost another year, were eventually able to return to Indonesia. Upon their return in August 2017, Dhania and her family came to view Indonesia as much more Islamic in many aspects when compared to the Islamic State caliphate from which they had returned. The narrative presented through Dhania's personal experiences living under IS offers a very important lesson for pupils to be more critical of the deceptive, romanticised narratives and distorted understandings of

Islam pushed by extremist groups (taken from N. K. Dhania, personal communication, April 18, 2018).

Dhania and her family are but one example of Indonesian youths and families drawn to the illusive hope of an Islamic caliphate. This is unsurprising in light of IS's extensive use of the internet and social media to spread its propaganda. Testimonies such as Dhania's are needed to show young people that the reality behind IS's promises is quite different, and that they need to be more critical of the media they are exposed to. Providing a platform for former terrorists and returnees to share their experiences has the potential to have a significant impact on youth decision-making in response to extremist ideologies and the messaging of terrorist groups.

Economic Empowerment for Former Terrorist Prisoners

Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP) and Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (YLP), are pioneering CSOs leading the way among the very few CSOs that offer economic empowerment programs working with former terrorist prisoners. As one of the leading CSOs on P/CVE, YPP's economic empowerment program targets the hearts and minds of the ex-terrorists by supporting their need for economic independence. YPP organises entrepreneur training and then allows prisoners to choose to start either their own small enterprise or become involved in a business set by YPP. One of the most successful economic empowerment avenues for former terrorists to emerge out of the YPP program is *Dapoer Bistik Solo* (DBS). Widodo Kainan (32) the main chef, is proud of the fact that there have been many former terrorist prisoners involved in running DBS, working in a range of roles such as cashiers, purchasers and in marketing. In addition to this, Kainan notes that DBS management is also involved in organising religious meetings and discussions to support prisoners in their disengagement from their previous radical networks. Furthermore, Kainan argues that YPP's economic empowerment program would not only lead to economic independence, but also to ideological independence (Kainan, personal communication, August 28, 2018). The founder of YPP, Noor Huda Ismail, has stated that DBS now plays more of a role as a meeting point and a public space for many former terrorists in Solo and its surrounding areas (Ismail, personal communication, September 30, 2018).

Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (YLP) has also opted for an economic empowerment approach in its programs aimed at former terrorists. In contrast to the vast majority of CSOs, which are primarily based in Jakarta, YLP was founded in 2017 by Ali Fauzi Manji in Lamongan, East Java. Lamongan and its surrounding areas are home to many ex-terrorist convicts from the JI and JAD networks. As a former terrorist himself, Fauzi has the support of a number of his friends, many of whom are also ex-terrorist convicts. The prime objective of YLP's work in Lamongan is to improve the circumstances of former terrorists by empowering them economically and assisting their disassociation from their former networks. In this endeavour, YLP has the support of many of its stakeholders, including the police force in the Lamongan region and the Director of BNPT, Suhardi Alius. Although Fauzi's program has been ridiculed by current JI and JAD members, he has continued to progress forward and is currently trying to gain as many board members as possible to support the existence and the sustainability of the foundation.

As the brother of Bali bombers Muchlas and Amrozi, Ali Fauzi Manzi (47) was also involved in JI activity. After training at JI's Hudaibiyah Camp at Mindanao in 1994, Fauzi developed skills in military strategy and weaponry techniques. During the Ambon and Poso social conflicts, he was appointed as the head instructor of military training of Nusantara militia. After the conflicts, Fauzi travelled back to a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) military camp in Mindanao where he was eventually caught by the Philippines authorities in 2004. Deported to Indonesia in very poor health in 2006, Fauzi received extensive medical treatment and remained in the custody of Indonesian authorities until, after a complete change of heart, he turned his back on his previous life and disengaged from his violent extremist connections. Since then, Fauzi has been involved in many government and CSO-based P/CVE programs and initiatives. His involvement in the P/CVE initiatives also brought him to meet many victims of terrorism among whom were the families of the victim of the 2002 Bali bombings. The meetings with the victims or and their families reinforced his decision to establish Yayasan LingkarPerdamaian (YLP).

Based in Yogyakarta, Muhammad In'am (42), serves as one of the board members of YLP. A native of Lamongan, In'am is the head of accompaniment and empowerment of ex-terrorist convicts for YLP. In'am himself was never a terrorist, but his younger brother died carrying out a suicide bombing in Aleppo, Syria in 2014 and many of his counterparts

from Lamongan were also involved in violent attacks. These close personal connections with violent extremism motivated In'am to become involved in combatting violent extremism. In Yogyakarta, In'am established Café Gandroeng. Although not initially established with this purpose clearly in mind, In'am has since dedicated his café to creating opportunities for ex-terrorist convicts as part of a broader disengagement program.

Surrounded by many universities, Café Gandroeng is well known among students in the eastern part of the city. Ahmad Azhar (26) and Salman Alfaluty (33) are among some ex-terrorist convicts working at the café. After spending some years in prisons due to their involvement in violent extremism, Azhar and Alfaluty came to regret their actions and detached themselves from their respective radical groups, NII and JAD. Azhar and Alfaluty have said that they feel lucky to be accepted at In'am's café. At the time of our interview, Alfaluty has been at the Gandroeng café for approximately 5 months, while Azhar had been there for only 2 months. In addition to teaching them how to brew coffee and run a café, they said that In'am would often discuss with them religious matters, especially with regard to ideological aspects. Alfaluty confessed, however, that he continues to view the caliphate in a favourable light (taken from A. Azhar and S. Alfaluty, personal communication, August 24, 2018).

In addition to providing personal and intensive 'training' to ex-terrorist convicts like Alfaluty and Azhar, Muhammad In'am has organised several entrepreneurship workshops for ex-terrorist convicts in his café as part of his involvement with YLP Lamongan. His expertise and dedication to countering terrorism is well known by BNPT, and has resulted in In'am being invited by BNPT to present on entrepreneurship for pre-released inmates. For In'am, Gandroeng offers a very good opportunity for ex-terrorist prisoners to start their new lives through training them to interact with a wide range of people and offering them practical skills.

Conclusion

As recruitment by extremist groups and the creeping spread of extremist ideology continue to present insidious challenges in Indonesia, countering violent extremism (CVE) cannot be seen as just a task for government bodies; rather, civil society must also be involved. Generally speaking, government bodies alone cannot address the broad scope and diversity of challenges presented by radicalism and terrorism. Indeed, even BNPT and DGC, the most authoritative bodies involved in conducting P/CVE programs within prisons, still struggle to coordinate these programs alone due to the overcrowding of prisons and the mobility of

the prisoners. Among the few CSOs dealing with terrorist convicts in prison, PRIK and DASPR at the University of Indonesia research centre play an important role in addressing the challenge of violent extremism.

While it is difficult to determine to what extent the initiatives in prisons have been successful, there is a good reason for believing that the involvement of former terrorists in the programs could increase the potential for successful outcomes. Although both PRIK and DASPR have included religious scholars, psychologists and entrepreneurs, the limited frequency of their visits still hinders the effectiveness of the program. This suggests that the in-prison programs could benefit significantly from an additional support from prison wardens (*pamong*), given the consistently close proximity or wardens to the prisoners on a day-to-day basis.

So far, P/CVE initiatives involving former terrorists out of the prison system appear to have been reasonably successful. But as government bodies do not work directly with ex-terrorist prisoners in these types of programs, this field of work has been the domain of CSOs. The key among these CSOs are YPP and YLP. To disengage ex-terrorist prisoners from their previous networks, both YPP and YLP are trying to appeal to these prisoners by organising entrepreneurship workshops and providing venture capital to set up their own small-scale enterprise. Although these initiatives are not able to be large-scale operations, their approach appears to be more feasible and has demonstrated clearer signs of success.

The last, and perhaps the most successful element of these initiatives, has been the involvement of former terrorists in youth programs. Young people have been found to be the most vulnerable section of society in relation to their susceptibility to radical ideology. AIDA's program of peaceful campaign is already being conducted with teenagers in a number of schools across many areas in Indonesia that have been identified as particularly at risk. Such programs can be relatively easily adopted by many other CSOs, as has already been demonstrated by the effective work of Ruangobrol.id, KIJ and CISForm.

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CHAPTER 10

The Dynamics of Islamic Mass Organisations in Preventing Violent Extremism

Wachid Ridwan

Introduction

The involvement of religiously inspired social reform movements in Indonesia spans the history of the republic and extends back well before the country's independence. Prior to independence, several key Islamic Mass Organisations (IMO), including Muhammadiyah and NU, were officially recognised by the Dutch colonists. During that period, a number of leaders from these IMOs contributed directly to the struggle for Indonesia's independence and to helping to develop the masses of ordinary people who were not part of the small elite that benefitted from colonial schools and training institutions. Tens of millions faced disadvantages in all sectors of life, most significantly in relation to education (Sukma, 2003). This movement for social reform grew among the middle class of Indonesian society, who were concerned about the liberty of the nation amidst the grip of colonialism.

W. Ridwan (✉)
Muhammadiyah University, Jakarta, Indonesia

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The first IMO established during the Dutch colonial reign was the *JamiatKheir* organisation, whose members were primarily Muslims of Arab descent. Its initial objective was to act as a social organisation offering help to the poor, both materially and spiritually. However, following its progress in this capacity, the organisation shifted its trajectory to focus solely on education in order to prepare the young Muslim generation to play a pivotal role in elevating their socio-economic potential in the future, rather than simply continuing to serve the weak *ummah*. For educational purposes, *JamiatKheir* officially founded the *JamiatulKheir* madrasa based on the Dutch notarial deed Roeloffs Valks under *Stichtingsbriefder Stichting* 'School Djameat Geir'. As a show of resistance to Dutch colonial rule, the *JamiatulKheir* school curriculum did not teach Dutch and instead taught English (Republika.co.id).

After *JamiatKheir* was formed and began to take an active role in society, several other IMOs began to emerge with similar missions and goals. These emerging IMOs included *SharikatDagang Islam,* or 'Islamic Trade Association', which later changed its name to Sharikat Islam or 'Islamic Association' and was led by the popular figures Tjokroa minoto and Salim. This association worked towards improving the living standards for Muslims, particularly in the areas of trade and commerce. Other organisations include groups like Muhammadiyah, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), *Al Irsyad*, Persis and Islamic Unity, most of which are regarded as Islamic modernists in Java, and the *Thawalib* established in West Sumatra. The mission of each of these modernist Islamic organisations was to educate and prepare Indonesian Muslim youths for the future. Unfortunately, despite the peaceful nature of these IMOs, their motives were soon suspected of being subversive, and consequently they began to be closely monitored by the Dutch colonial government. Despite this, they persisted, continuing their mission to provide education with the overall objective of attaining independence and sovereignty for Indonesia.

Muhammadiyah and NU quickly established themselves as the two leading IMOs in Indonesia, and their charitable works continue to develop, while other IMOs from the Dutch colonial era have not survived on the ground because of the ethnically exclusive nature of their operations. Although Muhammadiyah and NU have different religious outlooks and organisational management directions—modernist versus traditional—they share a common mission to educate. Muhammadiyah, with its modern school system, teaches balanced knowledge between sciences and religious subjects. NU's *pesantren* (boarding schools) began

with a focus on religious studies, although currently virtually all NU *pesantren* incorporate a parallel secular state curriculum alongside their Islamic studies curriculum. Typically they do this by running parallel madrasah (schools) within the *pesantren* complex: a madrasah diniyah (religious school) and a madrasah aliyah (secular school).

Education and Social Sectors as Agent of Change

In terms of quantity, leaving aside state elementary and junior high schools, the privately owned schools of Muhammadiyah and NU play a major role in secondary and vocational school sector in Indonesia. This shows the dominant role of IMOs in shaping mental character through education, both before and after Indonesia's independence. Mental character building greatly influences an individual's ideology and the values that go on to inform their personal belief system.

Following Indonesia's independence, IMOs played a significant role in contributing to development goals across virtually all aspects of life. Education and social services are the two most prominent sectors that have been emphasised because they are crucial facets in improving the quality of human resources. As the provisions of Indonesian law (Law of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013) on social organisation stipulates:

> Community organisations are obliged to carry out activities in accordance with goals of the organisation; maintain national unity and integrity and integrity of the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI); maintain religious values, cultures, morals, ethics and norms and provide benefits to society; maintain public order and create peace in society; conduct financial management in a transparent and accountable manner; and participate in achieving State goals.

Thus, augmenting government initiatives in building the nation is a major factor in both the existence and pursuits of IMOs. Tens of thousands of private schools and orphanages are scattered along the archipelago, reflecting a major effort to educate people in marginalised communities and prevent them from being left behind as an enduring consequence of Dutch occupation, which saw access to schooling limited to only those from higher socio-economic families. Millions of students are studying in private schools established by IMOs that are largely located in villages

and towns that government facilities barely provide for. Likewise, thousands of orphanages have also been established in order to help the poor to pursue equal opportunities for access to education and welfare. The range of activities and support they provide in the education and welfare spaces demonstrates the commitment of IMOs to serve as active agents of change.

Over time, the students attending these schools will go on to form the next generation of youth facing multiple challenges as a result of various global and local problems, such as injustice, economic disparity and poverty, all of which can have detrimental impacts on one's mental character, as well as on one's religious ideology. In Indonesia, religious ideology is malleable, and is subject to the influences of Islamic extremism, shaped by political issues in the Middle East, and perceptions of Western domination of Muslim-majority countries (Lewis, 1993). The younger generation is particularly susceptible to these influences as their knowledge of Islam is often relatively weak, leaving them vulnerable to being influenced by radicalism. It is important that education and social services in the broadest sense facilitate the development of sound thinking and respect for differences.

Understanding and respect should be the foundation of a cultural approach to addressing differences in religious ideology, an approach that Muhammadiyah and NU must continue to develop. These two organisations have followers numbering tens of millions of people, thousands of educational institutions and orphanages. To the extent that their followers can be helped to develop better character, to become more tolerant, moderate, open-minded and respectful, they can help transform society. Their members will be better prepared to confront global problems carefully and without prejudice, so that think with clarity, objectivity and creativity in their approach to these challenges. Members will also be better prepared to communicate in a manner that leverages respect and empathy, responding in a compassionate manner to others and to themselves.

Modelling Approach of Preventing Violent Extremism

Creating a model that can better predict risk and direct investment in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) has the potential to make a substantial difference in limiting the spread and impact of violent

extremism. One of the first steps that needs to be taken is to deepen the existing understanding of the actors involved in the system and understand precisely how they contribute. Modelling can help the Indonesian government determine an appropriate P/CVE strategy that will help to improve protection for all citizens. The key elements of the model being proposed here are set out in causal loop diagram below.

The aim is that a model built to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the ideology and radicalism of militant groups operating in Indonesia can be used to predict likely future developments. Modelling may also be used to evaluate and design policies for P/CVE. P/CVE modelling in this chapter is intended to determine levels of IMO participation in moderating ideological factors. This participation plays an integral role in contributing to P/CVE strategies in Indonesia, specifically through its role in facilitating information distribution, attitudes of tolerance and alignment of radicalism.

In this model, both government and IMOs are placed as units of equal importance, and quantitatively both units also have similar parameters on the basis of their similar level of interest in and commitment to counterterrorism efforts. In the Indonesian context, the government has tended to disregard or undervalue community participation in countering violent extremism, despite the significant contributions of CSOs like Muhammadiyah and NU.

IMOs collectively represent important community stakeholders with significant potential to contribute to preventing violent extremism. As a consequence of their involvement in P/CVE activity, members of this community have often been victims of attacks carried out by terrorists who believe their actions to be justified in the name of jihad. There needs to be a greater emphasis on the community to taking a leading role in the struggle against terror.

Ideology as a Driver of Radicalism and Violent Extremism

Throughout its history, terrorism in Indonesia has been dominated by links to radical Islamism. These links can be seen in a number of incidents of violent extremism beginning in the early days of Indonesian independence until the early 1980s, carried out by the Darul Islam movement. Incidents include the hijacking of a Garuda aircraft, popularly known as

the 'Woyla' tragedy, and the bombing of the Borobudur Temple (Karnavian, 2014). These instances of violence illustrate that radical Islamic ideological motives can fuel resistance movements against a range of other parties but tend to be especially directed against the government which is accused of not acting in line with Islamic law. To a large extent, the roots of modern terrorism in Indonesia originated with the Darul Islam movement in the 1950s, which to this day continues to evolve and metamorphise into various new forms (Solahuddin & McRae 2013).

The 2002 Bali bombing saw radical interpretations of Islamist ideology that had arisen out of the Darul Islam movement culminate in a large-scale violent attack. During their trial, the three perpetrators of the Bali bombing repeatedly declared their commitment to violence against non-Muslims in the name of jihad and insisted on the need to create a society under an Islamic state. Despite their claimed religious convictions, the ideology subscribed to by these perpetrators runs contrary to the Islamic teaching that stipulates that Muslims are forbidden from causing harm to themselves and to others.

For this reason, it is often popularly perceived that individuals who hold these beliefs and commit, or are willing to commit, acts of terror must be not only poorly educated and ignorant with respect to their knowledge of Islam but have other deep-rooted problems. Evidence from many examples of terrorism, however, indicates that many perpetrators of violent extremism do not necessarily have significant psychopathological problems, many are relatively well-educated, and they do not necessarily come from disadvantaged lower socio-economic backgrounds. The perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, for example, included graduates from reputable colleges in the United States. Likewise, some of the Bali bombers were also graduates from overseas universities and came from relatively privileged backgrounds. Similarly, the 2016 shooting attack on the Holey Artisan Bakery, an up-market cafe in the diplomatic quarter of Dhaka, Bangladesh, which killed many civilians, was conducted by perpetrators who were well-educated and came from wealthy families. In fact, one of the perpetrators was the son of a ruling party official, and several others were graduates of Australia's Monash University in Malaysia. Thus, contrary to public assumptions of irrationality, low level of education, and poorer socio-economic background of perpetrators, a terrorist can be well-educated, economically well-off and without the excuse of having serious psychological problems.

The relative rationality of an ideological position is a subjective phenomenon constrained by human imperfections, which have the power to limit one's ability to interpret information (Nalbandov, 2013). With regard to this subjectivity, Bryan Caplan (2001, p. 98) states that if someone truly believes that death in the name of jihad under an Islamic movement brings unlimited rewards, then terrorism remains rational even though it is seen to be irrational in the eyes of so-called 'unbelievers'. Many studies have argued that the foundations of Islamist movements provide implicit explanations rooted in social psychology in which mass behaviour perceived as collective action comes from exogenous structural strain, disequilibrium and social pathologies such as alienation, anomie, and normative ambiguity that create individual frustration and motivation for 'deviant' social behaviour. This is seen to be closely coupled with structural tensions such as modernisation, industrialisation, or even economic crises that cause psychological tension, which in turn results in a willingness to engage in collective action. This also implies that the participation of individual activities in society is the result of ideological 'irrationality'.

Other studies have shown that there was a boost in Islamic activism as a consequence of the crisis generated by the secularisation project that failed in the Middle East (Waltz, 1986). In an examination of youth issues in Tunisia, it was demonstrated that youth views on political and economic difficulties drive their dissatisfaction and readiness to affiliate with Islamist opposition movements. Dissatisfaction also creates psycho-social problems for many young Tunisians, and this situation helps explain why the opposition party prioritises areas such as justice and welfare. The reason many young people join, or at least show empathy to, Islamist movements needs to be understood as a response to a very serious sense of social alienation, leaving them feeling out of control and as outsiders within their own community.

The experiences of dissatisfied, young Tunisians can offer a point of comparison for the situation faced by young Muslims in Indonesia today. Young Tunisians have only known the political disappointments that have emerged due to an absence of effective participation by Tunisia's main community, a society that for many young Tunisians has moved too fast and seen too many contradictions. Consequently, these personal circumstances for many give rise to loneliness and frustration regarding their personal quality of life, leading them to a sense of crisis. This situation has been exacerbated by a very rapid socio-economic transformation and

economic policies that are manipulated by concentrating wealth among a handful of businessmen, state bourgeoisie and corrupt government officials. Average Tunisians, and young people in particular, face difficult conditions such as dense settlements, lack of housing, as well as city services that are not adequate in terms of the infrastructure provided, as the cost of living necessities rises, real wages decrease and unemployment increases. Professionals and intelligentsia are in a particularly vulnerable situation because of the blocking of social mobility as a result of widespread economic lethargy and workplace nepotism that emphasises connections over expertise.

Based on the above perspective, Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif, former Chairman of Muhammadiyah, explained during an interview that the religious and ideological views of radicals tend overwhelmingly to be oriented towards, and influenced by, developments in the Middle East. Indonesian Muslims tend to Islamic practices from the Middle East as representing superior forms of Islamic understanding, despite numerous Arab traditions having a cultural rather than religious nature and origin. Some Indonesian Muslims are influenced by these ideological teachings because they believe that Arabism is part of Islam. It is believed by many Indonesian Muslims that Arabs understand Islamic teaching much better than other, non-Arab Muslims. As Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif explains, 'this is in part because Arabs are fluent in Arabic and they can memorise the Quran easily. However, do they really understand the true meaning of the Holy Qur'an?'. This is a fundamental question that every individual Muslim must answer for themselves, regardless of where they live and how deep their religious devotion is. Nationality does not guarantee piety in religion, but faith is the main basis for piety of every Muslim.

Balancing Ideology with Other Factors

While radicalism and terrorism are not synonymous, radical ideologies can lead to terrorism. Radical in this context refers to an extreme doctrine that can be, and in many instances is, used as a motive and driver of crime and political violence. Increasing radicalism hangs on extreme ideology, *jihad* and perceptions of pan Islamism. The state of affairs in the Islamic world globally has become a focal point for the views of those who want to uphold *hilafah* (Islamic State) in Indonesia. Some who hold this view believe that the Indonesian republic (the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia–Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia-NKRI) needs to be

transformed into an Islamic State based solely on the Sharia, or Islamic law, and that it is not only religiously justifiable but even obligatory to achieve this through violence where necessary. This kind of view runs contrary to the State's principles of *Pancasila* (Indonesia state ideology) and democracy. The Indonesian Constitution in its preamble stipulates that:

> Whereas independence is the inalienable right of all nations, therefore, all colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice; And the moment of rejoicing has arrived in the struggle of the Indonesian independence movement to guide the people safely and well to the gate of the independence of the state of Indonesia which shall be independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous; By the grace of God Almighty and motivated by the noble desire to live a free national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence.

Unfortunately, there are some who want to change the principles of the Indonesian state and are offering a radical interpretation of Islam that, unlike the Indonesian government's approach, does not value the concepts of peace and harmony within Islam.

Over the past couple of decades, the imposition of Sharia law and the establishment of an Islamic State are featuring more prominently in discourses in the public sphere since Indonesia's experience during the reformation era (1999–2004) and its subsequent democratic transition, which in many aspects remains ongoing today. As part of this open process, radical ideology and the obligation to support *jihad* have also become part of this conversation, even though they are not in accord with the mainstream representations of the change that is happening. Some groups of prominent Muslim figures and their followers have been actively promoting the discourse of Sharia either implicitly or explicitly, but thus far Indonesians have not been particularly receptive, instead having other preferences, such as remaining under Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution. Other groups balked at opposing it with liberal ideology. Both sets of views garner different reactions depending on the point of view of each follower. This phenomenon is not unexpected during a period of democratic transition anywhere in the world, including Indonesia.

The opposition of these two competing issues is not expected to trigger social upheaval or violence, because the discourse is at the level of ideological thinking. Nevertheless, if polarisation were to include political elements, it is anticipated that such polarisation would likely lead to violence. Debate around the very nature and parameters of these issues continues in Indonesia, where some Islamic figures have stated that religion and politics are like two sides of the same coin, but others, who hold a more secular perspective, assert that religion must be separate from party-politics. They argue that personal religious affairs are centred in the private lives of individuals, whereas Islamists argue for a form of moral policing in which religion enters directly into state matters to regulate the behaviour of citizens.

In contrast to the reaction of jihadist networks, who tend to view violent struggle as being integral to achieving their goals, the ideological struggle for moderates is decisive, to be won by guaranteeing freedom that is expressed through democracy as a competing dogma of jihadism. It is made up of alternative overtures that seek to encourage the rejection of violent jihadism. In the end, the only way to defeat jihadists is to counter their radical ideology by offering an alternative: political freedom and hope for a peaceful change.

The development of ideology and the discourse around jihad continues to pose a significant challenge, in part because these issues are linked to the volatile conflicts in the Middle East and developments in these conflicts make this issue a moving target. In this model (Fig. 10.1), pan-Islamism, is a combination of Islamist ideology and jihadism (Ridwan,



Fig. 10.1 Model pan-Islamism, is a combination of Islamist ideology and jihadism

2018). It reflects the causal relationship between ideological factors and other factors in preventing radicalism.

In this model increasing welfare and counter-radicalisation initiatives represent variables that can reduce the escalation of radicalism. Economic development also plays a role but it is not easy to model economic and social justice factors, which must involve consideration of many aspects, including geographical boundaries, foreign cooperation and global interdependence. In other words, global issues have a significant influence on, and strong consequences for, these two variables. Indeed, as with perceptions of social and economic justice, pan-Islamism is also borderless in that it is influenced by global ideas and phenomenon. In this model pan-Islamism and welfare are identified as uncontrolled input factors. They contribute significantly to maintaining the overall balance of the model, albeit they have different values of parameters.

In addition to addressing issues relating to the economy and equity, 'deradicalization'—as disengagement and rehabilitation is generally referred to in Indonesia—is the other urgent factor that plays a significant function in reducing radicalism. In the last decade, the public has been critical of the government's deradicalisation program for a range of reasons, the central issue of which they argue is that ideology cannot be deradicalised. Yet programs to deradicalise terrorists have been implemented in many countries, indicating that deradicalising extremists is seen to be feasible despite the scepticism of many. This uncertainty is exacerbated by a chronic lack of proper evaluation in almost all plans being implemented. In addition, some obstacles have arisen due to confusion surrounding how to best define the objectives of the program itself.

Nevertheless, the Indonesian government takes pride in claiming that Indonesia is a country that has successfully implemented deradicalisation programs. A number of foreign states also acknowledge that Indonesia has seen some success in this field. Such claims are inherently subjective as they based on the judgement of each individual stakeholder. Nevertheless, it is significant that the Indonesian government maintains that of 700 convicted terrorists, 250 participated in deradicalisation programs and are no longer classified as being rehabilitated. While these assessments indicate a degree of success, the best evidence available suggests that deradicalisation tends to be successful mainly with 'soft' jihadists—that is, those who do not have a deeply embedded extremist ideology—whereas there is very little evidence of the programs having significant, if any,

impact on militant jihadists. This is underscored by the fact that the vast majority of militant jihadists refuse to join deradicalisation programs.

There are indications of grounds to be optimistic about the prospects for rehabilitation for many detainees, even if not for the most hard-core militants. My interviews with terrorist prisoners, reveal a pattern in which few of them will be charged with reoffending after their first conviction for terrorism activities. Most of the convicted terrorists interviewed received relatively short sentences of less than five years imprisonment. They know, however, that should they reoffend, they risk incurring much lengthier sentences. Over the past decade many of these convicts have been released back into society after serving their sentences and, to date, very few former terrorists have been arrested or convicted of further involvement in terrorist activities or other illegal activities. There is also no evidence to date that they have attempted to engage in terrorist activities overseas despite in their interviews having expressed their eagerness to travel to Syria. If these individuals were to go on to engage in terrorist activities overseas, the public would no doubt begin to question the government's deradicalisation programs and call for evidence of impact in order to justify the significant budget dedicated to these programs. Indeed, the most important aspect required to run a stable deradicalisation program is the development of a comprehensive appraisal available in open-source literature, which includes contributions from professional consultants outside of the government and offers transparency and accountability. While deradicalisation programs need to be subject to ongoing scrutiny, they deserve support and are a vital element in the overall success of countering and preventing violent extremism. IMOs must continue to play an active role in facilitating the rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners so that they can return to society. Part of this is by helping to re-aligning their religious ideologies and resettle them into society as regular citizens.

The Role of IMOs

The participation of IMOs such as Muhammadiyah and NU plays a strategic role in P/CVE. The United Nations has declared that one of the more significant developments in the field of counterterrorism and P/CVE is the extent to which civil society actors have participated in various important activities (UN General Assembly, 2015). IMOs have continuously promoted peace education and tolerance through

curriculum reform in schools; helping prevent the radicalisation of adolescents by providing psycho-social interventions that teach marginalised young people to manage their emotions and feelings of injustice and despair; creating trust by building platforms for governments and law enforcement agencies, marginalised communities and civil society to discuss issues related to radicalisation within the religious sphere; working with local governments to develop comprehensive local P/CVE action plans; establishing a 'School for Mothers' in various countries to raise awareness among mothers about how to identify and become involved when they see early signs of radicalisation or violence among their children; and reintegrating former young members of terrorist networks into mainstream society to prevent them being alienated.

According to UN records, there are more than one thousand P/CVE initiatives organised by civil society across more than one hundred countries around the world, while more and more civil society groups and networks of other local actors such as women, youth and families are also actively participating in the P/CVE sphere. This evolution is reflective of the universal recognition that each national government must continue to assume primary responsibility for the security of their own state, including threats from violence, terrorism and extremism that are more localised than ever before. This, however, requires constructive engagement with civil society actors who are often well placed to identify, prevent and overcome these threats.

As set out in the UN Secretary General's 2015 P/CVE Action Plan, the involvement of civil society is crucial in all aspects of P/CVE, and its value can be significantly enhanced through cooperatively engaging with government in different ways (United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, 2015). One glaring weakness in n P/CVE efforts around the world, that youth are not well represented. By bringing young people into P/CVE efforts, IMOs can support young people in actively countering, rather than propagating, biased perceptions of Middle East conflicts and radical ideology. In addition, bringing youth into P/CVE efforts helps to draw attention to otherwise neglected youth efforts and positive media campaigns.

Another avenue for IMO participation in P/CVE in Indonesia through contributing to strengthening the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB). FKUB is a semi-government-funded body that emphasises problem-solving approaches to crime prevention through close cooperation between police officers and interfaith religious leaders as a means

of reducing criminality and the threat of terrorism. The police, the general public and the government each have their own function: the police patrols the streets and work with community groups; residents work together to improve amenities, the social environment and prevent criminal activity; and the government creates security codes to improve environmental safety and prevent alcohol and drug abuse, which has been found to assist in reducing susceptibility to radicalisation in prisons. In Indonesia's case, preventing drug abuse in particular may be crucial because it has been frequently found to be a key factor leading users to criminal activity. When drug users are imprisoned, they have been found to be particularly susceptible to radicalisation. Indeed, a number of terrorists throughout Indonesian prisons had previously been convicted of drug offences and turned to religion while serving those sentences. Hence, the basic principles of FKUB's scope includes controlling access to public spaces and buildings, supervising certain areas to reduce the risk of crime, and strengthening milieu where people live and work peacefully.

Another key aspect is the commitment of IMOs directly to P/CVE strategies. Muhammadiyah has announced a movement of so-called 'comprehensive revitalisation' to cope with the multi-faceted obstruction of the current situation. The central axis of this approach is that it requires each member of Muhammadiyah to engage in practical examples of good deeds or behaviours that reflect a moderate Islamic ideology. The idea is that Muhammadiyah needs to move beyond efforts to merely revitalise ideology, and instead reinforce this work with a number of synergistic programs which bring together education, health and moderate Islamic teaching. It aims to implement these programs as a means to achieve harmonious life; furthermore, various forms of restitution are important for organisational consolidation. Muhammadiyah has a distinct organisational structure with a tiered system of control ranging from local villages, districts, regions, provinces, all the way to central command in the capital city of Jakarta, linking more than 30 million supporters. It controls numerous organisations including the women's wing, youth leadership and university students. Revitalisation efforts have always been designed in such a way that they bring a vision of idealism and are presented as the great mission of the organisation. This concept had been derived from content of the Qur'an, chapter Al Imran verse 104:

وَلْتَكُن مِّنكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى ٱلْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِٱلْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ ٱلْمُنكَرِ ۚ وَأُو۟لَٰٓئِكَ هُمُ ٱلْمُفْلِحُونَ

> And let there be such a group among you, that they may call towards goodness and command what is just and forbid evil. And the very same attained to their goals.

This text is foundational to the Muhammadiyah movement. It embodies the organisations core principle of promoting good deeds and forbidding evil (*amar makruf nahi munkar*) as the foundation for maintaining social cohesion harmony. Muhammadiyah is committed to continuing to develop the vision and mission of progressive Islam that led to its founding in 1912. The notion of promoting progressive Islam which was introduced by the founder of the Muhammadiyah, is the basis for the organisation's ideology of progress, widely known as the ideology of reformism and Islamic modernism. At the heart of this, is the principle of enlightenment (*tanwir*) as a way of liberating, empowering and advancing life from all forms of backwardness, oppression, strife and injustice of human life (Nashir, 2017).

According to this mindset, Muslims need to develop as modern people and create centres of excellence, embodying the characteristics of advanced societies. To the extent that they achieve this, Indonesian Muslims will emerge as disseminators of mercy for the universe (*rahmat an lil-'alamin*), where they have the privilege to be given to their nation and the world. For Indonesian Muslims, it is not enough to become only moderate, they must also be progressive, meaning constantly improving, in all areas of life. By doing this they can become bearers of the mission of mercy for the natural world and all of humankind. This is the foundation on which Muhammadiyah places itself as an Islamic mass organisation that bestows the crucial role of developing progressive Islam in Indonesia into the 21st Century.

Conclusion

Early in the history of the Republic of Indonesia, various IMOs have struggled through non-violent movements in liberating the country from Dutch colonialism. They gathered potency to enlighten the nation's successors through education and social development. Their struggle continued to develop and grow, expanding widely in the early years of independence. The education and social services provided by IMOs offered equal opportunities for all citizens from different backgrounds to help build the country. IMOs have continued to play a significant role

in shaping Indonesian society, through the promotion of peace, tolerance and non-violent communication.

Clear, positive, communication based on respect and the avoidance of conflict and violence needs to be taught comprehensively in both state and private schools so that the next generation will be able to develop strong peace principles to achieve their potential and be equipped to contribute meaningfully to their homeland. This form of education also contributes to supporting P/CVE efforts and empowers individuals to think critically, and 'peacefully', about global issues and shape the way they are represented in popular culture and global media. Exposure to these different, and often negative, influences can prove difficult for the younger generation to process, however preparing young people with the tools of peaceful communication can go a long way in supporting their ability to process and interpret this content.

Indonesia had multiple challenges to counter, not least the issue of ideologies that might lead to violent extremism. This challenge is certainly not easy to address in light of modern forms of communication, which allows access to a wide range of information from around the world. The rapid flow of information and the government's lack of power in countering radical ideology has resulted in some extreme religious groups openly opposing the principles of *Pancasila* and democracy. In Indonesia, this kind of phenomenon is problematic, as the reformation era introduced a free market of ideas. Liberal democracy with freedom is good but it also comes with limits on the authority of law enforcement to intervene.

As a tool for analysis, the modelling approach introduced in this chapter sets out the dynamics of radicalisation in which that ideology is a strong variable leading to radicalism, while other variables may reduce it. Comparing it to other variables such as economic status, equity and welfare, ideology is clearly of critical importance and especially when misused by political actors, can lead to hateful and violent extremism. As depicted in the two graphs introduced in the beginning of the chapter, an upward trend of radicalism is accompanied by a downward trend of civil society participation. This illustrates the importance of mutual cooperation between government and IMOs being developed in order to assist in finding ways to encourage moderation and revitalisation. This poses some serious challenges for Indonesia. But the evidence of the past decade suggests that the various efforts made by government and IMOs, in particular Muhammadiyah and NU, have considerable potential to meet these challenges. While the government can take political steps to achieve

state welfare, the IMOs can strengthen the community through education and social services in order to maintain harmony and social cohesion.

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CHAPTER 11

Online P/CVE Social Media Efforts

Ruici Tio and Samantha Kruber

Introduction

The Indonesian state has a long history of dealing with the threat of terrorist, separatist and insurgent groups. In recent years this threat has evolved and become more complex and so to have the responses. Initially the focus was on the potential of terrorist attacks by groups such as Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. Now attention is also given to a range of more complex and insidious threats emerging from a range of populist Islamic groups that seek to subvert the pluralist and tolerant principles that are enshrined in Indonesia's state ideology. The use of the online space by these groups to recruit members, gain support and spread their ideology is of growing concern, particularly in Indonesia's current socio-political context, which has seen an increase in exclusionary ideologies that call for narrow interpretations of religious identity at the expense of minority religious, ethnic and social groups.

R. Tio (✉)
Policy Programs Manager, Facebook, Singapore, Singapore

S. Kruber
Alfred Deakin Institute (ADI), Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

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Government and non-government actors, including CSOs, have responded with a range of P/CVE initiatives tailored for the online space to respond to this comparatively new theatre of radicalisation to violent extremism. The inherent challenges in recognising violent extremist attitudes online, identifying members or supporters of violent extremist groups, and the related challenges in evaluating the effectiveness of programme attempting to prevent or counter these groups, render programme in this field the subject of significant scrutiny and debate. The challenges of designing and implementing effective P/CVE approaches online are often further exacerbated by the scale, speed and sheer variety of online communications platforms and channels. This chapter will seek to provide a framework to assess the approaches undertaken by government, civil society and technology companies in countering and preventing violent extremism in the online space in Indonesia and will also look to a number of examples globally as existing best-practice approaches to online P/CVE that may further inform the Indonesian response.

Differentiating Online CT and Online P/CVE

There is an important distinction to be made between counter terrorism and preventing or countering violent extremism, as the primary objective, intended beneficiaries, and the type of intervention can vary significantly. Ris and Ernstorfer provide a useful framework adapted from an approach developed by the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP) to summarise these two approaches (Ris & Ernstorfer, 2017).

	Focus of Engagement
Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)	• Address the drivers of the conflict and implement conflict transformation and reconciliation programming • Create resilient communities, by building immunity to recruitment by violent extremists, by catalysing community-based programme • Deter and disrupt recruitment or mobilisation and assist with reintegration of former violent extremists

(continued)

(continued)

	Focus of Engagement
Counter-Terrorism (CT)	• Deter, disrupt and isolate groups that use terror • Train and equip state security forces to fight terrorist groups • Increase the state's capacity to prepare, prevent, protect and respond to terrorism • Interdict and prosecute through law enforcement

These definitions emphasise the distinction between CT efforts that generally seek to deter and disrupt terrorist groups from carrying out attacks, fundraising, or mobilising support, versus P/CVE approaches which generally seek to address the drivers of violent extremism or immunise against the appeal of violent ideologies in the first place. An inherent challenge to these approaches, however, is defining which actors are considered terrorist, violent extremist or intolerant. The category of violent extremism includes terrorism but covers a broader range of behaviours. And hateful extremism, which sometimes contributes to violent extremism, is a much broader again (Life After Hate, 2019). Terrorist individuals and groups are more likely to be identified by national or international law enforcement, violent extremist individuals or groups often fall into a grey area where the ideologies, materials or actions of the groups may not be explicitly illegal. And very often hateful extremism completely escapes legal censure even though it represents a critically important element of the larger problem.

The complexity of this is compounded in the online space where the removal of social media accounts or websites of terrorist groups falls into a murky area of jurisdiction between government, telecommunication and internet companies. Whereas internet service providers and internet companies generally have policies banning terrorist groups and individuals from utilising their services, the implementation of such policies tends to be very inconsistent due to the differences in regulations between countries and the ease by which these organisations can quickly recreate, adapt or re-establish their online presence.

With violent and hateful extremist groups and individuals that are not on watchlists or outright banned, policing their online presence

becomes inherently more challenging (Hussain & Saltman, 2014). Negative measures, such as the removal or blocking of objectionable content from terrorist or banned groups tend to be better suited to a CT rather than a P/CVE approach. Positive measures, such as presenting counter or alternative narratives and promoting resilience and critical thinking, however, tend to be more appropriate to a P/CVE approach (Rosand & Winterbotham, 2019).

The CT-P/CVE Spectrum in the Online Space

	Negative Measures	*Positive Measures*
Terrorists and VE Groups	• Removal and blocking of content by government, ISP's or social media • Reporting mechanisms, tools and policies for offending materials • Hashing technology to identify media content and prevent uploading in the first place • Surveillance	• Directly countering ideology or narratives by terror group • Providing or supporting alternative narratives • Promoting resiliencies and critical thinking • Direct interventions with individuals or communities being targeted by these groups to disengage, deradicalise
Radical, Fundamentalist, Hardline groups	• Removal and blocking of content, both by users and through artificial intelligence • Reporting mechanisms, tools and policies for offending materials • Demonetisation of content deemed to be hate speech or inciteful • Deprioritising content through the algorithm • Surveillance	

The focus of this chapter is on positive efforts to counter these groups. Nevertheless, it is helpful to frame this by starting with a brief analysis of negative efforts will shed light on the scale and complexity of this approach.

Censorship and Negative Measures

Censorship is one of the primary tools used by governments and tech companies or service providers to block terrorist or violent extremist groups from using the Internet to promote their cause. These measures can include removing websites and social media accounts, filtering content and reporting offending content or accounts. But not only does the censorship approach require a delicate balancing act factoring in individual rights to freedom of speech or expression, it also requires coordination in the face of jurisdictional challenges in tackling actors and content that is hosted on websites or platforms across the globe.[1]

In the Indonesian context, the responsibility of identifying offending websites falls under the Ministry of Communication and Information (MCI) and individual Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The MCI launched an artificial intelligence-based 'crawling system' in January 2018 to search the internet for 'negative' content such as pornography, hoaxes and radical content (Davies & Silviana, 2018). While this system may identify offending websites, it remains the responsibility of individual ISPs to block access to certain domain names, and the application of this can sometimes be inconsistent. Ultimately, this web-crawler system is based on the use of keywords to identify content that is searchable on the internet, but this is largely inapplicable to social media and messaging platforms.

Social media companies such as Telegram and WhatsApp in 2017 and Tik Tok in 2018 have been blocked or threatened with being blocked by the Indonesian government on the grounds of hosting obscene content (Silviana & Dave, 2017). While social media companies do coordinate with Indonesian authorities on the removal of harmful or offending content, ultimately the responsibility lies with the social media companies to comply. In the context of negative measures, these companies tend to employ a range of tactics that apply to the Indonesian context. While the role of social media companies will be the focus of the following analysis, it is also worth noting that the hosting of terrorist or extremist content is not limited to web hosting services and social media companies, but

[1] The following report provides a more comprehensive overview of efforts in Europe and also provides a breakdown of different major social media networks. Quilliam Foundation. *Jihad Trending—A Comprehensive Analysis of Online Extremism and How to Counter It. 2014.*

also includes a range of less conspicuous internet services such as file-sharing sites (e.g. We Transfer), link sharing sites (e.g. justpaste.it, bit.ly) and photo and music sharing sites (e.g. Sound cloud) that are even more difficult to control (Fischer-Birch, 2018).

Blocking or Removing Content Before It Appears

Most social media companies refer to international lists of banned organisations, such as the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) lists, combined with machine learning, to prevent terrorist or extremist groups from setting up accounts in the first place. Since the definition of terrorist and extremist groups can vary greatly between countries, however, the application of this tends to be very inconsistent. For example, while Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), the group behind the Surabaya bombing in May 2018, had been designated as a terrorist group on the SDGT list since January 2017, the Indonesian government didn't officially ban the group until August 2018. And even though prior to be banned the group certainly received the attention of Indonesian law enforcement, the organisation would have been allowed to host and distribute materials online without breaking the law prior to being officially banned.

Banned groups and individuals can, to an incomplete level of effectiveness, be prevented from setting up social media accounts, companies such as Facebook and Google also employ machine learning to improve and automate this process (Google Support, 2019). One example of this is the use of 'hashing' through a joint effort between the major technology companies to create unique digital fingerprints for offending videos or images that can then be stored in a database and shared with other companies to take down or prevent the same content on their platforms (Levin, 2017). The extent to which this is currently being applied in Indonesia, however, and to which groups, is not publicly known.

Reporting and Takedowns

Despite significant advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning since the emergence of today's dominant social media platforms the highly contextual nature of defining and identifying extremist content continues to require human intervention, particularly for offending

content that may not be authored by a banned individual or organisation. Reporting and takedown requests from government, civil society and individuals are central to identifying offending content, including hate speech and hoaxes. Companies such as Facebook, Google, Twitter and Telegram have responded on many occasions to takedown requests from the Indonesian government to remove offending content. Nevertheless, not all requests made by Indonesian authorities result in a take-down as many fall under grey areas where the request may not apply with the community guidelines of a given company, such as the case with LGBT content. An in-depth examination of the relationship between the Indonesian government and various tech companies is beyond the scope of this chapter but the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict has provided some important insights on this matter (IPAC, 2018).

Most social media platforms provide general community guidelines for use of their platforms and offer a reporting feature that allows users to report content or accounts that are seen to be promoting extremism or hate speech or more generally contravening those community guidelines. A number of the tech companies have also established a dedicated approach to identifying harmful content in Indonesia through localisation of initiatives such as the YouTube Trusted Flagger programme, which focused specifically on hate speech, and Facebook's Third-Party Fact Checker project, which focuses primarily on misinformation.[2] The Trusted Flagger programme relies on dedicated civil society groups to assist in flagging terrorist or hate speech content for removal, which then gets prioritised for review by YouTube prior to removal. The flagged content can then be used to help train and improve the accuracy of machine learning-based approaches to identify and remove harmful content.

The approaches outlined above primarily focus on preventing or removing content from known terrorist organisations and individuals. While the reporting and take-down functions expand this remit to include extremist and radical groups that may not be classified as terrorist groups, the vast majority of this content falls into a definitional grey area. For example, for YouTube the definition of hate speech outlined in the community guidelines refer to content *"that either promotes violence or*

[2] https://kumparan.com/@kumparantech/ikut-aturan-kominfo-youtube-buka-fitur-blokir-konten-trusted-flagger; https://www.liputan6.com/tekno/read/3647571/liputan6com-resmi-jadi-mitra-fact-checking-facebook-di-indonesia.

has the primary purpose of inciting hatred against individuals or groups based on certain attributes."[3] The Indonesian Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law similarly refers to hate speech as inflicting hatred on individuals and/or certain groups based on ethnicity, religion, race and other social divisions (referred to as SARA). Hate speech is covered in at least five articles of the Indonesian criminal code (KUHP) which, combined with the adoption of a revised anti-terror law in May 2018, has granted the Indonesian government far reaching powers on these issues.

In both the policies of social media companies and the Indonesian regulatory framework, however, there is significant room for interpretation as to what constitutes hate speech which not only makes it difficult to precisely define which groups should be considered extremist, radical or intolerant, but also conflates a range of actors—including those critical of the government or disseminating hoaxes—under the umbrella of hate speech.

P/CVE Approaches in Indonesia

The negative measures to counter terrorist and violent extremist groups described above, by and large, fall under the domain of government, ISPs and technology companies. In contrast with this, while civil society groups contribute in a number of key areas, the vast majority of their efforts are channelled into P/CVE 'positive approaches' to address the drivers of violent extremism and promote resilience against these ideologies.

The following diagram (Fig. 11.1) serves as a helpful means by which to frame the analysis of P/CVE communications approaches.

The framework above illustrates the approach adopted by Love Frankie in developing targeted P/CVE communication interventions. The x-axis distinguishes between approaches that aim to mitigate against VE groups (counter narratives and remedial interventions) versus those that aim to promote alternative narratives or resilience (positive alternatives and critical thinking). The y-axis also distinguishes between the types of communication approaches that can be achieved through one-way broadcasting of messages versus those that require deeper two-way dialogue. Finally, the framework also suggests the unit of intervention for the

[3] Notably, the YouTube definition also refers to sexual orientation, which would not be considered a protected attribute in the Indonesian context. See https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939.



Fig. 11.1 Analysis of P/CVE communications approaches (*Credit* M&C Saatchi World Services, Love Frankie)

communications approaches in each quadrant (e.g. individual, community and national level).

This is, of course, a simplification of the range of potential P/CVE interventions in the social media space. Nevertheless, this model provides a useful reference to analyse these efforts, with a particular focus on counter narratives, positive or alternative approaches, promoting critical thinking or resilience and remedial intervention for those who have already been radicalised to violent extremism.

Counter Narratives

Counter narratives seek to undermine the messaging of violent extremist groups by discrediting or demystifying the narrative they present and by challenging aspects related to ideology, fact, or logic (Briggs & Feve, 2014). By directly rebutting, undermining, or discrediting extremist group messages, counter narratives aim to trigger doubt among individuals involved with extremist groups, communities or ideas. The importance of credible messengers in counter narrative approaches cannot be overstated, and much of the counter narrative research recommends the involvement of credible messengers such as 'formers' (former terrorists/members of violent extremist groups), survivors of extremism (victims), and respected, influential community, faith or youth leaders or activists (Hedayah & ICCT, 2014; The Local, 2015; Tuck & Silverman, 2016).

Formers as credible messengers for counter narrative efforts have been used in examples ranging from the IRA in Northern Ireland, right-wing extremism EXIT programme throughout Europe and Islamist extremism prevention and disengagement programme. By inviting former extremists to present the individual experiences that informed their decisions to first become involved with, and then leave violent groups, serves as an extremely powerful counter narrative to the appeal of violent extremism.[4] For example, in Indonesia's case, a number of Jemaah Islamiyah leaders who have renounced the use of violence became quite vocal in offering counter narratives against engaging in violence in Indonesia and have been well-received mentors, particularly among incarcerated JI members or former members (IPAC, 2014). Nevertheless, it is essential to recognize that certain messengers and messages will only be relevant to certain groups. Former JI commander Nasir Abas, for example, has been highly effective working with JI prisoners, particularly in the years following the Bali bombings; but his influence upon newer generations of terrorists, and particularly those drawn to the conflict in Syria, is likely to be extremely limited (IPAC, 2014). It is therefore essential to continually assess the credibility of both the message and the messenger.

In the online space, there have been a number of counter narrative programme and efforts pursued to respond to online extremist narratives. For example, as part of the broader #StopJihadisme campaign launched

[4] QAISS report, p. 14;

by the French Government, a counter narrative video was released, which particularly targeting potential female ISIS recruits. The video contained graphic images comparing the promise made to new recruits by ISIS with the stark reality they are presented with upon arrival in Syria, visually and verbally conveying the message to viewers that "in reality, you'll find hell on earth and you'll die alone, far from home" (the local. Fr, 2015). Similarly, a video series produced by Exit USA, an organisation seeking to provide members of violent right-wing groups a pathway out, former right-wing extremists provided video testimonials which highlighted their personal experiences and the 'false truths' told to them by the organisations they became involved with (Silverman et. al., 2016).

Tech and social media companies have increasingly begun to make efforts to support P/CVE initiatives, although for the most part they have focused their efforts on CT responses such as removing content and banning users who promote violence, including terrorist behaviour and organised hate.[5] In one noteworthy P/CVE initiative however, Google piloted the Redirect Method in 2015–2016, a counter narrative-driven strategy designed in collaboration with Moonshot CVE. The Redirect Method uses Google Ad word technologies to target individuals using Google to search for violent extremist content and provides those individuals with links to counter narrative YouTube videos when their search results are returned (redirectmethod.org). The counter narrative pilot programme initially focused on debunking the themes used by ISIS to drive recruitment, but it was later expanded to target Neo-Nazi and violent white supremacist movements in the United States. Evaluations have shown, however, that the campaign was considerably more effective among the violent jihadist target audience than the far-right target audience, demonstrating the necessity of tailoring and revising programme for different audiences (Helmus & Klein, 2018).

Although counter narratives would appear to offer a much-needed response to the plethora of online extremist material, there are a number of criticisms of counter narratives as a CVE tactic. These include the sizable gap between the volume of counter narratives compared with the volume of sophisticated extremist material available; the dearth of evidence to support the notion that viewing extremist content actually leads to future violent extremist activity; and the fact that most counter

[5] See, for example, Facebook's community standards: https://www.com/communitystandards/violence_criminal_behavior.

narratives tend to be inherently defensive, thereby giving the extremist group the upper hand (Reed et al., 2017). As will be seen throughout this chapter, however, a number of additional online P/CVE responses have been developed to address some of these weaknesses and gaps.

Remedial Intervention

Remedial interventions involve directly engaging with individuals who have become involved with violent extremist groups or online communities and encouraging deradicalisation or disengagement from these groups/communities or ideologies (GCTF, 2018). These approaches seek to offer an 'off-ramp' to individuals involved in violent extremism or a means of 'exiting' the extremist community they have become entangled with. In a similar manner to counter narratives, remedial interventions benefit from the inclusion of credible messengers.

Much of the potential for remedial intervention lies in Exit programme. Exit programme seek to engage those already radicalised and potentially involved in violent extremist groups and gradually, through conversation with trained intervention providers, and offer them an off ramp. One particularly well-known example of an Exit programme is that of HAYAT Deutschland, a counselling programme established in Germany in 2011. Learning from Germany's experience with highly radicalised neo-Nazis, the HAYAT programme provided a contact point for radicalised individuals and their families and offered counselling and a step-by-step approach to stop and/or reverse the radicalisation process and provide pathways out of radical groups and behaviour (Hayat-Deutschland, 2019).

Comparing Exit programme in the Middle East and South East Asia with those undertaken in Europe, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013) argues that those programme in the Middle East and South East Asia have tended to focus on ideological or theological re-education via engagement with clerics, scholars and ex-militants or formers. European programme, on the other hand, tend to focus on the practicalities of exit, including economic assistance, psychological counselling and creating new social ties. Thus, for European programme, behavioural disengagement, rather than religious or ideological views, tend to be the central focus of these approaches (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Increasingly, however, as several of the chapters in this volume have shown, these approaches have begun to overlap, indicating advancements towards establishing best practices based

on global experiences. But for the most part, remedial interventions have continued to take place exclusively in the offline space, with few examples occurring in the online space.

In 2018, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) published a report assessing its Counter Conversations programme, an experimental initiative designed to test if offline approaches to countering violent extremism through direct conversational engagement with radicalised individuals could be applied in the social media space. The programme targeted individuals who appeared to subscribe to extreme right-wing or Islamist extremism views and engaged them voluntarily in conversation with ISD intervention providers via Facebook Messenger (Davey et al., 2018). The findings of the ISD report show promising potential for expanding and professionalising one-to-one messaging as a means of countering violent extremism, though this must occur alongside appropriate risk mitigation and sufficient individualisation (Davey et al., 2018). These initial positive results would indicate that further research, trialling and implementation of online remedial interventions may support and complement existing offline remedial interventions.

Positive/Alternative Narratives

Although counter narratives can, at times, offer a valuable means of confronting the messaging presented by violent extremism groups, they are, by their very nature, inherently reactive responses. As discussed above, counter narratives have faced criticism among some who suggest that reactive responses alone give extremist messengers the upper hand (Hedayah & ICCT, 2014, Reed et al., 2017). This has led to recognition of the importance of positive, or alternative, narratives. Positive or alternative narratives seek to proactively offer a positive vision of strong and cohesive societies, with the ultimate aim of making individuals less susceptible to the messaging of extremist actors in the first place. Positive/alternative narratives need not explicitly engage with violent extremism or violent extremist narratives; rather, they address any number of broader societal issues that can lead to individuals being more susceptible to the influences of violent extremism if left unaddressed.

A number of initiatives have sought to address this need to provide preemptive positive alternatives to prevent the appeal of violent extremism, and increasingly these messages are occurring in the online space. The essential role of CSOs, local voices and credible messengers in this process

has been recognised, and support for the expansion of CSO capacity in this space has come from both government and the tech industry. For example, the United Kingdom Home Office made funding available for the Building a Stronger Britain Together (BSBT) programme, which provided grants and in-kind support for CSOs in the UK to deliver programme that would build community resilience to violent extremism and produce positive alternatives to extremist recruitment (GCTF, 2018). Similarly, the YouTube and UNDP joint initiative 'Creators for Change' programme provided small grants for local CSOs in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia. This programme provides mentorship and training to support its local ambassadors and their social impact projects, which aim to tackle a range of issues including self-acceptance, showing kindness to others, celebrating different cultures, and global empathy and seek to create productive conversations about a wide array of issues (UNDP, 2018). These projects specifically target young people online and do so by engaging young, local online influencers to develop these messages, thereby increasing the relevance and credibility of both the message and the messenger to the target audience.

With a similar objective, in 2016 the Indonesian National Agency for Combatting Terrorism established the Peace Ambassador Initiative (Duta Damai), bringing together a community of youth bloggers, website creators and designers. Through training and support, the initiative's Ambassador Programme aims to be a self-sustaining project by training its youth membership to create their own online and offline counter narrative or positive narrative content, and to teach others to do the same (GCTF, 2018). In light of its success in Indonesia, having been taken up in 13 provinces since 2016, the initiative has been expanded to now include youth from across a number of other Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar and Thailand (GCTF, 2018). Though smaller in scale, Peace Generation Indonesia, a social enterprise that aims to promote peace through creative and cheerful media, has also sought to contribute to creating positive alternatives online. Though most of its projects focus on offline media (see for example Board games for Peace in Chapter Six) Peace Generation has delved into the online space through its Creator muda Academy initiative, a collaboration shared with the Cameo Project and the Maarif Institute and supported by Google as part of its Project Inspire. Creator muda Academy encourages young creators

to develop and share content promoting values of goodness online to the Madingsekolah.id platform. This platform seeks to provide positive content as an alternative to online content and hoaxes that promote intolerance, discrimination and hatred (Peace Generation, 2019).

Through promoting peace, tolerance and pluralism, positive and alternative narratives seek to establish a resilient and cohesive society that is less susceptible to the influence of violent or hateful extremist content, thereby tackling the problem before having to 'counter' it. Support from and collaboration with government and the tech industry has been integral in building the capacity of CSOs to develop, continue and expand these positive and alternative narrative initiatives.

Critical Thinking/Resilience

The basic logic of resilience in P/CVE is that certain personal qualities can render individuals and/or communities less susceptible to radicalisation to violent extremism. Thus, a range of P/CVE efforts have been designed to develop these resilience-building qualities. The development and encouragement of critical thinking is central to efforts to achieve greater resilience. Critical thinking is commonly understood as one's ability to "assess information, messages, ideas, and content, questioning and analysing the source and content of ideas" (Stevens et al., 2019, p. 3). In the online context, this involves building capacity in digital and media literacy and developing users' ability to critically assess the source of the content they are exposed to (raising questions such as is this material genuinely from the source claimed, and what authority does this source have on the matter presented?), as well as the content itself (is the content presented a legitimate/accurate representation, or is it fabricated and/or misleading?).

One example of this is ISD's pilot digital citizenship education programme, which has developed and tested curriculum and pedagogical approaches in order to build critical thinking skills and online awareness techniques with 16–19-year-olds in the Netherlands, with the objective of undermining the efforts of extremist groups and hate movements to influence and manipulate young people. This pilot programme has reported positive evidence of impact as well as room for future improvement for programme seeking to increase online resilience of young people, making them less susceptible to extremist group grooming and exploitation (Reynolds & Parker, 2018).

A crucial development in tackling online radicalisation is the recognition by the technology and social media industry that it has a responsibility to tackle issues that are facilitated by their products, including online radicalisation and anti-social behaviour more broadly. This change has been precipitated by the increasingly apparent use of social media sites to facilitate not only networking among violent extremist groups and individuals, but also to help these groups fundraise, recruit, plan and broadcast incidents of violent extremism. Furthermore, pressure from states demanding greater action from social media companies to counter and prevent the threat of violent extremism has also prompted the industry to act. For example, in 2017 the Indonesian government threatened a complete ban on the messaging service Telegram unless the company took action to address violent extremist content being distributed via its service, which served as a warning to other major platforms as well (Nuraniyah, 2019).

The 2019 Christchurch Call had an even more substantial impact on the tech sector. Spearheaded by New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and French President Emmanuel Macron following the devastating terrorist attack on two mosques in New Zealand, which saw 51 people killed and 50 injured and was live-streamed on social media, the Christchurch Call called upon governments and tech companies to commit to eliminating terrorist and violent extremist content online (christchurchcall.com). The Christchurch Call has since gained the support of a number of major online service providers including Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.

The tech sector has adopted a number of initiatives in order to start to respond to the threat posed by online extremism. One example is the We Think Digital initiative launched by Facebook in 2019. With a focus on the Asia Pacific, the initiative seeks to help individuals enhance their online critical thinking skills through a range of tailored interactive tutorials developed in partnership with experts from across the region. The initiative is not exclusively designed to tackle violent extremism, but rather focuses more broadly on individual behaviour online through modules that help users better understand what the internet and social media are, their rights, responsibilities as a 'digital citizen', managing their digital footprint, and how to be a critical thinker and show empathy when communicating online (Deevy, 2019). In the Indonesia context, We Think Digital has partnered with five Indonesian CSOs from a variety of different social spaces. These include Do Something Indonesia,

SiBerkreasi, Sudah Dong, YCAB Foundation and PGRI. Each of these organisations brings to the We Think Digital initiative their own unique, Indonesia-specific expert knowledge, ranging from anti-bullying, peace through formal education, economic empowerment and resilience against hoaxes and online radicalisation. The We Think Digital initiative's focus on ensuring the involvement of local CSOs reflects the broader commitment made by the tech sector members of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, which has enshrined in its membership criteria the need to support the expanding capacity of civil society organisations to challenge violent extremism (gifct.org).

Gaps and Challenges in Online P/CVE

While social media has greatly increased our ability to connect with one another and share ideas, including radical and extremist views, the offline space continues to be crucial to recruitment to violent extremist groups, particularly in the Indonesian context. Indeed, according to a study conducted by Solahudin, only 9% of Indonesians recruited to radical groups were introduced to those groups online; instead, the vast majority were recruited through more traditional offline means, such as prayer recital or study groups (Solahudin, 2018). Despite the enduring dominance of offline recruitment, however, it remains crucial to have a rigorous, comprehensive online strategy to prevent and counter violent extremism at its various stages. To do this, it is essential to improve our understanding of the way in which radicalisation and violent extremism occur in online and social media spaces in order to better target and tailor efforts to counter and prevent these phenomena. With this objective in mind, a number of gaps and challenges need to be addressed in order to advance the work of all actors active in this space:

- Though counter narratives have been used by a range of different actors including governments, tech companies, and civil society organisations, there is little evidence supporting the effectiveness of these narratives on the target audiences' attitudes and behaviours. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that it is extremely unlikely that individuals who already hold violent extremist views will change these views as a result of watching a counter narrative video (Silverman et. al., 2016). As such, sustained engagements

and remedial interventions are necessary if we are to see individuals disengage, while positive/alternative narratives and critical thinking and resilience initiatives are essential to reducing susceptibility to violent extremism in the first place. Counter narratives, while important, are not sufficient on their own.

- We must take an evidence-based approach wherever possible. To do this, we must generate more research into the effectiveness of online P/CVE approaches and continue to improve existing evaluation strategies. One of the greatest challenges facing terrorism research online is that while there is substantial data on the online content available, there remains very little on how this content affects users (Reed et al., 2017). This information is crucial to building our presently limited understanding of the relationship between viewing online content and radicalisation. The collection and analysis of data measuring the impact that terrorist narratives, counter narratives and positive/alternative narratives have on its consumers can provide valuable insights into the most effective messages, messengers, medium and on which P/CVE strategies are most effective at affecting target audiences.
- We need to continue to carefully consider the most appropriate messenger for the target audience and the message being delivered. This critical aspect is increasingly being recognised, with governments and tech companies alike acknowledging the need for local actors and civil society to be empowered to conduct and expand their P/CVE initiatives. Efforts to improve the reach, engagement and capacity of CSOs working in P/CVE have been reflected in the commitments made by individual tech companies, the GIFCT as a collective, and by governments providing funding and training to CSOs (GIFCT, 2019). The increase in the use of formers, youth and localised approaches in creating counter narratives and positive/alternative narratives has produced promising outcomes in the offline space, as demonstrated throughout a number of chapters in this volume. Further expansion of these efforts into the online space has the potential to enhance the reach of these positive results.
- It is important to recognise that there is no uniform 'violent extremism' and those drawn to the appeal of one manifestation of violent extremism may behave very differently and be drawn to different ideas and arguments compared with those drawn to other forms of violent extremism. As discussed earlier in this chapter,

one approach to counter narratives can produce different results for Islamist extremists versus right-wing extremists. Similarly, there is much variation within broad ideological categories, so counter-narrative approaches informed by one form of Islamist extremism (such as JI or AQ) may not be effective in targeting other forms (such as IS). Consequently, specific tailoring is critically important to the effectiveness of such programme.

- It is essential to continually develop our understanding of the link between online and offline spaces and continue to revise our approaches to P/CVE in response to these lessons. Despite the increasing use of the online space to disseminate violent extremist content online and to communicate with violent extremist networks via online social networking, it remains largely agreed that radicalisation in the online space only—that is, without outside or 'offline' communication—remains relatively rare (Frenett & Dow, 2015). Similarly, in a study of online violent extremism in Indonesia and the Philippines, Nuraniyah (2019, p. 11) finds that although social media increasingly facilitates recruitment, "it rarely produces lone wolf terrorists". Continuing to monitor trends in online/offline radicalisation and transcending the binary understandings of online and offline as separate spaces in which radicalisation occurs may help to strengthen existing approaches to P/CVE in both online and offline contexts.
- With reference to the Indonesian context, much of the focus has been on proactive resilience measures such as critical thinking and resilience building programme, and positive/alternative narratives. There have also been promising efforts made in reactive mitigation efforts through the development of targeted counter-narratives, though much of this continues to occur predominantly in the offline space. Increasing reactive mitigation efforts, and particularly looking to recent developments in the remedial intervention space such as the counter conversations pilot conducted by ISD, may provide a valuable addition to Indonesia's existing online P/CVE efforts.

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CHAPTER 12

An Introduction to Social Enterprise for Practitioners in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Natalie Ralph

Introduction

Income generation from the establishment of a social enterprise (SE) can contribute to supporting program sustainability for practitioners in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE). This is important because traditional sources of funding tend to be focussed on fixed-term projects with relatively short time frames. Consequently, P/CVE programs face perennial challenges with continuity and sustainability. SE also offers multiple opportunities for supporting P/CVE practitioners' work in other creative ways, beyond delivering income. In the last decade, entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship (Luke & Chu, 2013; Macke

N. Ralph (✉)
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Australian Research Council (ARC) Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science, Canberra, Australia

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et al., 2018; Schneider, 2016) have been widely promoted as vehicles for addressing social and environmental issues, such as unemployment among young people and creating positive alternative opportunities to counter the allure of recruitment into violent extremist groups (UN General Assembly, 2015). SE and related fellowships and events have included P/CVE practices, learning and support as part of their approach (Dupire, 2018). The broader private sector's contribution to P/CVE is also beginning to be explored (Rosand & Millar, 2017), although its contribution to peacebuilding more generally has generated over two decades of research and practice (Banfield et al., 2006; Ralph, 2015). This forms a useful foundation for exploring new, broader practices and innovative linkages between SE and P/CVE.

This chapter provides an introductory guide to assist P/CVE practitioners when considering SE to fund and assist their work. It begins by exploring what we mean when we talk about SE and social entrepreneurship, briefly outlining some international and Indonesian examples to illustrate. It then discusses why SE is a mechanism that should be considered more often to support P/CVE work and practitioners' target communities/groups. This includes a brief outline of the emerging field of 'Business for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism', and of concepts and practice in the more well-established field of 'Business for Peace'. The lessons learned by peacebuilders when working with business to support peace efforts may inform P/CVE practitioners in their business endeavours or when engaging with the broader private sector. The final section then discusses some key steps and issues to reflect upon when establishing a SE. There is a focus on Indonesian examples, along with literature, websites or organisations relevant to Indonesian practitioners that may provide assistance. Issues addressed include identifying organisations that act as 'enablers' relevant for seeking advice, training, funding, investment and capacity-building; understanding different models of SE and choosing an appropriate legal entity; and challenges and some solutions for those developing SE.

What is Social Enterprise and Social Entrepreneurship?

There is no agreed, specific definition of SE either globally or in the Indonesian context (Defourny & Nyssens, 2016; Pratono et al., 2016;

Social Enterprise UK, 2012). Nevertheless, the definition of SE formulated by UNESCAP represents a good starting point: 'any business which is primarily motivated by a social or environmental mission and reinvests a significant proportion of its profits toward this mission' (UNESCAP, 2018a, p. 23). SEs target issues such as empowering a community, young people and children, women, and marginalised groups; inclusive employment; environmental degradation; education; and health (for various SE approaches, typologies and history in Indonesia, see Idris & Hati, 2013; Pratono et al., 2016).

Margiono et al. (2017) and Yulius et al. (2015) pose four characteristics of a SE (or 'social venture'). These are: a mission to produce public/social value; reflect private ownership logic (i.e. limited profit distribution to owners, but owners have the right to include/exclude others in profit gain such as social venture capitals, distinguishing SEs from third sector organisations such as charities that are restricted in distributing profits); can have public or private funding (e.g. from business income, government grants or private actors such as investors and venture capitals); and public or private control.

It is broadly agreed that SEs should restrict negative environmental impacts even when the enterprise's key goal is primarily social (see the 'Triple Bottom Line' concept, Elkington, 1997). Some argue that SE could prove to be 'the future for social change', although there is wariness of businesses presenting as SE while not demonstrating the associated values (Social Enterprise UK, 2012).

While SE and social entrepreneurship are often discussed interchangeably, there are distinctions that need to be observed. Both portray commercial activities with a social goal and address a market gap. SEs may respond to market gaps left by the public and private sectors, but not every enterprise stands out for being entrepreneurial and unique. 'Entrepreneurship' reflects opportunity seizing, innovation and risk, and bringing new products, services, business models or social goals to the market, creating 'market-changing innovation' (Luke & Chu, 2013, p. 765).

Internationally, one of the best-known examples of SE is Bangladesh's Grameen Bank (2019). Grameen Bank was established in the 1970s as a sustainable approach to helping the poor access capital to develop very small businesses through micro-loans. Other international examples include D.Light, which sells affordable solar-powered lamps for people lacking electricity, and Greyston, which provides bakery employment for

the homeless (Social Enterprise Alliance, 2019). In Brazil, the Afro-Brazilian Incubator addresses discrimination of Afro-Brazilian people by facilitating their economic integration via entrepreneurship and offering relevant training (Business for Peace, 2014, p. 12).

In Indonesia, IBEKA promotes renewable energy technology solutions for enhanced environmental and socio-economic sustainability in communities, generating income from the sale of electricity and community cooperatives (Yulius et al., 2015, p. 7). Greeneration Indonesia (2019) prevents environmental degradation from waste by establishing several income streams. These include, for example, its businesses, Pasar Greeneration which sells environmentally-friendly products and souvenirs, and PlasticReborn which recycles plastic bottles into various items. In the creative industry, the women-led SukkhaCitta (2019) supports rural women artisans by providing 'intensive trainings in environmentally-friendly practices and business skills while paying a living wage' and access to online/urban markets.

Muhammadiyah (2019, UNESCAP, 2018a, p. 65), a thirty million strong Muslim religious mass organisation, runs many SEs, delivering services such as health care, education and microfinance. Ciptono provides 'diffabled' students vocational and entrepreneurial training to facilitate economic independence (Ashoka, 2019a). The Foundation, Mitra Bali, nurtures a fair-trade system for Balinese craftspeople disempowered in the tourism industry, by developing their business skills and socio-economic sustainability (Ashoka, 2019b, Mitra Bali, 2019; Pratono et al., 2016, pp. 15–16).

The Indonesian Government acknowledges micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) as a policy priority for jobs, economic growth and social cohesion (OECD, 2018). In 2015, the Indonesian Government formally acknowledged SE when introducing the National Entrepreneurship Draft Bill. This set out prescribed government support but the bill has not yet been passed (UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 23, 38). Despite this lack of legislation, Indonesia has a long history of social entrepreneurship (Pratono et al., 2016, p. 8), and in recent years, there has been significant growth in SE. In 2018, the number of new SEs in the preceding five years was five times greater than the previous five years (UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 79–80).

Why Set Up a Social Enterprise?

In 2018, it is estimated there were 342,000 SEs in Indonesia, with an average yearly income of US$57,467; the top three sectors being creative industries, agriculture and fisheries, and education (UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 14–15, 79–80; Yulius et al., 2015, p. 11). There is potential for stimulating the growth of SEs in other sectors, however, including in areas such as environmental protection, energy and the empowerment of women and youth (Yulius et al., 2015, p. 11). This demonstrates the variety of approaches that can be taken in SE and which crucially, can reflect local needs (including needs related to local P/CVE issues and target groups). Besides generating income, SEs typically produce a more inclusive workforce for women (British Council, 2017b). In Indonesia, women-led SEs comprise 40%, with a further 19 per cent led by both women and men. Women form the majority of the SE workforce (69%) (UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 14–15, 79–80). Women's entrepreneurship is promoted as a mechanism for women's empowerment, as well as for peacebuilding and reconciliation (Banfield et al., 2006; Bhardwaj & Ruslim, 2018; Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2019). Further, many SEs support youth employment. In Indonesia, 67% of SE leaders are aged 18–34 years old (UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 58–80), demonstrating this is a sector that young people can excel within and contribute to social and sustainable development efforts.

Supporting the Prevention of Violent Extremism

The emerging 'Business for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism' (B-P/CVE) field explores the plethora of activities that different business types and industries can undertake to support social cohesion and resilience. The field is still very much in its infancy, however, as demonstrated by limited research presently available. Entrepreneurship and digital and social media companies (Azani & Liv, 2018; Berger, 2019) figure most prominently in the irregular discussions of a 'business' role in P/CVE. For example, the United Nations (UN) Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (UN General Assembly, 2015) calls for support for entrepreneurship education, small enterprises, finance and grants to assist youth enterprise and to empower young social entrepreneurs in building community resilience against violent extremism.

There are emerging examples of research on risks posed to particular industries by violent extremism, such as the mining industry (Sharland

et al., 2017). Risks to businesses from violent extremism include, for example, threats to employees, supply chains and labour pools. However, in some circumstances, business is seen as more politically neutral than most governments (Koser & Rosand, 2016), and business has unique strengths that may contribute to a whole-of-society P/CVE approach. Many larger businesses through their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs already support initiatives that build social cohesion (e.g. education and women's empowerment) (Koser & Rosand, 2016). These could form the foundation for B-P/CVE interaction, including potentially partnering with P/CVE practitioners' own SE and P/CVE work. Case studies of 'peace entrepreneurs' are required, with analysis of impacts on local communities.

The B-P/CVE field is informed by the broader, more well-established field of 'Business for Peace' (B4P) (alternatively termed Peace Through Commerce or Corporate Peacebuilding). B4P research tends to focus on countries suffering violent conflict (such as Syria, Iraq or formerly Colombia, Katsos & Alkafaji, 2019) or high levels of human rights violations. The field also predominantly discusses larger businesses and transnational corporations (Fort & Schipani, 2004; Getz & Oetzel, 2009; Ralph, 2015) and to a lesser extent, MSMEs—but little attention has been given to SE. Despite this, examples abound for P/CVE practitioners establishing or engaging with business to increase local social cohesion and peace. Banfield et al. (2006) present myriad cases of local entrepreneurs and businesses applying their skills and resources to support socio-economic, security, political and reconciliation aspects of peacebuilding. B4P presents strategies that aim to reduce the negative impacts that businesses can have on local communities (such as forced resettlement or environmental degradation) through conflict-sensitive business practice.

There is a large body of research that identifies how business can help *build* peace through, for example, support for national or local mediation efforts, good governance and rule of law, and in the workplace, promoting diversity, inclusion and conflict resolution (Ralph, 2015). The UN Business for Peace platform has a local network in Indonesia with business members across sectors (Business for Peace, 2019).

In terms of SE, it is important to think beyond the single (although crucial) goal of generating funds for P/CVE practitioners' work. Context-specific P/CVE issues are well suited to being addressed by SEs because: '[s]ocial entrepreneurship is often carried out at the grassroots level,

thereby allowing for a more granular understanding of community needs and points of friction' (Mahmoud et al., 2017, p. 4). A SE may choose to sell local agricultural products, artisan crafts, community renewable energy and so on, to generate funds for a practitioner's P/CVE work (see Bunjil Energy, 2019, for an Australian case of renewable energy SE that supports Indigenous reconciliation). The business product/service and the business model (e.g. its influence on who forms the human resources) can also be aimed at a specific group, such as providing a service or employment for groups perceived as at-risk.

Youth can be trained in SE to establish their own or to support a P/CVE practitioner's SE. They may alternatively produce a product (e.g. artisan crafts) that generates income for the enterprise. Exploring 'peace' as a specific goal for social entrepreneurship, Mahmoud et al. (2017, p. 4) point out that for youth, social entrepreneurship can build skills, address identity and alienation, and entrepreneurs often demonstrate innovation and strong resilience in difficult environments, supporting resilience in their communities. SE skills mirror many of the skills identified as relevant to preventing individuals' recruitment by extremist groups (GCERF, 2018, p. 6). SE skills include '[c]ollaborating, communicating, critical thinking, resilience, working with and leading others, evaluating risk to inform decision making, influencing and negotiating, listening to and valuing others' contributions' (British Council, 2016). For those who face discrimination and marginalisation, mentoring and SE development (like engagement with local support groups and networks) can form mechanisms that facilitate a sense of efficacy, voice, leadership and engagement in non-violent civic activism that builds individual and community resilience and social cohesion (GCERF 2018, p. 6; Grossman et al., 2016; UN General Assembly, 2015).

SE may also facilitate specific interventions for de-radicalisation, disengagement and reintegration of those already engaged in violent extremism. In Indonesia, Noor Huda Ismail established Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (Institute for International Peacebuilding) in 2008. This foundation helped to establish restaurants and bakeries in Solo and Semarang, Java, which gives former extremists real-life skills and experience working as cooks, waiters, accountants and managers. They learn to provide a service to people from all social backgrounds and build social networks, and through doing so, 'gradually, the ex-detainees open up to different values, new perspectives, and new networks' (Ashoka, 2019c;

GTReC, 2012). Similarly, programs providing employment for reintegrating former fighters have been organised elsewhere, for example in Colombia, to provide valuable lessons and skills (Godnick & Klein, 2009).

Entrepreneurship in itself is proposed as a peacebuilding mechanism when aimed at encouraging cooperation towards an economic/social goal between conflicting (e.g. ethnic) groups (Banfield et al., 2006). In post-genocide Rwanda, Peace Basket was established as a cooperative/social entrepreneurship project that elicited cooperation and social capital between the Twa, Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups through making baskets, ultimately aiming to support peaceful relations between the groups (Oloke et al., 2018; Yoosuf & Premaratne, 2017). Peace Marketing by business not only promotes a business, but also promotes peace and social cohesion within communities by disseminating understanding of concepts and skills in peacebuilding, and peace psychology and education, leading communities to more fully understand how to maintain 'peace'. It promotes narratives and language that underpin commonalities, bring people together and encourages critical thinking in audiences to cultivate respect for diversity and tolerance (Peace Direct, 2017, pp. 7, 23; Ralph, 2015, pp. 119–122). A SE may use this approach in its own marketing and/or provide knowledge and skills in peacebuilding/CVE to marketing and other businesses to develop their Peace Marketing.

One way to further these collective goals is for P/CVE practitioners to organise a 'Peace Hackathon' (International Alert 2016, 2015) for social entrepreneurship aimed at addressing or funding local P/CVE issues and/or practitioners' work. Hackathons typically bring variously skilled, budding entrepreneurs and interested people together around a key focus (such as employment for refugees/marginalised, peace and renewable energy) and develop new business ideas (Funnell, 2019). Over a brief but intensive period of work, in just a few days, participants build teams and compete for prizes of support for winners to materialise their idea.

For P/CVE practitioners, a hackathon might involve providing a brief to the participants of what is needed (e.g. ideas for SEs that fund or assist particular work by practitioners) and sharing their expertise in P/CVE issues and approaches. If practitioners tend to focus on a particular group (e.g. at-risk individuals), members of this group can be trained in SE, facilitation and other skills to help lead and give advice at the hackathon. Seasoned business leaders and investors could be invited to provide

advice, mentorship and longer-term assistance for those with viable 'start-up' ideas—in partnership with P/CVE practitioners. Outcomes from hackathons such as networking have been shown to have positive benefits for social cohesion (Ockenden, 2015).

Examples of social/peace enterprise are growing. In Ghana, the Entrepreneurship for Peace Project provides entrepreneurship training and skills, mentorship, and networking opportunities to students and unemployed graduates, focusing on promoting democracy, peace and sustainable development (Youth Citizenship Entrepreneurship, 2016). Young Voices in Libya helps marginalised youth to counter terrorism and build peace in local communities, and offers advice on social entrepreneurship (Dupire, 2018). Beginning in 2017, in Jordan, young entrepreneurs from Arab countries have been able to attend an annual fellowship program and workshop on social entrepreneurship, P/CVE and community resilience. The workshop aims to train participants in leadership, activism, governance and creating socio-economic opportunities for empowering youth in turbulent contexts (Dupire, 2018). In Pakistan, YES Network Pakistan promotes youth-led, localised peace-making and has launched SE competitions on peace, offering mentoring, financial and technical support. The objective of this initiative was to address underlying issues of violence and empower socially-excluded youths to act as transformative agents, through leadership and ownership of projects that can address unemployment and extremism. The young people involved used information technology, music, sport and media to deliver peace projects promoting conflict resolution, reconciliation, tolerance and interfaith harmony (Peace Direct, 2017, p. 28). The following section presents some initial steps and key issues to reflect upon when developing a SE.

Steps and Issues to Consider When Developing a Social Enterprise

When preparing to establish a SE, P/CVE practitioners might begin by attending business events such as SE and impact investing gatherings to enhance understanding of business and investor objectives, and to identify market gaps (Stanley Foundation, 2019). There is also a Social Enterprise Indonesia Facebook site with useful information (Facebook, 2019). Before discussing some key issues in more depth, beginning with differing models of SE in Indonesia, the following simplified six steps presented

by social entrepreneur Greg Overholt (2014) for establishing a SE are instructive:

1. Identify the social/environmental issue that you aim to address;
2. Find team members that are passionate about your cause and have skills to contribute. Hold small networking events with interested people and ask them how they might see the SE developing;
3. Determine your model for SE and how you will operate. What will you do to make a meaningful impact on your chosen issue? How will you sustain your SE? (Can you develop a product/service that brings in income while also having an impact on your chosen issue? For instance, if assisting young people in a service, can you charge a small fee at first?). Test your idea to see if it will work;
4. Enjoy your work, have fun and do not fear failure;
5. Network heavily with others who can assist you (e.g. peers, advisors, enablers, investors) and ask for their help. Invite them to early meetings/events. Seek seed funding (see below);
6. Identify how you will grow your organisation. Do you need capital, advice, legal information and so on? Can you share skills to help others establish a SE, creating an 'ecosystem' of SEs that strengthens your organisation? Over time, decide how you, as an individual leader, will 'transition out' (exit) if you need to, and who can take over the organisation so that it is sustainable beyond your input.

In Indonesia, there exists a great diversity of models for SE (see Margiono, 2018 for different models and an analysis of 205 cases of 'social ventures' that have transformed from originally being non-profit organisations; Yulius et al. (2015) propose three types of SE; and Social Enterprise UK, 2012). As an example of a typology of models, Pratono et al. (2016, pp. 22–28) identify the following four models.

'Social Cooperatives' arise from mutual interest associations (e.g. religious groups and professional organisations). They avoid external influence and are self-reliant for resources. They may provide donations or community services, or partner with local communities requiring logistical assistance. Many provide microfinance programs, or activities such as community farming. They promote democratic governance and reinvest most income in programs designed to benefit members.

'Community Development Enterprises' address local community problems, share leadership with community leaders and create community-based ownership of assets and resource allocation. They develop the business model specifically for the target group, and income is developed from service provision to the community (e.g. waste management). For 'Social Businesses', their social mission is essential (e.g. promoting fair trade) but they operate as purely professional companies. They achieve their social mission by building market competitiveness and financial sustainability. The target group forms the direct beneficiaries, but it may not participate directly in the activities.

'Entrepreneurial NPOs' often emerge from non-profit organisations, with the social activities (e.g. providing jobs) being the priority but self-financed. They may offer multiple products/services either by generating income from their social activities (such as training or education services) or by developing products related to the social program. They are self-governing and independent.

These four models vary in approach to achieving their social mission, finance and governance. Regarding non-profits/NGOs (non-governmental organisations), there are programs that assist their transition to SE such as the British Council's NGO Transformation to Social Enterprise program (Margiono, 2018). NGO revenue streams include 'membership fees, charging fees for services (e.g. consultancy, facilitation, event organising), setting up businesses (e.g. cafés and coffee shops, room rentals, training facilities) and other initiatives (e.g. bazaars and selling t-shirts)' (UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 27–28).

In Indonesia, the lack of a specific legal entity for SEs increases legal and registration complexity, as a legal entity is usually required for access to investment (e.g. grants and bank loans). Different legal entities are regulated by specific laws and regulations, including on eligibility for various types of financing (for a brief outline of laws/regulations, see ANGIN 2016; UNESCAP 2018a, pp. 39–40). Examples of legal entities for SEs include Limited Partnerships, Limited Liability Company, Foundation, Cooperative and Association. The choice of legal entity should be decided early as it will inform strategy, operational procedures, accountability and governance structures, funding, and taxation structures (Pratono & Sutanti, 2016; Pratono et al., 2016, pp. 18, 28; UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 61–62). The ASEAN Social Enterprise Structuring Guide advises on appropriate legal entities in Indonesia, registration procedures, required documentation, licenses and permits for conducting business

activities, governance and regulatory obligations, taxes and tax deductible expenses for SEs (UNESCAP, 2018b, pp. 4–5).

For budding social entrepreneurs, there are various organisations in Indonesia from which to seek assistance. These include 'enablers', impact investors and financiers, business support organisations, policymakers and higher education institutions (UNESCAP, 2018, Yulius et al., 2015). 'Enablers' offer incubation, acceleration and capacity-building across different stages of enterprise growth. They provide business expertise, resources, information and networking opportunities (ANGIN, 2016; Bhardwaj & Ruslim, 2018; UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 41–55). Examples include the British Council, Ashoka, Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship, UnLtd Indonesia, RiseInc, Instellar, Remake City and Impact Hub Jakarta.

Impact Hub Jakarta shares resources and business skills in both rural and urban areas, and networks rural SEs to increase resources and connections (UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 41–55; Yulius et al., 2015). TrustLaw (of the Thomson Reuters Foundation) networks innovative SEs with law firms that provide free legal assistance (UNESCAP, 2018b, p. 10). The British Council's (2016, 2017a, 2019) Global Social Enterprise program provides training, mentoring and funding, and promotes SE education in schools (including a resource pack for teachers) and universities.

PLUS (Platform Usaha Sosial, PLUS, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c) offers an online social entrepreneurship curriculum and on-demand training in business models and planning, marketing, finance, project management, impact measurement, sales, operations, growth, investors and funds, legal issues and collaboration with others. As an example, PLUS has conducted a workshop with community leaders and Tenunkoe, a women's weaving empowerment and community development program in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara, to redefine Tenunkoe from a social movement to social business. P/CVE practitioners could partner with an existing organisation, like PLUS for instance, to develop a SE (and potentially a SE training project for young people or others).

SE financing includes impact investment, venture capital, peer-to-peer lending or crowdfunding (online platforms that generate funds from individuals). The online peer-to-peer lending platform, Amartha, assists Indonesian women micro-entrepreneurs (Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2019). Akseleran also assists early-stage enterprises to gain capital. Lending products include invoice or inventory financing, capital expenditure and online merchant financing (Akseleran, 2019; Maulani,

2019; UNESCAP 2018a, pp. 41–55). Business Support Organisations provide services such as legal, media and accounting (e.g. see UNESCAP 2018a, pp. 41–55). The Indonesian Government recently launched Integrated Business Services Centres for Cooperatives and SMEs to improve accessibility to business development services (OECD, 2018). Other government support includes, for example, training in cooperatives and entrepreneurship, funding for those trained through the National Entrepreneurship Movement, credits/loans including for women and registering intellectual property rights (Pratono et al., 2016, p. 11; UNESCAP, 2018a, p. 51). Some universities conduct social entrepreneurship training, mentoring, funding, community outreach and incubation or help NGOs transition to SE (e.g. see Pratono et al., 2016, pp. 15–6; UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 41–55, 2018b, p. 4).

As with any business, SEs in Indonesia face multiple challenges. Key challenges are attaining capital (e.g. debt/equity), grant funding and managerial and other skilled staff (UNESCAP, 2018a). SEs should enable competitive career paths for talented personnel that underline social impact outcomes. Indonesian SEs struggle with growth and often require 'capability building to become investable' (Yulius et al., 2015, pp. 11, 22). Other challenges are a complex business environment, maintaining good business processes, financial and legal administration, choosing the right business model, inadequate production capacity and poor cash-flow (UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 14–15, 76–78). Challenges arise in different stages of SE—seed, venture, growth and mature (for an explanation of the stages, see Yulius et al., 2015).

In the seed-stage, there is a dearth of skills in business planning, technical aspects and managing finances. There is often limited vision for expanding the business and regulatory constraints at the venture-stage. The growth-stage means balancing business growth with maintaining social impact, and commitment to social goals is a challenge for mature SEs who might also struggle to find skilled staff. Women can face discrimination when seeking support, such as from financial institutions (ANGIN 2016; Bhardwaj & Ruslim, 2018, p. 68; Ramus et al., 2018; UNESCAP 2018a, p. 36; Yulius et al., 2015). Social entrepreneurs often lack financial literacy and understanding of impact investment and investor requirements. Requirements might include innovative business models and/or proven success, high-quality products and/or scalability with attractive future returns on investment. To conduct due diligence and compare with other investments/SEs, impact investors require SEs to provide financial

and/or impact metrics. Many SEs do not measure and evaluate social or commercial impact, but they should do so, just like any P/CVE program that aims to have demonstrable impact (ANGIN, 2016; Berger, 2019; UNESCAP, 2018a, 36; Yulius et al., 2015, p. 18). Standardised social impact metrics exist although are not usually applied in Indonesia (e.g. see Yulius et al., 2015, p. 9).

There are several key strategies that a SE may adopt to counter challenges, maintain social impact and support profitability (Santos et al., 2015). Three key funding sources for SEs in Indonesia are personal income from another job, funding from family/friends and cash or in-kind donations (UNESCAP, 2018a, p. 77; ANGIN 2016). Many SEs initially gain grants/donations, then seed funding, followed by loans for growth, equity/social venture capital and social impact bonds. Impact investment in Indonesia can come from foundations, social investment wholesalers, charitable trusts, mass retail, high net-worth individuals, religious funds, impact investment fund managers and crowdfunding (for explanations of some of these terms, see Yulius et al., 2015, pp. 13–14).

As pointed out by UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific), SEs with no legal entity and/or those that are very early-stage could access micro-credit programs and lower-risk investments. Some Indonesian banks provide micro-credit programs with low interest rates and do not require a company to have a legal entity (UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 79–80). Crowdfunding, SE competitions and donor grants too may assist. The DBS Foundation of the Development Bank of Singapore provides a 'DBS Social Enterprise Package', enabling access to 'virtually free banking services' (DBS 2019). It supports SEs with grant funding, capacity-building, mentorship and a handbook on SE (Haryanti et al., 2016; Pratono et al., 2016, pp. 15–6). Angel investment or impact investment can expand more mature SEs. Assistance from enablers can help to better prepare a SE for investment (UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 79–80).

Business-to-Social Enterprise engagement leverages the broader private sector to assist SEs through donations via a company's CSR programs, partnerships on projects or companies incorporating the SE into their supply chain (Yulius et al., 2015, pp. 13, 31; UNESCAP, 2018a, pp. 79–80). When external/international actors such as donors and/or the private sector support social entrepreneurship projects, the empowerment of marginalised groups, for example, is enhanced when local communities

are genuinely consulted through a 'dialogical approach' on the form that funding and projects take (Oloke et al., 2018).

Conclusion

Social enterprise is increasingly promoted in Indonesia, as elsewhere, as a sustainable pathway to generate funds and other support for social and environmental initiatives. Internationally, there are emerging discussions of SE in relation to supporting P/CVE practitioners' work across communities and target groups. This chapter has explored SE and social entrepreneurship definitions, models and, though briefly, cases of SE in Indonesia and further afield. In responding to the practical needs of P/CVE practitioners to generate funding for their work, analysis of why practitioners should consider developing a SE is provided, illustrating general benefits such as the generation of funds and more inclusive jobs, but also benefits specifically related to P/CVE practice.

As part of this, emerging concepts, practice and key literature are outlined from the fledgling field of 'Business for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism' (B-P/CVE) and the more well-established field of 'Business for Peace'. P/CVE practitioners, for example, may benefit from lessons learned and new, innovative strategies for supporting peace and social cohesion from those who have established or worked alongside business to support peacebuilding.

Importantly, the chapter's final section presents vital steps and issues to reflect upon when developing a SE in Indonesia. These include identifying key actors in the SE ecosystem and which can provide training, advice, networking, funding or investment; choosing an appropriate legal entity and model for a SE, and challenges and potential solutions to building SEs. Examples of organisations, literature and websites relevant to Indonesian P/CVE practitioners considering SE (and certainly still instructive for international practitioners) are woven through the chapter.

The key to entrepreneurship is to be prepared to try and to 'give it a go'. Those passionate about social issues make strong SE leaders. A leaders' passion is important for an enterprise's ability to gain people's trust, its organisation and outcomes, and this passion can be derived from helping others and the associated positive feelings from helping others (Thorgren & Omorede, 2018). Passion for the social objective drives the social entrepreneur. As is routinely proclaimed in entrepreneurship events

and by successful entrepreneurs: do not fear risk and failure, these are part of the path to success!

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PART IV

Developing Capacity

Check for updates

CHAPTER 13

Capacity Gap Analysis of Civil Society Organisations Working Against Violent Extremism in Indonesia and South East Asia

Dan Goodhardt, Matteo Vergani, Greg Barton, and Samantha Kruber

What parameters limit the capacity of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to operate effectively in the P/CVE space? To answer this question, we need to consider a number of aspects, including the relationships between CSOs and other stakeholders. CSOs grow out of the communities they represent and benefit from close ties to the members of that community. Successful CSOs have complex relationships with domestic and foreign governments; whilst many CSOs receive funding from governments, they must protect their perception of independence to remain legitimate. In

D. Goodhardt · M. Vergani (✉) · G. Barton · S. Kruber
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia
e-mail: matteo.vergani@deakin.edu.au

G. Barton
e-mail: greg.barton@deakin.edu.au

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many cases, government funding is essential and CSOs are able to work effectively whilst maintaining their independence. But CSOs and their P/CVE programs risk not just failure but actually causing more harm than good if there is a perception that the government is controlling the content. The difficult reality is that CSOs are called upon to play a mediating role whether they like it or not. They have to constantly seek to strike a balance between the demands and needs of the community and those of the government, and to manage the perceptions and expectations of both. The quality and quantity of the relationships between CSOs and other stakeholders, such as communities, other CSOs, public and private organisations, is a key indicator of the health of their ability to conduct successful CVE work.

With this in mind, we conducted three studies, in 2018, 2019 and 2020, to examine the health of the CSOs working on addressing violent extremism in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. This section summarises and discusses the findings of these three studies which have previously been presented in three annual unpublished reports (Barton et al., 2018; Kruber et al., 2020; Vergani et al., 2019). The CSOs that we examined in this research belong to the SEAN-CSO network (South East Asian Network of Civil Society Organisations working against violent extremism), which is a network that brings together key regional civil society organisations working on P/CVE-related initiatives. The findings represent a window into the current workings of CSOs engaged in P/CVE work in South East Asia, with a main focus on Indonesian CSOs.

Our three studies used different methodologies and focused on different issues. For our first study in 2018, a total of 60 CSOs were surveyed, of which eight were from Malaysia, eight were from the Philippines, 20 were from Thailand and 24 were from Indonesia (see Fig. 13.1). The study is based on data collected through face-to-face and online questionnaires. Local partners collected the questionnaires in each country: Wahid Foundation in Indonesia, IMAN Research in Malaysia, Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID) in the Philippines and Patani Forum in Thailand. The questionnaire aimed to explore each CSO's current capacity to deliver P/CVE initiatives. This capacity includes conducting evaluations and is largely determined by the availability of knowledgeable and experienced practitioners. It asked questions about the types of P/CVE projects the organisations undertake, the knowledge and experience of their practitioners, and the perception of gaps and opportunities.



Fig. 13.1 Number of CSOs connections with other stakeholders by country

For the 2019 study, a total of 74 respondents completed the anonymous survey questionnaire, 11 from Malaysia, 12 from the Philippines, 19 from Thailand and 32 participants from Indonesia. Additionally, the researchers conducted in-depth interviews with 32 key regional stakeholders, including practitioners, researchers, diplomats, tech company professionals and government officials. The purpose of this study was to identify the common capacities, gaps and needs of the CSOs working on countering violent extremism in South East Asia. The key areas of enquiry were an assessment of the capacity building needs for each individual member and organisation, an exploration of sustainability, relationships and funding challenges. We also focused on collecting a longitudinal understanding of how resources and relationships have evolved over the course of the last five years.

In 2020, the study focused specifically on the relationships between CSOs and national governments from the perspective of CSOs. A total of 20 in-depth interviews were collected from members of civil society organisations, with 4 respondents from Malaysia, 4 from the Philippines, 3 from Thailand and 8 from Indonesia. The number of participants interviewed in this study was unfortunately less than initially hoped due to limitations resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, the findings still offer meaningful insights. The purpose of the 2020 study was to better understand the nature of the relationships between CSOs

and government actors and to gain insights into how these relationships impact CSO capacity and CSO-government collaboration. The interviews focused on CSO perceptions of their relationship with government across four key areas: (1) transparency and accountability; (2) equality; (3) shared interests; (4) personal relationships and reliability. In addition, interviewees were also asked about how their relationship with foreign governments differed from their relationship with local or national governments.

Of all of the countries represented in SEAN-CSO, Indonesia, the 275 million strong giant of South East Asia (compared with 111 million inhabitants in the Philippines, 70 million in Thailand and 33 million in Malaysia) has the largest representation of CSOs responding in each year, reflected in the surveys with 24 in 2018, 32 respondents in 2019 and 8 respondents in 2020.

The 2018 Capacity Gap Analysis

The 2018 research (Barton et al., 2018) aimed at exploring key issues related to P/CVE work among SEAN-CSO members. We found that CSOs in Indonesia tend to be a somewhat older and better established than their counterparts in other South East Asian countries, with 20 of the 24 CSOs surveyed being 10 to 30 years old (having been established between 1990 and 2010). This predominance of established CSOs differs markedly from other South East Asian countries, such as Thailand, where most CSOs surveyed were established in the past decade. CSOs in the P/CVE space tend to rely significantly on volunteers and most have only a small number of paid staff. They often collaborate with religious figures who provide support and legitimacy, and expert knowledge in the area of religious extremism. Indonesian CSOs reported to having relationships with a relatively large number and variety of partners, compared to the CSOs operating in other South East Asian countries. As the figure below shows, Indonesian CSOs tend to be much more connected with other CSOs, and governments than CSOs in other countries. Comparatively, they have slightly weaker relationships with educational institutions, which suggests an important area for improvement. Nevertheless, overall, the nature and extent of their relationships suggest that their health and capacity are comparatively stronger than their counterparts in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.

Across the four countries, the majority of the CSOs surveyed conduct projects focused on primary P/CVE interventions, which address the general population and aim to boost resilience to violent extremism and reduce risk factors of radicalisation. Significant exceptions are three tertiary de-radicalisation programs in Indonesia, and one program in Thailand that addressed individuals who have been victims of torture in the past and who therefore might be vulnerable to being co-opted into retaliating against the government in future, which we coded as secondary intervention. All other initiatives are either primary interventions or non-CVE programs (e.g. research initiatives or programs that are unclear in their aims have been categorised as "Unclear/Missing") (Fig. 13.2). We believe that this finding shows the urgent need to diversify the type of P/CVE initiatives, prioritising initiatives that target individuals at risk (secondary interventions) and formers (tertiary interventions). Although Indonesian CSOs are the only ones, among the surveyed sample, that focus on tertiary interventions, the high number of detainees and returnees from former ISIS territories that Indonesia has been dealing with suggests the need to invest more resources in this direction.

We asked our sample about whether they conduct some form of evaluation of their initiatives, and we collected some open-ended questions



Fig. 13.2 Types of P/CVE initiatives developed by the CSOs surveyed ($N = 60$)

about the type of evaluations being conducted. A large majority of the CSOs indicated that they do conduct evaluations on their initiatives, but most of them admitted that their evaluation methods are unsystematic or insufficient.

Examples of responses that suggest an unsystematic approach to evaluation are:

- "We have informally evaluated our projects through feedback received from conversations with participants and social media".
- "We normally hold a general meeting every quarter. The objective of the general meeting is to allow our member organizations to send their representatives to evaluate the performance of the projects. The meetings also discuss the dynamics of our movement and ways to improve it in the future".
- "We did an assessment by observing the participants and interviewed them to obtain their opinions about the activities. We also observe changes in their perspectives".
- "The project was very successful. 500 women from [anonymised] showed their support by participating in the [anonymised] initiative".

It is clear that the term "evaluation" has different meanings for different respondents. At a basic level, some CSOs report that they collect feedback from the participants regarding programs conducted. We would not consider this as representing evaluation, but rather as constituting the collection of participant feedback. Other CSOs reported to have outsourced to an external organisation the evaluation of their initiatives, to assess participants over "a series of interviews". However, no other specification was provided regarding the evaluation design, focus (impact vs process) or other detail. It is clear from the responses that evaluation is an area that is not well understood. Similarly, responses to the question "If you do not currently evaluate the changes in participants, do you think it would be useful for your project to do so in the future?" indicated that the benefits of evaluation are equally misunderstood. Interestingly, most CSOs skipped the question "Do you think the projects you have implemented have been largely successful? Why?" This indicates a lack of understanding of the impact of the initiatives. The following figure (Fig. 13.3) shows the breakdown of responses to the question "Do you evaluate your initiatives? If yes, how?".

The 2019 Capacity Gap Analysis



Fig. 13.3 Number and percentages of CSOs conducting evaluations of their P/CVE programs by country

For the 2019 report (Vergani et al., 2019), we first explored what terminology, in relation to violent extremism prevention, is preferred by SEAN-CSO members in each country. Indonesian survey participants appear to generally be more comfortable with the use of "resilience to violent extremism" and "PVE" instead of "CVE". Respondents from other countries expressed slightly different preferences. For example, Malaysians were much more comfortable with the term "CVE" than responders from other countries. Conversely, Thai respondents were less comfortable with using the term "resilience to violent extremism" than others, apparently because the concept of violent extremism itself was felt to be foreign to the Thai context. On average, the term PVE seems to be the most consistently preferred term across the four countries. Respondents acknowledged during consultations that all terms end up being burdened with unwanted baggage, and that it is probable that, over time, no term that will gather complete consensus across all contexts (Fig. 13.4).

In terms of reporting on the perceived sustainability and suitability of funding, the results also vary greatly across country contexts (focussing on the period 2014–2018) (Fig. 13.5). For example, Indonesian members reported having closer collaboration with, and receiving more funding



Fig. 13.4 Preferred terms related to violent extremism prevention across the four countries ($N = 74$)



Fig. 13.5 CSOs receiving funds from their governments ($N = 74$)

from, their national government than was the case with Filipino and Malaysian members. Nevertheless, even the most successful CSOs in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand acknowledge that it is critical to improve their relationships with their national government. Compared

with the experience in the Philippines and Thailand, where government funding can be a double-edged sword, because it can delegitimise CSOs in front of communities that have a low level of trust in the national or regional government, Indonesian respondents saw strong relationships with government as highly desirable. In fact, every CSO also reported having some form of partnership with an external entity.

In addition to seeking funds from their own government, Indonesian CSOs reported success in obtaining foreign government funding. In particular, the Governments of Australia and the United States have provided funding to several CSOs. In 2018, 60% of Indonesian respondents had received funding from a foreign government. When taken together with domestic government funding, Indonesian CSOs were much better funded than their regional counterparts in 2018. However, as is the case with CSOs across the region, funding is generally short term in nature, with more than 50% of Indonesian participants reporting that they did not have funding grants extending beyond 1 year (Fig. 13.6).

Foreign partners are best placed to provide resources to launch sustainable initiatives in the P/CVE space (e.g. social enterprise) and to collaborate on research initiatives. It is recognised, however, that for some CSOs in sensitive contexts collaboration with foreign entities can also undermine relationship with communities.

Overall, we observed that the majority of the CSOs surveyed are currently unable to sustain their programs and independently support the target population of their P/CVE programs with short-term and long-term grants. This points to the dependency the CSOs on the grants and assessment of the initiatives conducted by the CSOs. These findings confirm to us that the SEAN-CSO Network has significant potential to address gaps in sustainability and funding in P/CVE interventions by providing new training and skills focusing on how to establish social enterprises. It is important to observe that even though long-term grants are on the rise, especially in Indonesia, these funding models are not sustainable and constitute a key vulnerability of P/CVE work in the SEA region.

The 2020 Capacity Gap Analysis

The 2020 capacity gap analysis (Kruber et al., 2020) began by looking at the age, country of operation, and organisation type of the CSOs represented and the implications of these factors on the nature and quality of



Fig. 13.6 CSOs collaborating with their governments ($N = 74$)

CSO-government relationships. Of the CSOs represented, all had some previous experience working with government, the majority (16 out of 20 respondents) reporting having worked with government on many occasions, but 4 respondents reporting having only worked with government a few times. This experience ranged from participating with government in workshops and symposiums, collaborating on projects and policy, CSOs providing government with training and capacity building programs, formal and informal consultation, sharing of data and research results, and CSOs participating in government-established bodies. All Indonesian CSOs reported some form of formal collaboration with government agencies, oftentimes in the form of contracted work for government agencies such as developing training programs. In this respect, the Indonesian CSOs differed substantially from their Malaysian counterparts, who all reported only informal, or in one case "semi-formal" forms of collaboration with government. Reponses from CSOs in Thailand and the Philippines were mixed with regard to formal versus informal collaborations.

The age—that is, how long the organisation has existed for—of CSOs represented ranged from between two years old and sixty years old. Throughout the interviews, older CSOs were more likely to describe overall more positive relationships with government, whereas the majority of younger CSOs described their relationship with government as strained.

Described Relationship with Government According to Organisational Experience:

	Positive	*Somewhat strained*	*Poor/absent*
< 7 years (younger)	1 response	4 responses	0 responses
8–14 years (medium)	4 responses	2 responses	2 responses
15+ years (older)	4 responses	3 responses	0 responses

The reliability of government agencies as partners in P/CVE collaborations is one area the 2020 research found in need of improvement. Only

4 respondents reported that they believe that "the government" is a reliable partner that will continue to have a relationship with their CSO in the long term, whereas the majority (11 respondents) described "the government" as only being somewhat reliable. Importantly, respondents also identified that this reliability is largely dependent on personal relationships between members of CSOs and government representatives, and that the social capital of CSOs is crucial when seeking government support. This finding no doubt impacts the overall less positive experience of younger CSOs compared with their older counterparts. When commenting on government reliability, respondents indicated that the issue of continued collaboration was very much in the hands of government:

> if They Trust You, They Will Continue to Work with You. Trust is Essential. Social Capital, Trust and Who You Know Are Critical.
> yes, if the Attempt to Engage is There then There is Potential. The Attempt is Still not Quite There Though.

Many respondents noted that government reliability was largely dependent on strong personal connections with individuals within government agencies/departments, and that this is in, large part, the source of scepticism around government reliability, as personnel within these agencies and departments can change regularly. As one participant reported, their organisation had previously held good relations with government via personal connections, but when a key figure was not re-elected, that relationship deteriorated and the CSO found itself "sidelined". All but one of the Indonesian CSOs interviewed reported having strong personal connections with government. This is slightly better than, but otherwise consistent with, their counterparts in other countries, with three out of four CSOs in Malaysia reporting good personal connections, two out of three in Thailand and all respondents from the Philippines reporting good personal connections. This suggests that whilst personal connections with key figures in government are valuable and common among CSOs, more needs to be done to secure the endurance of CSO-government relations beyond personal tenure.

When asked about their perception as to whether CSOs were treated as "equal partners" when collaborating on projects or initiatives with government agencies, only five CSO respondents reported that they felt equality existed in their experiences, and of those five, three were from

Indonesia. No CSOs from Thailand felt their relationships with government agencies were equal partnerships, and only one from each of the Philippines and Malaysia reported equal relationships when collaborating. This appears to be a sticking point in CSO-government relationships, as nearly all respondents stated that they believe it is at least somewhat important for CSOs to be treated as equal partners when collaborating with government agencies, and nearly three-quarters believed it is very important. Respondents also indicated that because they are often dependent on government agencies for funding, resources and access, CSOs often feel pressure to limit their criticism of the government and to conform to government interests. This barrier limits both trust and freedom of CSOs. As our participants noted:

> without [an] Equal Relationship, CSOs Are not Going to View Government as Actual Partners and Will Always Be Suspicious.
> the Dilemma Would Be How Can You Say Something Bad to the Government Providing You the Funds?

It is for this reason that a number of CSOs found that international funders were overall easier to work with and CSOs found they had much more freedom to be critical of existing programs and policies when working with international partners than with domestic funders:

> with These International Members of the Community, We Can Speak Frankly, There is no Political Baggage.

Responses regarding perceptions of government transparency were far more mixed. According to these interviews, transparency is highly dependent on established trust and personal relationships between the CSO and relevant government actor. Indonesian and Filipino CSOs had overall more positive impressions of government transparency, with the majority in both cases responding that government is at least somewhat transparent. Thailand, on the other hand, reported the least positive views on the issue of government transparency. Despite more positive responses from Indonesia and the Philippines, there still remain limitations, as participants from these countries noted:

> Government is quite serious in formulating strategy and quite open to NGOs when it comes to, for example, formulating national strategy; but

> the problem is not only about involving us but working with us.… They are not really serious about working with us.
> you Have to Establish Relationship First or Government don't Really Trust You, don't Really Share.

The 2020 research finds that although CSOs work extensively with government, there is much room to improve relationships between CSOs and governments in South East Asia. This is the case in all four countries considered; however, Malaysia and Thailand in particular have reported the least positive relationships. Areas identified as in need of improvement include building trust, increasing transparency and establishing more equal partnerships when collaborating. These issues affect CSOs more based on age, with relationships between CSOs and government described in an increasingly positive light as CSOs gain more experience working with government agencies.

Addressing CSO dependence on government for funding and other resources has also emerged from the 2020 research as an important challenge. CSO perceptions that they must withhold criticism of government policies or practices, or that they must align their interests with government, are detrimental to CSO independence and freedom to operate. In the realm of Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), the need for CSOs to operate independently of government remains crucial. P/CVE initiatives aim to positively engage at-risk populations, redirect individuals from extremist activity and reengage former-extremists into society. CSOs that are perceived to be independent of government may be able to engage with individuals that would not engage with government agencies.

Conclusions

In conclusion, our data suggests that Indonesian CSOs are on average in a more conducive environment with respect to P/CVE than CSOs in other countries of the region. They tend to have more experience, are larger, have more funds and are more connected to government and other stakeholders. However, there are important areas for improvements, capacity building needs and challenges among CSOs working on P/CVE in Indonesia. We identify the following main issues across the three studies that we conducted:

1. The need to identify more sustainable funding models. We propose that a potential way forward to reach financial sustainability and maintaining independence from government would be setting up social enterprises. We believe that reducing dependency on short- and medium-term grants could significantly improve to the quality of P/CVE interventions and allow CSOs to operate with more freedom from government constraints and pressures.
2. The need to develop more equal relationships between government and CSOs by building trust and transparency. Although independence from government is important, the ability to work collaboratively with government and maintain government support and relationships remains essential for CSO initiatives to have wider reach.
3. The need to empower secondary and tertiary P/CVE interventions to address topical issues such as rehabilitation and reintegration of former terrorists and returnees from conflict zones. These issues constitute key challenges in the region, and CSOs can significantly contribute to developing an effective whole-of-society holistic approach to prevention and mitigation of social harm. P/CVE stakeholders, especially in Indonesia, are concerned with reintegration and rehabilitation of former terrorist and returnees from Syria and Iraq, which calls for more collaboration between civil society organisations, law enforcement and correction departments.
4. The need to create an evaluation framework to allow a common understanding of what success in P/CVE means, and how to measure it. This would allow Indonesian CSOs to start building cumulative and collective knowledge of what works and what doesn't work, and to make better use of resources.

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CHAPTER 14

Conclusion: The Way Forward

Samantha Kruber, Yenny Wahid, Matteo Vergani, and Greg Barton

Introduction

A common theme in all of the contributions to this book is the importance of recognising the full range of actors involved in CVE and the need to foster deep collaboration between these diverse stakeholders. Civil society organisations, local and national governments, international organisations, the private sector, the tech sector and community level groups including women's groups and youth organisations, all have a significant role to play in CVE, and greater collaboration between these

S. Kruber · M. Vergani (✉) · G. Barton
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia
e-mail: matteo.vergani@deakin.edu.au

G. Barton
e-mail: greg.barton@deakin.edu.au

Y. Wahid
The Wahid Foundation, DKI Jaharta, Indonesia
e-mail: zannuba@wahidinstitute.org

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actors will help create more effective programs and responses and facilitate more efficient alignment between stakeholder activities. Achieving better collaboration and cooperation is key to helping the various actors involved to contribute to CVE more effectively. Not only can they draw upon each other's respective strengths, they integrate them with the work of others in ways that lead to better tailored, more effective and more efficient overarching CVE strategy.

One of the key developments highlighted in this book is the shift towards more fully supporting the contributions of women to CVE. As Anggraeni explains in Chapter 3, because mothers have traditionally played an integral nurturing and protecting role within the family and broader community, they tend to act as agents of moderation. Consequently, mothers already make a very significant, if largely unrecognised, contribution to preventing violent extremism, they have; however, the potential to contribute in a more extensive fashion. This has been the focus of the Mothers for Change program run by the Center for Pesantren of Democracy Studies (CePDeS). The two-day "Mothers for Change" program prioritises education and capacity building to equip mothers with the communication skills and confidence to be agents of peace within the home. This program supports mothers in recognising the signs of radicalisation and helps them to develop strategies to protect their children from external influences.

In their chapter on empowerment for spouses of convicted terrorists, Magrie, Putra, Rufaedah and Putera expand upon this theme by recognising the long-established pattern of excluding, or ignoring, spouses and children of convicted terrorists in 'deradicalisation' or rehabilitation efforts. To better understand this, they conducted interviews with spouses of convicted terrorists and found that when women where left-out of the deradicalisation programs directed at their husbands they felt isolated and ignored, as a result became particularly vulnerable themselves to being recruited by radical groups. In order to address this, the authors developed workshops designed to empower women. These workshops were designed to both increase their resilience to violent extremism and help them to become actively involved in deradicalisation and rehabilitation both within their own home and in their broader communities. The workshops focused on education and guidance on a range of topics including entrepreneurship skills, religious outreach and tolerance, and critical thinking. As the first study to specifically explore the lives of terrorists' spouses in Indonesia, there exists great potential for Magrie,

Putra, Rufaedah and Putera's study to be further developed in future CVE programs for spouses.

Developing economic independence can also play an important role in capacity building and empowering women to be agents of peace within their families and broader communities, as well as preventing women from engaging in violent extremism themselves. As detailed in Voluvik's chapter on the Peace Village program, the Wahid Foundation has worked to address some of the root causes of female radicalisation and involvement in terrorist activity, which include economic dissatisfaction, boredom and the desire for a sense of personal meaning, identity and purpose. By providing women with the skills to achieve their own economic independence, produce their own products and develop their own brand, the Wahid Foundation has worked towards empowering women economically in order to allow them a greater voice and role in decision-making both within their own families and within the broader community. This capacity-building effort has sought to improve social cohesion through empowering women economically and providing them with leadership skills. The Mothers for Change program, the Wahid Foundation's economic independence programs and the empowerment workshops for spouses each prioritise reconceptualising women's role in terrorism and transforming women from the wives and mothers of terrorists, victims of terrorism and even terrorists or terrorist supporters themselves, into agents of peace, prevention and early detection.

Furthering the focus on understanding the role of women in terrorism and CVE, in Chapter 7, Hanifah examines the recent but significant shift towards exploring violent extremism and CVE through a gendered lens. Traditionally, both violent extremism and CVE have been dominated by men and masculine narratives of security, violence, war and state power, while women have been marginalised and issues of gender deemed irrelevant. As Hanifah makes clear, it is perhaps as a consequence of this traditional approach that the 2016 foiled suicide bombing plot by Dian Yulia Nova, and the tragic bombing of a church in 2018 by a mother and daughter duo, came as such a shock. These cases and similar instances of women's involvement in terrorism around the world have helped to trigger the introduction of gender analysis into studies of violent extremism and CVE, with a particular focus on the role of women throughout these processes. Although often portrayed by the media as mere 'jihadi brides' following men into violent extremism and terrorism, Hanifah shows that there has begun to be a turning away from this

reductive interpretation in recent research publications. Indeed, like men, women become involved in violent extremism in response to a variety of motivating factors, and their roles range from the low-key roles of wives and mothers, to include being the prime drivers of travel, and, in some cases, becoming combatants themselves. Establishing a better understanding of women's motivations and roles, as well as the gender nuances in women's involvement in supporting violent extremism, has the potential to lead to markedly better designed and more inclusive CVE strategies.

In Chapter 8, Wildan looks at the incorporation of former terrorists in CVE. Wildan examines a range of CSO-run CVE programs conducted with former terrorists. These include (1) prison-based programs working with convicted terrorists, (2) youth programs aimed at preventing young people from succumbing to the appeal of terrorist groups and (3) economic empowerment programs to help prevent former convicted terrorists from re-engaging in violent extremism. Central to each of these programs are individuals with first-hand experiences of terrorist groups, including victims of terrorism, family members of terrorists and not least of all, former terrorists themselves. Particularly, in the context of youth initiatives aimed at prevention, the testimonials of former terrorists work towards debunking some of the propaganda sold by the terrorist organisations by revealing the reality of life in extremist groups, be they local or distant. At the same time, the inclusion of victims of terrorism can help create a sense of empathy for those victims. For programs dealing with convicted terrorists both within and outside the prison system, the focus is on deradicalisation and reintegration. In order to prevent individuals returning to their previous networks, some CSOs have focused on economic empowerment in reintegrating former prisoners. This not only gives them economic independence, but it also provides them a place in broader society, with the hope that this integration prevents their return to previous networks in which radical ideology would be nurtured and promoted.

Prison-based initiatives, on the other hand, tend to focus on the contributions of religious scholars, psychologists, spouses and entrepreneurs. As Wildan points out, many of these programs do not include former terrorists directly; and former terrorists need to be consulted so that they may provide advice and expertise to these programs. Interestingly, as Wildan has also noted, the major barrier in these programs is the reluctance of the inmates themselves to actively participate. This perhaps indicates that

further consideration of the role former terrorists can play in the prison-based initiatives to potentially encourage inmate participation. Further, there is an evident lack of coordination between the CSOs and government bodies conducting in-prison initiatives; the establishment of greater cooperation and coordination would perhaps help to prevent program overlap and work towards optimising in-prison programs.

In Chapter 9, Ridwan uses a modelling approach to argue for the importance of developing a more comprehensive and cooperative approach to PVE. The modelling approach adopted in Ridwan's chapter demonstrates the correlation between ideology and increasing radicalism and extremism, and suggests that greater investment in shaping ideology is the key to countering the predicted increase in radicalism and extremism. While the Indonesian government has had a number of successes in its deradicalisation programs, Ridwan looks to Islamic Mass Organisations (IMOs) as integral actors in shaping ideology and preventing violent extremism. As Ridwan shows in his chapter, IMOs have historically played a significant role in shaping Indonesian society, particularly through education. IMOs have a substantial impact on ideology formation and many have committed themselves to the promotion of peace and tolerance through a range of avenues including education and education reform; addressing feelings of injustice and despair among marginalised youth; trust building between government, law enforcement agencies, marginalised communities, and civil society; working with government to establish comprehensive PVE action plans; educating mothers on the signs of radicalisation; and reintegration support. Through these efforts, which facilitate the important role of civil society in PVE, Ridwan argues that IMOs have a significant role to play in both independent PVE efforts and working with government to strengthen existing PVE programs.

Moving beyond domestically based organisations, Suhadi and Sandyarani have looked at the work of Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Indonesia, demonstrating that collaborative projects involving international and local actors can be far broader in terms of their reach. Focusing specifically on youth programs, Suhadi and Sandyarani demonstrate the benefits of collaborative efforts involving various parties in CVE programs, opening up opportunities to share data, networks and program design with other actors to pool resources and develop the activities of all actors involved. The short-term nature of these international collaborations, however, has

given grounds for concerns about the future of these wide-reaching CVE programs. It is here that more support is needed to ensure that programs are effectively passed on to local organisations and that these local actors are sufficiently resourced so that their success may continue even once their international partners cease direct involvement.

The range of programs showcased throughout this volume demonstrates the expertise, innovation and resourcefulness of a range of CSOs currently active in the P/CVE space in Indonesia. As is argued in Chapter 10, there remains, however, considerable scope for utilising these offline programs to inform P/CVE in the online space. In terms of P/CVE online, Indonesia has seen substantial efforts made by CSOs, government and the tech industry to establish critical thinking and resilience programs, as well as offering positive and alternative narratives to those narratives produced by violent or hateful extremist groups. These initiatives contribute to preventing violent extremism by fostering social cohesion and mitigating some of the risk factors associated with radicalisation. Similarly, counter narratives have been widely utilised around the world to counter the messaging of violent extremist groups and debunk the 'truths' told by these groups to attract potential recruits. Nevertheless, evidence from pilot studies and existing programs in Europe suggests that greater efforts to engage in online remedial interventions may offer a valuable contribution to providing a comprehensive online P/CVE strategy and should be informed by continued research. All online efforts should continue to take into account the relationship between online and offline radicalisation, and should always consider and reassess the credibility of the chosen messenger/s, message/s and medium to best engage the target audience.

In Chapter 11, Ralph identifies the potential for social enterprise to provide an alternative to traditional, and often limited, funding sources for P/CVE organisations and practitioners through economic empowerment and sustainability. Ralph points to the success thus far of the "Business for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism" (B-P/CVE) field in action and however recognises that digital and social media companies remain the predominant groups involved in B-P/CVE efforts. More research into this emerging field and a more diverse range of potential business partners need to be achieved in order to fully realise the benefits of B-P/CVE. Further, there are range of social legal, and environmental contextual barriers that need to be assessed when considering the establishment of a social enterprise. Nevertheless, as Ralph's chapter

demonstrates, there are a range of strategies for addressing these challenges, and in social enterprise, risk and failure can in fact be the path to success.

The recurring challenges that arise throughout the CVE and PVE initiatives presented in this book highlight the need for greater efforts to cooperate and coordinate between various stakeholders to prevent overlap, increase efficiency and embrace the individual strengths of the various actors involved. Not only does this have the potential to improve the operation and outcomes of the programs and initiatives being conducted, but it will also ensure the best utilisation of the limited funding available to these actors. Financial constraints limiting the capacity CVE and PVE actors can be partially overcome through greater cooperation and coordination but more needs to be done to support these actors financially. Providing training and education to these organisations in order to improve their capacity is an important step; this may include helping them find sources of funding and partnerships with businesses, offering strategies for organisations to generate their own sources of funding, and training and assisting them in ways to maximise the reach of their existing funds.

Future Directions and Challenges

Women and P/CVE

Many of the chapters in this volume have stressed the importance of introducing a gendered lens to both the study and practice of CVE and PVE. As the chapters by Anggraeni, Hanifah, Voluvik, and Magrie, Putra and Rufaedah make clear, women have a significant role to play in countering and preventing violent extremism both within the home and as part of the wider community. It is encouraging to see the role of women as actors in P/CVE in Indonesia, and indeed elsewhere around the world, being expanded. More needs to be done, however, to ensure these traditionally marginalised voices continue to be heard and are incorporated at all levels of P/CVE, including at the policy making and implementation levels.

While the authors throughout this book are largely positive about progress made thus far, particularly with regard to efforts made by civil society organisations to include women and a gendered approach in their CVE strategies, there remains much room for improvement. Despite the unique contributions to CVE women can offer, more research into this

area is needed to further develop our understanding of the range of interactions between gender, violent extremism and CVE. Further developing this knowledge has to potential to help create more robust CVE strategies incorporating women. Furthermore, the limited representation of women in CVE, particularly at the national policy making level, and in the intelligence and policing services, needs to be interrogated and corrected to improve female participation at these levels as well.

Masculinity and Violent Extremism

It is also important to see a gendered approach to P/CVE expanded to not only include understandings of women's roles and potential, but also critically examine masculinities and the role that masculinity plays in the radicalisation process, and how this can be used to further countering and preventing violent extremism efforts.

Concepts related to male identity and masculinity play a significant role in radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremist groups. Much of the material produced by violent jihadist organisations exploits masculine identity. For example, Hafez has examined the videos and biographies of suicide bombers in Iraq during the 2000s and how these have been used to attract recruits around the world. He finds that the content of these materials often shows the mistreatment of women and plays on appeals to men's sense of masculinity to shame them into taking action to protect their mothers and sisters (Hafez, 2007). Similarly, the Islamic State's recruitment material typically depicts a threatened Muslim community in need of defence and makes extensive use of appeals to masculinity in its recruitment material as a means of attracting potential recruits.

Throughout the magazine, *Dabiq*, for example, IS praises the principles of male honour and individual self-sacrifice; IS romanticises war and presents engaging in violent jihad as a means by which potential recruits can prove they are not cowardly, passive, weak or feminine (Andersen & Sandberg, 2020). IS confronts their potential recruits with a hyper-militarised, hyper-masculinised image of what it means to be 'real men', and entices these potential recruits with the promise of power, glory, wives and/or sex slaves, financial reward and membership of a 'brotherhood', providing them with a sense of meaning, belonging and the fulfilment of their perceived entitlement to power (Van Leuven et al., 2016). Though religion often gains significant attention, the appeal of jihad is not always

raised out of religiosity, but rather an attraction to war, which "transforms ordinary men into superheroes" (Aslam, 2012). Indeed, it is not only Islamic extremists that drawn upon masculinity in their recruitment approach. For example, Kimmel draws comparisons between white supremacists and al-Qaeda, arguing that both adopt masculinity as a form of 'symbolic capital', using it as an ideological resource, a rhetorical device to problematise the identities of their enemies, and a recruitment device to entice supporters (Kimmel, 2005).

Despite its recurrent use across different forms of terrorism and violent extremism, masculinity is often sidelined when understanding violent extremism and radicalisation, particularly when religion is also a feature. In looking at the 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting, Haider argues that the homophobic nature of the attack needs to be viewed within a broader framework of fundamentalist Islamism. The attack was first and foremost an act of Islamist terror and secondly—and as a consequence of the first—a homophobic attack. Haider (2016) argues, however, that this approach is excessively reductive, and instead suggests that all forms of terrorist extremism today "share a certain toxic masculinity". With a few exceptions, the exploration of the role of concepts of masculinity has been largely neglected in the extensive study of Islamic terrorism and violent extremism (Duriesmith & Ismail, 2019; Gerami, 2005). Though some studies have called for recognition of the role of masculinity and incorporation of this into CVE/PVE (Aslam, 2012; Van Leuven et al., 2016), limited progress has been made in this direction thus far. Understanding how masculinity influences the radicalisation process is an essential step and this understanding needs to be translated into strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism. Confronting this gap is an important next step for the gendered approach to CVE and PVE.

Empowering CSOs in the CVE Space

Despite the important P/CVE initiatives that CSOs are actively engaged in, there are a number of challenges that restrict and limit the ability for CSOs to operate in this space. As Chapter 13 explores, CSOs working in Southeast Asia face a range of impediments that limit their capacity to continue and further develop their activities. Across the three-year capacity gap analysis study that is the subject of Chapter 13, financial sustainability was consistently cited as a major, if not the major, challenge facing CSOs. CSO dependence on government funding can have a

limiting effect on CSOs; if we recall one participant's comments from the 2019–2020 capacity gap analysis canvassed in Chapter 13, "how can you say something bad to the government providing you the funds?" Furthermore, the expectation of CSOs to act as both watchdogs and deliberators places them in a particularly challenging position, requiring them to balance constructive engagement with critical detachment (Steffek & Ferretti, 2009). Support to help CSOs achieve greater financial sustainability will go some way to alleviating this pressure. But more research and collaboration are needed to further empower CSOs in their activities and in their relationships with governments, partners and donors. While Indonesian CSOs operate in a comparatively more conducive environment to their neighbouring counterparts in Southeast Asia, there remains much room for improvement to ensure Indonesian CSOs working in the CVE space are able to sustain and develop the important work they are conducting.

Returning Foreign Fighters

As the Islamic State movement began to lose territorial control of its self-declared Caliphate in Syria and Iraq, the inward flow of foreign fighters swiftly declined and began to reverse as a number of foreign fighters that had already travelled to Iraq and Syria began to attempt to return home. Research on foreign fighter returnees recognises that the rising flow of returnees warrants concern; however, the threat posed by these individuals is often overstated (Byman, 2016; Lister, 2015). The fear surrounding returnees often lies in the perception that, foreign fighters are trained, battle-hardened and prepared to commit acts of terrorism at home.

The reality, however, is more complex. Many foreign terrorist fighters are not trusted to do a lot of fighting and many do not receive significant training. And even if they do, the experience that they do acquire is more suitable for fighting in insurgencies or civil wars, not for orchestrating clandestine acts of domestic terrorism (Byman, 2016). Furthermore, as Byman and Shapiro (2014) identify, there are a number of key outcomes that point to a reduced risk of returnee violence: many foreign fighters die in the conflict they have travelled to; some fighters opt to stay and fight or move onto another conflict rather than return home; others are disillusioned and return non-violent; while others return remaining set in their views but with no interest in committing attacks at home.

Nevertheless, the "veteran effect"—a phenomenon which sees the likelihood of a terrorist cell successfully committing an attack and causing fatalities statistically increase if there is even one foreign fighter present in that cell—means even small numbers of returnees seeking to commit domestic attacks are cause for concern (Lister, 2015). A key insight here comes from Byman's suggestion that deradicalisation programs need to effectively 'triage' returnees to better distinguish between returnees that ought to be prosecuted and detained and those that simply need to be monitored (Byman, 2016).

The role of security services is, of course, also significant in reducing the threat posed by returnees; it is therefore essential that these services have the resources available to assist them to monitor and disrupt plots involving foreign fighters and/or domestic sympathisers. Effective monitoring comes with a cost, and these costs have often been cited as justification for preventing or disallowing the return of foreign fighters. Nevertheless, recent research by Malet and Hayes (2020) suggests that this cost may be more short term in nature than was initially anticipated. Their findings show that the recidivism rate among terrorists is far less than that among conventional criminals, and, more importantly, that "the median lag time between return and plot or arrest is less than six months for most returnees, the majority of attacks occur within one year, and nearly all attempts occur within three years" (Malet & Hayes, 2020). Their data has led them to conclude that the first five months from return is the "dark window" within which foreign fighters are most at risk of committing a domestic attack, suggesting that this is the prime time for these individuals to be involved in disengagement and reintegration programs (Malet & Hayes, 2020). With many Indonesian prisons already over-crowded and under-resourced (Ismail & Sim, 2016), an influx of returnees who may well be charged with terrorism offences will only exacerbate an already strained system. Therefore, triaging returnees, tailoring monitoring timeframes to focus primarily on the early "dark window" period of return and developing cooperative and coordinated efforts with CSOs working in the P/CVE space may not only provide some reprieve for the prison system but also prove to be a more efficient approach.

But is important to also recognise that 'returnees' are a diverse category. In March 2017, Soufan Center estimates put the overall number of Indonesian foreign fighters travelling to Syria at 600; of those, 435 were sent back upon arrival in Turkey, and less than 50 returned to Indonesia of their own accord after making it to Syria or Iraq (Barrett, 2017). Even

though these numbers are out of date and later estimates suggest significantly larger numbers, the overall number of returnees with potential experience is relatively small, but remain concerning given the number that did not make it to IS territory. Indeed, those who were intercepted on their way to Iraq or Syria and turned back fall outside the conventional definition of returnees but pose a particular threat; they had prepared themselves for conflict and had all the enthusiasm of a new recruit but returned having not had the opportunity to fulfil their intentions, likely leaving them with a sense of failure and resentment (Barrett, 2017).

Up until now, however, even though IS has encouraged supporters to commit attacks in their home countries, it has not committed any significant proportion of its resources to out of area operations, even during its peak. This, Hegghammer and Nesser have argued, suggests that IS does not pose the same type of external threat that Al Qaeda did in the past (Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015). Despite this, P/CVE actors need to remain conscious of the evolving nature of IS and other violent extremist groups' messaging (Munoz, 2018; Winter & Parker, 2018).

The Way Forward

Though particular threats may change over time, the challenges presented by violent and hateful extremism will continue to persist and indeed evolve, and CVE initiatives must not only react to these changes but also pre-empt them in order to effectively counter and prevent violent extremism. Throughout this book, the integral role of CSOs in preventing and countering violent and hateful extremism has been demonstrated in diverse and innovative programs, practices and research initiatives. The achievements of CSOs working in the P/CVE space in Indonesia to date are substantial and offer valuable lessons for CVE practice, not only in Indonesia but also for regional and global audiences. These achievements have occurred despite barriers that, though varied, are not unique to the Indonesian context. This summary offers some insights into the way forward for CSOs, researchers, government and other key stakeholders, but such analysis remains a work in progress. The research agenda needs to continue to seek ways to build the capacity and financial sustainability of CSOs, improve their relationships with key stakeholders and support monitoring and evaluation practices to work towards establishing and sharing best practices.

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CHAPTER 15

Appendix: How to Design Impact Evaluations of CVE Programs—A Practical Guide for Indonesian Civil Society Organisations

Matteo Vergani, Greg Barton, and Muhammad Iqbal

Introduction

This booklet seeks to offer practical advice to civil society organisations about how to design an evidence-based evaluation of P/CVE programs. It is the outcome of extensive consultation with civil society organisations, refined through the delivery of multiple evaluation training programs conducted as part of the South East Asian Network of Civil Society

M. Vergani (✉) · G. Barton (✉)
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia
e-mail: matteo.vergani@deakin.edu.au

G. Barton
e-mail: Greg.barton@deakin.edu.au

M. Iqbal
Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia

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Organizations (SEAN-CSO) working together against violent extremism. Here, we aim to offer a practical step-by-step guide to assist civil society organisations in Indonesia to navigate the use of existing booklets and toolkits to assess the effectiveness of P/CVE programs. Additionally, we provide original tips and advice tailored to the Indonesian context, as well as a library of measurement tools in both English and Indonesia language.

This booklet is intended to complement William's guidebook (2021) and existing P/CVE toolkits, in particular RAND's toolkit (Helmus et al., 2017), Hedayah's evaluation toolkit (Mattei & Zeiger, 2018), USIP's introduction to evaluation (Holmer et al., 2018) and International Alert and UNDP's toolkits. All of these toolkits are free to download. They offer very important insights to practitioners who need a practical guide to conduct evaluations. However, sometimes they describe similar concepts in slightly different terms, which might cause confusion among readers. These booklets and toolkits intend to reach a broad audience across different cultures and contexts, but they can be difficult sometimes to use in specific local contexts, especially by civil society organisations that do not have previous experience with evaluations, and who don't know how to conduct a simple and effective measurement of attitudes and behaviours for evaluation purposes. We believe that there is the need for a more localised approach to designing P/CVE evaluations, to offer insights and tools that can be used by P/CVE practitioners in a way that is relevant to their localised contexts and language.

The final section of this booklet contains a library of measurement tools, which is particularly important because we imagine this as being a first step towards standardisation of P/CVE evaluation measurement in Indonesia. International experts, scholars and P/CVE practitioners unanimously agree that, overall, we lack a precise understanding of what works to prevent violent extremism because we don't have enough reliable evaluations of P/CVE programs to form our evidence base. This is a systemic problem that undermines our effort as a global community to prevent violent extremism and terrorism. For this reason, it is imperative to test the effectiveness of P/CVE initiatives in each local context with the same set of measurement tools. This will allow us to establish a baseline understanding of whether some initiatives work better than others, and what types of interventions are more effective with certain populations. This section, by providing a simple, common and comprehensive set of procedures, and a library of measurement tools, aims to promote standardisation of evaluation practices in the Indonesian context.

In the next sections, we summarise the theoretical notions and arguments used in the literature to explain how to design evaluations (and specifically P/CVE evaluations) and discuss how to adapt them to the local context of Indonesia. We identify four main steps to design a successful evaluation:

Step (1) uncovering assumptions,
Step (2) developing a program logic,
Step (3) collecting the data,
Step (4) understanding the data.

We understand that practitioners tend to design the evaluation from step (3), and mostly focus on data collection and data analysis. However, we believe that the first two steps are crucial, and they cannot be avoided. We discuss each step in a separate section and then offer a discussion of practical data collection tools, including questionnaires in both English and Indonesian language, which practitioners can readily use to evaluate P/CVE programs in their local contexts. Before diving into the four steps to conduct P/CVE evaluations, we think it's necessary to tackle some key cultural underpinnings that inform the way in which we think about impact evaluations. Acknowledging these premises is an essential step to understand and implement effective P/CVE evaluations.

Premise. Understanding the Cultural Underpinnings of "Impact" Evaluations

It's important to think about evaluations as structured analyses, which need clear criteria and standards, which we use to answer questions about the effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness of our programs. Evaluating P/CVE programs is vital to understand whether programs produce positive effects, to recognise areas for improvement and to guide the allocation of scarce resources. In the literature, the term "evaluation" usually refers to different activities. In the field of P/CVE, van Hemert et al. (2014) identifies four types of evaluations: impact (examination of results and intended and unintended impact), process (examination of the implementation of the program), mechanism (examination of the underlying mechanism of the intervention, which explain why a program is supposed

to achieve its aims) and economic (examination of the financial costs and return of the investment).

Holmer et al. (2018) identify four slightly different types of P/CVE evaluations: monitoring (ensuring the activities are conducted on time and within the budget), process (identifies changes, best practices and issues in the implementation of the program), evaluation (which refers to whether the objectives are achieved) and impact evaluation (which refers to a high-level assessment of the larger cumulative change brought to bear by the implementation of a program or set of programs). Similarly, other P/CVE evaluation experts (see, for example, Helmus et al., 2017; Holdaway & Simpson, 2018; Mattei & Zeiger, 2018) propose slightly different classifications to describe what types of evaluation can and should be done in the P/CVE space.

After reviewing all these materials, we suggest simplifying these classifications and consider only two broad categories of evaluations:

(1) ***process evaluation***, which refers to the task of assessing whether the activities are completed as planned, on time, within the prescribed budget and resources, and
(2) ***impact evaluation***, which examines whether the program achieved its aims and results, and whether it affected the desired change in the target population.

Both impact and process evaluations are useful.

During our engagements in South East Asia with P/CVE stakeholders, we observed that most of the existing (and scarce) P/CVE evaluations focus on process, not on impact. Process evaluations usually focus on tracking participation or attendance, collecting participants' satisfaction surveys and other measures of the implementation of the activities (such as adherence to the program plan). These evaluations are seen as easier and less threatening to donors and service providers. They are seen as easier because the data is easier to collect than impact evaluation data: for process evaluations, the data comes from the organisation that is providing the service, which is usually able to provide with comparatively low effort information about resources and implementation of the program. Process evaluations are seen as less threatening because they don't tell if the program achieves the objectives that it is meant to achieve, but only if it is implemented well, and how to fix any implementation

issues. To be fair, the prevalence of process evaluation is not just a characteristic of South East Asian P/CVE evaluations, but it is common also in other contexts such as Australia, Europe and the United States.

Impact evaluations are inherently more difficult and require significant expertise, resources and skills. Also, they are often seen as threatening by both funding bodies (such as governments) and service providers (such as civil society organisations) because they could potentially reveal that the program did not achieve its intended objectives, or possibly even produced unintended negative consequences. No donor or service provider wants to discover that its program has little positive impact (or a negative impact), because they fear negative repercussions such as a loss of credibility, public image or cuts in funding, when they contradict the corporate and institutional narrative of success that public and private organisations use to justify the allocation of resources to P/CVE programs. The political context also plays a key role in fuelling these anxieties, especially when P/CVE is used as a rhetorical device by politicians in their ideological discourses and electoral campaigns. These tensions and anxieties are not unique to the P/CVE field. Related fields such as crime prevention (e.g. gang violence and hate crime prevention) and public health (e.g. stigmatised communities' health, such as HIV and first nations' health) experience very similar pressures from the political context.

A key component of a viable solution may be to re-shape the public perception of P/CVE as detached from political discourses and objectives. Many P/CVE experts are key players in public discourse. They are invited to comment on security matters by media outlets. They write opinion pieces, they have large numbers of followers in social media, and they often have large numbers of students, too. In these public fora, these experts can contribute to re-shape the perception of P/CVE as detached from electoral and ideological arguments, and in the process demystify attempts by politicians and ideologues to instrumentally use P/CVE to polarise public opinions and pursue electoral gains.

In parallel, we suggest another component of a practical solution, especially for donors: we propose shifting P/CVE culture towards accepting (and paradoxically even incentivising) piloting new ideas, strong evaluations and—importantly—also failure. We should draw inspiration from how the software development world adopted the "fail fast" mentality, which is a principle that guides the allocation of resources to pilot projects. The idea is that, when testing and evaluating new projects,

there is little gain in avoiding, delaying or silencing failure. Failure is a cornerstone of the learning process, but only when it is acknowledged. Moreover, people can learn from others' failures, which allows an entire field to grow and find new and viable solutions, instead of repeating the same errors over and over. This is what the field of P/CVE needs globally. We believe that this change should be incentivised by donors, who should reward reporting on failure instead of sanctioning it.

Although most scholars and practitioners agree that there is an urgent need for high-quality evaluations in the P/CVE field, some resist the adoption of rigorous evaluation methods. Some argue that evaluating the impact of a P/CVE program is particularly difficult because it entails proving a negative, that is, the absence of violent extremism and radicalisation, which is supposedly not measurable (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016; Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; Romaniuk & Chowdhury Fink, 2012; Vidino & Hughes, 2015). Others argue that the lack of clarity of definitions of terms like P/CVE, disengagement and rehabilitation makes the operationalisation of those concepts (and their measurement) difficult if not impossible (Chowdhury Fink, 2014; Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; Vidino & Hughes, 2015). Some blame practical problems like the risk of recidivism (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011), social desirability bias in evaluation surveys (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011), arbitrary targets of success (Vidino & Hughes, 2015), difficulties in recruiting control groups for ethical and practical reasons (Schuurman & Bakker, 2016), presence of confounding variables and intervening factors that are independent from the prevention program (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011), data disclosure (Bartlett & Miller, 2012) and conflicting time-frames between political cycles and intervention cycles (Chowdhury Fink, 2014).

On the basis of the above arguments, some civil society organisations have started to believe that it is practically impossible to conduct evaluations with control groups and pre- and post-intervention measurement. In our engagements with civil society organisations in South East Asia, we found many practitioners who believe that while control groups might represent an academic "golden standard" it is one that is not practically feasible. Some believe that ethical issues arise when including control groups in the research design, because they would not be granted the benefits of the intervention. These are important and legitimate genuine concerns. And yet, most of these problems often have workable solutions even if some problems remain.

It is useful to think that the difficulties encountered in conducting rigorous evaluations are not so very different from the ones that other social programs have to deal with, for example prevention programs that aim at reducing the incidence of risky behaviours among stigmatised communities, including gang violence, alcoholism, drug addiction, obesity and family violence. Consequently, we need to closely examine the evaluations conducted in these related fields and learn from the methods used to overcome these barriers. For example, Baruch et al. (2018) published an article looking at how P/CVE could use best practices from the evidence-based healthcare movement. Also, we should seek to make good use of tools and best practices from fields like psychology and criminology to identify best practices and lessons learned to reduce the impact of problems related to social desirability bias in evaluation surveys (see, for example, Podsakoff et al., 2012).

The fact that it is possible to lift the quality of P/CVE evaluations is demonstrated by comparative reviews that looked at the difference between evaluations in the P/CVE field and evaluations in related fields, such as prevention of gang violence. Van Hemert et al. (2014) reviewed all publicly available evaluations of P/CVE and gang violence programs globally, and coded the methods used in the evaluations. They found that in the field of P/CVE only 3% of evaluations had an experimental or quasi-experimental design (i.e. the use of a control or comparison group). Comparatively, in the field of gang prevention, 60% of evaluations have at least some experimental component. These findings clearly suggest that there is room for improving the quality of P/CVE evaluations. Clearly, it will not be feasible to include a control group or an experimental design in all P/CVE evaluations. Nevertheless, we should aim to do so whenever possible.

There are a number of empirical evaluation studies that P/CVE evaluators can employ as a gold standard and then attempt to replicate their methodology and design. For example, Paluck (2010) conducted a well-designed, rigorous, yearlong field experiment to evaluate the impact of a radio talk show designed to reduce intergroup conflict in Congo. This impact evaluation is particularly interesting because it shows that the radio broadcasting intervention did not work as expected by the producers, and it was actually associated with more intolerance, more awareness of grievances and less propensity to help out-group members (Paluck, 2010). Other rigorous impact evaluations of primary P/CVE programs have been conducted in Mali (Aldrich, 2014), USA (Williams, 2021;

Williams et al., 2016) and the Netherlands (Feddes et al., 2015). The community of P/CVE practitioners and researchers stands to benefit from examining closely these evaluations' methodologies and seeking to replicate them wherever possible.

After this introduction to the cultural underpinnings of P/CVE evaluations, it's time to dive into a more practical discussion. The following sections aim to provide a step-by-step guide about how to conduct a P/CVE evaluation. We identify four main steps, each one will be described in a separate section: (1) uncovering assumptions, (2) developing a program logic, (3) defining the evaluation design and (4) understanding the data. Each section will include examples from the Indonesian context and practical exercises to run through the critical steps described in each section.

Step 1: Uncovering Assumptions: Does Your Program Impact on the Overall Reduction of Violent Extremism?

One of the most frequent questions that P/CVE practitioners ask during evaluation capacity building workshops is: how do we know if our program reduces violent extremism? This is the simplest, and at the same time the most difficult, question to answer. The reality is that it is very hard, if not impossible, to measure trends in violent extremism in a certain time and space, because of the secretive nature of the activities of terrorist organisations and counter-terrorism agencies. We don't have enough information to assess trends such as the number of people recruited by terrorist organisations, the reach of terrorist groups among target audiences, the emotional support and the financial resources that terrorist groups are able to generate among certain communities and many other indicators that might reveal trends of violent extremism in a certain time and location.

Even when data about terrorist incidents is publicly available, it does not provide a reliable measurement of the overall risk of violent extremism, because it is likely to be distorted by the activities of counter-terrorism agencies, and their ability to disrupt and prevent terrorist engagement. The overall number of terrorist incidents might decrease, but this could be motivated by the ability of counter-terrorism agencies to disrupt plots, or to reduce the conditions that allow terrorists to even plot attacks. But this does not necessarily mean that there are less terrorists who are ready to engage in violence. Trends in public data

about terrorism are not a reliable reflection of whether the risk of violent extremism decreases or increases over time in a certain context. To put it simply, if we are not able to measure fever with a functioning thermometer, we cannot reliably measure the extent to which our medication works in reducing fever. Similarly, if we are not able to measure reliably trends in violent extremism and terrorism, it is not possible to know with any certainty the extent to which our programs and policies are effective in reducing it. Adding complexity to the picture, research has established that there are multiple pathways to violent extremism, and multiple sets of causes that drive a person to engage in terrorism (Vergani, 2018; Vergani et al., 2018). Therefore, given the current state of research in the field of radicalisation to violent extremism, it is not easy to establish unequivocal risk factors of radicalisation, which need to be addressed by P/CVE programs (Baruch et al., 2018; Kundnani, 2012).

Given these notable constraints on our ability to measure trends in violent extremism, we need to establish an alternative method to understand the impact of our programs against violent extremism. We propose here that a practical solution is to understand the assumptions, and the evidence underlying the assumption, about the relationship between the program's objectives and violent extremism.

Let's make some practical examples to clarify this idea. All prevention programs are based on assumptions about what causes, or increases the risk of, a risky behaviour. Why do we say that avoiding the use of tobacco prevents cancer? Because we have evidence that smoking tobacco increases the risk of cancer. Tobacco is not the only risk factor of cancer though. The reasons why people get cancer are various, difficult to pinpoint, and sometimes they have to do with genetic predispositions. Also, smoking one cigarette does not immediately translate into getting cancer. Nevertheless, we have more than enough evidence to suggest that smoking does increase the risk of cancer. Based on this assumption, public health practitioners plan programs that aim to prevent cancer by reducing the use of tobacco, for example awareness campaigns that highlight the health risks associated with smoking tobacco.

We suggest that we should be thinking about P/CVE programs in a parallel way. For example, P/CVE programs that aim to provide employment opportunities to women in rural areas assume that if women find employment there will be less people engaging in violent extremism in their village. In this case, it's important to understand the assumption: why would women's employment decrease extremism? Why do

employed women reduce the emergence of violent extremism? A possible explanation might be that women would be busier and more satisfied, and therefore less likely to engage in violent extremism. Another explanation could be that employed women would be a more empowered and prominent figure in their families, able to have a positive influence on their children and husbands, reducing their likelihood to engage in violent extremism. With this in mind, let's train our ability to uncover assumptions behind P/CVE programs with an exercise.

Exercise 1: Based on the brief description provided, please identify what are the program assumptions

Program description	*Assumptions about risk factors of radicalisation*
1. The program aims to combat social isolation in young Rohingya refugees in Aceh through organising sport activities. Sports are used to create opportunities for community participation and personal development	
2. The program organises a forum where Rohis instructors meet to discuss religious-based extremism and how to counter the narratives of violent and extremist preachers	
3. The project aims to train and support former terrorists who are released from prison after serving their sentence to create small businesses and to integrate them and their families in the community when they leave prison. The project provides re-integration individual and group social support including family support where appropriate	

We propose that a viable approach to understand whether a P/CVE program is able to have an impact on violent extremism is to:

(1) spell out the assumptions that underpin it, explaining what the program aims to achieve and why this is meant to reduce violent extremism.
(2) and identify and collect the empirical evidence behind the assumptions.

For example, coming back to the example that we referred to above: is there evidence that more female employment in Indonesian rural areas is associated with less engagement in violent extremism? This question needs to be answered with the best and most complete data. We have learned that nothing should be taken for granted: after reviewing all the scientific evidence on the topic of radicalisation into violent extremism, we understood that there are many opinions about what factors increase the likelihood of people radicalising, but there is not a lot of substantial empirical evidence (see Vergani et al., 2018). We need to be very critical with the evidence and put it to the test by playing devil's advocate about the evidence on radicalisation factors. In International Alert and UNDP's evaluation toolkit (Holdaway & Ruth, 2018, p. 55), you can find a good checklist of questions about the assumptions, such as: "is the assumption supported by the available evidence? Does it need testing?" (Holdaway & Ruth, 2018, p. 55).

We do not expect that CSOs will be able to conduct research to test assumptions. Rather, we strongly suggest civil society organisation practitioners get in touch with established researchers in the field of radicalisation and terrorism and discuss with them what is known about radicalisation factors. Research in this field is constantly evolving, new studies are published on a weekly basis, and it is very hard and time-consuming for non-researchers to keep up to date on new developments and trends. It is also important to acknowledge that some social researchers would reject the legitimacy of applying the public health metaphor (and the public health model) to P/CVE. These researchers would also more generally oppose the adoption of the scientific method to study human behaviour. We respectfully disagree with them and think that the public health model has been enormously beneficial in the ways in which we think about P/CVE. We are aware that further discussion about this would take us out of the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, we think that it is important to acknowledge that in our approach to P/CVE evaluation we adopt a scientific paradigm. For readers who are interested in the methodological and epistemological debate about the application of the scientific method to study human society, we suggest further readings (such as Bryman, 2016).

Let's use another example to explain how to identify assumptions of a program that has already been implemented. Imagine that you are asked to evaluate the impact of a P/CVE program that aims to debunk myths, rumours, misconceptions and misinformation about the

Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia through a series of YouTube videos addressed to a young audience. What is the assumption of the program? The assumption is that a young Indonesian who believes in myths, rumours, misconceptions and misinformation about Ahmadiyya will be more likely to engage in violence against them. Conversely, a young Indonesian holding correct information about Ahmadiyya will be less likely to engage in violence against them.

Is this assumption correct? Well, the best way to know this would be to check whether people who engaged in violence against Ahmadiyya believe in myths, rumours, misconceptions and misinformation about Ahmadiyyas more than those who didn't. Is there any past research about it? Is there any other anecdotal information about it in the Indonesian media? Moreover: is there any evidence showing that people who know more about a religious out-group tend to become more violent against them? And is there any evidence that more knowledge about religious out-groups reduces engagement in violence against them?

These questions might seem banal, but they are not. Any researcher with some experience in this area would agree that, while it is very clear that out-group knowledge and prejudice are associated, it is not at all clear what is the cause and what is the effect (Mansouri & Vergani, 2018; Vergani, 2018). Moreover, the links between attitudes (like prejudice) and behaviour (like violence) are also somewhat unclear: for example, not all people who support terrorist groups engage in terrorist violence (Vergani et al., 2018). On the other hand, there is quite a bit of evidence linking belief in conspiracy theories and support for extremist ideas (see, for example, Van Prooijen et al., 2015). In sum, there is enough evidence to say that people who believe in myths, rumours, misconceptions and misinformation about Ahmadiyya are more likely to support extremist views against them. We should probably be more cautious about drawing further causal links between the variables, and about adding violent behaviour to the picture. This does not mean that a program like the one presented in the example is not useful. It means, however, that we should know what to realistically expect from it and to not overestimate its intended impact.

Let's test our ability to find evidence about the following assumptions:

Exercise box
Assumption (1) ***lack of religious education is a risk factor of support for extreme religious views in Indonesia***. Look for the existing evidence on the topic, and look for evidence that supports and challenges this assumption.
Evidence to support the assumption
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
Evidence to challenge the assumption
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
Now, ***describe in a few lines a P/CVE program based on this assumption***
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We acknowledge that this procedure cannot guarantee that the program will be able to affect trends in violent extremism and terrorism. Research in the area of radicalisation to violent extremism is piecemeal and mostly unsystematic, and many radicalisation factors are not well understood (Vergani et al., 2018). We surely need more research on the risk factors of radicalisation. We propose, however, using this procedure as a practical first step to uncover and understand the assumptions behind a

P/CVE program, and to provide the available evidence about its impact on trends of violent extremism. It is not the perfect solution, but it is a step in the right direction, using available resources and knowledge that all P/CVE practitioners can easily access.

Step 2: Drawing the Program Logic: Identifying the Specific and Measurable Aims of Your P/CVE Program

Good program logic is the holy grail of effective evaluations. Very simply put, program logics are clear conceptual models, generally expressed as graphical descriptions, of what the objectives of the program are, and how the objectives will be achieved. It is essential to know what the goals of the program are, in order to be able to assess whether the program has achieved them. This is a simple concept but is one which is surprisingly often overlooked by many P/CVE practitioners across the world. It makes sense intuitively: if we don't know where we wanted to go, it is impossible to assess whether we have gone to the right place, and if we have taken the best route to get there.

Evaluation manuals and booklets generally state that, when designing a program, we should always identify a list of concrete and measurable outcomes. For example, a rehabilitation program might aim at creating barriers to recidivism through the establishment of family and friendship ties, sense of agency and meaning in life. Establishing (or strengthening) these three elements (1—friendship ties, 2—sense of agency and 3—meaning in life) would be the outcome of the program. To be useful, these three elements need to be measurable, which means that we need to be able to count how many friendship ties a person has, and to measure with a questionnaire a person's sense of agency and meaning in life. Counting friendship ties is a relatively easy and intuitive task, and we can use questionnaires developed by social psychologists to capture sense of agency and meaning in life. At the end of this section, we will provide some of these questionnaires translated into Indonesian, ready to be used by practitioners who want to assess the effectiveness of their P/CVE programs.

To identify the objectives of the program, here we propose a simplified version of Horgan and Braddock's (2010) evaluation methodology. In their view, practitioners should: identify and invite all stakeholders of the program. Stakeholders are "those individuals or groups with a reason to care about the decisions to be made and have enough political power

to influence those making a decision about the program under evaluation. In the case of risk reduction initiatives, stakeholders may include: officials from the governments that are operating the program, influential citizens, representatives from affected extremist groups, and so forth" (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 283). We suggest that practitioners should invite the stakeholders to a focus group or roundtable discussion, describe the program and ask them what they think should be the measurable objectives of the program. Once a list of objectives has been identified, the stakeholders should then be asked to rank them on a scale from 1 to 5 in terms of importance. Finally, P/CVE practitioners should look at the final ranking and select only a few (preferably between 1 and 3) objectives to measure. This will help to avoid wasting time and resources assessing indicators that might be irrelevant.

If outcomes must always figure prominently in program logic, the other components are less clearly fixed. But as a good rough guide we would suggest that, in addition to the *project outcomes*, there should generally be three components: *resources* (such as physical space, materials, staff or other equipment), *activities* (which are the actual program activities such as education or training programs, or sport activities) and *target population* (described in terms of total number, demographic characteristics, ethnicity, religious affiliation, etc.). These three additional components (resources, activities and target population) should be so framed as to be easily identifiable for the practitioners who design the program.

Other P/CVE evaluation toolkits suggest different lists of objects that should be included in program logics. For example, in the International Alert and UNDP's toolkit (Holdaway & Ruth, 2018), the program logic (called in this toolkit "theory of change") includes outcomes, outputs (intended as information, event, object or state of being produced as a result), impact (intended as high-level impact on reduction of violent extremism) and activities. Hedayah's evaluation toolkit (Mattei & Zeiger, 2018) includes in their program logic impact, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs (which are what we define as resources). RAND's toolkit (Todd et al., 2017) includes resources, activities, outputs, outcomes, evaluation (which indicates how the program addresses the outcomes) and needs (that the outcomes address).

We believe that our four basic program logic components (outcomes, resources, target population and activities) capture the key elements that need to be considered to plan an effective evaluation and provide a simple

and clear framework that can be applied by all practitioners. To sum up, the four program logic components are: (1) *Resources* (do you have a physical space? Staff? Materials? Equipment? Funding?); (2) *Activities* (are you planning to do communication programs? Education or training? Counselling? Other group activities?); (3) *Program's target population* (what is the age group? Genders? Community? Ethnicity? Nationality? Profession? Religion? Are they individuals at risk of violent extremism, or communities that influence individuals at risk of violent extremism?); (4) *Program outcomes* (what is the program expecting to change? Decrease prejudice levels? Increase knowledge levels? Decrease levels of anger? Increase employment levels? Increase trust in institutions?). Let's test our ability to identify the key component of a program logic:

Exercise box

Please use the program that you have created as part of the exercise in Sect. 15.1 of this booklet. If you haven't done it, please use any other P/CVE program of your choice, based on your experience or creativity.

Please write a list of:

1. Resources

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

2. Activities

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3. Target population

_____
_____

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4. Outcomes
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Having identified a list for each of the four components, it is now necessary to draw logical arrows between them, to connect them in a "chain of causality". Each element within each component (e.g. each activity, each resource, each group in the target population, each outcome) needs to be connected to another with logical arrows, as in the example below. The result will be a synthetic graphical description of how the program is supposed to work, and how its objectives will be achieved. Developing a program logic model is useful for many reasons: it helps to communicate clearly the project, it is a good management tool, and it helps in consistently replicating programs. And, most importantly for us, it allows us to effectively evaluate the program!


Invite Buddhist community leaders to Iftar dinners at Islamic cultural centres
AIMS TO
Reduce prejudice between Buddhist and Muslims

Let's train our ability to draw logical arrows between program logic components.

Exercise box
Please link the components identified in the previous exercise using directional arrows. This will draw a map of the program logic. The final outcome will look like a map, or a diagram.

Identifying the program logic assists all forms of evaluations. As discussed in the introductory section of this toolkit, there are two broad categories of evaluations: process evaluation (which refers to the task of assessing whether the activities are completed as planned, on time, within the prescribed budget and resources) and impact evaluation (which examines whether the program achieved its aims and results, and whether it affected the desired change in the target population). A program logic can assist in posing the right questions to assess both process and impact of a program. In term of process evaluation, examples of questions are: were the resources enough to achieve the desired outcomes? Were the resources used efficiently and as planned? Were the activities conducted as planned? And if not, why? In terms of impact evaluation, examples of questions are: were the outcomes achieved? Did the program change what it was seeking to change? These will be key questions to plan the evaluation design.

Step 3: Collecting the Data

To choose when and how to collect data, you need to start from the desired outcomes in your program logic. The outcomes are always about changing either attitudes or behaviours (or both). For example, let's think about a program that aims to change (specifically, to reduce) prejudice towards religious minorities among Muslim villagers of East Java. How do we measure this change? The best way is to assess the villagers' attitudes and behaviours both before and after the program, and then compare the data collected at the two points in time to understand whether there was any change. Evaluations should always consider, when possible, collecting data from program participants before the program starts and after the program ends. This is very important because it allows you to detect whether your program caused any change among the participants. For example, if prejudice against religious minorities among Muslim villagers of East Java is set at 8 out of 8 (in a scale where 0 is "no prejudice at all" and 10 "maximum level of prejudice") before the intervention, and at 5

out of 10 after the intervention, it means that there was a 30% reduction in prejudice against minorities, which would be an outstanding outcome. This method is commonly referred to as *pre-/post-intervention evaluation*.

Wherever possible, we suggest always collecting additional pre- and post-intervention data from a group that did not participate to the program but is similar in the composition of the participating group (also called "intervention group"). This group of people who are not participating to the program is called the *comparison group*. In a controlled environment (such as in a lab), scientists randomly assign the pool of program participants to either participate in the program or not participate in the program, and those who do not participate in the program are defined as the control group. This is much harder in real-world settings, where the comparison group is made up of people with similar characteristics to the ones who participate in the program. For example, if your program is aiming to reduce prejudice against religious minorities among Muslims living in six villages of East Java, you need to select another six villages in East Java that are similar to the ones where you conduct your program in terms of religious, social and demographic composition. Then, you must collect data before and after the program in both the six villages that participate in your program and also in the other six villages that do not participate in your program.

We are aware of the difficulties of engaging communities and other target groups to be comparison populations. Collecting data is an expensive and time-consuming task, and it is difficult enough to do it among the program participants. So, why should we repeat it among people who are not even participating in our programs? The answer is simple: without including in the design a comparison group that has not, or not yet, participated in the program, it is not possible to know whether any change in the target population is due to the program or to other contextual factors.

Let's make it clear with an example. Let's imagine that during the delivery of our program aiming at reducing prejudice towards religious minorities among Muslim villagers of East Java a communal conflict takes place between Muslims and Christians in Ambon. This communal conflict is likely to increase prejudice against religious minorities in East Java. So in the six villages that form your comparison group, which did not participate in your program, you might find that prejudice goes from 8 out of 10 (before the intervention) to 10 out of 10 (after the intervention),

because the communal conflict in Ambon increased prejudice against religious minorities among Muslim villagers in East Java. In the six villages that participate in your program, however, prejudice remains at 8 out of 10 before and after the program. This would be a success, because it shows that your program can reduce prejudice of 20% compared to the comparison group. If you did not have the comparison group, you would not be able to capture the success of your program.

The use of comparison groups is naturally easier in primary P/CVE interventions and more complicated in secondary and tertiary interventions where, for example, staged delivery of P/CVE programs can be dangerous because it increases the risk of violence and terrorism. Finding a comparison group can be hard, and also ethically challenging because you are asking participation from people who are not even receiving the benefits of your intervention. For this reason, we suggest a practical technique that can help you to identify your comparison group, which is called *staged delivery*. The technique is very simple, and it consists of dividing your participants in two groups: the first group will participate in your program first, and the second group will participate in your program after the evaluation is completed. In this way, the second group will function as comparison group during the evaluation.

Going back to the example of the six villages in East Java, you should select three villages where you deliver your program first and use the other three villages as a comparison group. When the evaluation is finished and you have collected data before and after the program is delivered in the first three villages, you deliver the program in the remaining three villages of the comparison group. This technique is not always easy to use because of budget and other limitations, including sample size limitations. When conducting evaluations, it is always important to have a number of participants in the "intervention" and "comparison" groups that is as large as possible, especially if you want to detect a statistically significant effect (i.e. an effect that you are confident did not occur by chance). We strongly suggest engaging a statistician to help you determine (by conducting what statisticians call a power analysis) the right sample that you need in your evaluation. It is important to remember, however, that statistically significant effects are rarely detected in program evaluations. Rather, program staff might set up benchmarks based on previous programs that are considered adequate. For example, you might decide that a reduction in prejudice of 10% could be a realistic outcome for your program, given past experiences in similar contexts.

In theory, all evaluations should be designed when the program has not been implemented yet, to allow collecting data from program participants before the program starts and after the program ends. However, we know that this is not always possible. Sometimes evaluations are planned after the program started, or even after it ended. In this case, it's not possible to collect data before and after the intervention (unless you have a time machine!). We suggest two (complementary) strategies: the first is to select a comparison group that matches the intervention group's characteristics as much as possible and to collect data about the outcome measure in both groups. For example, we could look at whether the six villages in East Java that participated in your program have consistently less prejudice to religious minorities than other similar villages that did not participate in the program. The second strategy could be to collect data from program participants asking them if they perceive that their skills, their behaviour and their knowledge have changed since starting the program. Neither option is perfect because ultimately both strategies are flawed: participants' bias and other intervening variables that are impossible to account for could affect the results. Nevertheless, this is the best you can do, when you are asked to evaluate a program after the program is delivered. Let's train our ability to design P/CVE programs:

Exercise box

Please read the following program description and design an evaluation.
The program "living together" aims to reduce prejudice against religious minorities in six Muslim villages in East Java. The program consists of 10 meetings at the local library with Muslim villagers, where Christian and Hindu religious leaders discuss their religious traditions with the villagers. Forty villagers will attend the meetings in each village.
Where and when will you collect the data?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
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_____
_____
_____

What samples will you use to collect the data?

_____

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Step 4: Understanding the Data

Impact evaluations aim to capture whether the program achieved the desired change in the target population. Going back to the program logic (Step 2 of this booklet), you need to have your outcomes clear in mind, before you decide how you want to measure them. For example, if your program aims to decrease the level of prejudice against a religious minority (e.g. Ahmadiyya), you need to identify a good tool to measure and examine prejudice against Ahmadiyya among your participants. This will be your outcome measure, and it will tell you how well your program has enacted the expected changes in the target population.

Broadly, we can identify two types of outcome measurement tools: qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative tools aim to understand *why* there was (or wasn't) a change, and *how* the change happened and was perceived by the participants. *Interviews* and *focus groups* are the most common qualitative tools. Quantitative tools, by contrast, aim to *measure levels* of attitudes and behaviours and to attribute a number to them. This will allow you to measure, for example, attitudes like prejudice on a scale from 1 to 10. *Questionnaires* are the most commonly used measurement tools of this type. Likert scales are typically used for the answers: they often have 5, 7 or 10 points that are used to allow the respondent to express how much they agree or disagree with a particular statement. The following images provide examples of measurement tools that you can use in a questionnaire.

Example 1. Question with answer using a Likert scale


How effective do you think this video is in making the Muslim youth think critically about the message of extremist groups like ISIS?
Extremely effective
Very effective
Moderately effective
Slightly effective
Not effective at all

Example 2. Items with answers using Likert scales

To sum up, the choice to use quantitative or qualitative measures depends on the questions that your evaluation wants to answer. If you want to know how much change your program achieved in a target population, you should use quantitative tools. If you want to know how

and why your evaluation affected (or didn't affect) change among your target audience, you should use qualitative methods. We suggest using both methodologies in your evaluations, in order to have a deeper and more nuanced understanding of your program. You can find a sample of outcome measures used in evaluations of P/CVE programs at the end of this booklet. Not all these measures will be relevant to you. We hope, however, that you will find measures that can be useful for evaluating your programs. We encourage you to refer to existing evaluation toolkits to design your own survey. We find particularly clear and precise guide to be Appendix A of RAND's toolkit (Todd et al., 2017, p. 81), titled "Creating Your Own Survey". The section provides a step-by-step approach to creating surveys for P/CVE evaluations. Additionally, we identified a number of outcome measures in the next section, for you to use in your own evaluations.

Once you have collected the data, you need to analyse it. To analyse interviews and focus group data, the easiest way is to identify the recurring themes in what participants say. Themes are recurring sentences, or ideas, that are associated with a specific outcome measure. This allows you to organise the interview findings in different sets, each one focusing on a specific question (e.g.: why did the intervention decrease prejudice against Ahmadiyya?) or on different types of answers to the question (e.g.: because it made participants see Ahmadiyya people as human beings who suffer, or because it made participants aware of Ahmadiyya religious practices and false conspiracies about them).

To analyse pre-/post-intervention quantitative data, the easiest way is to determine the levels of your outcome measure before and after the intervention, and check whether there was any change. The participants in your program and the comparison group must be assessed separately. For example, if you measured prejudice against Ahmadiyya on a scale from 1 (lowest prejudice) to 5 (highest prejudice), you might find that among your program participants prejudice was on average 4 before the program and 2 after the program. Conversely, you might find that in the comparison group, prejudice remained on average 4 both before and after the program. This would be an exceptionally good impact of your intervention!

However, it often happens that the data shows that there is no change between measurement before and after the program. Why is that? Sometimes the problem is in the research tools and evaluation design: the sample size might be too small, the program activities and outcome

measures might be mismatched, or the participants might be already too aligned with the program objectives. For example, if you try to decrease levels of prejudice against Ahmadiyya among participants who have already very low levels of prejudice against Ahmadiyya, the program won't have any effect because you are already "preaching to the choir". You should be aware of these potential problems when analysing the data, before establishing that the program is not working.

We always recommend asking a research specialist to analyse the data. In most cases, data analysis is very easy to conduct for a quantitative researcher. Collaboration between universities and civil society organisations can open great opportunities for researchers, who will be able to apply their knowledge to real-world problems and to use new data for teaching and research purposes (when possible), and opportunities for civil society organisations, which will be able to evaluate with more precision the impact of their programs. Existing toolkits provide some instructions to analyse data, for example Appendix B of RAND's toolkit (Todd et al., 2017, p. 105), titled "Analyze Your Program's Evaluation Data".

It is also important to highlight that evaluations of P/CVE programs involve important ethical considerations. Civil society organisations and researchers should be primarily concerned with protecting participants from harm and avoid disclosure of personal information. Also, you should be aware that publishing interview extracts or other data could potentially increase the risk of participants being identified. For example, if you provide an extract of an interview of a participant that you identify as being a young female from a certain village, there is a chance that someone might be able to identify the respondent by combining information in the quote and the demographic details, especially if the participant belongs to a small group. This could affect participants' safety and should be avoided at all costs. Also, individuals must be fully informed that they are participating in research, and they need to give true voluntary consent, not affected by power relationships with the deliverers of the program. Let's train our ability to analyse evaluation data:

Exercise box

Please try to analyse the following evaluation of a P/CVE program and describe how you would interpret the data.

The program "living together" aims to reduce prejudice against Ahmadiyya in an Indonesian village where there were instances of violence between members of the Ahmadiyya community and other villagers. The program consisted of 10 meetings at the local library with non-Ahmadiyya villagers. 50 villagers attended the first 9 meetings, but only 20 attended the final meeting. The evaluation assessed the average level of prejudice against Ahmadiyya on a scale from 1 (low prejudice) to 5 (high prejudice) before and after the intervention. The average level of prejudice was 4 before the first meeting, and the average level of prejudice was still 4 after the final meeting. Individual interviews conducted after the intervention revealed that Ahmadiyya members had attacked a villager in a near district between the 9th and the 10th meeting. The reason why only 20 villagers attended the last meeting is that they went to attend to an anti-Ahmadiyya rally.

Given this information, do you think that the program worked? If yes / no, why?

_____
_____
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Evaluation Framework and Library of Tools to Assess Key P/CVE Issues

There is consensus in the P/CVE field that scholars and practitioners have, so far, not meaningfully benefited from evaluations (see, for example, Baruch et al., 2018; Vergani, 2017). There is a growing

consensus, however, about how the field of P/CVE can build cumulative knowledge and improve understanding about what works in preventing violent extremism. Accumulating evidence about what works in P/CVE means that policymakers and practitioners will be informed in their decisions by coherent and stable evidence. Currently, the lack of consistency in the measurement tools used to assess the impact of P/CVE programs prevents us from being able to accurately compare outcomes and understand what works, where and when.

Efforts to create consistent evaluation frameworks are not new. The field of public health has a solid set of frameworks that scholars have used to propose P/CVE evaluation frameworks (see Baruch et al., 2018). In this section, we build on this scholarship to propose an evidence-based approach to P/CVE evaluation and to establish a common set of resources to assess the impact of P/CVE programs. These resources are meant to assess attributes that in the literature are considered risk factors of radicalisation to violent extremism. It is important to acknowledge that no single one of these factors is unequivocally associated with violent extremism across different contexts (Vergani et al., 2018). However, such risk factors underpin most P/CVE programs in Indonesia and beyond. Please refer to Step 1 of this booklet for a discussion of the relationship between P/CVE program outcomes and violent extremism.

The table contained here is not meant to be exhaustive. It builds on the theoretical framework that we created in our previous systematic scoping review of radicalisation factors (Vergani et al., 2018) and it tries to provide as many measures in Indonesian as possible. From the long list of available measures, which we reference, we report in full only some measures that we find particularly useful for the Indonesian context. Please remember that you need to tailor the language to your audience: if you think that the examples and questions provided in this section are not appropriate to your audience, feel free to re-word them and to adapt them to your local context. However, if you change the wording, please remember a few tips:community of P/CVE practitioners and researchers stands to benefit from

– Use clear and concise wording. Only include the relevant information in the question: nothing more, nothing less. Too many details can confuse the reader.

- Do not include more than one question in a question. For example, do not write: "are you tall and have curly hair?" Rather, this should be two separate questions: "are you tall?" and "do you have curly hair?"
- Do not use adjectives or biased wording that can lead participants to answer in a certain way. For example, avoid saying: "everyone likes nasi goreng, do you like nasi goreng?" or "do you like tasty nasi goreng?" Rather, ask: "how much do you like or dislike nasi goreng?"
- Allow participants to skip sensitive questions, and include them at the end of the survey. Sensitive questions might put participants off, and if they feel uncomfortable, they might drop off and stop the survey.
- Pre-test the survey. After creating the survey, ask a small group of people similar to your target population to complete the survey and tell you what they think of it. Please ask them to tell you whether they find some questions to be particularly difficult, or unclear.

Risk factors	*Suggestions of measurement tools*
Push factors (perceived inequality, injustice, victimisation)	Vile World scale (Stankov et al., 2010) Major experiences of discrimination scale or the everyday scale (Williams et al., 1997) Trust in police scale (Williams et al., 2016) Rosenberg's set of questions on trust in people (Rosenberg, 1956) Hansard audit of political engagement (Johnson & Marshall, 2004) Political efficacy (Craig et al., 1990) Regime-based trust (Craig et al., 1990)

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Risk factors	*Suggestions of measurement tools*
Ideological factors (anger to the West, religious ideology, etc.)	West: Sins of the Western nations (Stankov et al., 2010) Extremism and violent extremism (Iqbal et al., 2016) Divine Power (Stankov et al., 2010) Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (Swami, 2012) Sympathy for violent radicalisation and terrorism (SyfoR) scale (Bhui et al., 2014) Extremist statements (Vergani et al., 2020; Vergani & Link, 2020) Grievance, activism and radicalism scale (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009) Religious orientation (Ghorbani et al., 2010) Religiosity (Purnomo & Suryadi, 2017)
Emotions (anger, other negative emotions)	Positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS) (Watson & Levin-Aspenson, 2018) Harrington's frustration discomfort scale (2005) Measures of anger, aggression and violence (Ronan et al., 2013) Emotional stability scale (Chaturvedi & Chander, 2010; Williams et al., 2016)
Meaning in life	Meaninglessness (Neal & Groat, 1974) The Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Steger et al., 2006)

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Risk factors	*Suggestions of measurement tools*
Personality traits and other personal psychological factors	Revised religious fundamentalism scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) Moral disengagement (Pelton et al., 2004) Critical openness (Sosu, 2013a) Reflective scepticism (Sosu, 2013b) Integrative complexity (e.g. Savage et al., 2014; Liht & Savage, 2013) Measures of attachment (Stein & Slavin-Mulford, 2017) Self-efficacy scale (Sherer & Maddux et al. 1982) Powerlessness (Neal & Groat, 1974) Outgroup hostility (Amjad & Wood, 2009) Sense of control (Lachman & Weaver, 1998) Death Anxiety (Lester & Abadel-Khalek, 2003) Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 2013)
Social factors (alienation, social isolation, lack of belonging)	Jessor and Jessor social alienation scale (1977) Social isolation measures (e.g. Zavaleta et al., 2017) UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell et al., 1980) Loneliness (Hays & Di Matteo, 1987) Social isolation (Dean 1961) Identity fusion (Whitehouse, 2014) Sense of belonging (Hagerty & Patusky, 1995)
Resilience	Brief resilience coping scale (e.g. Sinclair & Wallston, 2004) The BRAVE-14 Standardised Measure for Youth Resilience to Violent Extremism (including measures of connectedness—Grossman et al., 2020)
Attitudes to violence and crime	Indicators of criminal behaviour (Davis & Shalafer, 2017) Proviolence (Stankov et al., 2010)

Selected Measures in English Language

Integrative complexity. This concept refers to the ability of a person to think in ways that incorporate different perspectives and improve critical thinking skills. It is meant to increase personal resilience to the appeal of violent extremist narratives, which are black-and-white.[1]

- Vignettes with a moral dilemma relevant to the local population are presented to participants. For example, a dilemma could activate a conflict between the conservation of tradition (including religion) and self-enhancement or openness to change. Participants are asked to tell their opinions about the dilemma, and the interviewer will code the responses looking for the capacity to discuss and accept different viewpoints on the issue.

Example of moral dilemma 1:
Takfir is a twenty-five-year-old university student living in London. Whilst in London he met another Muslim student named Leila. Although Takfir had never dated before, he started seeing more of Leila and ended up falling in love, and then became intimate with her. Wanting to do the right thing, Takfir proposed to Leila that they should get married as soon as possible. Leila, however, had just accepted a student grant that required that she remains single until she finished her degree in three years. She wants to carry on with the relationship as it is, but without making it public.

Please write down… What should Takfir do? Why should he take that course of action?

Example of moral dilemma 2:
Fatima is a Sixth Form College student. Fatima always did well in school, but she was never encouraged by her parents to go to university. But because Fatima received top national-level scores in her chemistry and biology A Levels, her college tutor insisted that she should accept an offer from a top university in London. Her parents would pay her tuition if she asked them, but this would mean that her parents would not have enough

[1] Adapted from Liht, J., & Savage, S. (2013). Preventing Violent extremism through value complexity: Being Muslim being British. *Journal of Strategic Security, 6*(4), 44–66.

money to send back to Fatima's uncle's family in Egypt. Fatima's uncle has lost his job and can now barely support his family.

Please write down… What should Fatima do? Why should she take that course of action?

Critical openness. This concept refers to the tendency to be actively open to new ideas, critical in evaluating these ideas and open to modifying thinking in the light of convincing evidence.[2]

Strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, strongly disagree?

- I usually try to think about the bigger picture during a discussion
- I often use new ideas to shape (modify) the way I do things
- I use more than one source to find out information for myself
- I am often on the lookout for new ideas
- I sometimes find a good argument that challenges some of my firmly held beliefs
- It's important to understand other people's viewpoint on an issue
- It is important to justify the choices I make.

Reflective Scepticism. This concept aims to capture the tendency to learn from ones past experiences and be questioning of evidence.[3]

Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree?

- I often re-evaluate my experiences so that I can learn from them
- I usually check the credibility of the source of information before making judgements
- I usually think about the wider implications of a decision before taking action
- I often think about my actions to see whether I could improve them.

[2] Adapted from Sosu, E. (2013a). The development and psychometric validation of a Critical: Thinking Disposition Scale. *Thinking Skills and Creativity, 9*, 107–119.

[3] Adapted from Sosu, E. (2013b). The development and psychometric validation of a Critical Thinking Disposition Scale. *Thinking Skills and Creativity, 9*, 107–119.

Brief Resiliency and Coping Scale. This concept aims to measure people's tendencies to cope with stress in a positive way.[4]

Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree?

- I look for creative ways to alter difficult situations
- Regardless of what happens to me, I believe I can control my reaction to it
- I believe I can grow in positive ways by dealing with difficult situations
- I actively look for ways to replace the losses I encounter in life.

Outgroup hostility. This notion aims to measure whether people consider hostility and violence against an out-group acceptable. The following items use the example of the religious minority of Ahmadiyya, but it could be adapted to other out-groups.[5]

Please indicate whether you find completely wrong, somewhat wrong, unsure, somewhat right, absolutely right:

- Cursing Ahmadiyya in prayers and praying for God's wrath against Ahmadiyya people
- Damaging Ahmadiyya property
- Making threats against Ahmadiyya people
- Speaking in public against Ahmadiyya people
- Writing negatively about Ahmadiyya people
- Forwarding anti- Ahmadiyya e-mails or written material.

Trust in police. This measure is designed to measure people's trust in police.[6]

Imagine that you wanted to talk to the police, just to ask them for advice about what to do about a friend of yours, whom you believed

[4] Adapted from Sinclair, V. G., & Wallston, K. a. (2004). The development and psychometric evaluation of the brief resilient coping scale. *Assessment, 11*(1), 94–101.

[5] Adapted from Amjad, N., & Wood, A. (2009). Identifying and changing the normative beliefs about aggression which lead young Muslim adults to join extremist anti-Semitic groups in Pakistan. *Aggressive Behavior, 35*(6), 514–519.

[6] Adapted from Williams, M., Horgan, J., & Evans, W. (2016). *Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led P/CVE Program*. US Department of Justice.

might be considering doing something illegal that could end up injuring other people.

How likely do you think the following would happen?

[All items on 7pt scales: 1 "Very unlikely" – 7 "Very likely"].

The police would…

- Overreact
- React appropriately
- Allow me to remain anonymous
- Try to monitor me or my friend
- Allow the discussion to happen, without creating a record of it
- Cause more harm than good
- Try to trick me
- Be trustworthy.

Support for extreme violence. This measure aims to capture support for extreme violence, and it was developed by comparing common elements of extremists' propaganda across different ideologies.[7]

Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree?

- We should never use violence as a way to try to save the world
- Armed struggle is the only way that youths can redeem themselves and their society
- All problems can be solved through negotiations and compromise
- Killing is justified when it is an act of revenge
- If violence does not solve problems, it is because there was not enough of it
- The only way to teach a lesson to our enemies is to threaten their lives and make them suffer
- Our enemy's children are like scorpions; they need to be squashed before they grow up
- War is the beginning of salvation
- Those who claim to be against the use of any form of force are on their way to becoming slaves
- A good person has a duty to avoid killing any living human being.

[7] Adapted from Stankov, L., Saucier, G., & Knežević, G. (2010). Militant extremism mind-set: Proviolence, vile world, and divine power. *Psychological Assessment, 22*(1), 70–86.

Selected Measures in English and Indonesian

Sense of control: This concept refers to how much an individual thinks they are in control over their life. It is operationalised as two different subscales: sense of mastery and perceived constraints. Sense of mastery looks at how well an individual can achieve their goals, while perceived constraints look at how much an individual thinks there are factors outside of their control that are preventing them from achieving their goals.

The Mastery subscales are items 3, 6, 8 and 12; the perceived constraints are items 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 and 11. Items with a * are reversed scored.

Lachman, M. E., & Weaver, S. L. (1998). The sense of control as a moderator of social class differences in health and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*(3), 763–773. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.763

*1	There is little I can do to change many of the important things in my life	Tidak banyak yang bisa saya lakukan untuk mengubah sebagian besar aspek penting dalam hidup saya
*2	I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life	Saya sering merasa tidak berdaya dalam menghadapi masalah hidup
3	I can do just about anything I really set my mind to do	
*4	Other people determine most of what I can and cannot do	Orang lain menentukan sebagian besar dari apa yang saya bisa dan tidak bisa lakukan
*5	What happens in my life is often beyond my control	Apa yang terjadi dalam hidup saya di luar kendali saya
6	When I really want to do something, I usually find a way to succeed at it	
*7	There are many things that interfere with what I want to do	Banyak hal yang mengganggu apa yang saya ingin lakukan
8	Whether or not I am able to get what I want is in my own hands	
*9	I have little control over the things that happen to me	Saya tidak mempunyai kendali atas hal-hal yang terjadi kepada saya
*10	There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have	Sungguh tidak ada cara untuk memecahkan beberapa masalah yang saya miliki
*11	Sometimes I feel that I am being pushed around in life	Terkadang saya merasa saya dipaksa-paksa dan diatur dalam hidup
12	What happens to me in future mostly depends on me	

Sense of belonging:
This concept refers to how much an individual thinks they are part of a larger group. It is operationalised as two different subscales: a psychological state of belonging (SOBI-P) and the antecedents of belonging (SOBI-A). SOBI-P essentially measures how much an individual feels like they belong, while SOBI-A measures how much an individual desires for belonging.

The SOBI-P subscales are items 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 27. The SOBI-A subscales are items 2, 4, 6, 9, 12, 14, 17, 21 and 26. Items with a * are reversed scored.

Hagerty, B. M. K., & Patusky, K. (1995). Developing a Measure of Sense of Belonging. *Nursing Research.*

1	I wonder if I really fit in with my world	Saya bertanya-tanya apakah saya benar-benar cocok dengan lingkungan sekitar saya
2	It is important to me that I am valued or accepted by others	
3	I am not sure if I really fit in with my friends	Saya tidak yakin jika saya cocok dengan teman-teman saya
4	In the past, I have felt valued and important to others	
5	I describe myself as a misfit	Saya menggambarkan diri saya sebagai seorang yang canggung
6	It is important to me that I fit somewhere in this world	
*7	People accept me	Orang-orang menerima saya
8	I feel like piece of a jigsaw puzzle	Saya merasa seperti keping bagian dari teka-teki gambar
9	I have qualities that can be important to others	
10	I feel like what I offer is valued	Saya merasa seperti apa yang saya tawarkan dihargai
11	I feel like an outsider	Saya merasa seperti orang luar
12	I am working on fitting in better with those around me	
13	I have no place in this world	Saya tidak mempunyai tempat di dunia ini
14	I want to be a part of things going on around me	
15	I could disappear for days	Saya bisa menghilang selama berhari-hari

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*16	I am a part of mainstream society	Saya adalah bagian dari masyarakat umum
17	It is important to me that my thoughts and opinions are valued	
18	I tend to observe life rather than participate	Saya lebih cenderung untuk mengamati kehidupan dibanding berpartisipasi
19	If I died, few people would come to my funeral	Jika saya meninggal, tidak banyak orang yang akan datang ke pemakaman saya
20	I feel like a square peg in a round hole	Saya merasa sebagai pasak persegi yang mencoba masuk ke dalam lubang bundar
21	Generally, other people recognise my strengths and good points	
22	I really don't fit	Saya sama sekali tidak cocok dengan lingkungan sekitar saya
23	My background and experiences are different than most people's	Latar belakang dan pengalaman saya berbeda dengan sebagian besar orang-orang
24	I prefer to not see or call my friends	Saya lebih suka untuk tidak bertemu atau menghubungi teman-teman saya
25	I feel left out	Saya merasa tertinggal
26	I can make myself fit in anywhere	
27	I feel not valued or important	Saya merasa tidak dihargai atau tidak penting

Sense of meaning:
This concept refers to how much an individual feels that their life has meaning. It is operationalised as two subscales: presence and search for meaning. The presence of meaning subscale measures how much meaning an individual feels they have, while the search for meaning subscale measures how much an individual is looking for meaning.

The search for meaning subscales are items 2, 3, 7, 8 and 10. The presence of meaning subscales are items 1, 4, 5, 6 and 9. Items with a * are reversed scored.

Steger, M. F., Frazier, P., Oishi, S., & Kaler, M. (2006). The Meaning in Life Questionnaire Assessing the Presence of and Search for Meaning in Life. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, *53*(1), 80–93. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0167.53.1.80

1	I understand my life's meaning	
2	I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful	Saya mencari sesuatu yang membuat hidup saya lebih berarti
3	I am always looking to find my life's purpose	Saya selalu mencari tujuan dari hidup saya
4	My life has a clear sense of purpose	
5	I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful	
6	I have discovered a satisfying life purpose	
7	I am always searching for something that makes my life feel significant	Saya selalu mencari sesuatu yang membuat hidup saya terasa penting
8	I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life	Saya sedang mencari tujuan atau misi untuk hidup saya
*9	My life has no clear purpose	
10	I am searching for meaning in my life	Saya sedang mencari arti dalam hidup saya

Loneliness:
This concept refers to how much an individual feels that they are disconnected from the world. It is operationalised as one scale that measures how lonely an individual feels. Items with a * are reversed scored.

Hays, R. D., & DiMatteo, M. R. (1987). A short-form measure of loneliness. *Journal of Personality Assessment*. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa5101_6

2	I lack companionship	Saya kekurangan persahabatan
3	There is no one I can turn to	Tidak ada orang yang bisa saya andalkan
*9	I am an outgoing person	Saya adalah orang yang senang bersosialisasi
11	I feel left out	Saya merasa ditinggalkan
14	I feel isolated from others	Saya merasa terisolasi dari orang lain
*15	I can find companionship when I want it	Saya bisa mendapatkan persahabatan ketika saya menginginkannya
16	I am unhappy being so withdrawn	Saya tidak senang menjadi orang yang menyendiri
17	People are around me but not with me	Orang-orang berada di sekitar saya tapi tidak bersama saya

Death Anxiety / Your own death:
This concept looks at how an individual is anxious about certain aspects of death. It is operationalised as 4 different subscales: Your Own Death,

Your Own Dying, The Death of Others and The Dying of Others. The "Your own death" subscale measures how anxious an individual is at the prospect of their own death.

Lester, D., & Abadel-Khalek, A. (2003). The collett-lester fear of death scale: A CORRECTION. *Death Studies*, *27*(1), 81–85. http://doi.org/10.1080/07481180302873

	How disturbed or made anxious are you by the following aspects of death and dying? Read each item and answer it quickly. Don't spend too much time thinking about your response. We want your first impression of how you think right now. Circle the number that best represents your feeling	Seberapa terganggu atau cemas Anda ketika berpikir tentang aspek kematian yang tercantum di bawah? Mohon untuk membaca setiap aspek dan menjawab secepat-cepatnya. Jangan terlalu lama berpikir tentang jawaban Anda. Kami menginginkan kesan pertama tentang bagaimana Anda berpikir pada saat ini. Mohon pilih jawaban yang paling mewakili perasaan Anda
1	The total isolation of death	Isolasi total dalam kematian
2	The shortness of life	Betapa pendeknya hidup
3	Missing out on so much after you die	Ketinggalan banyak hal setelah saya meninggal
4	Dying young	Mati muda
5	How it will feel to be dead	Bagaimana rasanya mati
6	Never thinking or experiencing anything again	Tidak akan bisa berpikir atau merasakan apapun lagi
7	The disintegration of your body after you die	Hancurnya tubuh setelah kematian

Religious Orientations (Short):

1	My whole approach to life is based upon my religion	Cara saya menjalankan hidup saya seluruhnya didasari oleh agama saya
2	What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow	Bagi saya, hal terutama yang ditawarkan oleh Agama adalah kenyamanan dalam menghadapi kesulitan dan kesedihan
3	I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there	Saya pergi ke Masjid terutama karena saya senang bertemu dengan orang-orang yang saya kenal

MCES

Ghorbani, N., Watson, P. J., Zarehi, J., & Shamohammadi, K. (2010). Muslim extrinsic cultural religious orientation and identity: Relationships with social and personal adjustment in Iran. *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, *31*(1), 15–28.

0	Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses	Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda
6	My commitment to religion is based on the belief that religion is necessary if a society is to be moral	Komitmen saya kepada agama didasari oleh kepercayaan bahwa agama sangatlah penting untuk memastikan masyarakat yang bermoral
M7	I am religious because religion is so important in preventing crime and other social disorders, and I want to contribute in this effort	Saya adalah orang yang religius karena agama sangatlah penting dalam mencegah kejahatan dan kekacauan sosial lainnya, dan saya ingin berkontribusi dalam upaya ini
10	In order to prevent and control criminal behaviour, society must support religion	Untuk mencegah dan mengendalikan perilaku kriminal, masyarakat harus menyokong agama
14	I follow the teachings of my religion as a way to help solve social problems	Saya mengikuti ajaran agama saya sebagai cara untuk membantu memecahkan masalah sosial
M18	Most of the problems of society result from the failure of people to be religious	Sebagian besar masalah yang dihadapi masyarakat berasal dari kegagalan orang-orang untuk menjadi manusia yang religius
19	From my point of view, religion is a gift from God to humanity that is designed to make the world a better place in which to live	Dari sudut pandang saya, agama adalah sebuah karunia dari Allah kepada manusia yang bertujuan untuk membuat dunia ini menjadi tempat yang lebih baik untuk dihuni
M20	My life is grounded in religion because without religion society becomes inhumane	Hidup saya berdasarkan kepada agama, karena tanpa agama masyarakat akan menjadi tidak berperikemanusiaan
21	If I were not religious, I would contribute to cultural processes that would weaken my society	Jika saya tidak religius, artinya saya berkontribusi kepada proses kultural yang akan melemahkan masyarakat
22	My religious activities are motivated by a belief that religion helps prevent injustice in the world	Aktifitas agama saya termotivasi oleh kepercayaan bahwa agama membantu mencegah terjadinya ketidakadilan di dunia ini

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25	The true purpose of my religion is to help create a more just world	Tujuan sebenarnya dari agama saya adalah untuk membuat dunia yang lebih adil
28	Underlying my faith is the belief that religion is essential to the moral development of the society	Dasar kepercayaan saya pada agama adalah keyakinan bahwa agama memiliki peran penting dalam perkembangan moral masyarakat
29	If the people fail to be religious, a society cannot survive, and this largely explains why I am religious	Jika orang-orang tidak religius, maka masyarakat tidak akan bisa bertahan, dan karena inilah saya religius
30	A lack of religion produces many difficulties within a society, and this is an important reason why I am religious	Ketiadaan agama akan menyebabkan aneka ragam kesulitan dalam masyarakat, dan karena inilah saya religius
M31	I am religious because I know that the loss of religious life leads to the decline of civilisation	Saya adalah orang yang religius karena hilangnya kehidupan beragama akan mengakibatkan merosotnya peradaban

MER

0	Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses	Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda
1	Experiences of submitting to God cause me to feel more vital and motivated	Perasaan tunduk kepada Allah SWT membuat saya merasa lebih vital dan termotivasi
2	Sometimes, submission to God simultaneously creates within me a fear and a love of God	Terkadang, tunduk kepada Allah SWT memberi saya perasaan takut dan sekaligus cinta kepada Allah SWT
3	Submission to God has caused me to experience greatness and humility at the same time	Tunduk kepada Allah SWT membuat saya merasakan kemegahan dan sekaligus kerendahan hati
4	What guides me to cope properly with life difficulties has been submission to God's will	Yang membimbing saya dalam menghadapi tantangan hidup secara baik adalah kepasrahan kepada kehendak Allah SWT
5	I have understood how my passion to be closer to God has internally liberated me in contrast to the enslavement produced by the other passions in my life	Saya telah mengerti bagaimana semangat saya untuk mendekatkan diri kepada Allah SWT telah membebaskan saya, berbeda dengan keinginan duniawi yang justru memperbudak saya

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6	When I look deeply within myself, I understand that the experience of loving God is worth any effort in my life	Jika saya melihat secara mendalam pada diri saya, saya mengerti bahwa merasakan rasa cinta kepada Allah sesungguhnya setimpal dengan upaya apapun di dalam hidup saya
7	My experience of God's presence in my life is important to experience love towards him	Merasakan kehadiran Allah SWT dalam hidup saya adalah bagian yang penting untuk merasakan rasa cinta kepada-Nya
8	For me, the core of religious practices and ceremonies is that they help me achieve a close relationship with God	Bagi saya, inti dari praktik-praktik keagamaan adalah bagaimana mereka membantu saya untuk mencapai hubungan yang dekat dengan Allah SWT
9	The experience of loving God produces a special enthusiasm within me	Merasakan kasih cinta kepada Allah SWT memberi saya perasaan antusiasme yang spesial
10	Intimate closeness to God is at the core of my efforts to be religious	Kedekatan yang mendalam dengan Allah SWT adalah bagian yang inti dalam usaha saya untuk menjadi orang yang religius
11	Submitting to God gives me important insight into my inability in comparison to the greatness of God	Tunduk kepada Allah SWT memberi saya pengertian yang penting terhadap ketidakmampuan saya dibandingan dengan kebesaran-Nya
12	Submitting to God is a lovely experience for me because I experience my finite nature in comparison to the greatness of God	Tunduk kepada Allah SWT adalah pengalaman yang indah bagi saya karena saya meraskan keterbatasan saya dibandingkan dengan kebesaran Allah SWT
13	What has given me peace in all of my life difficulties is being in submission to God's will	Yang memberi saya ketenangan dalam menghadapi tantangan hidup saya adalah kepasrahan kepada kehendak Allah SWT
14	In my view, religious practices are a means for orienting my submission towards the infinity of God	Dalam pandangan saya, praktik-praktik keagamaan adalah cara untuk mengarahkan pengabdian saya terhadap kemahaan Allah SWT
15	Experiencing submission and closeness to God enhances my understanding of God	Mengalami rasa tunduk dan kedekatan dengan Allah SWT menambah pengertian saya terhadap-Nya

Internal Political Efficacy:
Craig, S. C., Niemi, R. G., & Silver, G. E. (1990). Political efficacy and trust: A report on the NES pilot study items. *Political Behavior*, *12*(3), 289–314.

0	Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses	Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda
1	I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics. (SELFQUAL; agree)	Saya memandang diri saya sebagai seseorang yang mampu untuk berpartisipasi dalam kegiatan politik
2	I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country. (UNDRSTND; agree)	Saya merasa diri saya mempunyai pemahaman yang cukup bagus mengenai isu-isu politik yang menghadapi Indonesia
*3	Other people seem to have an easier time understanding complicated issues than I do. (OTHERS; disagree)	Orang lain sepertinya lebih mudah memahami isu-isu kompleks dibanding dengan saya
4	I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people. (PUBOFF; agree)	Saya merasa saya sama mampunya dengan orang lain pada umumnya jika bekerja sebagai seorang pejabat
*5	I often don't feel sure of myself when talking with other people about politics and government. (NOTSURE; disagree)	Saya sering merasa kurang percaya diri ketika membahas isu-isu politik dan pemerintahan dengan orang lain
6	I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people. (INFORMED; agree)	Saya rasa pengetahuan saya tentang isu politik dan kepemerintahan cukup baik dan sebanding dengan orang lain pada umumnya
*7	Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's gong on. (COMPLEX; disagree)	Kadang-kadang isu politik dan pemerintahan tampak sangat rumit hingga orang seperti saya tidak dapat mengerti apa yang sedang terjadi

Regime-based external political efficacy:
Craig, S. C., Niemi, R. G., & Silver, G. E. (1990). Political efficacy and trust: A report on the NES pilot study items. *Political Behavior*, *12*(3), 289–314.

0	Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses	Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda

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8	There are many legal ways for citizens to successfully influence what the government does. (LEGAL; agree)	Banyak sekali cara yang sah secara hukum bagi masyarakat untuk mempengaruhi apa yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah
*9	In this country, a few people have all the political power and the rest of us are not given any say about how the government runs things. (FEWPOWER; disagree)	Di negara ini, hanya sekumpulan kecil orang-orang yang memiliki kekuatan politik, sementara yang lainnya seperti kami tidak mempunyai suara atas bagaimana pemerintah bertindak
10	Voting is an effective way for people to have a say about what the government does. (VOTESAY; agree)	Pemilu adalah cara yang efektif bagi masyarakat untuk mempengaruhi tindakan pemerintah
11	Under our form of government, the people have the final say about how the country is run, no matter who is in office. (FINALSAY; agree)	Dalam sistem pemerintahan kami, masyarakatlah yang memutuskan bagaimana cara menjalankan negara ini, tanpa memperdulikan siapa yang menjadi presiden
*12	If public officials are not interested in hearing what the people think, there is really no way to make them listen. (MAKELSTN; disagree)	Jika para pejabat memang tidak memperdulikan opini masyarakat, maka tidak ada apa pun yang dapat dilakukan untuk membuat mereka mendengar suara kami
*13	People like me don't have any say about what the government does. (NOSAY; disagree)	Orang seperti saya tidak memiliki suara dalam apa yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah

Regime-based trust:
Craig, S. C., Niemi, R. G., & Silver, G. E. (1990). Political efficacy and trust: A report on the NES pilot study items. *Political Behavior*, *12*(3), 289–314.

0	Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses	Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda
19	Whatever its faults may be, the American form of government is still the best for us. (BESTGOVT; agree)	Apapun kekurangannya, sistem pemerintahan Indonesia adalah yang terbaik bagi Indonesia
*20	There is not much about our form of government to be proud of. (PROUDGOV; disagree)	Tidak banyak dari sistem pemerintahan kami yang dapat dibanggakan

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*21	It may be necessary to make some major changes in our form of government in order to solve the problems facing our country. (CHNGGOVT; disagree)	Mungkin perubahan drastis perlu diterapkan dalam sistem pemerintahan kami untuk memecahkan masalah yang dihadapi negara kami
22	I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of. (LIVEHERE; agree)	Saya lebih memilih untuk hidup di bawah sistem pemerintahan kami dibanding sistem-sistem lain

Alienation:
This concept refers to a sense of general alienation according to the meaningfulness of daily roles and a perception of interpersonal isolation from others around them. It is operationalised as one scale. Items with a * are reversed scored.

Jessor, R., & Jessor, S. (1977). *Problem behavior and psychosocial development*. New York: Academic Press.

1	I sometimes feel that the people I know are not too friendly	*Saya kadang-kadang merasa orang-orang yang saya kenal tidak terlalu ramah dengan saya*
2*	Most of what I do during my day seems worthwhile and meaningful to me	*Saya merasa sebagian besar dari aktifitas sehari-hari saya berharga dan bermakna untuk saya*
3	I sometimes feel uncertain about who I really am	*Kadang-kadang saya merasa ragu dan bimbang dengan identitas diri saya*
4	I feel that my family is not as close to me as I would like	*Keluarga saya tidak seakrab dengan saya seperti yang saya inginkan*
5*	When the people I know are having problems, it's my responsibility to try to help	*Ketika orang yang saya kenal sedang menghadapi masalah, adalah kewajiban saya untuk mencoba menolong*
6	I often wonder whether I'm becoming the kind of person I want to be	*Saya sering bertanya-tanya apakah saya akan menjadi figur orang yang saya inginkan*
7	It's hard to know how to act most of the time since you can't tell what others expect	*Saya kesulitan untuk tahu bagaimana cara berperilaku yang tepat, karena tidak mudah untuk mengetahui ekspektasi orang-orang di sekitar saya*
8	I often feel left out of things that others are doing	*Saya sering kali merasa ditinggalkan dalam kegiatan orang-orang di sekitar saya*

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9	Nowadays you can't really count on other people when you have problems or need help	*Pada masa sekarang ini, kita tidak bisa terlalu mengandalkan pertolongan orang lain ketika kita sedang menghadapi masalah*
10	Most people don't seem to accept me when I'm just being myself	*Sebagian besar orang sepertinya tidak menerima saya apa adanya*
11	I often find it difficult to feel involved in the things I am doing	*Saya sering merasa kesulitan untuk menimbulkan semangat dalam menjalani aktifitas-aktifitas saya*
12	Hardly anyone I know is interested in how I really feel inside	*Tidak banyak orang yang peduli terhadap perasaan saya yang sebenarnya*
13	I often feel alone when I am with other people	*Saya sering merasa kesepian dan sendiri ketika saya sedang berkumpul dengan orang lain*
14	If I really had my choice, I'd live my life in a very different way than I do	*Jika saya punya pilihan, saya akan menjalani hidup saya dengan cara yang berbeda dengan sekarang*

Self-esteem:

1	I feel confident about my abilities	Saya merasa percaya diri dengan kemampuan saya
2	I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure	Saya khawatir apakah orang lain menganggap saya sebagai orang yang sukses atau orang yang gagal
3	I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance	Saya merasa frustrasi dengan kinerja saya
4	I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read	Saya merasa mengalami kesulitan dalam memahami hal-hal yang saya baca
5	I feel self-conscious	Saya merasa saya adalah orang yang sadar akan dirinya
6	I feel as smart as others	Saya merasa saya sepintar orang lain
7	I feel displeased with myself	Saya merasa tidak puas dengan diri saya sendiri
8	I am worried about what other people think of me	Saya merasa khawatir dengan apa yang orang pikir tentang diri saya
9	I feel confident that I understand things	Saya merasa saya memiliki pemahaman yang bagus terhadap hal-hal pada umumnya
10	I feel inferior to others at this moment	Pada saat ini saya merasa rendah diri terhadap orang lain
11	I feel concerned about the impression I am making	Saya merasa khawatir dengan kesan yang saya berikan

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12	I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others	Pada saat ini saya merasa kemampuan skolastik saya lebih rendah dibanding kemampuan orang lain
13	I feel like I'm not doing well	Saya merasa tidak berhasil
14	I am worried about looking foolish	Saya khawatir saya terlihat konyol

In-Group Identity:

1	I feel a bond with the ____ people	Saya merasakan ikatan dengan sesame orang ____
2	I feel a solidarity with ____ people	Saya merasakan solidaritas dengan sesama orang ____
3	I feel committed to the ____ people	Saya merasa berkomitmen terhadap sesama orang ____
4	I am glad to be ____	Saya senang menjadi seseorang ____
5	I think that ____ s have a lot to be proud of	Menurut saya orang ____ memiliki banyak hal yang bisa dibanggakan
6	It is pleasant to be ____	Menurut saya menyenangkan untuk menjadi orang ____
7	Being ____ gives me a good feeling	Menjadi orang ____ memberikan saya perasaan yang baik
8	I often think about the fact that I am ____	Saya sering berpikir tentang fakta bahwa saya adalah orang ____
9	The fact that I am ____ is an important part of my identity	Fakta bahwa saya adalah orang ____ adalah bagian yang penting dari identitas saya
10	Being ____ is an important part of how I see myself	Menjadi orang ____ merupakan bagian penting dari bagaimana saya menilai diri saya
11	I have a lot in common with the average ____	Saya memiliki banyak kesamaan dengan orang _____ yang lainnya
12	I am similar to the average ____ person	Saya mirip dengan orang _____ yang lainnya
13	____ people have a lot in common with each other	Orang ____ mempunyai banyak kesamaan dengan orang ____ yang lainnya
14	____ people are very similar to each other	Orang ____ sangatlah mirip dengan orang ____ yang lainnya

Social Dominance Orientation:

Pratto, F., Çidam, A., Stewart, A. L., Zeineddine, F. B., Aranda, M., Aiello, A., … Henkel, K. E. (2013). Social dominance in context and in

individuals: Contextual moderation of robust effects of social dominance orientation in 15 languages and 20 countries. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *4*(5), 587–599. http://doi.org/10.1177/1948550612473663

1	In setting priorities, we must consider all groups	Dalam menetapkan prioritas, kita harus mempertimbangkan semua kelompok
2	We do not need to insist on equality among these groups	Kita tidak perlu memaksakan adanya kesetaraan diantara kelompok-kelompok tersebut
3	Group equality is something that is ideal for us	Kesetaraan kelompok adalah sesuatu yang ideal buat kita
4	The superior group deserves to dominate the lower group	Kelompok yang unggul sudah sepantasnya mendominasi kelompok yang lebih rendah

Religiosity:
Purnomo, F. H., & Suryadi, B. (2017). Uji Validitas Konstruk Pada Instrumen Religiusitas Dengan Metode Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). *JP3I*.

1	I know my religious teachings	Saya mengetahui ajaran agama Saya
2	I understand my religious teachings	Saya memahami ajaran agama Saya
3	I think about problems / issues regarding religion	Saya memikirkan permasalahan/isu mengenai agama
4	I am interested in delving deeper into the topic of religion	Saya tertarik mempelajari lebih dalam topik agama
5	I follow information on religious issues through radio, television, internet, newspapers and books	Saya mengikuti informasi permasalahan agama melalui radio, televisi, internet, koran, maupun buku
6	I seek answers to religious issues through radio, television, internet, newspapers or books	Saya mencari tahu jawaban mengenai permasalahan agama melalui radio, televisi, internet, koran atau buku
7	I am not interested in discussing religious issues / issues	Saya kurang tertarik membicarakan masalah/isu agama
8	I believe that God exists	Saya percaya bahwa Tuhan itu ada
9	I believe in a great power	Saya percaya adanya kekuatan yang Maha Besar
10	I believe that all creatures are God's creation	Saya percaya bahwa makhluk adalah ciptaan Tuhan
11	I believe in life after death, such as the day of resurrection or reincarnation	Saya percaya adanya kehidupan setelah kematian, seperti hari kebangkitan ataupun reinkarnasi

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12	I am not sure that my religious teachings are correct	Saya tidak yakin bahwa ajaran agama Saya adalah benar
13	I believe that there is a Messenger of God	Saya percaya bahwa adanya Utusan Tuhan
14	I believe in the scriptures of my religion	Saya percaya dengan kitab suci agama Saya
15	I believe in the truth of my religion	Saya yakin dengan kebenaran agama Saya
16	I believe that my religious teachings are true	Saya yakin bahwa ajaran agama Saya adalah benar
17	I worship in places of worship, such as mosques, churches, temples and monasteries	Saya melakukan ibadah di tempat ibadah, seperti masjid, gereja, pura, vihara, dsb
18	I attend religious events	Saya menghadiri acara-acara keagamaan
19	I follow a religious community	Saya mengikuti komunitas keagamaan
20	It is important for me to attend religious events in places of worship, such as mosques, churches, temples and monasteries	Penting bagi Saya untuk mengikuti acara keagamaan di tempat ibadah, seperti masjid, gereja, pura, vihara
21	It is important for me to join a religious community	Penting bagi Saya untuk mengikuti komunitas keagamaan
22	I worship God when I am alone	Saya melakukan ibadah individual/dikerjakan sendirian
23	I pray to God	Saya berdo'a kepada Tuhan
24	I pray spontaneously at times when I experience something that moves me	Saya berdo'a secara tiba-tiba ketika mengalami kejadian yang membuat Saya tersentuh
25	I try to get close to God	Saya mencoba untuk dekat dengan Tuhan
26	It is important for me to worship God when I am alone	Penting bagi Saya untuk melakukan ibadah yang bersifat individual atau yang dikerjakan sendirian
27	It is important to me to pray to God	Penting bagi Saya untuk berdo'a kepada Tuhan
28	I find it futile to participate in religious events in places of worship, such as mosques, churches, temples and monasteries	Saya merasa sia-sia untuk mengikuti acara keagamaan di tempat ibadah, seperti masjid, gereja, pura, vihara
29	I feel God controls life and events	Saya merasa ada campur tangan Tuhan dalam kehidupan
30	I have experienced situations where God seemed to show me the way or to reveal something to me	Saya mengalami keadaan dimana Tuhan seperti menunjukkan jalan atau mengungkap sesuatu pada Saya

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31	I have experienced circumstances that made me feel God was real	Saya mengalami keadaan yang membuat Saya merasa Tuhan itu nyata
32	I have experienced circumstances that made me feel at one with everything	Saya mengalami keadaan yang membuat Saya merasa menyatu dengan segalanya
33	I experience situations where I felt touched by God's power	Saya mengalami keadaan dimana Saya merasa tersentuh karena kuasa Tuhan

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This book provides an overview of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) to assist readers in developing a more complete understanding of P/CVE and the issues of radicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation. It shines a light on some key P/CVE programmes and initiatives in Indonesia and is written to facilitate understanding preventing and countering violent extremism in a larger frame. It is intended to be of interest to civil society activists, security practitioners, communities, policy makers and researchers alike. It represents a collaboration, born out of partnership in the field, that brings together academic researchers and civil society activists from Indonesia and Australia. Around the world, far too little is known about Indonesian society in general and Indonesian Islam and civil society in particular. This is, in large measure, because of the barrier of language. This book represents a small, but hopefully significant, contribution to opening a window to Indonesia. The focus of this book is on the challenging issues entailed with violent and hateful extremism. The initiatives it portrays and the people it describes, and whose voices it channels, are filled with the hope of transforming the world to make it better.

Greg Barton is a research professor in Global Islamic Politics in the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), Deakin University, researching Islam and civil society, democratisation and countering violent extremism. The central axis of his research interests is the way in which religious thought, individual believers and religious communities respond to modernity and to the modern nation-state.

Matteo Vergani is a researcher in ADI and a senior lecturer in sociology at Deakin University, Australia. His primary research interests are political and bias violence, its causes, its impact on society and the study of what could prevent it. He is the founder of the online platform *Tackling Hate*, which provides free training modules for practitioners working on tackling various forms of hate and extremism.

Yenny Wahid is the second daughter of H.E. Abdurrahman Wahid and established the Wahid Foundation to carry on his work in building tolerance and understanding. She was a former journalist for the Australian newspapers, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age and a member of the special staff for political communication working in the office of President Yudhoyono.

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